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Confidentiality
Section 5 some associated apperidicies and Section 6,
in the original version of this thesis passed by examiners
in January 1986, contained some confidential information.
In this public version, this confidential information is
omitted and the symbol <> is used to indicate wherever this
occurs.	 The effect is fairl y small and does little to
damage the integrity or the flow of the original text.
It must be stressed that, although my field research
has involved many companies referred to, the views expessed
are my own. My interpretation of events will not always be
the same as those of every company participating in the
study.
	
Finally, the field research discussed in detail in
Section 5 was completed in 1983. This section attempts to
examine events only up to that time. Desk research covering
more recent events has allowed for some subsequent updating,
but the situation of many companies visited and discussed in
Section 5 will now have changed.
Summar.'
This dissertation presents the results of usin g a
multidisciplinary "business policy" approach to examine the
competitive situation of UK vehicle component manufacturers.
With the cooperation of the companies involved in six
product sectors, detailed studies have been made comparing
the strate gies and performances of UK com petitors over
several years, as well as those of selected competitors in
Japan, Germany and the USA.
The UK vehicle component industry has undergone an
unprecedented decline in performance.
The causes of this decline are many. External factors
outside the control of the companies concerned include the
declining competitiveness of UK based vehicle manufacturers
and the exceptionally unfavourable UK business environment
including the pressure on real wages.
But the decline in competitiveness of UK vehicle
component manufacturers is not solely due to these factors
outside their own control. Just as important is the lack of
Btrategic management capability at the top management level
of the companies themselves. Before the recession many of
the companies failed to see the changes that were occurring
in the pattern of competition and that their competitive
position was sli pp ing . Few recognised that competition was
becoming more European or even more global. Even fewer were
able to effectively analyse the situation, select a viable
long term strategy and pursue it with commitment. Such a
strategy required a choice of the part of the market in
which to compete as well as how to compete particularly as
far as longer term production strategy (productivity,
quality , flexible manufacturin g systems etc) was concerned.
The recession only added to this problem and obscured
the underlying cause. Many companies were forced to
retrench but still have not recognised the longer term
strategic issues which must be addressed if the long term
decline is to be reversed.
1. Introduction
The roots of this study date back twelve years, to a
decision on completion of my final economics examinations at
Cambridge to continue my professional trainin g as an
engineer and to return to industry. Having worked in
industry, studying economics kindled an interest in the
issue of why British industry seemed to be failing to
compete, and more importantly in what could be done about
it. Yet once kindled this interest was scarcely quenched by
studying economics.
Indeed the sheer generality of many theoretical
approaches often seemed to preclude sufficient attention to
many specific issues arising out of the unique contextual
circumstances of British production. There were of course
many instances of more practical approaches, such as my
tutor C F Pratten's work in the field of international
productivity comparisons, but somehow what was regarded as
mainstream economics appeared to have sidestepped the issue
of industrial competitiveness, an issue seemingly so central
to Britain's needs:	 it was as if some impasse had been
reached.
Whilst continuing to develop my academic Interests, I
therefore determined to make use of my early trainin g by
returning to industry as an engineer so as to see the
problem from a participant's viewpoint. My early training,
much of it supervised by Cambridge, involved visiting or
working with about one hundred factories throughout the UK
and elsewhere in Europe and permitted a broad perspective.
For the next five years I continued to work with c3KN.
	
For
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about half this time I was a development engineer on
"product and process development" in the area of forgings
(one of the cases discussed in this thesis); for the other
half as a project engineer on international projects,
including GKN's project to establish, in liaison with German
operations, manufacturing facilities for constant velocity
joints in the USA. 	 Only then, when I had attained
qualifications as a Chartered Mechanical En gineer, in
management studies, and in ICMA professional accountancy
examinations, did I feel properly equipped to begin this
study, a study of Britain's competitiveness, focused onto an
important sector where my past experience can be of most
use.
Although focused, as any doctoral thesis must be, this
is not however yet another narrow study, of interest only to
those closely concerned. The sector chosen is quite
deliberately complex and large enou gh to be economically
significant in itself;
	
whilst yet bein g amenable to an
examination	 of the s pecific competitor companies	 and
countries. The case approach adopted is envisaged as
providing a bridge between those studies of Britain's
competitiveness which because of their generality are
necessarily over-aggregated, and many case studies which
tend to be too narrow to link back to any more general
picture.
Research findin gs are bound to be influenced by the
disci plinary approach of the researcher. Thus it is natural
for an economist looking at the problem of the UK's
declining	industrial competitiveness to seek in 	 this
phenomenon lessons for economic policy .	 Similarly
	
a
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- marketing expert will seek lessons in terms of how British
firms can improve their approaches to marketin g .	 Indeed in
reviewing contributions to this issue it is clear that every
discipline (including those with engineering backgrounds
such as my own) sees the issue primarily as one of its
subject	 area.	 Methodologically
	
such	 stances	 are
particularly attractive, since in taking a single discipline
approach it is possible to establish more rigorous tests of
hypotheses.	 Yet from a policy perspective competitiveness
is a multidimensional issue and a balanced multidisciplinary
approach Is essential, though this in practice precludes
more quantitative methods.
The difference in perspective offered by this approach
ma' be illustrated by a military analogy.
	
Modern business
competition is. in fact, very much like warfare. Doubtless,
whether winnin g or losing, staff despatched to the front
line would see highlighted lessons for particular fu- tions.
It would be possible to write treatises on how logistics for
example could be improved, of general interest to anyone
interested in that sub j ect.	 However a policy perspective
attempts to take a commander's broad view point.	 First, he
wants some feel (through a balanced report with some
quantitative back-up where appropriate) as to how the war is
going .	 Are we winning or losing? How serious is the
situation?	 Even establishing this may be no mean task.
More importantly however, what are the key problems and
therefore key requirements if the situation is to be
improved? This is the perspective attempted here. Of
course the commander may also wish to draw on those more
3
specialist staff functions which seem likely to be of
critical	 significance,	 but that entails a	 different
perspective.
Unlike war though,	 decisions affecting	 business
competitiveness are not made by any single commander but
reflect decisions and choices made by many parties. The
competitive situation of the automotive components sector is
affected by choices made by the wider community (including
government) which can considerably affect the climate for
business, decisions by UK vehicle assemblers, and decisions
within the component companies themselves from top level
"strategic decisions" right through to choices adopted on
the shop floor by employees and labour unions. After
studying the situation I have come to the view that each of
these parties, in isolation, is quite helpless to deal with
what appears to be a dangerous erosion of the country's
competitiveness in this sector.
	 Accordingly, this study
simply attempts to describe the actual situation 	 and
underlying issues as accurately as possible.	 The target
audience therefore is all these parties involved; it is
hoped to contribute both to debate and ultimatel y to
securing a more united response, without which it seems
likely the UK will continue to decline.
Finally It has been most encouraging that the ESRC
sponsored workshop involving many industrial participants,
"SSRC Initiative on the Competitiveness and Regeneration of
British Industry" (Russell Hotel, London, 17.10.83), appears
to have endorsed many of the specifications drawn up for
this research.	 This called for research focusing on
business	 sectors exposed to international competition,
4
focused onto specific companies and specific competitor
countries in particular Germany, Japan and the USA, and
finally onto issues of particular concern to management.
The emphasis in the business policy approach adopted is on
how effective thinking on issues relatin g to business
strategy can be improved.
Not•s and Abbz'•viationi
OE(M): original equipment (manufacturer(s))
AM:	 aftermarket
The main focus in this study has been on the OE
situation, but a fairly broad perspective has been adopted
recognising that OE and aftermarkets are highly
interrelated. Similarly the term "vehicle" generally refers
to cars, but su ppliers were also encouraged to discuss the
commercial vehicle situation where appropriate, and many
anyway did not distinguish the two activities.
In zlust a few cases, company names have been disguised.
Thus UKF1 refers to a UK for ging company, JF1, USF1 and GF1
to Japanese, US and German forging companies respectively.
Subsequent numbers, as in UKF2 for example, denote further
forging companies of the same nationality. UKSi. similarly
refers to a UK silencer company, but there are no other
products for which this has been necessary.
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2.	 .vi.w .f	 Liter'&tur
2.1 Evidence of competitive decline
2.11 The histor'ical situation
The issue of British competitiveness today is deeply
rooted historicall y .	 By the middle of the nineteenth
century, Britain's ma j or business sectors were the most
internationally competitive the world has ever known: "over
0% of the entire world output of traded manufactured goods
[were] produced within the country" (Mathias, 1969). Even
this figure grossly understates Britain's domination of
higher value-added business sectors at that time. 	 85% of
visible exports were in the form of finished goods, whereas
92% (by volume) of imports represented raw materials.
Britain was producing approximately two thirds of the
world's coal, half its iron, five sevenths of its steel, two
thirds of its hardware and about half of commercial cotton
cloth (Kennedy, 1981, p20).
The history of Britain's subsequent decline is well
documented. As the rest of the world began to develop, such
a lead was of course to prove unsustainable.	 As industrial
development	 took off elsewhere,	 Britain's growth
	 in
industrial production slowed - from L% p.a. during 1820 -
180, to 3% p.a. during 181&0 - 1870 and j ust over 1.5% p.a.
during 1875 - 189 L1, far less than its chief rivals. In the
newer more important industries, such as steel, chemicals,
machine tools and electrical goods, Britain quite rapidly
lost what early lead it possessed. 	 Also it was pushed back
out of European and North American markets as other
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governments, with less vested interest (at that time) in
free trade, developed their emer ging industries behind
protective tariff barriers.
German steel output, only half that of Britain in 1870,
was twice its size by 1910. However, alarm over the
competitive situation felt in this and many other industrial
sectors was to have little im pact on those formulating
policy.	 Other business sectors, many closer to government,
held opposite interests.	 Businesses in the service sector,
particularly those in the City but also industries such as
shipping and shipbuilding, held opposite interests because
of their involvement in the expanding activities of overseas
rivals. Kennedy (1981, p25) also argues that those involved
in policy formulation "did not usually concern themselves in
any intimate way with economic trends, and frequently
manifested an aristocratic scorn for business men".
Indeed, as even countries well behind have since
outpaced	 Britain.	 no	 adequate response to	 overseas
competition appears to have been forthcoming at any point in
Britain's subsequent histor y . Barclays Review (1983) neatly
summarises the decline in Britain's trade performance from
1900 to the present day. 'Not only has Britain's share of
world trade fallen, but import penetration has accelerated
in recent years to the point where, for the first time this
century, Britain is now runnin g a deficit on trade in
manufactured goods.
2.12 Britain'a poat-Wax' international trade aituation
Britain is hi ghly dependent on international trade,
most of this being trade in manufactured g000ds. 	 With the
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rise of North Sea Oil, manufactured goods have fallen only
sli ghtly as a percentage of all exports, from 80% in 1955 to
75% in 1980. As a percentage of all imports, manufactured
goods have risen sharply over the same period, from 23% to
61%.
Like other advanced countries', Britain's dependence on
international trade has been growing . A number of writers
have argued that the trade position in the important
manufacturing	sector has been allowed to	 deteriorate
alarmingly, in that risin g import penetration has rapidly
outstripped the growth in exports, as shown in Table 1.
Table_i Trade in manufactured goods 1955 - 1980
1955 1965 197Q 1975 1980
Imports/home demand %	 8	 ii 15	 22	 30
Exports/mfrs' sales %
	 19	 18	 21	 27	 32
Source: Williams, Williams and Thomas (1983, pp138-9)
A number of forces of course influence an economy's
overall trade balance, and will an yway tend to keep the
total position in e quilibrium in the long run. However,
since the trade balance has been a problem constraining the
economy in the past, such trends if allowed to continue
could pose serious problems in the future, particularly
after North Sea Oil ceases to make such a positive impact.
More significant is their evidence of a decline in
Britain's share of world exports of manufactures, in
comparison to performances of other advanced competitor
countries, as shown in Table 2. This point is less subject
to qualification from international trade arguments.
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Table_2 Division of world manufacturin g exports 1955 - 1980
% by country
	
1955	 1965	 1970	 1975	 1980
UK	 20	 11&	 11	 9	 10
Germany	 15	 19	 20	 20	 20
France	 9	 9	 9	 10	 10
Italy
	 3	 7	 7	 7	 8
USA	 2t	 20	 18	 18	 17
Japan	 5	 9	 12	 11	 15
Source: Williams, Williams and Thomas (1983, ppll6-7)
UK manufacturing has been losing ground to other major
competitor	 countries,	 particularly Japan and mainland
Europe. After 1970 Japan continued to move ahead, but these
fi gures suggest the situation otherwise began to stabilise.
Britain, inevitabl y , fell back somewhat from its very strong
position in the aftermath of the War and this factor may
explain the decline also in the US position. Yet the extent
to which decline persisted is disturbing, and the reversal
of the UK and West German positions suggests the problem was
not merely one of an inability to sustain an unrealisticalW
hi gh share.
Concern over the Issue of Britain's "deindustrial-
isation" has given rise to many recent contributions, for
example Blackaby (1979).	 Although some have argued that
manufacturing decline may be mitigated by the rise in
services, Brown and Sheriff's paper showed that decline
taking place in the main manufacturing business sectors did
not merely reflect a switch to services, since as Table 3
indicates services have also displayed some decline in
competitiveness, if slightly less sharp.
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Table_3 Britain's share of trade in other sectors
	
1955	 1960	 1965	 1970	 1975
Manufactured goods 	 20%	 16%	 1L%	 11%	 9%
Invisibles	 25%	 21%	 18%	 16%	 13%
Private services 	 26%	 22%	 17%	 17%	 16%
Source: Brown and Sheriff (in Blackaby, 1979)
Along with Singh (1977), Brown and Sheriff also argue that
the UK economy is heavily dependent on manufacturing, since
the net balance of payments contribution from services is
relatively small.
2.13 Comparative out put performance
I consider output levels and long term sustained growth
in	 output	 as significant indicators 	 of	 competitive
performance.	 From a general economic point of view
Britain's level of output per capita has been lower than
many rival countries, es pecially the USA as is shown in
Table IL
Table IL Per capita GDP ($)
Countri	 1967	 1978
West Germany
	
2,030
	
10,3LW
United States	 Lj,oLl.0	 9,588
France	 2,190
	
8,760
Japan	 1,150
	
8,386
All OECD countries	 2,290
	
7.683
United Kingdom	 1,980	 5,11.96
Exchange rate conversions - average rates for year given.
Source: Caves and Krause (1980)
Table 5 shows Britain's economic growth has been
consistently lower than com petitor countries, apart from the
USA.
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Table_5 Average annual growth rates of GDP (%)
Country	1957-67 1967-78	 1967-73 1973-78
U.K.	 3.1	 2.3	 3.11	 1.1
U.S.A.	 11.1	 3.0	 3.5	 2.11.
Japan	 10.4	 7.2	 10.2	 3.7
France	 5.6	 11.11.	 5.6	 2.9
West Germany
	
5.5	 3.8	 5.3	 2.0
OECD	 11.8	 3.8	 11.8	 2.5
Source: Caves and Krause (1980)
In consequence, Britain's share in world output has
been gradually falling, but the decline of its share in
manufacturing output has been particularly serious as
indicated in Table 6.
Table 6 Britain's share of output 1960 - 1975
1960	 1966	 1972	 1975
UK share of world GDP	 8.2%	 7.6%	 6.11%	 6.11%
Share of OECD mfr output	 9.6%	 7.3%	 5.9%	 5.8%
Source: Brown and Sheriff (1978)
In recent years, as Table 7 demonstrates, Britain's
manufacturing output has fallen even further behind.
Table_7 Manufacturing output growth 1970 - 1981
	
1970	 1973	 1975	 1979
	 1981
U.S.A.	 100	 122	 109	 1411	 142
Japan	 100	 128	 109	 1115	 160
EEC (exe UK)
	
100	 115	 108	 128	 125
of which:
W. Germany
	
100	 113
	
103	 122	 119
France	 100	 122	 1111.	 136
	
125
Italy
	
100	 114	 107
	
131	 136
UK	 100	 111	 102	 106
	
91
Source: Begg and Rhodes (1982)
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2I..4	 pofitabii.itv and invsutm.nt
Sustained business growth depends upon profitability,
which appears to have been lower in the case of UK
manufacturing than for rival countries.
Table 8 Net rates of return in manufacturing
Averages p.	period	 LU^,	 UA	 W Germany
1960-71	 13%	 30%	 23%
1972-75	 8%	 21%	 16%
1976-79	 6%	 22%	 17%
Net return is defined as net operating surplus as % of net
capital stock of fixed assets (excluding land).
Source: Begg and Rhodes (1982).
Given the UK's relatively high levels of inflation and
its consequently hi gh cost of finance, such levels of
profitability seem unsatisfactory and may have contributed
to the poor investment record indicated in Table 9.
Tab].e 9 Investment per head in manufacturin g (ECU)
JJJ	 Belgium Holland Itali	 France	 Germanw
72	 86	 96	 6L	 106	 155
Source: Begg and Rhodes (1982). Figures from Eurostat
Review, 1970-79.
The broader issue of the UK'S low economic growth has
been widely discussed, for example Beckermann (1979), but
there is recognition that com petitive problems in the
manufacturin g sector are particularly sharp and merit
detailed attention.
2.15 Industry sectors
Table 10 suggests competitive decline among mazjor
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manufacturin g sectors has been wides pread, but has been a
particular problem in electrical en gineerin g , vehicles,
textiles, leather goods, clothin g and footwear.
Table_b	 Britain's trade performance by SIC
Import	 Exports /
Penetration*	 Sales ratio*
	
1970 1975 1982	 191Q. 1975 1982
Total manufacturin g %	 ia	 18	 22	 16	 18	 21
Chemicals	 15	 17	 23	 21	 26
	 32
Metal manufacturers	 16	 20	 25	 13	 111.	 20
Mechanical eng'	 ill.	 18	 22	 29	 35	 37
Instrument eng'	 23	 33	 38
	 32	 36	 39
Electrical eng'	 1/1.	 21	 311.	 19	 26	 28
Vehicles	 7	 17	 30
	 30	 36	 32
Metal goods	 5	 9
	 13	 12	 111.	 15
Textiles	 12	 19
	 31	 17	 19	 22
Leather goods	 16	 21	 35	 20
	 19	 23
Clothin g and footwear	 11	 20	 31
	 10	 9	 13
Shipbuilding & marine	 311.	 11.7	 15	 19	 21	 16
Food, drink & tobacco	 18	 19	 15
	 3
	 IL	 5
Timber & furniture	 26	 23	 26
	 2	 11.	 5
Paper, printing & publ' 18	 19	 20	 6	 7	 9
Import penetration here defined as imports (c.i.f.) / home
demand + exports
Export / sales here defined as exports (f.o.b.) / manuf'
sales + exports
Source:	 Barclays Review, November 19 83 (based on Business
Monitors) and CSO Annual Abstracts
Literature giving more detailed attention to particular
sectors often suggests even more serious decline than is
revealed in such aggregated statistics: examples being
motorcycles (Boston Consultin g Group, 1975), shipbuilding
(Williams, Williams and Thomas, 1983), portable power tools
and typewriters (Prais, 1981), textiles (Toyne et al, 19811.),
telecommunications (NEDO, 1978), as well as cash registers,
colour televisions and dishwashers.
Analysis directed at specific UK industry sectors, such
as Boston Consulting Group (1975), seems to get closer to
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the heart of Britain's problems of competitiveness. 	 More
recently, studies of global industr y competition such as
Toyne et al (19811.) have increased in sophistication.
Any study of UK competitiveness must be sensitive to
broader economic issues;
	 but it seems both important and
promising to extend analysis to im portant UK business
sectors in a manner highlighting the competitive situation
between the businesses which are actually in competition.
2.16 Clarification of the iaBue
Clarification of the issue of competitiveness requires
some definition or concept which recognises the problem both
at the economic level and also at the business level.
Competitiveness broadly refers to the ability of a
business, group of businesses or indeed a country's econom,y
as a whole, to sustain future growth.
	 At the level of the
firm,	 competitiveness may be defined by a business's
sustainable growth rate relative to actual or
	 likely
competitors. This same definition can also be extended to a
group of businesses such as a business sector in a given
country, or indeed to the group of business sectors in a
country comprising its economy, in which case the issue is
one of economic growth relative to that of rival countries.
At	 all levels the concept of sustainabilit y	is
important, because it is this that rules out superficial
analysis and forces deeper examination of fundamental
factors underlying the strength or weakness of a business's
competitive position. 	 It may not be difficult to obtain a
temporary boost to performance: demand policy can stimulate
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faster growth in the short term, an improvement in economic
growth can stimulate the immediate prospects even of
business sectors facing underlying competitive problems, and
even a business in a weak position can stimulate its market
share for a time;
	
but the problem in all these cases
reduces to sustainability. If the underlying competitive
position is weak, a business will ultimatel y have to concede
further growth as weaknesses show up in areas such as
finance and, at a higher level, an economy will do the same
as bottlenecks of one type or another be gin to make
themselves felt.
In the long term of course, the effect of
competitiveness shows up in the growth of living standards
(or real wage levels) that is sustainable, either for those
working in a business or more generally in relat-ion to the
living standards available to people or workers in a given
country.	 Again the key word is sustainable: it may not be
difficult to obtain a temporary boost to living standards by
pillaging	 the	 investment	 or	 ploughback	 on	 which
competitiveness depends.	 This creates a paradox. Improved
competitiveness should be reflected in improved living
standards (or average wage levels); but improved living
standards may undermine competitiveness. Such confusion can
be avoided if we distin guish carefully between short term
and longer term issues.
Competitiveness in this Longer term sense seems closer
to the challenge presented here, if Britain is finall y to
grapple with its most fundamental problems, problems that
have been ongoing for a centur y or so. Yet, it also seems
that the issue presented by competitiveness can pose more
15
acute problems than what might seem to be a matter of gently
slipping behind some of our faster rivals. What makes this
so is that the intensit y of competition generally appears to
advance relentlessly in the longer term, though in the short
term cyclical effects may sometimes result in some temporary
amelioration.
So far Britain's relative economic decline has been
associated with generally risin g living standards. The same
level of relative performance, if continued in conditions of
increasingly	 intense international	 competition,	 risks
declining living standards at some point, an altogether less
comfortable phenomenon.
At sector level there is already concern that in some
cases falling behind rivals has already become an issue of
survival:	 as competitive conditions intensify it is of
course those who are less competiUve who are the first ta
go.	 Finally, at the level of the firm the dangers of
falling behind rivals in terms of relative growth (loss of
market share) have been widely recognised, since at some
point the cost position usually becomes untenable because of
the "experience" effect (Hedley, 1976). In discussing the
causes of corporate collapse Ar geriti (1976) argues that the
problem often "steals up unawares",	 with intensifying
competition	 finally making its mark	 either	 in	 an
unanticipated price war or in the next business downturn.
The seriousness of the problem of allowin g the
competitive position to erode depends on the likelihood of
serious problems in the future and, of course, on how much
pop1e feel they have to lose,	 Both matters call for
16
knowledge of the particular context and circumstances.
	 The
degree of seriousness with which policy makers in Britain
regard the issue of competitiveness in the face of other
policy trade-offs, will of course depend on views on
particular issues, such as whether North Sea Oil can be
counted on to provide acceptable living standards in the
long term, if the competitive position of ma j or business
sectors is not safeguarded.
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2.2 Economic literature and the issue of competitiveness
221 Classical economics
Adam Smith in his "Wealth of Nations" and later
classical and neo-classical economists have argued that
sustained growth in the "wealth of a nation" depends on the
accumulation of capital. 	 This in turn depends on people's
willingness to forsake some degree of consumption (or real
wages) in the short term, reflected in savings propensities.
An important point is that on this basis competitiveness
depends not merely on the absolute level of performance but
on the willin gness to ease pressure on immediate consumption
(real wages):	 the question of the "penny saved" is more
crucial than the "pound earned".
In classical economics competitiveness depends 	 on
people's economic choices, 	 particularly in respect to
immediate pressure on living standards. A particular problem
here is that people and their representatives tend to be
myopic as to the effect of immediate choices on future
growth in living standards.
	
However, government's most
constructive role (short of bein g able to influence such
choices directly) is viewed as one of non-intervention,
other than to facilitate the "hidden hand" of the free
market.	 In particular it should not create distortions by
attempting	 to support businesses or business	 sectors
advancing	 their particular vested interests.	 Indeed,
government should if necessary take active steps to prevent
any	 such	 group	 (including trade	 unions)	 seriously
Jeopardising	 the effective functioning of the	 market
mechanism.
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If pressure on immediate living standards (real wage
levels) becomes too hi gh classical economics suggests the
result	 will	 be	 "voluntary
	
unemployment".	 People's
Preferences may push up real wage levels. 	 Transmitted via
the price mechanism increased competition will squeeze out
marginal business projects, thus raising the marginal
product of remaining labour until it matches the new real
wage level. Thus a link arises between competitiveness and
unemp loyment.	 If people display insufficient commitment to
long run competitiveness because they are unwillin g to
forego better living standards today, the effect is to
render marginal employees uncompetitive In the
	
labour
market, marginal business ventures (or perhaps even marginal
business sectors) uncompetitive in the marketplace, and
finally to reduce the level of growth that can be sustained
in the wealth of the nation.
The main message from classical economics is clear and
essentially simple:	 the main way in which people's choices
can contribute to Improving competitiveness is by being, if
necessary, willing to reduce the pressure of their demands
upon immediate livin g standards.
It is important to distinguish competitiveness in the
sense used here from a popular usage of the term, referring
to the balance of trade situation of an economy or business
sector.	 In the long term, with which we are concerned,
imports and exports must balance for any economy regardless
of performance, owing to powerful equilibrating forces such
as exchange rate movements. A deteriorating trade balance
can be an important indicator of a weak competitive
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position; but as Brittan (1981L) has pointed out to make
"competitiveness" in this limited sense a prime ob j ect of
policy would, except in extreme circumstances, be to risk a
futile zero sum game, and merely encourage beggar-my-
neighbour policies.	 However, competitiveness as defined
here, which has to do with competing with better
performances in rival countries in respect to sustained
growth, is not a futile zero sum game: indeed it is a
central problem facin g the country.	 It is therefore wrong
for Brittan to conclude that the whole issue of
competitiveness is best i gnored and that attention can
safely be turned to more amenable policy targets such as
dealing with inflation.
Exchange rate policy does have a maj or impact on
competitiveness, but it must be recognised that it is merely
a special case of the real wage issue. Evidence on UK
import and export elasticities (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1980)
does not contradict international trade arguments that after
allowing for some initial adverse impact due to the "3"
curve, a fallin g exahange rate would make British business
sectors more internationally competitive, other things being
equal. However the crucial problem, which has led to some
disillusionment at the Bank of England, in respect to
exchange rate policy, is that wage demands in recent years
have taken into account the inflationary impact 	 of
devaluation, so as to negate any im provement in the relative
cost position within a few years. 	 If so this is merely a
special case of the real wage inflexibility issue already
discussed,	 though	 it could still be worthwhile 	 for
governments to play some role if pressure on real wages were
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relaxed.
2.22 Keynes
Keynes "General Theory", whilst in large part accepting
the classical "equilibrium" model and Its assumptions,
nevertheless demonstrated that rigidities, in the way In
which economic systems actually operate in the real world,
could result in disequilibrium phenomena not allowed for in
classical theory:	 because of this there was a case in
certain circumstances for a degree of more 	 pragmatic
Intervention by government, particularly in respect to
sustaining the level of aggregate demand.
In	 the absence of such intervention "Involuntary
unemployment" could arise (accompanied of course by marginal
business	 activities	 unnecessarily	 being	 rendered
uncompetitive), without accurately reflecting people's true
preferences in terms of the trade-off they wished to make
between real wages and the prevention of unemployment.
"Men are involuntaril y unemployed if, in the event of a
small rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the
money-wage, both the aggregate supply of labour willing
to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate
demand for it at that wage would be greater than the
existing volume of employment." Keynes (1936)
It will be noticed that if in fact real wage demands
were not flexible, unemployment could not be described as
"involuntary" and there would be no case for government
intervening to restore aggregate demand.	 In the context of
the 1930's, with price levels in fact falling, Keynes did
not believe wage bargaining reflected pressure by labour for
any general level of real wages but felt that it was a
process directed merely at protecting relative real wages
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(differentials).
"In other words, the struggle about money-wages
primarily affects the distribution of the aggregate
real wage between different labour groups and not its
average amount per unit of employment, which as we
shall see depends on a different set of forces. 	 The
effect of combination on the part of a group of workers
is to protect their relative real wage. The general
level of real wages depends on the other forces of the
economic system." (Keynes, 1936, p14)
Keynes clarified how his policies would affect the
level of real wages if they were to be successful.	 As
output increased (as a result of demand policies) Keynes
agreed with the classical assump tion that this would result
in a decline in the marginal productivity of labour, and
since he too maintained the assumption that this was equated
to the real wage it followed that the real wage would also
fall.	 Indeed	 he stressed that demand policies were
precisely the mechanism by which labour could be assisted to
achieve the reduction in the real wage necessary to restore
full employment e quilibrium, in the context of difficulties
In the wage bargaining process such as differentials and the
consequent stickiness of money wages.
"So long, indeed, as this proposition holds, any means
of increasing employment must lead at the same time to
a diminution of the marginal product of labour and
hence of the rate of wages measured in terms of this
product." (Keynes, 1936, ppl718)
Keynes was aware that any attempt by government to use
demand policy to deal with "voluntary unemployment" (ie
where the general level of real wages was genuinely
inflexible), would be Inappropriate and merely lead to
inflationary problems.
In summary, according to Ke ynes governments could and
should intervene, through the use of demand policy, to
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prevent	 unnecessary unemployment (or marginal business
activities being unnecessarily made uncompetitive) 1 but orW?
so far as people were genuinely prepared to relax demands on
the general level of real wages.
223 Keynesian. and the n.o-olasaical backlash
In more recent years governments have understandably
succumbed to the temptation of usin g demand policies less
sensitively	than	 Keynes envisaged to	 maintain	 full
employment, even beyond the point where people were really
prepared to accept a fall in the general level of real
wages.
Sustained full employment after the War naturally led
employees and unions to the feeling that the traditional
trade-off between wage demands and unemployment no longer
applied. (Indeed many economists also came to doubt trade-
offs	 such as those implied in the Phillips 	 curve).
Increasingly wage targets came to be set in real, and not
merely in monetary, terms as people became more aware of the
retail price index. 	 But the apparent success In employment
terms of Keynesian policies came at the price of increased
Inflation.	 The problem arose that the initial benefit of
Keynesian demand policies seemed to come through effectively
frustrating people's attempts to gain higher real wages.
Although money wages were successfully increased, so long as
government sustained adequate monetary demand, companies
restored acceptable profit margins by increasing price
levels. Since the result was merely to frustrate underlying
demands in respect to real wage increases, this led to the
vicious circle of s piralling inflation, resulting partly
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from "cost-push" and partly from "demand-pull".
As Keynes would have anticipated, demand policies
became gradually less effective, since real wage flexibility
could no longer be assumed.	 From an immediate policy
viewpoint the problem was that an increasing proportion of
any
 in j ection of aggregate demand was becoming dissipated in
price rather than output increases, plus the fact that at
some level inflation had anyway to be brought under control.
The inevitable neo-classical backlash, urging an end to
Keynesian policies, was supported by research into the
longer term implications of governments increasing the money
supply.	 The adoption of morietarism by Britain (and also a
number of other governments) is essentially, however, a
return	 to	 the stricter classical position	 of	 non-
intervention.	 The new emphasis on securin g more stable
longer term conditions was in this respect beneficial to
competitiveness, yet it also caused two immediate problems.
First,	 the	 sudden	 shift away from a broadly
expansionary stance in fiscal policy had an immediate
deflationary effect reinforcing the impact of the world
downturn followin g the oil price hike in 1979. 	 This led to
the classic	 Keynesian	 step-down multiplier	 process
(accentuated by destockin g ). Second, employees were slow to
anticipate the effect of monetary policy on price levels,
company profit margins, and on the real value of wage
increases sought, and they were anyway frequently reluctant
to acknowledge the tradeoff between real wage increases and
unemployment.
Taken together these two factors led to a sharper rise
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in unemployment (and more mar ginal business activities being
rendered uncompetitive) in the UK than in many other
countries.
The debate between post-War Keynesians and monetarists
representing a return to classical economics is clearly
still highly contentious, but on balance both extremes
appear to have something to learn from each other. The
over-use of demand policy , beyond the point envisaged by
Keynes himself, where labour is really prepared to relax
pressure on the general level of real wages, has often
encountered problems such as inflation and may have been
counter- productive	 in some cases (eg France's	 recent
experience). Yet the processes described by Keynes are
still very much in evidence, and where there is greater real
wage flexibility such as in the USA, demand policies do
appear to play a part in reviving business conditions
conducive to growth. Even here one must be cautious: the
effect on sustained economic performance cannot properly be
j udged until the backlash as the US is finally forced to
deal with its increasing level of debt.
In conclusion, the main way in which economic choices
can contribute to conditions conducive to competitiveness is
through people being sufficiently committed that they are
mutually prepared to relax pressure on real wage levels.
Demand policy by government can play some limited role,
where such willin gness exists. The most beneficial stance
by government is probably one that is sensitive to context -
if wages and working practices are flexible and inflation is
low, there is greater scope for demand policy , but if not it
may be that more conservative policies, aimed at at least
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restoring more stable lon g term conditions in respect to
inflation, and forcin g people to recognise the consequences
of their own economic choices,	 offer at least	 some
advantages.
2.24	 Smith's attack on both classical and Keynesian
approaches
Having reviewed "The British Economic Crisis", Smith
(1984) is critical of both classical and Keynes' models. He
argues that policy makers should put a greater priority on
dealing with the problem of declining competitiveness, and
that they should be prepared to adopt more pragmatic and
direct approaches.
Smith (1984, pp128-9) questioned the many assumptions
essential to classical General Equilibrium models of the
economy, arguing their lack of applicability in modern
economics.	 He cites Professor Frank Hahn as a leading
theorist in this field, arguing the dangers of applying such
theories to policy making In the real world:
"I have always regarded General Equilibrium analysis as
akin to the mock-up an aircraft en gineer might build.
My amazement in recent years has accordingly been very
great to find that many economists are passing the
mock-up of as an airworthy plane, and that politicians.
bankers and commentators are scramblin g to get seats.
This at a time when theorists all over the world have
become aware that anything based on this mock-up is
unlikely to fly, since it neglects some crucial aspects
of the world, the recognition of which will force some
drastic redesi gning. Moreover at no stage was the
mock-up complete; in particular it provided no account
of the workin g of the Invisible Hand..."
(ibid. pplLt8-9)
Smith mounts similar attacks on more recent variations
on classical equilibrium models, such as the Rational
Expectations Hypothesis,	 citing Frank Blackaby at the
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N.I.E.S.R. (ibid, pl L&O). His concludin g theme is the damage
done as a result of misplaced faith in such general theories
by actual policy makers.	 Again he cites Hahn: ". . . the
vulgarizations of most text-books of economics are both
scientifically	and	 politically	 harmful",	 and	 Smith
concludes:
"The problem is that the vulgarizations have, with a
vengeance, stepped out of the pages of textbooks, and
out of the lecture theatres, where they can onl y, do
intellectual damage, into the world of policy making."
(ibid, p152)
Having attacked the classical underpinnings of both
monetary policy specifically and of undue faith in free
market "laissez faire" more generally, Smith goes on to
argue that Keynesian policies contain many of the same
assumptions.	 More importantly however, they are anyway
inapplicable to dealin g with the realities of declining UK
competitiveness as outlined earlier in his argument.	 He
concludes his criticism of Keynesian approaches such as
demand management with an attack as follows:
"But policy interventions of that type seem to offer
little in the face of the problems outlined in the
first section of this book. These problems are
specific ones concerning manufacturin g performance, and
the R & D, investment, engineering and education inputs
to that performance. Keynesian policies of demand
management are aimed elsewhere; they are pitched at an
abstract level which brackets out the s pecific problems
of industrial organisation which face Britain. For
this reason it is necessary to explore such problems
directly, without relying on policy panaceas derived
from the hi ghly abstract preoccupations of theoretical
economics. It is not that theoretical economics is not
important, not a worthwhile and necessary activity. It
is simply that it is time for politicians and others to
stop thinking that it can offer simple answers."
(ibid 1
 p183)
Smith further argues that such misplaced faith in
general economic approaches to policy making has dangerously
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distracted attention from dealin g with the real issue of
declining competitiveness:
"The tragic consequence of all this has been a
concentration of attention by British politicians on
economic issues which are to a greater or lesser extent
peripheral to our real and urgent problems; in effect,
they have not seen the wood for the trees. 	 If the
crisis is to be resolved, therefore, future policies
must abandon what mi ght politely be called the
"indirectness" of past and present policy measures.
Policies should be based on a much more realistic
assessment	 of our future prospects,	 and of the
mechanisms that have made them so bleak."
(ibid, 9200)
Smith concludes by recommending more pragmatic and
specific policy approaches of the type successfully adopted
in Japan, showing how a number of policy successes have
hinged on specifically rejecting general economic arguments
adhered to in the West. He cites Mr Y. Ojima, Vice-Minister
for International Trade and Industry, as statin g that it was
"decided to establish in Japan industries which require
intensive employment of capital and technology,
industries that in consideration of comparative costs
of production should be the most inappropriate for
Japan,	 industries such as steel,	 oil	 refinery,
petrochemicals,	 automobiles,	 aircraft,	 industrial
machinery of all sorts, and electronics including
electronic	 computers.	 From	 a short-run	 static
viewpoint, encouragement of such industries would seem
to conflict with economic rationalism.	 But from a
long-range viewpoint, these are precisely the
industries where ... demand is high, technological
progress is rapid, and labour , productivity rises f5•?
(ibid. p220)
Thus with such a clear commitment to the long run
growth and competitiveness of their industries, the Japanese
appear to be aware of the dangers implicit in over-general
economic arguments and of the need always to remember the
overridin g priority of "competitiveness".
2.2 Other writers
Smith (op cit, 198A) provides a good exanple of much
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recent economic literature dealing with "Britain's Crisis".
Variations on this theme can be seen in Glyn and Harrison
	
(1980),	 Eatwell (1982), Williams, Williams and Thomas
	
(1983),	 and Pollard (1982).	 Literature analysing the
success of Japanese economic policies also supports Smith's
theme, for example G.C.Allen (1980). Many of these writers
further develop the view that again and again Britain,
partly as a result of institutions and attitudes, has
sacrificed the profitability and competitiveness of its
businesses	 on the altar of other goals.	 The broad
conclusion is the same: there is a need for a more decisive
commitment to positive development of our business sectors,
particularly that of manufacturing.
Pollard notes the generalist background and affinit y of
those in many institutions such as the Treasury, which
predispose them towards general policy measures:	 indeed he
sees them as almost addicted to the more "s ymbolic" goals of
economic management.	 Attitudes off many involved in the
political deci3ion making process, he argues, are inhex.ntly
geared to the short term and still reflect a contempt for
what is happening in specific business sectors. 	 The
contempt for what is happening at the level of production
also extends he feels to unions, who havin g lost confidence
in their company's ability to win future business are
ambivalent about ensurin g companies keep ahead in terms of
production developments aimed at maximising efficiency.
The linkage of British economic decline and
"generalist" attitudes has been noted by Wiener (1981) as an
almost cultural phenomenon, deeply rooted in histor y and in
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the educational system.	 Moreover Dahrendorf (1982) links
Britain's poor economic performance to the traditional
cultural virtue of tolerance. Alas, it seems that tolerance
extends egually to a rather complacent acceptance	 of
allowing the competitiveness of businesses to become eroded.
Certainly a cursory ins pection of Britain's histor y suggests
that the country has not always been exactly tolerant of its
more committed leaders, until situations have actually
reached crisis point, from dive of India to Churchill. It
might appear that the other face of "tolerance" is a certain
contempt for "commitment", that is until crises finall y jolt
the British people into responsiveness.
Britain's lack of commitment to the rapid development
of its business sectors also of course reflects the greater
priority afforded to other goals doubtless laudable in
themselves.	 The investment that Pollard feels has been a
key problem has been in turn crowded out by consumption
today, either through real wage levels being too hi gh or
through resources going into public services which have only
at	 best	 an indirect effect	 on	 assisting	 business
competitiveness.	 Many writers have pinpointed particular
aspects of this problem, manifest not least In the cost and
availability of	 funding for productive	 investment.
Particular issues raised include Issues as various as
housing subsidies and mortgage relief, non-repayable student
grants, the welfare state generally, and so on.
Yet these issues may be summarised as further
manifestations	 of a lack of commitment	 to	 business
competitiveness	 in terms of policy priorities.	 This
argument is broadly summed up in Bacon and Eltis (1978):
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the productive sector of the ecomomy (defined essentiall y as
businesses in the free market sector of the economy) is seen
as	 having been critically weakened by a premature
dissipation of resources into other activities, the public
sector in particular. It is of course a question not merely
of whether the UK diverts more resources than other rivals
such as Germany into housing, education or the public
sector,	 but of timing;	 for premature moves in this
direction may have damaged the competitiveness of our
business sectors so that they are now too weak to support
the weight of other activities which they are required to
bear.
Many of the chronic economic problems which have dogged
progress in the UK, such as balance of payments problems
leading to stop-go policies and to some extent inflation,
and with which economic advisors have become so preoccupied,
may in this light be seen merely as symptoms of a more
fundamental problem - the problem that Britain has not been
prepared to make the trade-offs that would have allowed its
business	 sectors	 sufficient	 resources to	 ensure	 a
competitive future.	 This supports the argument	 that
Britain's top priority should be to divert resources back to
business to rebuild competitiveness.
The issue of "deindustrialisation" has come to the fore
in recent years in a number of conferences and publications,
eg Blackaby (1979), and there is also a growing recognition
that many of the problems are too deep rooted to be tackled
by macroeconomic policies alone.	 Caves and Krause's (1980)
review of the situation cites Posner's four teams: 	 having
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simulated effects of radically different 	 macroeconomic
policies over many years, they found remarkably little
difference	 would have resulted in	 Britain's	 present
position.	 The only exception seems to have been that all
teams agreed that Britain made a mistake in not devaluing
prior to 1967 - a policy move that might have improved the
relative cost position of British business.
Neither do Britain's problems seem to result from being
in the wrong business sectors. 	 Panic and Rahian (1971)
showed the UK was not unduly hampered in terms of its share
of faster growing manufacturing exports: in 1968 59% of UK
exports came into the faster growing categories, compared
with the USA 71%, Germany 6 L1%, France 56%, Japan L7%, and
Belgium 36%. This casts doubt on the idea that the UK's key
problem is one of getting out of "sunset industries" and
into "sunrise industries".
Economists and other commentators have reco gnised the
need to turn their attention to more basic micro-level
issues in diagnosing Britain's performance problem. 	 Stout
(1977) and Connell (1979) have shown that the problem was to
a considerable extent one of non-price competitiveness,
pointing to issues such as desi gn, bad marketing, late
delivery, and poor after-sales service. Connell (1979)
showed for example German exports of mechanical engineering
goods were worth 60% more per ton than British export goods
in the same sector. 	 Research at the Science Policy Unit at
Sussex University more generally points to the key role in
competitiveness played by technology (Pavitt, 1980) and the
same point has been made by others. eg Millman (1983).
Productivity differentials between the UK and other rival
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countries, evidenced by Pratten (1976b, Prais (1981), and
the Central Policy Review Staff (1975). point to the need to
push analysis on from rather broad analysis to the situation
within business sectors and firms, and also down to the
level of the shop floor.
Yet we still need a way to provide a more balanced
picture of the competitiveness problem, to link policy
analysis at the macro level (which clearly does affect
business competitiveness) with greater recognition of the
situation within business sectors. 	 Without this it is
difficult for policy makers to get a feel for the trade-
offs involved.	 For example Dunnet (1980) demonstrated the
danger of government pursuing economic policies without
adequate sensitivity as to their effect on business sectors
such as the car industry. Polic y makers could make use of a
more reasonably balanced and also more specific analysis of
the situation, and it does appear that they are now becoming
more sensitive to the impact of fluctuations in policy (such
as sudden changes in taxation, hire purchase arrangements
and indeed stop-go policy generally) on the competitive
situation of major business sectors.
Another milestone in this respect is Williams, Williams
and Thomas (1983) who try to balance a broader anal ysis of
the way in which Britain has permitted manufacturing
business sectors to decline with three cases detailing the
competitive situation in particular industries.	 This also
allows the dimension of company policies to be drawn into
the analysis.
Thanks to the work of NEDO, SPRU and other research
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bodies, there is an increasing wealth of studies analysing
competition within particular business sectors.
There does however appear to be a gap in the literature
between fairly aggregated economic studies, 	 which are
perhaps	 over-general,	 arid more detailed	 studies	 of
competition within specialist business sectors, which are
difficult to relate back to the broader picture. It is
hoped this study of a large and complex sector will help to
fill this gap arid also complement other studies.
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2.3
	
Competitiveneas	 in the context of literature on
busineas strategy
2.31. Introduction
Business competitiveness may therefore be assisted by
more appropriate economic choices, but finally the issue
depends on performance at the level of the firm. Literature
in the field of management and business strategy provides
many concepts and analytical tools useful in this context.
Historically these ideas have developed to meet the
needs of enterprises, that have grown larger and more
complex,	 faced	 with changing and increasin gly severe
competitive circumstances. Also since the days of small
owner-managed firms, new "stakeholders" such as government
and trade unions have emerged, creatin g a demand for new
tools of analysis (Thomas, 1981 and 1983). The pattern of
business evolution, since most businesses really took off in
the late 19th century, has been described in Chandler (1962)
and this work provides a useful framework for tracin g the
evolution of these analytical concepts (Hofer and Schendel,
1980). It is convenient to review past approaches to
business strategy in stages broadly corresponding to their
historical development.
2.32	 Entrepreneurial appr'oachaa
At an early stage in the development of business
strategic decisions were typically taken by an owner-manager
or entrepreneur, just as in many small businesses today.
Few formalised analytical techni ques were Involved: the
entrepreneur relied heavil y on initiative, experience and
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zludgement, and perhaps some creative vision. Even in the
modern sophisticated world it would be unwise to i gnore the
simp le, though powerful, principles through which successful
entrepreneurs secure competitiveness.
Ohmae (1982) argues that the success of many large
Japanese corporations, such as Sony and Honda, is due not to
the application of complex analytical techniques or
strategic decision making processes, but to the type of
creative	 flair	 and	 total	 competitive	 commitment
characteristic of entrepreneurial approaches.
	 He cites the
boldness and commitment of leaders such as
	 Konosuke
Matsushita and Soichiro Honda in the execution of their
plans regardless of minor shifts in circumstances; by
contrast, he argues, the detailed sophisticated planning
characteristic of bureaucratic organisations makes "about as
much sense as rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic"
(ibid, p82).	 Furthermore, he continues, "all of today's
industry
	
leaders,	 without exception,	 began by	 bold
deployment	 of strategies based on KFS" (key	 success
factors).
Successful entrepreneurs frequently exhibit decisive
market entry strategies, respond quickly to opportunities,
and subsequently retain a clear notion of their business's
intended	 basis	 of	 competitive	 advantage	 - all
characteristics	 highlighted	 in one recent	 study	 of
successful business strategies (Doyle, Saunders and Wong,
1985, pplO and 18).	 The same study also supports the
decisive commitment displayed by many entrepreneurs in
a competitive niche in the market place, even, if
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necessary, at the expense of short term profitability.
Such commitment is also manifest in being prepared to
accept risks where necessary, as Ohmae (1982, plt9) argues:
"The strategist must have the courage to gamble and
accept the risks involved. This gamble - the strategic
decision - is the narrow gate through which a company
must pass if it is to win superiority in the demanding
field of competitive business, practical only in head-
on competition."
Having committed himself to earl 	 investments, the
entrepreneur is keenly aware that any shortfall in future
commitment	 or future investment creates the risk
	 of
bankruptcy and of rendering valueless all such costs should
it result in competitors getting ahead. Again many larger
corporations today have been able to improve competitive
performance by taking simple steps to ensure directors'
personal stakes are a little more in line with those of
committed entrepreneurs.
Successful entrepreneurs often seem to have
	 been
remarkably ignorant in respect to financial and other
analytical techniques. I would suggest this may be due to
two related compensating strengths, a particular sensitivity
to more contextual matters and leadership.
Many examples of entrepreneurial approaches today are
manifest in small business activities. There seems
increasing awareness by bank managers vetting such small
business proposals (as well as in the literature in this
area) that impressive financial figuring is not enough, and
that their quality in respect to detailed contextual issues
may often be a better predictor of success.	 This is a
reminder that effective strategy thinking must not be
superficial:	 it must of course be co gent, but it is also
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often essential that attention should be guided logically
towards more specific, often quite technical, issues of key
significance.
The natural stress in all anal ytical concepts and
techniques tends to be on principles of general application.
A danger is a tendency to downplay the strategic importance
of more specific contextual issues.	 For example Andrews
(1971) advances his first chapter "The Importance of Being
General" but does not balance his argument by reminding
readers that effective strategy thinking can rarely afford
to stop at the general level or it is likely to be
superficial. This point is perhaps particularly poignant in
a British context, since the problem of declining British
competitiveness has been partly linked to a generalist bias
in British culture, and particularly in the culture of
managers (Wiener, 1981, and Terry, 1979).
The willingness to pay commensurate attention to more
specific and detailed issues leads to a fuller appreciation
of the strategic contribution made 'by people working on more
s pecific tasks, for example in the production area.	 By
contrast Andrews' defence of a more generalist approach is
in danger of encouraging elitism and contempt for technical
details or mere functional specialists:
"The generalist above all cannot allow himself to be
intimidated by the language, demeanor, and
organisatiorial insensitivit y of his hi ghly educated
subordinates . . . The successful generalist survives
and succeeds in a specialised world by virtue of his
management skills rather than his technical knowledge"
(Andrews, 1971, pp2O-21)
The	 point	 is	 of practical importance 	 in	 strategy
implementation.	 better performance in toolmaking,
for example, has been attributed to relationships between
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German managers and functional staff/em p loyees being more
"continuous and conti guous", leadin g to greater employee
commitment and fewer industrial relations problems (NEDO,
1981). Again recent literature suggests such simple
principles as "management by walkin g about" apply equally to
large corporations (Peters and Waterman, 1984; and Goldsmith
and Clutterbuck, 1984).
The influence of cultural factors, at a corporate
level, on competitiveness has become increasin gly recognised
(Hofstede,	 1980).	 The	 entrepreneur's	 response	 is
leadership. He is aided by a simple, communicable sense of
direction, often lacking in bureaucratic organisations, and
by a sensitivity to issues and people based on intimate
involvement: a simple principle that has survived the test
of time (Barnard, 1972; Follett, 1973; McCarthy, Minichiello
and Curran, 1979, p131; and Prior, 1977). Indeed perhaps the
essence of leadershi p is to transform the pervading culture
and ethos.
From leadership comes commitment, and with sufficient
commitment	 and ability competitiveness can always	 be
improved. The ultimate test, however, as discussed in the
last section, is the willingness if necessary to accept
lower real income levels until the competitive position is
restored, sometl4ng many entrepreneurs seem prepared to do
when the occasion demands.
The entrepreneurial approach is a reminder that, for
those really concerned, the issue of competitiveness is not
just a problem in optirnisation, but is often a question of
an organisation's survival, particularly as competition
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intensifies. This harsh fact calls for a quite different
attitude to that prevalent in bureaucratic organisations:
as Ohmae (1982) has put it, "it is the difference between
going on a diet and going into battle". Indeed as modern
writers have noted, those involved in business strategy have
much to learn from military strategy (Quinn, 1980).
In	 summary,
	
the key strengths characteristic of
entrepreneurial approaches to strategy are a sensitivit y to
context and the degree of competitive commitment. In
reviewing more sophisticated approaches to strategy it Is
hoped such simple principles will not become eclipsed.
2.33 Financial approach
Few organisations, even non-profitmaking ones, can
ignore	 financial	 analysis if they
	
hope	 to	 remain
competitive.	 Historically,	 the increased influence of
finance	 was	 probably	 associated	 with	 industrial
consolidation. Horngren (198L1., p18) cites US surveys
indicating that "more chief executive officers began their
career in an accountin g position than in any other area such
as marketing	 production or engineering". 	 Recently, he
believes, the influence of finance has increased as a result
of high inflation and persistent recession. 	 Business Week
(15 August 1982, p811.) also indicated that controllers
"... are now getting involved with the operating side
of the company, where they give advice and influence
production, marketing and investment decisions as well
as corporate planning."
Inadequate attention to the financial situation, both
to profitability and also cash flow, may in the extreme
result in collapse and competitiveness can scarcely be
L0
assured without continued financial viability in the short
term! Apart from the usual accountancy techniques and the
use of more s pecialised ratio analysis such as Z scores, a
substantial literature has emerged for those concerned to
avoid such pitfalls. Generally such problems can be traced
back to ineffective management, though economic conditions
also have some effect (Argenti, 1976). A related and more
common problem, receiving more attention in today's more
competitive conditions, is that of retaining competitiveness
in less extreme situations, where it is nevertheless
necessary to turn around performance rapidly to avoid
collapse (Slatter, 198J1; and Bibeault, 1981).
Apart from these fairly
 extreme circumstances,
financial analysis reminds us that sustainable growth can
only be achieved if care is taken to maIntain a 'business in
balance.	 Expansion or diversification has constantly to be
balanced	 against	 the	 need	 for	 retrenchment	 and
ratiorialisation, for without some "pruning" financial,
managerial and other resources will become overstretched,
weakening the competitive position and the foundations of
further growth. - Financial anal ysis assists an organisation
to evaluate its " portfolio" of activities (whether products
or entire divisions) to ensure profitability (or cash flow)
is adequate to zlustify future inclusion.
Current cost accounting has emerged to ensure those
really concerned to maintain their com petitive position in
the longer term are fully aware of additional provisions
needed to allow for the effects of inflation (it is less
relevant for businesses which may ultimately wish to
withdraw from activities concerned).
ii.i
Clearly those concerned with ensurin g competitiveness
must be sensitive to these and other issues raised by
financial analysis, but some reservations should also be
made. Financial analysis is of course only the starting
point in assessing an organisation's strategic situation:
Buchele (1967) enumerates several limitations.
Recently a number of writers have produced forceful
arguments that financial techni ques can prove misleading in
some circumstances, and that in particular an overemphasis
on financial analysis may have led to declining
competitiveness in the case of US industries (Ha yes and
Garvin, 1982; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). In Britain the
case of Norton-Villiers-Triumph is often cited as a case of
over-cautious financial policies resulting in a situation of
competitive	 retreat	 and ultimately
	
collapse	 (Boston
Consulting Group, 1975).
Another potential danger is that su perficial use of
financial techniques could encourage complacent
organisatjons, unwilling to tackle s pecific problems (for
example mannin g levels in production), to recover financial
control through premature retrenchment or rationalisation.
Financial crises may be put off for many years, and
profitability can probably be sustained at reasonable if
not exciting levels; but the real cost, in insulating
management from their more specific problems, is paid
through retreat in the marketplace, so that competitiveness
suffers accordingly. Costs associated with retrenchment are
inherently difficult to handle when making
	 financial
appraisals and rarely receive adequate attention.
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It may also be possible, if unpleasant, to restore
financial performance in marginal areas on projects, if
people can be persuaded to reduce pressure on real wage
levels - this of course changes the basis of all financial
ap praisals. Recent American experience suggests that given
greater commitment by management and employees, real wage
flexibility
	
can play an important role in	 restoring
competitiveness.
In general, however, financial systems and controls
play an important role in coordination and in enhancing
people's commitment throughout organisations. Used
effectively, they may perhaps be considered as laying the
foundations of sustainable growth,
	 and can contribute
greatly to an organisation's competitiveness, a well
documented example being the case of Norcros (see Channon,
1971).
2.34 Marketing
The first effect of increasing competition, in the
context of efficient financial markets and the changing
structure of British business, had been to increase the
importance of financial analysis in strategic decisions;
but a rising
 proportion of discretionary spending following
the Second World War, coupled with further competition, made
necessary a greater recognition of the strategic importance
of marketing considerations. Orgariisations could no longer
assume customers would buy their products just because they
were the lowest cost producers, as Ford had found to its
cost some years earlier when its market position was
overtaken by General Motors.
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Levitt's classic article "Marketing Myopia" (1965)
evidenced many examples of organisations whose
competitiveness had declined as a result of failing to
respond adequately to changing customer needs;
	 in the long
run profits ensued only by doing so. To do so more
effectively organisations could track their target market
segments closel y and orientate their operations accordingly.
Product portfolios being offered could be evaluated against
"product life cycles".
The new "marketin g concept" involved a	 different
organisational philosophy.
	
A product-centred approach was
advocated, with each centre the responsibility of a product
manager. Such a manager could liaise and coordinate with
the various functional areas to ensure the best final "mix"
from the viewpoint of satisfying the target customer's needs
effectively.
	
To ensure competitiveness it was essential to
commit the organisation totally to the task of responding
adequately to changes in the external marketplace.
	 Indeed
more	 recent	 interpretations	 stress	 the	 su'btler
organisational	 issues in addition to the armoury	 of
marketing weapons, such as the four "p"s.
There is evidence of British organisations bein g less
marketing orientated than, for example, their Japanese
counterparts (Doyle, Saunders and Wong, 1985). The same
study also indicates that more successful organisations were
more committed to their market positions, even where this
involved some trade-off in short term profitability.
The concept of commitment is valuable.
	
Naive over-
eagerness to follow market changes could lead to an over-
emphasis on faster growing market segments at the expense of
premature abandonment of slow growth segments. 	 Obtaining a
proper balance demands sensitivity
 to an organisation's
particular competitive circumstances. 	 Whilst higher growth
market sectors may often be associated with higher long term
profitability , this is not true of all. 	 Hall (1980)
identifies	 a number of US companies in eight mature
industrial sectors exhibitin g outstanding performance;	 nor
were they even market leaders.
Even basic ideas such as product or industry "life
cycles" are still contentious. 	 Van Rossuin (198iL), for
example, argues:	 "The glaring fallacy is the underlying
assumption that death is inevitable, that the cycle is
ultimately determined by predestination". 	 In reply, Arthur
D Little's Phili p Middleton (198A) demonstrates that life
cycle concepts continue to be useful tools of strategic
analysis, but he does not fully acknowledge the danger of
encouraging premature and inappro priate loss of competitive
commitment that might result in the case of some products.
The point applies particularly to the motor industry,
which has until recently been regarded as a mature industry.
On this analysis further investment in BL, particularly as a
low market share contender, mi ght have been discouraged.
Recent more detailed examination of the specific competitive
circumstances in this industry have shown that a process of
"dematurity" is now takin g place and that such pessimism
would have been unwarranted (Altshuler et al, 198LJ; Jones,
1981; Chew, 198k).
2.3
	
Other functional areas
Levitt (1965) had argued that many US railroad
companies had failed because, instead of defining themselves
in terms of customer needs for transportation, they had
placed	 too	 much emphasis on distinctive	 operational
characteristics, le of operating railways. Yet this
inherent tendency in the marketin g approach, to define the
business in terms of products or services, could also prove
dangerous. An organisation might well have far more
resources and competitive advantages vested in operational
assets and skills than on the marketin g side, where the
potential synergy could well be very low, particularly for
business sectors such as automotive components manufacture.
Skinner (1978 and 1985) demonstrated the strategic
importance of manufacturing considerations, pointing out
that downplaying these could have the result that "a
function that could be a valuable asset and tool of
corporate strategy [could become) a liability instead".
Skinner's findings have been further endorsed by other
writers and the importance of manufacturing / operations
strategy is now widely reco gnised (Hill, 1983; Hayes and
Wheelwright, 19811).
Further endorsement has come from research suggesting
that manufacturin g policy has been a distin guishing feature
of the Japanese approach to strategy, and one that has
underpinned their competitive success in industries such as
automobiles. Abernathy et al (1982) concludes:
"Managers must reco gnise they have entered a period of
competition that requires of them a technology-driven
strategy, a mastery of efficient production, and an
unprecedented capacity for workforce management."
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Also noteworthy is a broader vision contained in the
same article:	 that if the wider issue of industrial
competitiveness is to be addressed then policy makers at the
macro level as well as at the level of the firm must
appreciate the key importance of such issues:
"Managing change successfully proved difficult because
policy makers in business and government, trained in an
old economic calculus, have found it hard to see the
new competitive realities for what they are - or to
identify the best terms in which to analyse them.
"Policy makers fail to understand that the old rules of
thumb and worn assumptions no longer hold . . . As a
result, decision makers who continue to act as if
nothing has happened are, at best, ineffective and, at
worst, inadvertent a gents of economic disaster."
For those concerned with identifying key strategic
issues at the level of the firm, clearly the im portance of
different	 functional areas such as manufacturing	 and
marketing varies de pending on the particular business sector
and circumstances.	 Those advocating a greater role for
manufacturing policy in strategic thinkin g must of course
recognise the importance of financial and marketin g issues,
but their point that more specific production issues often
prove to be of key importance is a timely reminder of the
need for a balanced approach.
Those concerned to ensure an organisation's continued
competitiveness must therefore not only be sensitive to
issues raised by financial or marketing appraisals, but also
be prepared to give commensurate attention to more specific
issues in areas such as production.	 Depending on the
organisation's particular strategic context, even quite
mundane matters may emerge as being of key importance to
continued competitiveness:	 for example in one industry
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Garvin (1983) traced the key reasons for Japan's success
against US competitors to manufacturing policies resulting
in better levels of quality.
Again these issues have wider implications for the way
in which busInesses organise. Thus if production issues are
found to be of key importance, it may be necessary to deal
with issues such as power, status, remuneration, training
and organisational arrangements.
In the UK there has been considerable concern about
production becomin g a "Cinderella function" in the face of
increasingly powerful staff functions such as accountancy
and marketing.	 There is also	 substantial	 evidence
suggesting that the UK is particularly weak in the area of
manufacturing policy . Comparative international studies by
Hutton and Lawrence (1978 and 1979) for example have
p inpointed Britain's competitive weakness in comparison to
Germany in the area of production management.
Production may be a particularly serious area of
neglect in the UK.	 However there would seem to be similar
dangers in neglecting some other functional areas.
	 Hutton
and	 Lawrence's study (1981) also points to Britain's
weakness in en gineering , and research at the University of
Sussex's Science Polic y Research Unit has evidenced the key
role played by technology in determining competitive success
in a number of industries (Pavitt, 1980). The impact of
Pilkington's float glass process in 1958 on the pattern of
competition is perhaps the classic example of this.
By now most fundamental areas have argued for a more
central role in strategy formulation, not least because such
arguments provide the rationale for additional power and
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prestige.	 The fields of industrial relations and personnel
management understandably argue that in the long run
organisations only achieve success through the careful
selection and management of the people who make up the
organisation.	 Arguments put forward by the procurement
function	 are	 perhaps particularly pertinent	 to	 the
components	 industry
	
(Bailey
	
and	 Farmer,	 1981).
Organisational experts have argued the key importance of
addressing	 organisational	 issues such as	 appropriate.
structure (particularly in the context of more diversified
organisations)	 and corporate culture	 (Channon,	 1973;
Hofstede, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1978).
Given a multitude of such arguments, it is clear that
if the issue of competitiveness is to be fully addressed a
contextual approach, sensitive to such various issues, is
required. In practice, successful executives are reluctant
to place too much emphasis on general theoretically based
approaches and rely heavily on more specific knowledge of
their businesses (Peters and Waterman, 198a).	 Where their
intuition and Judgement suggest particular developments may
be important to their competitive situation, evidence
suggests they are often prepared to override conclusions
suggested by analytical tools such as financial analysis for
example (Donaldson and Lorsch, 198L&).
2.36 Strateia Implications of Market Share
2.361 Experience effects
A powerful approach raising some important strategic
issues has emerged out of the Boston Consulting Group's
ltg
research on the experience curve.	 Having demonstrated that
unit costs tend to fall by a et proportion, roughly between
20% and 30%, every time accumulated production doubles it
was but a short step to the recognition of the strategic
importance of market share (Boston Consulting Group, 1968
and 1975; Hedley, 1977). In the long run high share
companies ought to dominate business sectors since their
costs ought to fall faster than competitors'.	 There are
provisos of course, such as the need for careful business
definition.	 Benefits do not derive automaticall y from
experience,	 but	 require	 considerable	 organisational
commitment.	 Product innovation can discount the benefit of
experience gained on earlier products.
Statistical evidence presented by the BCG is anything
but solid. Data obtained frequently hinged on price data as
a proxy for cost data, and many industries do not conform to
the broader picture the BCG seek to establish. Porter
(1980) for example evidences a number of industries in the
USA where the market leaders are	 considerably
	
less
profitable than the followers.
Such analysis has nevertheless been particularly useful
in highlighting key competitive issues in technology-driven
industries such as electronic calculators, and the
importance of these ideas was perhaps illustrated b y the
domination of this market in the USA by Texas Instruments, a
major proponent of this approach. The power of the concept
was enhanced through organisational changes and new control
systems, so that competitive coxmnitment could be harnessed
throughout the organisation - indeed it is a good example of
how strategy analysis can transform corporate culture.
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This said, such ideas advocated by the BCG are scarcely
foolproof, as exemplified by Texas Instruments' more recent
problems in the cases of digital watches,
telecommunications, and mincomputers - problems attributed
by Uttal (1982) directly to this very approach. What is
most potentially dangerous is where such ideas about the
advantages of hi gh market share actually lead to businesses
cuttin g back their commitment to remaining competitive in
other business units (eg by corporate headquarters
deliberately reducing investment). The advantages of market
share are generally corroborated by fi gures published by
PIMS (Schoeffler et al, 197k) which suggest return on
investment for companies with relative market shares over
80% average three times that for com panies with market
shares under 20%.	 However researchers utilising the same
database have demonstrated that there
	 are	 numerous
exceptional	 situations where low share
	 companies	 do
extremely well, particularly where attention is given to
carefully constructed com petitive strategies (Woo and
Cooper, 1982). Not all their evidence entirely contradicts
BCG's recommended approaches (e g the fact that focused
strategies emerge as a key characteristic of more successful
low share companies makes one suspect poor business
definition, a crucial point made by the BCG); however it
certainly gives the lie to any notion that low share
companies are inevitably doomed.
Other research also underlines this point. In the case
of declinin g industries Hall (1980) also evidenced the
success of many low share companies. 	 Newton (1983) also
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evidences many industries where low share companies have
consistently outperformed high share companies over many
years: Rugby Portland Cement for instance achieved twice the
return achieved by the two UK market leaders over many years
whilst at the same time buildin g market share.	 This
evidence suggests that companies should be extremely wary
about allowing market share ideas to undermine competitive
commitment, and they should certainly look very long and
hard at the s pecifics of their own competitive situation
first.	 Ideas that are true more often than not may well
prove to be quite wrong in their s pecific situation!
There is also another quirk in the BCG's earlier
findings which has not been much enlarged on since.	 Boston
Consulting Group (1975) deals at some length with the
problem of exchange rate movements whose impact they found
could be even greater than that of experience curves. 	 Thus
although Japanese motorcycles displayed t ypical experience
curves with costs calculated in yen, the same curves
expressed in dollars were actually slightly upward sloping.
BCG therefore recognise that where international competition
is being considered it is necessary to adlust for exchange
rate trends.	 This is in fact merely a s pecial case of a
more general proviso already noted:	 that any differences
between competitors in real wage levels, and any trend
differences, must always be taken into account.
2.362 Portfolio Approaohai and PIMS
Experience effects raise portfolio issues of particular
significance to larger company group ings.	 Here the recent
impact	 of BCG and other portfolio approaches, 	 which
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hi ghli ght such issues, has been considerable. Haspeslaugh
(1982) estimated that 49% of US Fortune 500 corporations
employed some type of portfolio matrix approach in their
planning.
The same points as in the last section also apply here.
The danger of such approaches leadin g to some premature loss
of total competitive commitment is particularly apparent.
Only in the case of hi gh growth / high share "star" business
units, and some hi gh growth / low share "question mark"
business units - not a very hi gh proportion of most company
groups today - is anything like full competitive commitment
suggested; in other cases it is explicitly discouraged!
The latter situations also raise serious organisational
problems.
Of a number of variants, Shell's Directional Policy
Matrix explicitly deals with shortcomings due to equating
"market attractiveness" with simply "growth", and equating
"strength of competitive position" with merely "market
share" (Coate, 1983). Yet additional sophistication and
realism is gained only through a large number of fairly
subjective evaluations.
With its ability to handle many exploratory variables
the PIMS approach, outlined by Schoeffler et al (1974), is
particularly so phisticated and its database is increasingly
powerful. The model also offers considerable flexibility.
Yet there is no supporting theoretical model to justify the
causal links suggested by their 37 variable equation.
Impressive accuracy from what is essentially an ex-post line
of best fit has to be judged with caution.
	 Also however
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accurately their equations describe the behaviour of their
chosen population or predominantly large US companies, they
may not hold well in particular sectors. Thus, although
this approach again raises questions of strategic Interest,
Its advocates are correct in warning that their results
should be treated as "directional Indicators" and not as a
substitute for managerial judgments.	 The latter point
perhaps applies to all analytical techniques.
2.37 Porter's Approaoh
More	 recently Michael Porter's best	 selling
"Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Anal ysing Industries
and Competitors" (1980) has been influential, particularly
upon US businessmen. This approach forces those involved In
strategy to analyse the underlying competitive dynamics that
apply to a business's specific situation. 	 A framework for
approaching the problem is supplied, 	 as are generic
guidelines	 for a number of	 competitive	 situations
(fragmented industries, emerging industries, the transition
to maturity stage,
	 industries characterised by global
patterns of competition), and for a number of generic
strategic options (vertical integration, ca pacity expansion,
entry into new businesses). This is valuable in that it is
then possible to Inte grate this general framework and the
general guidelines it offers with more specific knowledge of
the business's circumstances.
Porter's framework also offers the possibility of
extension.	 More empirical work by other researchers means
that understandin g the keys to competitive success in such
generic situations can be continuousl y improved: see for
examp le Harri gan (1980) on declining businesses and Harrigan
(198L) on vertical integration. Porter's approach is
supported by rich examples of industry competition. At this
stage these are necessarily limited to somewhat thumbnail
sketches (see for example Hout, Porter and Rudden, 1982,
"How Global Competitors Win Out" - not everyone would
completely
	
agree	 with this three page
	 analysis	 of
Caterpillar's competitive position vis a vis Komatsu In the
li ght of subsequent evidence).	 However as more detailed
studies emerge, analysing key competitive issues in
particular industries in greater depth (for example Toyne et
al's "The Global Textile Industry" 19811, and studies similar
to my own now being carried out under Prof. B.T.Houlden at
the Universit y of Warwick) it should be possible to provide
greater depth to the overall approach.
Many of Porter's strategic guidelines make use of
matrix portfolio approaches already discussed and as such
are sub j ect to many of the same reservations, but there are
additional potential dangers from the viewpoint of
competitiveness in Porter's approach.
Porter's	 approach is directed	 towards	 achieving
defensible niches in which there is potential for some
degree of monopoly.	 Otherwise, from an economic viewpoint,
free markets must in theory eventually destroy any
possiblity of profitability (beyond the cost of capital,
with some allowance for risk) through new competitors
entering the market. Porter draws on economics literature
originally directed
	 to	 explaining monopolistic	 and
oligopoljstjc competition, such as work on entry barriers,
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in order to draw up ground rules for the way companies can
direct themselves to areas of less intense competition.
"The intensity of competition in an industr y is neither
a matter of coincidence nor bad luck. Rather,
competition in an industry is rooted in Its underlying
economic situation and goes well beyond the behaviour
of current competitors."
(Porter, 1980)
It Is important for management to understand and manage this
situation.
Economic models, however, explicitly assume that all
competitors are equally efficient and that factors of
production are given for any o peration. This may be a
useful assumption in the exp lanation of the behaviour of
some markets, but it is a poor assumption in understanding
the	 situation between competitors.	 The existence of
considerable residual productivity differentials between
companies and countries, even after allowing for type of
equipment, scale etc is well documented (Pratten, 1976a and
b; CPRS, 1975). Even small improvements here or in other
areas of efficiency make an enormous impact on residual
profit margins and ROCE.	 Leibenstein (1966) demonstrated
moreover not only the importance of such	 efficiency
differentials in comparison to gains possible 	 through
allocative efficiency (Porter's arguments lie in the latter
area of economic theory ), but he also demonstrated the
importance of changes in X-efficiency in determining
competitive behaviour among companies.
Porter ma' well feel that in the long run efficiency
differentials against both actual and potential competitors
are less important from the viewpoint of strategy than the
gains from achieving a position of less intense competition.
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but this thesis is not full y supported. Moreover in the
long term even a reasonable degree of monopoly power may
well prove unsustainable as its existence sets up many
countervailing forces. It should also be noted that the
increasin g power of product and process changes continually
undermine any gains through monopoly power.
Many of Porter's themes are essentiall y exploitational.
The key strategic issues on which he focuses attention are
how a company can achieve less intense com petition, rather
than the key issues it needs to face in order to improve its
own performance and effectiveness relative to that of
competitors. In the lon g term this approach is likel y to
prove extremely dangerous. Firstly, particularly in markets
characterised by longer term business relationships such as
industrial markets, it is well established that prices are
considerably influenced by the notion of the fair price
(Bailey and Farmer, 1981), which limits exploitatiorial
possibilities. In the case of automotive component
suppliers, Ford for example have so phisticated procedures
for undermining attempts by. any supplier to increase their
degree of monopoly/exploitation.
Secondly, the intensity of competition is relentlessly
increasin g .	 Any company that achieves some temporary
cushioning against competition is likely to adapt
accordingly with overheads and inefficienc y tending to
increase (see Leibenstein, 1966), and many gains will be
eroded by additional wage settlements (others can play the
power game too).
	
Ultimately competition will anyway
intensify.	 Probably in the next severe downturn, price
levels will fall towards minimum cost levels.	 In this
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situation any companies which have not maintained maximum
pressure on cost reduction may later find their advantageous
bargaining position with respect to customers has anyway
become eroded.	 Any company that is relying on a marginally
better bargaining position may well find that it becomes
"locked in" to a more cushy "hi gh cost" position. 	 Others
showing greater commitment to increasing internal efficiency
and effectiveness may prove leaner, 	 fitter and	 more
adaptable	 in the face of the next wave of 	 intense
competition. This may prove of far greater benefit than any
small gains possible through bargaining power.
Porter's book (1980) i gnores the issue of real wages
not being the same for all competitors. This is
particularly important in the context of global competition
in which he takes a particular interest. The whole basis of
international trade theory in economics, the concept of
comparative advantage (see for example Ohlin, 1933) is that
over long periods of time real exchange rates in competitive
countries	 will move to offset competitive	 advantages
achieved by one country over another. It is well recognised
that considerable productivity differentials exist between
countries offset by real wage adjustments. B y discounting
both factors Porter's position here seems inconsistent with
international trade theory. The Boston Consulting Group's
international work does recognise the need to allow for
varying exchange rates.	 Porter's approach may therefore
risk underplaying the effects of real wage rate variations.
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2,38 Structural and organisational issues
The evolution of businesses into complex multiproduct
organisations, noted by Chandler (1962) and corroborated by
subsequent research in many countries including Britain, has
itself raised issues of strategic importance (Channori, 1973;
Rumelt, 197 1k; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976).
The promise of faster growth and risk reduction
presented by diversification or acquisition has received
cautious support in some recent research though the impact
on profitability has been more ambiguous (Newbould and
Luffmann, 1978). In the case of mergers and acquisitions a
multitude of research studies have resulted in no conclusive
support in respect to improved financial performance, and on
balance would suggest some degree of cynicism, particularly
from the viewpoint of acquirers, since any net benefit seems
to be often absorbed in the price premium paid	 to
shareholders	 of organisations acquired	 (Singh,	 1972;
Kitching, 1967).
However to date such studies have been at a fairly
aggregate level.	 Literature on business strategy would
suggest that benefits from such policies would depend on how
appropriate they were to the particular situations of
companies involved,	 and how effectively they were
implemented. Lubatkin (1983) suggests this would call for
subtler research methods, so that some assessment of the
business logic or synergy expected could be taken into
account.
One might expect the presence or absence of "synergy",
discussed in earlier literature (Ansoff,
	 1968) to be
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important, but although Rumelt (197 11) found some support for
the idea that diversifications into related activities were
in general more successful, there has also been evidence to
suggest acquisitions in totally different fields are j ust as
successful (Hogarty, 1970).
Evidence does suggest that the manner in which
acquisitions are planned and executed is important in
determining success or failure. Ansoff (1972) suggests that
organisations	 which	 have instituted	 formal	 planning
procedures do better.	 Others have suggested the importance
of the CEO's full involvement and commitment. The presence
or absence of individuals able to undertake the difficult
role of "change-masters" in such sensitive situations has
also been shown to be important (Mace and Montgomery, 1969)
and people issues generally appear to be hi ghly important.
A key problem identified is how businesses	 can
structure their organisations a ppropriately to meet new
problems	 entailed	 in	 managing Increased	 diversity.
Certainly	 there is evidence of a
	
transformation	 In
structure, as businesses broadly have moved towards
divisional forms of organisation in Chandler (1962), Channon
(1973), Dyas and Thanheiser (1976), and Rumelt (197 L ), but
	
only the latter demonstrates the link with	 improved
competitiveness in terms of financial performance.
There	 is a tendency to overstate the	 strategic
significance of the Issue. 	 The term "strategy" is used
almost as a misnomer for a particular strategy,
diversification, despite acknowledgement in the most recent
study on "strategy and structure" that by far the majority
of companies examined over the last decade had undergone no
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diversification at all (Luffman arid Reed, 1981k).
Dyas and Thanheiser (1976) introduce their study by
claiming that perhaps the key strategic problem facing
modern businesses is how to manage diversity. Whilst Europe
remained awestruck in the 1960's in the face of "the
American it was natural to focus on US companies'
sophisticated systems for managing highly developed and
complex corporations.	 In the context of conducive growth
conditions, handling associated or ganisational problems
seemed indeed a key issue if Europe was to catch up with the
competitiveness of US companies. In the last decade however
competition from US business has diminished and attention
has	 instead focused on Japanese competitors	 pursuing
different managerial approaches. The abilit y to manage
diversity (the issue still stressed in Luffman and Reed.
198!t). does not seem to be the key determinant of Japanese
competitive success.
Here subtler organisatiorial issues seem to be involved.
These may be less amenable to research techniques involving
such large numbers of companies. Structural issues such as
divisionalisation are relatively easy to establish as they
are usually evident from company annual reports; 	 subtler
organisational issues often call for treatment in
considerable depth (for example Pettigrew, 1985) and would
seem at least to require direct company access.
Since the inception of literature on management,
organisational issues have been a central area of interest.
Their importance has increased as the activities of modern
organisations	 have become more diverse. 	 More recent
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literature	 on strategy,	 whether in respect	 to	 its
formulation or implementation, gives greater reco gnition to
the	 influence of or ganisational factors (Johnson
	
and
Scholes, 1983).
As	 businesses	 further evolved,	 expanding	 their
operations internationally, additional organisationa].
problems were created and, as in the case of diversity, this
led to structural and organisational adaptions (Stopford,
1968). However it is increasingly recognised that many
issues necessaril y
 shape the choice of appropriate structure
and organisation, calling for a "contingency approach".
Yet the key problem, from the viewpoint of
competitiveness, seems to be how organisations can adapt to
the increased number', and speed 1
 of changes necessitated by
their competitive environment, an issue dating back to Burns
and	 Stalker's classic study
	
(1966).	 Competitiveness
ultimately
 stems from a system's performance along so many
dimensions.	 The problem as Saunders (198L.) argues is
obtaining greater or ganisational commitment for making the
necessary changes.
	 The final reason for differences in
performance	 is	 the accumulation of
	 slightly
	
better
performance in a host of s pecific areas, rather than any
single "bi g issue". Saunders believes that it is their
unique approach to this problem of organisational commitment
to change that has underlain the increased competitiveness
of Japanese manufacturers.
2.39 The need for an integrated contextual approach
Faced with such a multidimensional problem and so many
possible
	 approaches,	 those	 concerned	 to	 ensure
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competitiveness at the level of the firm have little choice
other than to employ an inte grated contextual approach.
This has been recognised in the classic approaches to
strategy that have emerged in recent years following writers
such as Drucker (1955), and is best expressed in the concept
of ensuring satisfactory !match t
 between an organisation's
internal policy areas and changing threats and opportunities
presented the external environment (Ansoff, 1968; Andrews,
1971; Argenti, 1976a, 1979, 1980; McCarthy, Minichiello and
Curran, 1979; Glueck, 1980; Johnson and Scholes, 1983).
Such approaches also recognise the influence of an
organisation's distinctive goals and the values of people
involved.	 Recent literature has given greater attention to
the need to understand the cultural context in which
decisions affecting competitiveness take place, and the
process by which strategy is formulated (Miles and Snow,
1978).	 Without this balance earlier approaches tend to
present a highly rational basis of analysis, but one which
is a little out of touch with the way in which decisions
affecting competitiveness actually take place (Johnson and
Scholes, 1983; Johnson, 198A).
The final purpose is to isolate key issues requiring
attention if competitiveness is to be safeguarded, so that
people involved at least reco gnise the difficult choices or
trade-offs they are making.
	 However this should not be a
passive, bureaucratised process of analysis, culminating in
over-general and inconclusive findin gs.	 Rather the purpose
is to sharply remind all concerned of key changes that must
be made to happen if competitiveness (which is ultimately
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the difference between prosperity and a survival crisis) is
to be assured.	 This requires an attitude of commitment,
recalling the almost militaristic analysis of writers such
as Ohmae.	 The aim is not passive, it is to transform the
prevailing culture.
The strategic issues raised by the need to sustain an
organisation's competitiveness cannot, therefore, be treated
as an isolated analytical problem.
	 Rather they are now
recognised as constituting a much wider problem of
"strategic management" (Houlden, 1985). Nor finall y can it
be divorced from the crucial problem of implementation.
Performance is likely to be better improved by simple
unsophisticated plans, even if only 80% right; where the
ability or commitment to implement them Is lacking even the
best strategic plans contribute nothing.
6L
2.4	 Literature on the vehicle and vehicle eomponenta
induBtries
Central	 Policy	 Review Staff	 (1975)	 incisively
summarises many key com petitive issues then facing UK
vehicle manufacturers: poor distribution networks,
inadequate products on offer, poor quality, late delivery,
lack of capital investment, poor labour relations and
excessive manufacturing costs. Dunnett (1980) indicates the
impact of political and economic factors such as stop-go
policies,	 sharply
	
varying taxation and hire purchase
arrangements.
As the impact of international competition increases,
volume also appears to be a problem for UK manufacturers.
OECD's "Long Term Outlook for the World Automobile Industry"
(1983) argues that com petition in the vehicle industry has
become more international for three main reasons: the
development of the EEC, the impact of Japanese exports, and
the advantageous cost position of newly developed countries.
Vehicle industries in Europe, the USA and Japan have all, it
is claimed, become steadily more concentrated as
manufacturers have pursued scale economies even at some cost
in flexibility ; the same process is expected to continue on
a worldwide basis.
This important argument calls for careful analysis. In
respect to Europe, which represents the largest world
market, Marfels (1983) finds little evidence of increased
concentration between 1970 and 1979; but the industry did
anticipate that increased US and Japanese competition would
result in further concentration and rationalisation in the
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1980's.
Altshuler et el (198A) offer a radically different
interpretation of worldwide developments to that of the
OECD. This report on behalf of MIT's International
Automobile Programme sees little evidence of production
movin g to low cost countries.	 Advantages of	 volume
production are said to have been eroded;	 instead both
market changes and technolo gical changes recently have
placed a premium on flexibilit y .	 World car developments,
intended	 to	 exploit the advantages	 of	 volume	 and
internationalisatiori, are riot viewed as having been
successful. The team also refute earlier suggestions that a
process of "maturit y" was takin g place in the industr y . See
also Jones (19 81 ), and Jones (1983a, p220) for a tabularised
summary of the two contrasting scenarios. MIT's scenario
offers a more attractive outlook for medium sized producers
such as BL, at least from the point of view of volume.
The	 underlying pattern of competition within the
industry	is	 argued to have undergone a number 	 of
transformations.	 Each stage has been associated with a
change in the competitive balance. A Schumpeterian view is
taken, with the pattern of com petition seen as propelled by
an ad j ustment process, with those behind trying to restore
the balance.	 Political interference has however often
proved Important (within limits) in this adjustment process.
Japan's competitive lead today Is viewed as the result
of a transformation as revolutionary as the one which gave
the USA its original domination over the industry. Not only
is it suggested, therefore, that the Japanese lead best
practice in respect to specific issues such as quality, but
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that the whole approach to management in Ja p an	 also
represents a step forward in managerial best practice.
	 The
suggestion that this has been the result of reversing
several managerial assumptions, however, raises crucial
questions in the area of competitiveness.
this new system utilizes several key concepts that
turn old ideas about production organization upside
down.	 The notion that quality costs more has been
reversed.	 Defect prevention turns out to cost less.
Similarly	the	 traditional assumption that 	 large
inventory buffers are needed for hi gh process yield has
been turned around.	 High yield, defined as a large
number of good parts per unit of operating time, seems
most likely to be obtained with very low buffers.
	 Yet
another notion that has been reversed is that output
can	 be	 increased and information about
	 factory
conditions can be obtained only through an independent
system of supervision and information reporting.
Instead of sending manufacturing orders from the top
down and bringing information from the bottom up, the
Japanese producers have learned that moving knowledge,
skills and decision making down the system into the
hands	 of the primary work force makes the
	 old
supervision	 and	 information-gathering 	 systems
redundant.	 Between the assemblers and suppliers the
Japanese have also pioneered new techniques.
	 The old
ideas that financial integration, top-down decision
making	 with tight control of product information,
multiple sourcing, and geographic dis persion are the
keys to production efficiency have given way
	 to
operational	 coordination	 combined with
	 financial
disaggregation,	 increased	 single	 sourcing,	 and
geographic concentration."
(Altshuler et al, 19814., ppll4.6-1L4.7)
Despite high volumes on some models, Japanese
competitive strength has generally relied less on a crude
volume approach and more on subtler issues such as the
flexibility yielded by their alternative approach.
	 The
Japanese vehicle industry resisted concentration, which
might have improved volumes, and also world car approaches.
Their system can handle increasing product variety and more
frequent model changes. Such flexibility and their strength
in small cars enabled them to take advantage of the second
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oil price increase in 1979 to gain considerable market share
in America;	 it also assisted rapid progress into the
European market between 1979 and 1980, before they were held
back by restrictions.	 The critical problem for the UK
industry
 then becomes one of bridging the gap with "best
practice" established by Japanese manufacturers;
	 undue
volume orientation could even prove to be a mistake.
Bhaskar, as well as examining the world situation, has
focused on issues facing the UK and European industr y .	 In
some senses Bhaskar (1981L) could be construed as having
become more o ptimistic from a UK viewpoint.
	 He also
recognises the increased importance of issues such as
flexibility (both in respect to the market and technology)
and he has moved away from earlier world car scenarios
(Bhaskar, 1980). Many UK problems identified by CPRS (1975)
have been tackled,the main ones remaining being poor quality
and excessive manufacturing costs (resulting from the high
exchange rate).
	 Bhaskar recognises that the Japanese lead
reflects a su perior approach to management, but cites Jaguar
as showing how UK managers elsewhere could respond:
"To defeat the Japanese, management may well have to
break with a tradition which has been central over 50
to 60 years. An example which illustrates this
concerns the decision to Invest in products without
financial j ustification alone. One of these qualities
is entrepreneurship, and although it is a very old
concept it seems to have been I gnored by the motor
industry recently."
(Bhaskar, 1981, p11)
Yet there is no margin for complacency.
	
Despite
revival in 19811.,	 such a rosy picture "obscures	 the
smouldering fuse of a time bomb".
	 Like the MIT team,
Bhaskar sees this threat as Japan.
	 He also sees government
as needing to play a major role in any ad j ustment process,
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but here he points to signs of both US and European
governments being "lulled into a false sense of security".
The issue of flexibility has not entirel y dispensed with the
problem of volume. Although the UK MIT team representative
(Jones, 1985a) has projected a much more o ptimistic future
(based on "dematurity" scenarios) for medium sized volume
producers such as BL, Bhaskar (1981) already sees problems
for European manufacturers strapped of cash, volume and
ploughback.	 Despite "optimistic noises" he sees some
evidence of a vicious s piral of decline.
Early academic research into the UK supplier industry
itself was largely descriptive and often included in studies
concerned primarily with the assembler sector (Rh ys, 1972;
Redden, 1975; Bhaskar, 1979). A number of Monopolies
Commission reports highlighted the competitive situation in
particular UK component markets. 	 The general picture
arising from these and Industry commentaries suggested a
healthier competitive situation internationall y than for the
assembly sector.
Methodologically,
	
the	 Price	 Commission	 (1979),
supported by overseas research in Germany, Japan and the USA
and more briefly in Sweden and Italy, set new standards,
though many results remained confidential; but the main
focus was on the consumer interest in the aftermarket, also
covering distribution. 	 The report at that time found
profitability to be reasonable, though not excessive and
plant	 and equipment reasonably comparable to that of
overseas	 rivals.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 increasing
internationalisation, it noted that UK automotive component
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manufacturers' working methods were relatively inefficient,
due particularly to industrial relations problems. This was
leading to "a gradual transference of work overseas" (ibid.
sections 6.18, 5.55 and 5.56).
Volume was also a particular problem for UK suppliers:
plagued by low volumes and poor and unreliable order
sizes, they had little incentive to invest and progress was
stagnating (ibid, section 5.7). However, citing an
extensive survey by Motoring Which? (April 1978) the y found
no evidence of UK component prices being internationally
uncompetitive: "Spare parts for British cars are generally
quite a bit cheaper than those for forei gn ones" (ibid.
section 7.31). To improve volume prospects, particularly in
the future,it was important to allow UK suppliers access to
the aftermarket associated with foreign
	 cars.	 Their
recommendation,	 to	 therefore	 disallow	 franchising
agreements, has now been implemented.
Though suggesting volume problems might also be offset
by	 further	 exports,	 the report noted	 the	 crucial
interdependence of UK assemblers and suppliers. The
importance of close linkages between the two sectors has
been particularly noted in the case of Japan (Anderson,
1981; Shimokawa, 1982 a and b; Jones, 1983a). The Commission
was concerned about potential damage to UK suppliers' long
term competitive situation should their negotiating position
not remain on an equal footing with UK assemblers (ibid,
paragraph 97, p12).
More recently, the competitive implications of the MIT
team's findings for UK suppliers have been highlighted by
their UK re presentative (Jones, 1983a).
	
Concepts such as
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"dematurity" are extended to the supplier sector, in a
manner also supported by Bannock (1983), and provide a more
optimisitic outlook.
Jones' recent component study (Bessant et al, 19811),
though limited to Austin Rover's West Midlands suppliers,
has produced hi ghly significant conclusions:
"The	 decline in UK production plus the lack of
competitiveness were also the principal reasons for a
drastic restructuring of the components industry"
(Bessant et al, 19811, p80)
The	 report	 indicates	 moves	 towards	 greater
concentration and rationalisatlon, but the key changes are
seen as a move to a "radicall y different management style",
and the need for closer customer involvement, particularly
in the context of j ust-in-time. There is also concern about
the way in which the pattern of competition is developing:
"The continuing effects of overcapacity and price war
have meant that it is not necessarily the best firms
which survive"
(Bessant et al, 19811, pLL9)
Like Altshuler et al (198L1) the report	 believes
technological and market changes have reduced critical
production levels necessary for scale economies for vehicle
assemblers, and it believes this has substantially enhanced
BL's survival prospects.	 Projections for future Austin
Rover production levels (Bessant et al, 19811. p23) seem
somewhat overoptimistic, but the report warns that a unique
opportunity could be missed by suppliers:
"If they cannot achieve the necessary production
increases then we foresee almost all of the gains from
ARG's increased volume being lost to forei gn supliers"
(Bessant et al, 19811, pBl)
In fact suppliers have little margin for complacency.
These projections are based on overseas sourcing at Austin
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Rover increasin g from 15% in 1983 to 25% in 1986. Austin
Rover, havin g completed its own restructurin g over the last
six years, now requires the supplier sector to do the same.
More recently, Jones (1985b) warns that suppliers' markets
are bein g damaged by a shar p increase in "tied component
imports" by multinational assemblers.
If Jones' scenario for BL does prove overoptimistic
this only adds weight to his expressed concern that the
competitive gap identified in the supplier sector represents
a ma j or problem. The report calls for further research into
the supplier sector and suggests:
"It would be necessary in addition to proceed on a
product by product basis based on good research into
the current and future prospects of each product group"
(ibid. )
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3. Mathodo1ow
3.1 Conceptual approach
Research from particular disciplines, such as
marketing, has contributed to an understanding of the
problem of UK competitiveness (eg Doyle, Saunders and Wong,
1985).	 Such	 studies	 are characterised by rigorous
methodologies. - Hypotheses, being well grounded in an
established literature, can be carefully formulated and
tested along fairly scientific lines and in a manner giving
confidence as to the general applicability of research
findings.
However, because competitiveness is a multidimensional
issue, I have chosen instead a multidisciplinary approach.
I have aimed at a more rounded understanding of the
situation in a particular industry, makin g use of case
studies to add a greater depth of understanding.
Taken in its multidimensional sense, there is no
comprehensive theory of competitiveness.	 The key factors
involved vary from one industry to another. 	 My research
emphasis has therefore been less concerned with the
"verification of theory": like Glaser and Strauss (1967,
p233), I found it necessary to pursue a "grounded approach",
guided as much by substantive issues as by more general
theory. As they have argued, the criterion of
methodological rigour then depends more heavily "on the
detailed elements in the actual strategies used for
collectin g , coding, analysing and presenting data" (ibid.
p224).
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3.2 Appz'osch Adoptid
The competitive Bituation facin g UK automotive
component manufacturers can only be understood in the
context of the business environment to which they are
exposed. I therefore analysed developmentB in the upstream
vehicle assembly industry by reviewing academic and trade
literature and other published sources such as official
statistics. In addition I approached a number of vehicle
companies (one in the UK, one in Germany, and five in Japan)
to examine more closely issues of concern to the component
sector.
Because	 of the scale and complexity of the UK
automotive component industry, I chose a small number of
product sectors for close examination. This raises more
practical problems than taking a purely company based
approach because companies such as GKN are engaged in a
number of product activities. However, to address the issue
of competitiveness it was essential to focus on situations
in which manufacturers were directly competing against each
other, so that "winners" and "losers" in the competitive
game could really be distinguished. Also apart from the
question of what one UK component manufacturer needs to do
to outperform another, an important issue addressed by this
study is what can be done to improve their collective
performance. Comparisons with international competitors are
more illuminating between manufacturers of the same
products, actually in direct competition with each other.
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3,3 Chaia. of Product sctoro
Product characteristics likely to affect the pattern of
competition were derived partly from the academic literature
and partly from an overview of the automotive components
industry.
	
Literature on business competition suggested
different patterns of competition might be expected in cases
of high versus low technology,
	
of new versus mature
products, of monopolistic versus fragmented industries. The
impact of international competition might also be expected
to depend on product related characteristics such
	 as
opportunities provided by technology or scale economies, or
logistical considerations. 	 An overview of the industry
suggested	 an	 important distinction	 between	 original
equipment and aftermarkets and also (Redden, 1975) indicated
that	 a substantial proportion of automotive component
manufacturers su pplied only about 30% of their components to
the automotive market.
The small number of product sectors examined in detail
clearly could not be representative in any statistical sense
but, as shown in Table 11, they were chosen to cover many of
the range of characteristics expected to affect the pattern
of competition.
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Table 11 Characteristics of automotive product sectors
chosen for close examination
Charac-	 ball andforgingselectronjclexhaust
	 spark :brake
	
teristics :roller :
	 :instrumen-:systems : plugs :linings
	
:bearings:
	
Itation	 :
Automotive: only
	
quite	 very	 I very	 very I very
dependarice 30%
	 I high	 I high	 high	 : high I high
	
•	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Expected	 very
	
fairly I medium	 very
	
very I fairly
radius of : hi gh	 I low	 I low	 I hi gh	 high
competi-	 I	 :	 :
tion	 I	 :	 I
	
•	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Main	 Ioriginallorjgjnal orisina1 	 after-	 after- after-
market	 lequip- lequip- I equi'-	 :market	 Imarket Imarket
:ment	 Iment	 I ment
	
•	 I	 I	 I	 -	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Pattern ofloli gop- frag-	 I fairly	 loligop- Ifairly fairly
competi- Iolistic Imented
	 monop-	 Iolistjc Imonop- loligop-
tion	 1	 1 olistic	 OE but	 Iolisticlolietic
but new IAN more I
I entrants Ifrag-
:mented
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
•	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Technologymedium Ifairly
	
high	 I low	 Imedium Imedium
	
I	 Ii	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 1j.OW	 •	 ,
	
I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Importance quite Ifairl y
	high	 low	 : quite I quite
of scale	 high	 :10w	 1	 1 high : high
economies :
	 :	 :
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
3.t& Examination of Product Sectors
Individual product sectors chosen were first reviewed
through desk research - market research and trade
association reports where available, press and trade zlournal
articles, official reports (eg the Monopolies Commission,
the EEC and NEDO) and official statistics (eg Census of
Production and trade statistics).
	 Manufacturers were
identified through national and international trade
directories.	 Their annual reports were anal ysed and
additional desk research was undertaken in the case of key
manufacturers.	 The main perspective was on the period from
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the early 1970's, when UK vehicle production was at its
peak, but some further historical context was built up.where
possible. Where, as in automotive bearings and automotive
forgings, the automotive industr y represented one of a
number of markets, additional research was carried out into
the component sector more generally.
I then carried out interviews with selected UK and
overseas automotive component manufacturers, between 1981
and the first half of 1983. The purpose was to get an
overall picture of the pattern of com petition. Where only a
small number of key UK competitors were involved, as in
automotive ball and roller bearin gs, the aim was to visit as
many as would allow access. Where large numbers were
involved, as in automotive forgings, all major companies
were approached, together with a selection of smaller
companies	 covering	 the	 range	 of	 sizes.	 Overseas
manufacturers approached included major competitors
identified together with a wider selection drawn from
international trade directories.
Because of the possible commercial sensitivity of
competitive issues, companies were first approached at Chief
Executive level and offered a veto, if necessary, prior to
publication on any sensitive material contributed in the
course of visits or interviews.
A structured interview approach was used. Companies
varied considerably in their situations and issues discussed
were rarely amenable to simple answers. A flexible approach
was employed, using many "open" questions in order to allow
companies to focus on what they saw as their key competitive
problems.	 A typical questionnaire used as a startin g point
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for such discussions is shown as Appendix A.1.
The pattern of these interviews varied, but generally
included some discussion with either the Chief Executive or
some senior company representative. I was then directed to
appropriate company personnel to pursue questions on
specific topic areas - typically executives involved in
planning, marketing, product development and production. In
most cases I was able to tour the factory to gain a fuller
appreciation of technical and manufacturing developments.
Where access was particularly good, repeat visits were
carried out to add further depth to discussions.
To gain further understanding of the	 competitive
situation facing UK component manufacturers, overseas
manufacturers were also visited in Germany, Japan and the
USA. Germany is the most si gnificant competitor in terms of
direct trade in automotive components. Indirect competition
(via vehicle manufacturers) is also important. Since
components represent some 70% of the manufacturing costs of
Japanese cars, the competitive impact of their component
industry on UK component manufacturers has (to date) been
more indirect than direct. Similarly, US component
manufacturers were visited because of the competitive
significance of the US automotive industry.
Overseas interviews were carried out to complement the
analysis of competitive situations affecting UK component
manufacturers. In addition emphasis was placed on four main
comparative themes:
a) comparison of productivity levels;
b) comparison of manufacturing develo pments under1ing
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differences in production performance levels;
c) comparison of senior executives1 production
management and en gineers, in terms of education.
training and previous experience;
d) comparison of approaches to longer term planning and
strategy formulation at senior executive level.
A typical questionnaire used as a basis for structured
interviews with overseas manufacturers is shown in Appendi,
A. 2.
Despite the potential problem of confidentiality,.
access to companies was generally good as is shown in Table
12:
Table 12 Number of companies accessed
jJJ	 Germany.'	 Japan	 J1A
Automotive
ball and roller
bearings	 7
Automotive forgings
	 11
Automotive
instrumentation	 2
Automotive
exhaust systems
	 8
Automotive spark
plugs	 1
Automotive brake
linings	 1
Other automotive
components	 -
Vehicle customers 	 1
2	 3	 2
1	 3	 1
-.	 2	 -
-	 1	 1
-.	 1	 1
2	 2	 -
2	 1	 -
1	 5	 -
The automotive ball and roller bearings sector
given particular emphasis.
	 Since product characterjst1e
were conducive to international trade and competition,,
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competitive developments in that sector were felt likely to
indicate	 future	 developments in less	 internationally
developed sectors. Access was achieved to all seven
automotive ball and roller bearings manufacturers in the UK
and to most of the major overseas manufacturers.
With over one hundred forging manufacturers in the UK
alone it was impractical to visit all manufacturers. Three
of the four largest companies were visited, including GKN
Forgings which accounts for over 60% of UK automotive
forgings production. A further cross section of
manufacturers was also visited to reflect the situation
across the size range down to much smaller companies.
Both	 of	 the	 two	 independent UK	 automotive
instrumentation companies were visited.
	 They have since
combined their operations.
In the automotive exhaust system sector 1 which is
fairly fragmented, the largest UK manufacturer and six
others (across the size range) were visited.
Briefer studies were also carried out in two other
sectors. The largest independent manufacturers of
automotive spark plugs were visited in the UK, the USA and
Japan. In brake linings, access was only achieved in the
case of one out of the three ma j or UK manufacturers but
useful comparisons were drawn from visits to manufacturers
in Germany and Japan. A small number of overseas visits was
made to manufacturers of other automotive components,
prinaipally axles, brake assemblies, and wheels.
Interviews were also carried out with representatives
from trade associations, consulting companies, specialist
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research centres and relevant government de partments, and
with academic researchers, both in the UK and overseas.
3.5 Checking for generality
Initial research overviewing the automotive components
industry was later extended in order to check whether
research themes emerging from the product sectors examined
applied more generally. Some themes, such as the strategic
importance of developments taking place in the area of
production,	 are	 inherently difficult to check at an
aggregated level.
	 It was however possible to review other
relatively well documented automotive product sectors, such
as engines and tyres.
	 I also made use of a small number of
visits to miscellaneous automotive component companies.
The pattern of company performances across the industry
more generally was analysed by aggregating performance
figures published by Inter Company Comparisons: for
strategic assessment, data is needed over a reasonable time
period and I was able to use continuous data over 7 years
for 66 companies and over 12 years for 24 companies.
For all products for which data was available, Census
of Production data over many years was analysed in
conjunction with trade figures, so as to complete market
analysis as far as possible.	 This data enabled me to
examine the industry's collective international performance.
Finally, another theme emerging from the study was the
importance to this industry's competitive situation of UK
economic choices more generally (particularly in respect to
pressure on real wage levels). To examine this issue I again
made use of aggregated data.
8i
4,, fl Vehicle IndustrY
41 IntroductIon
This section reviews upstream developments in the
vehicle industry in greater detail, to give an appreciation
of the competitive environment to which UK component
manufacturers are exposed.
Since OE components represent about 60% of most
European vehicle assemblers' costs (Knibb, 1983, p121), the
competitive fortunes of UK assemblers and their suppliers
would appear highly interde pendent,	 as highlighted in
section 2.4.
	 The competitiveness of the component industry
is critically dependent on the strength of its home market
base;	 yet any erosion in the competitive position of UK
vehicle	 assemblers	 is likely to reflect	 fundamental
weaknesses within the supplier sector, in addition to more
obvious	 knock-on effects.	 Conversely,
	
any sustained
improvement in the competitiveness of UK vehicle assemblers
is likely to depend on whether any such weaknesses in the
supplier industry are satisfactorily rectified.
Section 2.4 indicated two competing scenarios.	 One
emphasises an international process of concentration and
rationalisation (linked particularly to the problem of
volume); the other emphasises subtler issues and argues for
a radically different scenario.	 Their implications are
quite different both for the future outlook of the UK
component industry and for its relationshi ps with UK vehicle
assemblers.	 Arguments will be reviewed in a historical
perspective.
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4.2 Historical p.r.p.otiv.
At the turn of the century Europe was still pre-
eminent.	 In 1906 France and Germany accounted for 58% of
worldwide vehicle production (Altshuler et al, 198A, piLl.).
Its position also being strong, Britain strongly advocated
free trade and maintained no tariffs on auto imports until
World War I.
An almost revolutionary change then took place in the
pattern of com petition, transferring the competitive lead to
US manufacturers.	 Ford's Model T marked radical changes
both in production methods (with the introduction 	 of
continuous assembly ) and also in the approach to management
and	 organisation.	 Between 1910 and 1921 Ford fully
exploited experience benefits associated with volume, by
modernising	 plants,	 vertically integrating to	 reduce
purchasing	 costs,	 eliminating model changes 	 and	 by
increasing the division of labour. 	 Costs were cut by three
quarters as US market share increased from 10 to 55%
(Abernathy and Wayne,	 197Ll.).	 This more "scientific"
approach to management, based on the division of
manufacturing skills and routinisation of complex tasks, was
further developed during the early 1920's by Alfred Sloan at
General Motors. The US competitive lead, encouraged by a
substantial home market, continued until almost 1955. The
development of competition over this period was dominated by
adjustments taking place in other countries as they sought
to deal with this competitive gap. 	 American domination in
car production over this period is demonstrated in Table 13.
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Car productIon 1929-1955 ('000 unit8)
192Q	 icn8	 95Q	 1955
World	 5,355	 3,074	 8,168	 11,015
N America	 4,791	 2,143
	
6,950	 8,295
w EuroPe	 5511.	 879	 1,110	 2,486
Japan	 -	 -	 2	 20
UK	 341	 523	 898
N America/world %	 89	 70	 85	 75
W Europe/world %
	
10	 29	 111.	 23
UK,/W Europe X	 39	 47	 36
Source: SMMT Yearbooks
The US also led in commercial vehicles, but the UK
position here was stronger. In 1955 the US produced
1,250,000 commercIal vehicles compared to 340,000 in the UK
arid onl y 49,000 in Japan.
Faced with so large a competitive gap all major
European countries and also Japan responded with high
tariffs and other protective measures. Even Britain
sustained a 33.3% tariff (originally introduced as a wartime
measure in World War I) up until 1960. In addition, It
introduced a horsepower tax disadvantageous to the US and
steep tariffs were extended to tyres and other components.
Both Ford and General Motors responded by establishing
manufacturing operations in Britain and Germany between 1925
and 19311.; but stronger protectionism in Japan went further
and prevented such moves. The US presence in Europe spurred
efforts to brid ge the gap with world "best practice", both
as regards new technology and new managerial approaches. US
multinationals were also an important influence in the
supplier sector, for example Champion (s park plugs), Timken
(tapered roller bearings), Borg Warner (gearboxes), and
Cuimnins (engines).
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Since the introduction of Ford's Model T volume has
been an important factor shaping competition. 	 Specialist
manufacturers of highly differentiated products (eg Morgan,
Lotus and, on a larger scale, Mercedes) have been less
affected than "volume	 who represent the bulk of
the market.	 However even volume producers have always had
to balance the pursuit of scale economies associated with
volume against the need to preserve flexibility, both in
terms of marketing and manufacturin g policies. In 1927 the
insensitivity of Ford's extreme volume orientated approach
to a changed pattern of market demand led to a one year
close-down as the company was finally forced into retooling
for a completely new model, and a total reversal in the
market share position a gainst General Motors (Abernathy and
Wayne, 1974).
Nevertheless, rationalisation and concentration have
generally been driven by the search for scale economies,
even perhaps at a cost to flexibilit y. OECD (1983, p11)
points out that the number of US automakers fell from 80 in
1920 to 30 in 1930 and about 9 in 1950 (today the top 3
produce 95% of US cars), and they argue that a similar
process of concentration has taken place in Europe and
Japan.
Heterogeneous markets within Europe appear to have
frustrated the achievement of scale economies comparable to
the USA,	 despite progress in other 	 respects.	 The
competitive gap just before World War II was still evident:
even Ford's modern facilit y at Dagenham had higher delivery
costs in Europe than vehicles brought in from Detroit
des pite shipping rates and hi gher US wages (Altshuler et al,
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19811, p18).
However by 1955 the European vehicle industry had
virtually recovered from the effects of war. During the
next 15 years its share of world output rose substantially
whilst the American position waned, as shown in Table ill.
Table 1/1. Car production 1955-1970 ('000 vehicles)
Year	 1955	 1960	 1965	 1970
World	 11,015
	
12,985
	
19,281	 22,755
N America	 8,295
	
7,001	 10,016	 7,11.91
W Europe	 2,1186	 5,120	 7,519	 10,379
Japan	 20	 165
	 696	 3,179
UK	 898	 1,353
	 1,722	 1,611.1
N America/world %	 75	 511	 52	 33
W Europe/world %
	 23	 39	 39	 11.6
Japan/world %	 0.2	 1	 U.	 111.
UK/W Europe %	 36	 26	 23	 16
Source: SMMT Yearbooks
Europe's fast growing markets were still protected by
hi gh external tariffs until about 1960. Even then
manufacturers in America took little interest in European
markets, which were distinctive in terms of consumer tastes
(particularly in respect to size) and still relatively
heterogeneous.
Intra-Euro pean trade grew rapidly,
	
encouraged by
falling internal tariff barriers. This enabled
manufacturers to sell their more specialised products in all
the markets of Europe in sufficient quantities to realise
reasonably good production economies. 	 As its volume
situation improved, the European industry also gained in
competitive strength because of its flexibility.
Manufacturers, still more numerous than in America, competed
vigorously in the face of a wide range of design
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requirements. Though partially offsettin g improvements in
terms of volume, this generated equally wide ranging and
often highly innovative technical solutions, such as front
wheel drive.	 Following GATT, technological innovativeness
and overall flexibility not only enabled European
manufacturers to defend their own fast growing markets, but
it also enabled them to counter-attack US competitors' Own
markets in some limited market segments. Later, in the wake
of the oil crisis, flexibilit y (as well as a focus on
smaller vehicles) was to prove even more important.
Britain, partly because of its isolated position in
Europe and partly through problems of its own makin g , did
not fully participate in the resurgence of European
competitiveness. Its share of Western European vehicle
output fell steadily from 36% in 1955 to 16% in 1970, as was
shown in Table 111.
1L3 The rise of Japan
Though the competitive gap against the US had been
brid ged, Europe's resurgence was more due to its abilit y to
defend its own fast growing markets, than to any competitive
supremacy capable of dominatin g rivals elsewhere. Yet
Japan's almost exponential rise in vehicle output, already
evident in Table 11, reflected a transformation in the
competitive situation as significant as that Instigated by
US manufacturers earlier in the century (Altehuler et al,
198fl).
As Shimokawa (1981, p27k) argues, "both macro and micro
factors have increased international competitiveness in the
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Japanese auto industry". Without commitment at government
level to the protection and development of this industry.
Japanese manufacturers could never have survived Western
competition at any time up until the late 1950's. They were
behind on technolpgy and beset with industrial relations
problems	 affecting both quality and efficiency .	 The
government fostered the industry 's development through
assistance on licensing overseas know-how and through the
provision of scarce financial resources (McArdle et al,
1985, ppA7-A8). Their system of industrial and conglomerate
groups, in turn supported by the banking system, also helped
directly. MITI attempted, at an early stage, to rationalise
vehicle assemblers by reducing their numbers and also to
encourage the development of an independent supplier sector.
Both attempts were aimed at benefits from volume more
comparable to those of Western competitors; but both failed.
The main contribution made by Japan's uni que industrial
system was that it actually succeeded in fosterin g virile
domestic competition, whilst at the same time providing a
system of	 close collaborative relationships 	 between
businesses, and particularly assemblers and suppliers
(Shimokawa, 1981). Japanese economic choices, such as their
hi gh savings ratio, allowing low interest rates and low
exchange rates have also produced a conducive climate for
business growth.
At the micro level, following the break-up of the
intense Nissan strike in 1955, the Japanese modelled a
unique labour relations approach, aimed at gaining much
greater participation and flexibility on the shopfloor.
Lifetime employment and uni que payment schemes played an
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important role.	 More fundamentally however they turned
upside down conventional organisational approaches based on
the division of labour and scientific management. The
number of layers of management were drastically reduced
(just as Nissan is now doing in the USA, Financial Times
17.2.85, p8) and a new approach was developed with attention
focused onto shopfloor work groups.
In this context it was possible to adopt a new
manufacturin g philosophy, though progress was slow and
incremental, taking effect over a matter of 20 years. The
approach was characterised by a commitment to securin g long
term benefits of organisational learning even at the expense
of short term problems. As indicated in 2.11, concepts such
as "total quality" and just-in-time systems of stockless
production (linking in suppliers also) turned established US
manufacturing ideas upside down.
The system has yielded levels of quality, productivity,
efficiency and flexibility (both in terms of varying orders
and in terms of the ability to handle an increasing variety
of new products) as yet unmatched elsewhere. By the early
1980's the Japanese cost advantage over US manufacturers in
small cars has been estimated at $1,500 (at 215 yen/$;
Altshuler et al, 19811).
As international trade barriers fell the impact was
felt initially in particular market segments, but became
more significant after the oil crisis and as successive
generations of products have gradually been introduced.
Table 15 shows how the division of world auto production has
been affected in more recent years.
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Tab1e_t5 Car production 1970-1983 ('000 vehicles)
Year	 1970	 1973	 1978	 1983
World	 22,755
	 29,609	 31,226	 29,11.911.
N America	 7,11.91
	
10,895
	 10,315
	 7,750
W Europe	 10,379	 11.11.72
	 11.321	 11,116
Japan	 3,179
	
11,11.70
	 5,748	 7,152
UK	 1,641	 1,7117
	 1,223
	
1,045
N America/world %	 33	 37	 33	 26
W Europe/world %
	
46	 39	 36	 38
Japan/world %
	
111.	 15	 18	 211.
UK/W Europe %	 16	 15	 11	 9
Source: SMMT Yearbooks
The Japanese share, Just over 1% in 1960, is now
virtually on a par with North America (in 1982 it was
ahead).
In spite of GATT and free trade rhetoric European
governments responded, Just as they had had to when faced
with the earlier rise in US competitiveness, with measures
aimed at some degree of protection.	 This has helped to
stabilise the European position. Restrictions have so far
held the Japanese share of the European market to about 11%,
whereas some estimate that unfettered this share would rise
to about 25% (Marketing 1 1 .3.85, pp3O-32). History suggests
that although protection can play an important role for a
time, it can only stave off an inevitable process of
adJus tmen t .	 There seems to be a recognition, shared by the
US government which in 1985 abandoned the "voluntary
restraint agreement", that the scope for such measures is
perhaps now more limited.
European	 manufacturers cannot escape
	
Japanese
competition either in the now open US market, or in other
markets.	 Since the early 1970's European car exports have
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fallen from 3m to 1.3m units. Ford claim Japanese
manufacturers alone have eliminated 1.ôm European exports as
well as taking im car sales in the European home market
(Financial Times 16.10.84, p 1).	 European overcapacity in
1984 was estimated at 2.3m units or nearly 20% (ibid, ply),
leadin g to vicious price competition.	 Many progressive
European manufacturers (e g Ford Europe) are	 pursuing
competitive standards set by Japan and finding the lessons
applicable to their own European situation. Thus any
European country or company which does not ra p idly close the
competitive gap with Japan faces inescapable competition
from other European competitors who are doing so, as well as
increasin g Japanese competition based within Europe itself
(such as Nissan and Honda).
	
As Table 15 shows, the UK
vehicle industry 's share of Western European production has
fallen	 back to only 9%:
	
its position	 would	 seem
particularly precarious.
4.4 Globalisation of aompetition
Most commentators would acknowledge the pressing need
for vehicle assemblers (and indeed their suppliers) to
bridge the competitive gap with Japan; but whether or not
these new developments will lead to further concentration in
the world vehicle industr y is more contentious. Following
the firBt impact of Japanese competition, many felt the
answer to be yes.	 Moves to smaller, more fuel efficient
vehicles	 seemed to be bringing world markets 	 closer
together. General Motors and Ford responded by attempting
to exploit benefits associated with internationalisation and
volume by developing "world cars" such as GM'S "3" car and
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Ford's Escort.	 In addition major international link-ups
such as tetween GM an Toyota seemed to confirm "world car
scenarios"	 of	 increasing	 internationalisation	 and
rationalisation.	 Japanese competition was seen as merely
catalytic to this process.
The MIT team however point to a radically different
scenario in the wake of the transformation they see as
having taken place in the pattern of competition. Improved
methods developed by the Japanese now place a premium on
flexibility; crude volume orientation may be dangerous, as
it proved to be for Ford in 1927.
Europe, the largest market, still displays distinctive
preferences and different patterns of segmentation. 	 French
customers still prefer their own distinctive styling,
and Italians prefer smaller cars suited to their narrow
streets, whilst the German market tends to polarise between
good quality, fairly practical cars (eg the VW Polo) and
more expensive, luxury, high performance cars (eg BMW and
Mercedes).	 National companies still orientate their models
primarily to their national markets.
Market segmentation has become even more complex, with
differentiation not merel y on the basis of size but also
along entirely independent dimensions of luxury, utility,
economy and performance. "Down-sizin g" has compressed model
ranges, but intensified competition has led to an increased
variety of product offerings, as even volume manufacturers
such as VW/Audi, Renault, Fiat and Peugeot have placed
greater emphasis on product differentiation. 	 Also, ARMC's
forecast to 1987 (Financial Times, 2.8.85, plI) suggests most
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of the 500,000 units of additional market demand expected in
Europe will go to s pecialist producers such as Mercedes,
BMW, Volvo and Saab, rather than to volume producers.
Specialist segments have also become more profitable.
These developments have been supported by much more
flexible systems of vehicle manufacture; Bessarit et al
(198 1. ) argues, for example, that new toolin g systems and
manufacturing methods (along lines pioneered in Japan) have
enabled BL to reduce the critical level for scale economies.
There	 has	 been an	 explosion	 of	 technological
innovations:
- electronic	 developments	 aimed at	 fuel	 economy
(engine/drive train management systems), safety (anti-
skid	 systems)	 and	 product	 differentiation	 and
convenience (instrumentation)
- use of new materials aimed at wei ght	 reduction
(plastics) or safety (windscreen materials)
- new concepts in vehicle design
Patenting activity has increased sharply in Japan, the USA
and Germany, though Britain appears to lag behind (Jones,
1983a, p227).
The conflicting demands of volume and flexibility have
been partly reconciled by an emerging pattern of both
competition and cooperation between vehicle assemblers and
also component manufacturers, analogous to the pattern of
competition which has for many years existed in Japan.
Extensive j oint ventures, such as between BL and Honda, are
already widespread (eg joint engine development by Renault,
Peugeot and Volvo) and seem likely to increase. The same
pressure is forcing much closer cooperation
	 between
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assemblers and their suppliers (eg BL and Perkins on diesel
engine development for the Rover V6) and also between
component manufacturers themselves.
These	 factors modify any scenario of	 increasing
concentration (even among volume producers). 	 Altshuler et
a]. (19811, p183) argue that this and the likelihood of, if
necessary, protective intervention mean "there are likel y to
be about as many automakers 20 years from now as today". On
this basis prospects for medium volume producers such as BL
are much brighter. Similar thinking leads Bessant et al
(19811, p23) to expect Austin Rover's output to increase from
360,000 vehicles in 1982 to 575,000 in 1986.
MIT seem to have been correct in debunking more extreme
world car scenarios. The Japanese competitive advantage
does appear to be based more on flexibilit y than on volume,
as Bhaskar (19811) would also seem to argue.	 GM and Ford do
seem to have misjudged the market in introducin g their world
cars.	 For example, the US market moved sharply away from
European-type small cars just as the Escort/Lynx and ideas
of rationalislin g parts between Europe and America did not
work out in practice. Bannock (1983, p38). pointed out that
95% of components for the US version were sourced locally.
The most recent Financial Times survey (11.9.85, pX) has
summarised the situation: "The first world cars appeared as
recently as 1980 but already the concept seems to be as old-
fashioned and outdated as a model T Ford".
Yet whilst they are correct in pointing out the dangers
of simplistic scenarios and of crude volume orientated
strategies,	 I	 believe they may have understated the
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significance of volume in a broader sense. 	 In consequence,
Bessant et al's (198L&) conclusions about the prospects for
medium sized volume car producers seem to be 	 over-
optimistic.
Bhaskar suggests overcapacity in Europe, currently
about 2.5m cars p.a., could reach I1.m by 1990 if present
trends continue (Financial Times 11.9.85, pXII).	 Pressure
for	 rationalisation will be compounded by
	
investment
demanded by the accelerated pace of technical innovation,
and the need for new plants and models.	 Marfels (1983,
pxvii) cited the US industry as planning investment of about
*75bri. DRI Europe (1985, p15) point out that 198LJ. was the
fifth consecutive year of aggregate losses by European
vehicle manufacturers and that an aggregate cash haemorrhage
of $2bn p.a. over the same period has left a legacy of
balance sheet weaknesses.	 They see signs of both bankers
and governments losing patience (see also Financial Times
11.9.85, pXII). At the same time, "The average expected
product sales-life in Europe is still currently 8 years,
when Japanese competitors are moving towards IL years (as for
instance Mazda with the 323).	 GM's replacement of the
Kadett after just 5 years has set a new standard in Europe."
Marfels'	 (1983) survey suggested European vehicle
assemblers	 expected	 further	 concentration	 and
rationalisatiori would result from increased competition from
the USA as well as Japan. 	 US manufacturers reported an
aggregate surplus of $2Obn in 198LL ( Financial Times
11.9.85, p1) and their new model programmes are impressive.
GM's Saturn, for example, represents a massive $3.5bn
investment aimed at overcoming the substantial Japanese cost
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advantage. Japanese aggregate profits in 198LL were reported
at $L&bn (Financial Times 11.9.85. p1). Bhaskar (1981. p12)
warns of further improvements in Japanese models' "product
characteristic index" comprising factors such as style,
performance, comfort and handlin g, cost and maintenance.
Japanese models are also ahead on quality and reliability
(ibid, pp3Ol-303).
Some rationalisation is already happening. 	 Knlbb
(1982) points out that the number of uni que vehicle marques
in Europe has fallen from 50 in 1972 (cars and commercial
vehicles) to 3LI in 1982 and projects a further fall to no
more than 25 by 1992.	 In 1978 there were 78 vehicle models
with ilL accountin g for 85% of the market. 	 By 1990 Mnibb
estimates the number will fall to no more than 1L6 with 6
models taking 60% of the market.
Larger multinational assemblers are particularly
affected. Poor profitability has forced Peugeot and Renault
to retrench. Ford, des pite better profitability, has had to
cut back its international operations and is now linking
with Ford.	 Even VW has cut back in the USA.	 Gooding
(Financial Times,
	
3.5.85, p13) suggests the only car
assemblers with credible multinational operations in the
1990's will be VW in Europe, GM arid Ford in the USA, and
Nissan, Toyota, Mitsubishi and Honda in Japan.
chairman,	 Carl Hahn,	 argues that	 European
manufacturers cannot afford to draw back into the European
market: "We already see the Americans in Europe and the
beach-heads of the Japanese in Europe ... this IS the
future: one world market for cars where the customer is
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pampered by every automobile manufacturer in the world"
(Financial Times, 3.5.85, p13).
Hahn does not accept that the emer ging networks of
collaboration	 between assemblers (and their	 component
suppliers) will stave off such pressures: 	 "Links for
components do not change your core problems. You have to
have a sound base". Another plank in MIT'S argument is that
FMS production methods will enable medium sized volume
producers such as BL to obtain production economies, with
plant output as low as 2L0,O00 cars p.a.. 	 DL has achieved
real progress towards greater flexibility. It has also
during the last year cut its "concept to production" time
down from 5 to 3.5 years, but as DRI Europe (1985, p17)
point out:
"the leap between current practice and this Utopic
future (heralded for instance in the MIT study) and
where sixteen passenger car manufacturers could
theoretically all operate at competitive production
levels by utilising the latest manufacturing technology
is a very long one, and probably beyond the ability of
many partici pants to fund".
They conclude:
"Major changes in the relative share of each volume
manufacturer are liable to take place."
Like Bhaskar (198i) DRI also point to further threats
from Japan, whose share of world car output they project
rising from 2L16% in 198A to 30% by 1990. Given moves also
by US manufacturers, this must have a further catalytic
effect on acceleratin g world rationalisation. Thus, whilst
crude volume orientated strategies such as "world car"
developments may well be dangerous as MIT indicate, the
scenario of further concentration in the world industry
cannot be entirely dismissed. 	 On this scenario the
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prospects for UK vehicle assemblers such as BL and for their
suppliers are likely to hang on a knife edge once the
immediate upturn Is over.
Table 15 showed that UK vehicle manufacturers' market
share even within Western Europe fell from 15% in 1973 to 9%
in 1983. Table 16 analyses recent developments in the UK
market.
Table 16 UK market shares (%)
1973	 1978	 1983
	
31.9	 23.5
	
22.6	 16.1
	
18.7	 8.3
15.8
15.5
1.0
2.1
7.9
13. Li
10.2
10.8
23.2
32. Li
10.0
23.6
311. 0
UK produced:	 BL
Ford
Vauxhall arid
Talbot
UK assembled:	 BL
Vauxhall and
Talbot
Captive imports: Ford
Vauxhall and
Talbot	 0.3
Other imports:	 Japanese	 5.6
European	 20.9
UK produced	 72.3
UK assembled	 -
Captive imports	 0.3
Other imports	 26.5
Source: Bessant et al (198L1),p11
3.7
0.6
Li. Li
10.9
2fl.. 5
117. 8
3.8
13.0
35.11
UK decline may be traced largely to BL's weak position
in the market. The other critical factor is that more
powerful companies such as Ford and GM have relied
increasingly on "tied imports", implying that even they are
finding Britain uncompetitive as a manufacturin g location.
Bhaskar (19811, p295), believing that many other
problems affecting the UK motor industr y have been tackled,
is particularly concerned that the UK cost position has been
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rendered uncompetitive by economic choices: "Since 1978,
monetarism and North Sea Oil have contrived to introduce a
new element which completely swamped the competitiveness of
the motor industry". Real exchange rate movements have been
reflected in much higher UK vehicle cost levels and prices
(see for example Ashworth et al, 1982). From such analysis
the rise in tied imports is unsurprising. 	 More recently
Jones (l985b) has pointed to a new element in this
situation, "tied component imports, contributin g in 198L1 a
further 9 effective imports (other imports in total being
similar to 1983).
Jones' (1985b) acknowledgement that BL's progress in
the marketplace is becomin g stymied by intensified
competition from GM and Ford suggests the MIT scenario may
be underrating the continuin g implications of volume. Taken
together with the problems of operating from a now less
competitive cost base, I would therefore be even more
concerned about the UK vehicle outlook, unless the UK
responds much more positively to the challenge posed by
international competition.
14.5	 The relationship between vehicle production	 and
component markets
The sizes of European markets for vehicle parts are
shown in Table 17.	 Figures include parts for tractors and
engines as well as for cars and trucks.	 The UK's share of
European trucks, tractors and small/medium engine production
in 1980 was 27%, the largest in Europe.	 This increases UK
figures.
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Table 17 Sizes of main European markets for original
equipment vehicle parts in 1981
Country	Value/Cbn	 European share/%
Germany	 6.3	 33
France	 3.6	 19
UK	 3.1	 16
Spain	 2.1	 11
Italy	 1.9	 10
Rest of Europe	 2.1	 11
Total	 19.1	 100
Source: Knibb (1982)
These	 figures nevertheless indicate that the	 UK
component market is larger than that suggested by vehicle
production levels, where the UK share is only 11%. UK
producers of both cars and trucks have traditionall y bought
In to a much greater extent than others in Europe.
Although declining slightly between 1979 and 1981,
international trade in parts has been increasin g more
rapidly than vehicle production. Between 197L. and 1979
original parts imports rose 270% in Germany, 100% in France
and 60% in the UK. compared with vehicle volumes up by 37%,
18% and -26% respectively (Knibb, 1982). Trade is expected
to increase further as is shown in Table 18.
Table 18 Trade trends in European component markets
1979	 1981	 1990 (forecast)
European market, 1981 £bn 21.8 	 19.1	 22.0
Non-Europe trade, %
	
1	 1	 2
Inter-European trade, %
	
10	 9	 23
Domestic, %
	
89	 90	 75
Source: Knibb (1982)
Of the projected market increase between 1981 and 1990
only £1.7bn is expected to derive from rising vehicle
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production and £1.2bn is expected to come from greater
outsourcing by vehicle manufacturers (Knibb, 1982).
Accelerated technical change and a poor fundin g position are
thought likely to increase European assemblers' reliance
upon suppliers.
In the past the position of UK suppliers was strong and
fairly independent, their technological capabilities having
developed to meet the needs of many engineering based
industries. As in the USA, supplier/assembler relationships
were "arms length", rather on a free market basis. Both
assemblers and suppliers were cushioned from com petition by
UK tariffs up to 1960, and both sectors tended to be
complacent	 about	 their	 effect	 on	 the	 other's
competitiveness.	 Suppliers	 were	 also	 cushioned	 by
established	 and	 sometimes	 monopolistic	 customer
relationships.
Dual- and sometimes multi-sourcin g were introduced
partly to improve securit y of supply on key components in
the early 1970's, and partly for cost reasons. In the mid-
70's IlK assemblers experienced more intense international
competition and had to pass pressure for cost reduction on
to suppliers. The later extension of multi-sourcing
increased negotiating power, and so reduced costs in the
short term, but at the expense of weakening the supplier
network. Suppliers were hit by falling production volumes,
with the remainin g business increasingly s plit up (further
offsetting scale economies) leadin g to more rivalry among
suppliers.	 After 1979 worldwide recession in the motor
industry and growing ovexaapaaity stepped up international
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competition just as the cost position of UK assemblers and
supplierB was sharply eroded by a soaring exchange rate.
Both BL and Ford conducted detailed international
surveys comparing component costs. 	 BL's Chief Executive,
Ray Horrocks (CBI/SMMT	 conference,	 London,	 16.5.83),
described how they had "found that, virtuall y across the
board of electrical, mechanical, trim and body components,
Japanese produced parts were between ten and thirt y five per
cent cheaper tian tie cost of their European equmvanents
Indeed if sheer commercial logic was to be the sole
criterion then a large proportion of our components business
would have left the UK at the time". Ford's Chief Executive,
Sam Toy also pointed to the fact that UK suppliers were
responding inadequately to itei'ratoral stanâards 	 of
competitiveness in three key respects:	 consistent quality,
delivery and price.	 He acknowledged there had been "some
drop in our level of local sourcing" and stated that:
"Because we are makin g our vehicles to European quality
standards not British ones; we have to survive out
there ourselves - and there has been some improvement
but there are still too many British suppliers who
cannot give us competitive standards of quality. 	 And
even when they do they often can't deliver	 the
quantities we need when we need them."
Vehicle companies were prepared for drastic action to
ameliorate the competitive gap which had emerged 	 on
components. Jones (1985b, p9) eummarises the impact on
component markets:
"The volume of UK components supplied to UK car
assemblers in 198A was as a result only 33 per cent of
the 1972 level. Between 1972 and 1979 the collapse of
the component market was almost entirely due to the
fall in the numbers of cars produced in the UK.
However, since then imported components accounted for
half the drop in the component market. There is little
doubt that the UK components industry suffered the
biggest collapse of any car producing nation in the
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world."
Much of this is due to multinational vehicle
assemblers; BL Austin Rover Group's volume adjustments have
so far been more competitive. "Currently, ARG is believed to
be purchasing between 85 and 90% of its components in the
UK" (Bessant et al, 1981&, p26). Yet in the context of
overcapacity in the component sector, BL's move back to
single sourcin g , its threat and occasionally use of overseas
sources enabled Its purchasing department to completely
reverse the bargaining positions of the two sectors: "most
components have been sub j ect to a four year price freeze and
some are even cheaper now than their 1979 prices" (Bessant
et al, 1983, p61).	 The UK general wholesale price index
rose j ust over 16% over this period. Whereas UK component
companies averaged about 18% return on capital employed
during the 1970's (see section 6.2) over twice that for UK
assemblers, for the first time ever they actually averaged
losses just as BL's financial performance was be ginning to
improve.
BL has recognised that such policies weakened the
technological capability of its supplier base and led to a
deterioration in supplier relations at precisely the moment
when it	 needed	 greater supplier collaboration	 and
technological support. Yet comparing overseas component
prices, Austin Rover estimates that in the four year period
after 1979, it effectively subsidised UK suppliers by about
£30m p .a. even after its drastic cost reduction programmes,
giving it little room for manoeuvre (Bessant et al, 198L&,
p62).	 Like other assemblers it is now attem pting to move
towards a much closer and more collaborative relationship
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with suppliers.
To this end both BL and Ford are entering into longer
term agreements, though with a smaller number of suppliers.
They are demanding hi gh standards of supplier service and
involvement, through from quality assurance, technological
support 1
 the taking of responsibility for a much more
flexible service (inventory costs bein g made a supplier
responsibility) and of course cost reduction. But in return
the relationship is gradually becoming more two-way, with
assemblers offering longer term assurances and being much
more prepared to offer suppliers more detailed information
and greater involvement in regard to their own plans. Gains
from collaboration (eg on cost reduction) are now being
split more equally between the two sides.
Such a relationship has been crucial in Japan to
developments which have led to an extremely competitive
vehicle industry, such as complete just-in--time systems of
manufacture, operating through from assemblers, to
suppliers, and to suppliers' suppliers. For UK component
manufacturers a closer relationshi p seems crucial:
"Given the hi gh degree of national purchasing there is
only a small proportion of business to be had in other
European countries by direct exports"
(Jones, 1983a, p233)
UK assemblers and suppliers alike now face a. race against
time to close the com petitive gap which has been allowed to
emerge.
1oL
188.4
80.8
115.9
224
52%
6.4%
IL 3%
-16%
239.4	 193.7	 179.4
113.4	 109.9	 104.7
132.1	 141.3	 146.3
258	 225	 221
51%	 63%	 66%
7.1%
47%	 57%	 58%
-7%	 -14%	 -19%
5. Cemoetition	 in Se1ectd SetOrA
	 Auto!1otive
Components Industry
3.1. Automotiv. ball and roller' bearingB
5.11 The UK market for bearinga*
To understand the situation in automotive bearin gs It
is first useful to examine the UK market for all types of
bearin gs. This is anal ysed in Table 19.
Table 19 UK ball and roller bearings market by value (em)
1970	 1974	 1978	 1980	 1982	 1983
Sales by UK
manufacturers	 83.3	 116.2
Less	 exports	 22.1	 40.6
Plus imports(1) 18.4	 62.7
= Home market	 30	 138
Import share	 23%	 45%
Japan's share	 3.2%	 6.6%
Exports/sales	 26%	 35%
BofT/home market +4.5% -16%
Adiusted	 1980 prices (em):
Sales by UK
manufacturers	 315	 280	 243	 239	 161	 142
Less exports	 82	 98	 104	 113	 92	 83
Plus imports	 68	 151	 149	 132	 118	 116
= Home market	 302	 333	 288	 258	 187	 175
1) Import figures have been increased consistentl y by 35% in
line with the trade association correction to raise
import prices to market prices.
Source: Business Monitor
Allowing for inflation, the home market by 1983 had
fallen to 53% of its level in 1970.	 Gradual market decline
* The term "bearin gs" will be taken to refer to "ball and
roller bearings" unless otherwise specified, thus
excluding p lain bearings.
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up to 1980 is understandable given UK vehicle production
levels for example nearly halved between 1973 and 1980; but
such steep decline after 1980, when UK vehicle production in
fact remained stable, would seem to reflect more fundamental
problems in the UK. and not merely recession either.
The market comprises direct automotive sales (28%).
mechanical engineering (25%), agricultural machinery (8%),
aero (6%), other transport industries (5%), and electrical
appliances (5%).	 The remaining 23% is directed through
distributors.	 Of this about 2% is for the automotive
aftermarket, so that bearin g manufacturers depend on the
automotive market for only about 30% of their sales.
Potentially, bearin g manufacturers might have been expected
to have had more scope than other component manufacturers
for	 offsetting automotive decline b y increasing other
activities. In fact, the market split is considered to have
remained fairly stable.	 The market base has therefore been
eroded	 by comprehensive decline among UK customer
Industries, allowing little scope in this direction.
The impact of direct international competition has
increased substantially .	 Import penetration increased from
23% in 1970 to 66% in 1983.
	
Although UK manufacturers'
export ratio increased from 26% to 58%, export volume
actually remained flat.
Thus business competition in this sector is now much
more international.	 Market performance has been damaged
both	 by direct international competition, 	 this being
reflected in the declining position on international trade.
and indirectly, due to comprehensive decline among UK
customer industries, themselves also hi ghly exposed.
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5.12 The direction of trade and competition
Table 20 analyses the source of imports and the
destination of exports.
Table 2Q Source of UK imports and destination of tJJ< exports
% of UK Imports	 % of UK Exports
1970	 1980	 1970	 1980
EEC	 33	 55	 22	 L5
USA	 33	 16	 10	 8.5
Japan	 11	 11	 -	 -
Germany	26	 30	 5
France	 3	 10	 6	 12
Italy
	
3	 11	 5	 11
Sweden	 10	 6	 3	 5
Source: Customs and Excise
US trade has reduced in significance, whilst Japanese
competition has become more important. The ma j or focus of
both trade and competition is now therefore Europe.
5.13 Competin& companies and market performance
In 1969 the three remaining major UK-owned bearing
companies merged, 	 with assistance from the Industrial
Reorganisation Corporation, to form RHP. Other UK
manufacturers of automotive bearings are subsidiaries of
overseas companies.
Table	 21 gives performance details for the most
important world competitors in this sector. 	 Some details
for UK subsidiaries are also included to give a better
appreciation of the UK situation. These should be treated
cautiously as their results reflect parent company marketing
operations in addition to UK manufacturing.
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Table_21 Sales	 performances	 of companies and of	 UK
subsidiaries
CompanM Units Sales Sales Sales growth Growth Sales
base	 1970	 1980	 1983	 1970-80 1980-83 icaa
%pa	 %pa
SKF	 kr/rn	 4,758 12,512 16,191 0.1	 (0.02) 1,390
(Sweden)
Timken	 $m	 365	 966	 na	 2.68	 na	 560
(USA)	 (1972)	 (1981)
FAG	 DMm	 1,680	 1,950 1.710 (3.03)	 (7.LL1J.)	 430
(Germany)
NSK	 y'OOO 52.27 167.7 185.6	 6.92	 2.87	 550
(Japan)
Kayo	 y'OOO 51.9	 110	 126.7	 1.18	 4.311	 375
(Japan)
Federal Mogul
(USA)	 Sm	 251.1
Torrington Sm
	
Does not publish accounts
(USA)
Nachi-Fuj ikoshi
(Japan)	 y'OOO 118.3
	
91.15 91.118 0.98
	
(0.05)
	 270
NTN	 y'OOO 115.3	 1119.1 1811.9	 7.36	 7.23	 550
(Japan)
INA	 DMrn Does not publish accounts
(Germany)
N Thomson y'OOO
	
12.2
(Japan)
SNR	 FFm	 Does not publish accounts
(France)
RHP	 Cm	 110.1	 120	 102.11 (1.91) (10.85)
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(UK)
SKF UK	 Cm	 22.19	 71.78 66.37 (1.25) (8.97)
	
66
Torrin gton UK
Cm	 6.608 211.1	 25.85 (0.13)
	 (0.53)	 26
(1982)
INA UK	 Cm	 11.279 11.6	 17.22 (2.01)	 5.78	 17
(1971)
NSK UK	 Cm	 6.88
(1979)
Timken UK Cm	 Does not publish accounts
Source: company accounts
*Note: growth rates calculated after adjustin g for inflation
of domestic currency by means of wholesale price
indices. 1983 exchange conversions based on sterling
at: $1.451 L1, 337.0 yen, FF12.11117, 21108.6 lira,
DM3.9536, 11.6125 Swedish kronor.
Poor UK sales performances (with the exce ption of INA
recently ) reflect the poor domestic market situation already
discussed.	 Although RHP is the UK market leader, it i
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considerabl y smaller than the parent companies of key
competitors takin g an international perspective.	 Most are
supported with	 UK and other overseas manufacturing
operations: SKF, Timken, Torrin gton, INA and NSK.
As the radius of competition has become more
international RH?, which lacks an overseas manufacturing
capacity, has found its competitive position against world
competitors increasin gly vulnerable. Between 1970 and 1980
total sales volume fell back relative to other competitors,
and also in absolute terms, at about 2% per annum. Between
1980 and 1983, as competitive conditions intensified it fell
back even more sharply: total sales volume declining at
about 11% p.a., des pite non-bearing activities increasin g to
27% of sales.
Competitor positions in the UK and other major European
bearing markets are shown in Table 22, and show the strength
and international integration of RHP's main competitors.
Furthermore, as will be explained later, most have achieved
defensible positions, coherent in international terms. Some
indication is given in Table 23.
Such coherence, in international terms, is less evident
in the case of FAG, SNR, Nadella and RHP and this tends to
be reflected in poorer long term performance. Their
competitive positions were undoubtedly stronger and more
coherent whilst competition was largely fought on a country
by country basis.	 France's Nadella, in needle bearings, is
too weak to survive competition from INA and Torrington and
at some stage may well be taken over.	 FAG is still
extremely powerful because of its strong German home market
base and because of Its hi ghly successful	 exporting
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performance.	 France's SNR, whilst weaker, is nevertheless
supported by its closely tied relationshi ps with French
vehicle manufacturers. RHP has a fairl y close relationship
with BL, but given a small and declinin g home market its
position in international terms has been weak.
Ts.ble 22 Competitor positions in European markets: % shares
German y	France	 Italy	 Spain
RHP* 22	 FAG*	 35	 SNR*	 SKF*	 70	 SKF
SKF*	 18	 SKF*	 35	 SKF*	 33	 FAG	 15	 FAG
Timken*1LJ.
	 INA*	 INA*	 Japan
Japan* 8	 Japan*
	
Tirnken*	 SNR
FAG	 5	 Timken	 SNCF*
Fafnir 4
	 SNR	 Japan*
INA*	 U	 RHP	 <1	 Nadella*
Others 25
(Others are
	 In 1968 FAG
principally
	
and SKF
Torrington*	 held about
SNR and	 40% each
then a host	 but have
of special-	 lost share
ist mfrs)	 to INA and
Japan.
Automotive onlw:
RHP	 25	 Vehicle	 SNR owned	 SKF's plant	 SKF has
SKF	 20	 customers	 by Renault	 closely
	
strong
Timkenl6	 more "open"	 and close	 linked with	 position
Torrington	 but compet-	 links with	 Fiat	 with SEAT
INA Japan 2	 ition among	 Peugeot	 (Fiat
mfrs	 link)
RHP link	 duopolistic	 and GM
with DL
fairly strong
* denotes market support through manufacturin g operations
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Table_23 Strategies of ma j or international competitors
TIMKEN	 TORRINGTON	 FAFNIR
I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I
World	 US marketjapan	 US leader European World
market	 leader	 market	 in needle header In leader
leader	 :	 leader	 hbearings	 needle	 in aero
bearings hmarket
I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I
Full rangeTapered 	 Full rangeFocused	 SImilar	 Strength
except	 hroller	 except	 hon	 applica-	 in pulley
tapered	 bearings htapered	 particulartions	 block
roller	 only and	 roller	 appllca-	 approach	 bearings
bearings	 world	 bearings, tions
	 to
hleader in but
	 Torringtonh
:this	 hEuropean
segment	 strategy
focused
hon metric
hball
bearings,
:volume
ranges
suchas
electrlcal
applica-
:tions
I	 ,	 I	 I
I	 t	 I
IntegratedMaj or baseEuropeari :strength	 Supported
manufac- :is USA,butposition	 in appllc-with manu-
facilities operations supported ations 	 facturirig
in all	 heupported :by modern engineer- boperations
major	 :by plants uK plant	 ing and	 throughout
European	 lri UK and dedicated hcustomer	 Europe aridh
markets	 France	 to volume hsupport onhrest of
metric	 more	 world
Manufac-	 marginal
turing
	business	 US
support inh
	
position
USA and in
	 European	 in this
some other:
	
position hniche 2nd
parts of	 hin this	 to
world	 :	 nlche 2nd Torringtonh
ItO INA butbut
Isupported supported
with manu-by manu-
facturin g facturing
facilitieshoperations
hinukand
IGermany
I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Metric	 hlmperial IMetric
	
lmperial IMetric
	 I Imperial
bias	 blas	 1	 bias	 Ibias	 Ibias
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Diversi-	 Diversi-	 Diversi- I	 I
fled (28%)Ifled (32%)fled (31%fl
into rel- linto rel- I
ated steellated eteell
	 1
activj t j eslact jvjtjea	 :	 :
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5.14 Kay iaivaa
5.141 Changing pattern of competition generally
In the late 1950's and early 1960's (prior to Britain's
entry into the EEC) British bearin g manufacturers remained
fairly isolated from European or Japanese competition.
Imports were mainly limited to specialist bearin g types,
mainly from the USA through Timkeri (tapered roller bearings)
and Torrington and some from SKF in Europe. Most of these
companies' sales, though, were based on production from
their UK factories and competition was on a national basis.
Exports to soft Commonwealth markets more than covered any
net imports from these companies, and the international
competitive position of the sector was strong.
Yet an undercurrent of change was takin g place in the
pattern of competition.	 Exports to Commonwealth markets
were declining ;	 but in Europe, now their main destination,
Britain faced powerful competitors. At the same time the
first tremors of Japanese competition signalled a step
change in the intensit y of competition among the ma j or world
bearing	companies.	 This	 in turn was to	 lead	 to
international rationalisatlon in the industry.
The key development involved was a change in
manufacturing processes. The Japanese mounted their attack
on the European market on a. few popular size ranges of
radial ball bearin gs, the main application bein g electric
motors.
	 Given long production runs they moved from batch
production,
	 which made use of fairly basic flexible
equipment, to a flow line operation employing dedicated
equipment.	 Although raisin g investment requirements this
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resulted in a step change in the productivity both of labour
and working capital. Gearing up manufacturin g operations
accordingly the Japanese aggressively pushed down costs as
cumulative production volume rose, in the manner of the
"experience curve".	 (Boston Consulting	Group,	 1975,
estimate the gradient for Japanese radial ball bearings at
73%).	 Japanese manufacturers were assisted by a fast
growing home market, which if not as large as Europe was
substantially more homogeneous.	 Moreover the structure of
their industry was less fragmented:	 in 1977 for example
four companies accounted for 90% of total sales and 95% of
exports.
The initial British reaction was one of almost amused
complacency as the Japanese struggled unsuccessfully to come
up to European quality standards. What then surprised many
was the degree of commitment with which the Japanese pursued
their strategic thrust. To achieve the re quired quality
they broke industry quality/cost trade-off norms, accepting
a substantial (in the short term) cost penalty by using
extensively expensive operations such as honing . Having
finally met quality standards and established a foothold in
the market they were gradually able to exploit experience
effects to improve cost levels and quality levels still
further.
As the Japanese competitive position gradually
strengthened British manufacturers, slow to respond, were
cushioned for a time by lower capital charges resultin g from
depreciated equipment.	 One Japanese executive who had
visited British plants recalled how he had envied such low
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capital costs at the time, though not with the benefit of
hindsight.
The effect on sales volume was fairly small,
particularly in the automotive market, starter motor /
alternator bearin gs being a fairly minor market segment.
Financially however such long order runs represented "cream"
business and multinationals such as SKF were quick to
respond with their own manufacturing changes. Manufacturers
finding profit margins under greater pressure recognised
that similar productivity and cost im provements could be
made in other market segments. The name of the game, at
least for the more powerful competitors, seemed to be
"volume", the means being to standardise onto fewer product
ranges.	 This	 became	 a	 crucial	 factor	 driving
rationalisation within Europe.
	
One by one the multinationals reorganised 	 their
manufacturing operations in the face of 	 international
competition intensifying as companies scrambled for volume
order business. No longer content to compete on a country
by country basis, SKF between about 1968 and 1975 radically
integrated manufacturing operations within Europe to obtain
the maximum benefits of volume.	 Their new "global
forecasting	supply
	
system" (GFSS) put	 planning	 and
schedulin g on a European basis. Tlmken reorganised its
British and French plants, hitherto fairly autonomous, into
Timken Europe and a new chief executive was appointed with a
brief to "bring down the walls in Europe".
INA and Tox'rington, though powerfully supported by
overseas	 manufacturing operations,	 responded	 more
cautiously.
	
Both stressed applications engineering and the
ii1
provision of a more flexible customer service. 	 They have
therefore been wary of becoming too orientated towards
volume order runs, and have so avoided head-on collision
with SKF for example exce pt in their more specialist
applications. Nevertheless by the end of 1982 Torrington
USA had finalised its plans to coordinate international
operations much more closely, mirroring many of the
manufacturing changes at SKF (e g commonality of tooling).
INA has also become more integrated internationally.
Thus	 as	 the radius of competition became more
international in volume segments, companies have generally
had to adjust their strategies.	 The choice has been to
orientate operations more internationall y, reorganising
where necessary to secure maximum volume benefits, or to
develop roles still coherent internationally but avoiding
head on competition with powerful international competitors.
5.1112 Response to automotive developments
Ford and GM have moved to centralised purchasing within
Europe and multinational bearing companies such as SKF and
INA have adapted their operations to provide better support
internationally. This has meant ensuring commonality of
design and quality standards so that no matter where Ford is
assembling or where SKF is manufacturin g , bearings will fit
and function properly:
	
a left hand bearing made in one
country may also have to match a ri ght hand bearin g made in
another.	 Commonality is particularly important in the
context of an increasing number of international joint
ventures among customers,
	 for example gearboxes which
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incorporate bearings. An effect has been to raise minimum
acceptable quality standards in all manufacturin g countries
to common norms, these being above those acceptable in
Britain in the past.
SKF now sets price levels against local market
conditions (UK price levels were about 12% higher than
elsewhere in Europe in 1981 due to exchange rate movements).
In the short term this involves riding cost variations
between different countries and affords some cushionin g to
countries such as the UK which have allowed relative cost
levels	 to rise.	 Having rationalised manufacturing
operations	 internationally,	 they want	 to	 minimise
disruption. However, in decisions with longer term
implications such as ma j or investments or closures, they are
now much more sensitive to the issue of cost competitiveness
(as indeed are all their customers). SKF has reorganised
formally to mirror increasin g integration in the world
vehicle industries, and sees further changes In the future.
This is illustrated by organisational charts in Appendix
B. 1.
Vehicle customers are requiring increased technical
support and this has been reflected in component company
strategies. Timken has stepped up R & D considerably. SKF's
move, up-value-added, into integrated wheel hub bearings
represented an investment of about $25m, a step change well
beyond levels affordable by Britain's RHP and recoverable
only in the context of a more international market.
Similarly, INA is placing still greater emphasis on
applications engineering such as its successful clutch
release bearing, an innovation saving Ford substantial
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warranty costs.
The bargaining position of vehicle customers has
increased, forcin g these suppliers to reduce mar gins in real
terms, whilst reflecting customers' needs much more closely.
For example the cost of stockholding, as a buffer against
varying vehicle production levels, has been passed back to
suppliers.	 Given	 fewer major vehicle	 purchasing
departments, and their wish to deal with a smaller number of
suppliers,	 there is pressure to squeeze out marginal
international competitors. 	 In such a capital intensive
industry this competitive pressure is of course increased by
overcapacity. Intensified competition has raised the cost
of complacency: for manufacturers not responding adequately
to new developments now face not merely suboptimal profit
levels, but the threat of closures and asset write-offs.
Thus customer demands have forced a more international
pattern of direct competition, both because in many cases
they required international support from component
manufacturers, and because they were increasingly able to
insist	 on	 international	 standards	 of	 service	 and
performance.
5. 13 Productivity
Some indication on productivity is given in Table 2L
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5486
1560
358
5000
3981.
9647
2532
1607
377
4000
5032
5949
6267
1524
1217
237
153
Table 24 Company productivit y performances
ComoanY	 Emoloweeg	 ProductivitY Growth Salec/
1970* 1980*	 70-80 80-83* .70_-83 Emloee
SKF
Timken
NSK
Koyo
Nachi-
Ftd ikoshi
NTN
REP
SKF UK
Torrington
UK
INA UK
NSK UK
Timken UK
198 3/C *
	
67375 56501	 45683
	
2.04	 5.33	 3.05	 30,400
	
22433 22874	 3.04	 29,100
	
7006	 7363	 1.11	 74,800
	
5487
	 5510	 4.19	 68,200
	
(0.71)	 53.900
	
(15.56)	 92,200
2.L1.il	 1.28	 2.25
	
16,300
8.96	 7.15 10.00	 43,500
	
(0.42) 5.99
	
1.00	 21.200
	
1.28 28.89	 8.51	 72,700
59, 000
Notes: Productivity growth rates calculated after allowing
for inflation of domestic currency by means of
wholesale price indices.	 Exchange rate conversions
as Table 6.1.
Figures not available for:	 FAG, Federal Mogul,
Torringtori, INA. N Thomson, SNR
* Exceptions to dates given:
1970 employees - fi gures f-or Timken and INA UK are
1972
1980 employees - fi gures for Koyo and NTN are 1981
1980-83 productivity growth - NTN is 1981-83 growth
Sales/Employee 1983 - Timken is 1980, NSK UK is 1978
Source: company accounts
Table 24 suggests that REP's productivity growth has
been reasonable compared with other ma j or companies.	 This
is partly because RHP has diversified into higher value-
added electronic activities. However Its productivity level
of about £16,000 sales/employee still appears well below
that of other competitors in other countries.
Productivity performance appears better for UK
subsidiaries of overseas companies, 	 but an increasing
proportion of their UK sales is made up of products
manufactured overseas.
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The operations of multinational companies in different
countries provide better evidence on this issue. Two plants,
one in Britain and one in Germany, belonging to one company,
were engaged as "dual sources" on the same automotive
bearing	product.	 Design,	 quality specifications and
production runs were identical.
	 I visited both plants to
investigate productivity levels. An executive with
experience of working in both plants stated that manning
levels in the German plant were approximately 40% lower than
in the British one.	 One factor was that German unions were
more flexible,	 reflecting a much healthier industrial
relations climate. A second factor was that responsibility
for a wider range of production tasks was vested in the
production operators themselves, and they were more actively
willin g and more appropriately trained for this
responsibility (eg German operators involved were dual
skilled).
I also visited both British and German plants belonging
to a second company and found executives held similar views
on the scale of productivity differentials and also on the
causes.	 German executives in both companies were critical
of complacency by UK production management. This was felt
to reflect inadequate pay levels, and inadequate attention
to the production function at a more senior level.
Both companies reflected criticisms, made by German and
Japanese	 executives,	 of an exploitational	 style	 of
management in Britain. They felt it was impossible to gain
fuller and more active participation from production
operators in an atmosphere in which productivity gains so
frequently resulted in unem ployment.	 Frequent recourse to
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unemployment was perhaps inevitable 50 long as British
management were content to allow their competitive position
to be eroded.
There was	 however evidence	 that multinational
companies, faced with increasingly severe UK conditions,
were moving sharply to deal with such productivity
differences.	 Until 1979 UK relative wage rates were on a
downward trend sufficient to cushion this problem. 	 By 1981
a rise of almost 11.0% reduced the gap between UK rates and
those of its overseas competitors. Multinationals generally,
stung by the effect this had on financial performance,
adopted a much stronger line insistin g that UK manning
levels	 come into line with levels in other European
countries: an example being SKF UK's January 1982 ultimatum
to its workforce that unless this happened the plant would
close.	 Productivity differentials within multinational
companies could now be expected to be significantly lower,
at least for comparable situations.
One Japanese company visited did not feel its UK plant
(though under Japanese management) was behind Japan on
productivity.
	
The situation was not altogether comparable.
The UK plant was small, very modern, and established on long
production runs, and productivity was to a substantial
extent process determined. 	 However like the Germans they
found UK operators individuall y competent and efficient.
Using Japanese managers they seemed to have succeeded better
at harnessing the loyalty,	 flexibility and	 active
participation of their UK workforce as a whole.
Thus UK management has been complacent on the issue of
120
productivity , especially until recentl y , so that as UK wage
rates moved more closely into line with international
rivals'	 in	 1980,	 international	 competitiveness	 and
profitability declined sharply. British managers need to
achieve the more constructive partnership with employees so
actively fostered by their German and Japanese counterparts.
5.144 Other production issues
The issue of manning is im portant in itself, but it is
also symptomatic of a wider malaise that has plagued UK
manufacturing . Where there is not the will 1 either by
management or by employee representatives, to insist on even
sensible manning levels, there would seem to be little hope
of matching concepts such as "built-in quality"	 that
characterise German and Japanese manufacturing operations.
Such approaches, which would also seem critical to
success in this sector, demand not merely even passive
acceptance of change, but positive and committed pursuit of
change by large numbers of production personnel. Progress
here is more demanding, often taking several years of
sustained and patient effort. Two things seem important.
First, top management in the UK need to recognise that
in the context of this particular industry they cannot
afford to treat such progress in production areas as a
merely operational matter, viewed in the perspective of
fairly short term operating budgets. For example, this
sometimes involves intractable industrial problems. From an
operating perspective, resolving these may be unattractive
because of obvious risks, but establishin g more healthy
"precedents" may be vital to further progress and therefore
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ultimately to competitive survival. 	 Where nece4rf
resolution of any such problems must be viewed s
strategic, longer term objective.
Second, and perhaps paradoxically, they need to r1J
less on externally imposed managerial control ystez (e
ex post quality control checkin g systems) and to deleg*
more authority (and recognition) to production personnel..
UK production management is poorly trained technically in'
comparison with Germany, and also in comparison with the UA
on more general managerial issues; the main problem however
is the poor level of morale in comparison with Germany and
es pecially Japan (where trainin g is not well developed).
However, increased delegation of power and authority is
unlikely to be effective unless there is first a better
partnership between management and employee representatives;
without this production managers are likely to be swamped by
the task presented to them.
Methods of production seem likely to change in two
directions.	 The first, only appropriate to extremely high
volume order runs, is the introduction of a third virtually
unmanned "ghost shift", a development pioneered by German
manufacturers. This technology though is appropriate to few
automotive bearings.	 It is not appropriate to UK
manufacturers, given their withdrawal from volume market
segments, and given a weak technolo gical and financial
position.
The other more appropriate challenge is to secure
similar benefits to those presently obtained only with the
advantage of long order runs on much lower order runs. This
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is inherently difficult in bearings and represents both a
technological and an organisational challenge: much
progress can only be incremental and depends on wholehearted
support by production personnel.
Although FMS technology might seem to benefit smaller
producers particularly, the immediate outlook is that it is
the larger companies who are best able to afford the
investment that in this sector will probably be needed.
Changes	 in production technology appropriate 	 to
automotive bearin gs are likely to take place fairly slowly,
but will	 probably encourage	 further	 international
rationalisatlon.
5.15	 Decline of multinational com panies' manufacturing
operations in the UK
5.151 SKF
The coherence of the parent company SKF's strategic
position is readily comprehensible in an international
perspective. As the world market leader, it offers the most
comprehensive	 product	 range,	 is	 strongly
	
supported
internationally,
	
and has integrated its operations to
exploit	 benefits	 associated with volume. 	 This	 has
substantially cushioned its UK manufacturing
	operation
against the decline in the UK market.	 In 1970, almost 90%
of SKF (UK)'a bearing sales were UK sourced. By 1981,
largely as a result of the "Global Forecastin g and Supply
System" programme (completed earlier), the majority of UK
sales were sourced from overseas;
	 but, conversely, most UK
production was destined for overseas, so that dependence on
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the UK market was reduced.
Along with most other com panies, SKF has found the UK
an increasingly unattractive base from which to source
bearings. Table 25 shows company profit performances:
Table 25 Company profit performances (pre-tax)
companM	 Av. profit/Sales	 Av. Prof jt/
1970-80	 193.0-83
Pjta] Emplo,'ed
1970-80
	
1980-83
SKF
Timken
FAG
NSK
Koyo
Federal Mogul
Torrington
Nachl-Fuj ikoshi
NTN
INA
N Thomson
SNR
RHP
SKF UK
Torrington UK
INA UK
NSK UK
Timken UK
6.LL	 5.0
10.1
2.2
5.0	 4.1
1.9	 2.1
9.2
Unpublished
2.3	 3.1
2.6	 6.3
Unpublished
3 . 9
Unpublished
5.1	 3.5
1.0	 (2.3)
ILI&	 1.5
8.0	 12.1
(8. AE)
Unpublished
5.7	 6.0
13.4
3. 2E
5. 8E
13.2
	
8.2	 5.1
(0.5)	 (3.7)
	
5.4E	 1.6
	
18.8	 21.5E(18. 9E)
Source: company accounts
SKF (UK) averaged pre-tax losses on ca pital employed of
0.5% between 1970 and 1980 and 3.7% between 1980 and 1983,
during which periods the parent company averaged profits of
about 6% ROCE. SKF (UK) remained profitable from 1970 to
1975 after which financial performance fell alarmingly:
apart from a marginal profit in 1980, it declared pre-tax
losses (even on a historical cost basis) in every year from
1976 to 1983!	 These results also incorporate marketing
activities on behalf of the parent company which are said to
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be more profitable than manufacturin g operations.
SKF (UK)'s sales do not reflect UK manufacturing output
and changes in employment levels give a better indication of
SKF's commitment to manufacture in the UK in comparison to
other companies. One should strictly allow for any
differential growth in UK productivity as compared with
other SKF plants, but this effect is small in comparison to
employment changes.
Employment in SKF (UK) has fallen from 5,500 in 1970 to
1,5 00 in 1983;	 by comparison, SKF's em ployment worldwide
fell, from 67,000 to &6,000 over the same period. Table 26
shows employment for bearings activities only over the last
five years, and compares the UK with SKF's other European
operations.
Table 26 Employment in SKF's European bearings plants
1978	 1983	 Reduction
Germany	 10,180	 8,188	 20%
Italy
	
7,563
	
6,100	 19%
France	 5,75L	 3,685
	
36%
UK	 3,U0	 1,162	 66%
Other European 5,288	 L&332
	
18%
	Total European 32,225 23,67
	
23%
Source: company accounts
UK employment in bearings alone has been reduced to one
third of its level five years ago, a reduction unmatched in
any other European country. The UK operation has now
retrenched onto a single plant at Sundon, havin g closed a
second plant in the same area and its Scottish plant at
Irving.
SKF's threat in January 1982 to close this last
remaining plant, the first such ultimatum in fourteen years,
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demonstrated even its precarious position.
A more recent changeover of the major UK production
lines demonstrated how marginal the UK operation has become
from the parent company 's viewpoint: in the weeks involved
manufacture was transferred to other European plants which
absorbed	 the	 additional production without	 apparent
problems.
SKF's automotive bearin g manufacture, its maj or UK
manufacturing activity a decade ago,	 has	 changed
significantly: only a few, automotive bearings are now
manufactured in substantial volume. <> Significantly SKF's
recent quotation for a volume order for BL Austin Rover was
based on manufacture in Italy. The major factors keeping
some manufacture in the UK are first that some local
manufacturing capability is useful marketin g support and,
second,	 political particularly in view of employment
implications.
5.152 Timken
Timken worldwide enjoy a unique niche, specialising in
tapered roller bearings. They are the market leader in the
US market and are supported by overseas manufacturing
operations.	 The	 coherence	 of	 their position	 in
international terms has been reflected in consistent
success, in terms of market and financial performance, and
on other indicatorB such as employment and productivity, as
shown in Tables 21, 24 and 25. Its US base is reputed,
however, to have been more profitable than Europe. In 1977
the company employed about 23,000 people in the USA, 4,000
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in the UK at two plants, Dueton and Northampton, and 1,300
in France.	 It also has other manufacturing operations
outside Europe and the USA. 	 The UK operation is helped by
the strength of its parent company and also by	 its
historical	 position as the main base for the parent
company's attack on the European market.
However Timken's parent company is perhaps even more
sensitive than SKF to what it perceives as a decline in the
UK'S attractiveness as a manufacturin g location. SKF has
integrated international manufacturing operations so as to
maximise the long term benefits, associated with scale and
experience effects, resulting from plant specialisation: so
it is less inclined to move production between countries
when the relative cost position changes. 	 SKF's structure
also provides some cushioning against the effect of exchange
rate movements.	 Losses in one country are partially offset
by gains in other countries. Also if sterling rises any
losses on UK manufacturin g operations tend to be offset by
additional profits on UK marketin g operations, since a high
proportion of their sales are sourced overseas. Timken is
less internationally integrated and they are therefore
highly sensitive to the UK's relative cost position.
Timken specialise in tapered roller bearings (about 20%
of the market) and their products are heavily automotive
orientated. They point to a step change in the cost of
keeping up with new technolo gical and manufacturing
developments in automotive bearings, and foresee an
intensification of international competition as leadin g to a
"shake out" of less competitive operations.
For this reason Timken UK is particularly critical of
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UK economic choices that have rendered UK o perations less
internationally competitive. Their cost position has been
influenced by real exchange rate movements (nominal rates
adjusted for differential inflation rates).	 Thus in 1973
they wanted to source as many bearings as possible from the
UK following the fall in sterlin g . By contrast at the real
exchange rate prevailing in 1981, the CEO's review of his UK
operation suggested that the UK simply did not constitute a
competitive base from which to manufacture. He felt the
country had "effectively made the decision to trade North
Sea Oil off against a substantial part of (the) industrial
sector". Automotive bearings are especially vulnerable to
such economic issues because they are price sensitive and
transport costs, even as far as America, represent only
about 5% of sales value.
Graphs showin g trends in relative UK labour rates in
manufacturing are shown in A ppendix D.5. They confirm that
a substantial drop in UK competitiveness took place between
1979 and 1981, making a discontinuity with trends over the
previous twenty years.	 Since then there has been some
return to past trends in the UK'S relative position against
the USA and to a lesser extent a gainst Japan. This should
improve Timken UK'S position as against US manufacturing
operations. However the UK cost position is still seriously
out of line with European countries. Not only does this
create an incentive to transfer production to France, but it
continues to undermine Timken's position a gainst its key
overseas competitors who are European.
It was also a question of market attractiveness, but
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Timken UK's customers were also manufacturers 	 highly
dependent on their international cost	 position;	 the
declining customer base reflected similar problems.
Competitive decline in the UK was a collective phenomenon
affecting manufacturing generally.
Timken see their own competitive position in automotive
bearings as stron ger, due to parent company support, than
any other UK manufacturer. Nevertheless they did not see UK
manufacture of this product continuin g on any substantial
scale in the long term, unless the business environment
became radically more favourable.
5.153 Other manufacturin g operations in the UK
A detailed analysis of other multinational companies'
UK bearing manufacturing operations is given in Appendix
B.3.. Tables 2L and 25 provided an indication of profit and
productivity performances in comparison to key international
competitors. Appendix B.3 supports two clear conclusions
from this section.
First, multinational companies have had to reorientate
their international operations in order to face intensifying
international competition.	 Second, operations marginally
competitive	 internationally	 have	 suffered
disproportionately. This has applied to virtuall y all UK
subsidiaries, and partly reflects a UK business environment
unfavourable to international competitiveness.
5.16 RHP's competitiveness
As the only British-owned manufacturer of automotive
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bearings arid the UK market leader, 	 RHP's competitive
situation will now be examined in detail.
5.161 RHP'a broad strategy
As international competition intensified during the
1960's, Britain's competitive position declined. Exports of
bearings, over 75% greater than imports in 1963, were only
36% greater by 1969. In such circumstances the Government
viewed with alarm a takeover bid by SKF (UK) for Ransome and
Manes, the largest of three ma j or national bearing
companies, which would almost certainly have left Britain
with no viable UK-owned companies in the industry.
The resultant strategy, supported by financial
assistance from the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation,
was a merger of the three remainin g UK-owned companies to
form RHP and this was followed by a programme 	 of
consolidation and rationalisation. Such a broad strategy
was to some extent dictated by a situation in which the
competitive position of the UK industry had been allowed to
weaken seriously. It was predicated on the assumption that
the key weakness was one of scale and over-fragmentation:
consolidation rigorously pursued promised to alleviate this
weakness, and provide a stronger base for exports.
British productivity was recognised to be weak and key
manufacturing developments being pursued by other world
companies offered the promise of radical improvements. The
seductive simplicity of such broad strategic thinkin g has
ultimately
	
proved	 superficial	 and	 misleading.	 By
effectively mimicking their strategies RHP has plunged into
head-on	 competition with powerful world
	 (not	 merely
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national) market leaders. This almost inevitably has
contributed to deterioration in its competitive position in
virtually all the ma j or automotive bearing market segments.
leading to a costly (in both financial and human terms)
process of retrenchment.
A key target in this strategy was to achieve longer
production	 runs.	 This	 was	 done	 successfully	 by
standardising the product range:	 the number of product
variants bein g reduced from about 15,000 to 5,000 within
just a few years. 	 Factories were accordingly reorganised,
so that production lines could be developed focused onto
particular bearin g types so as to exploit the advantages of
experience effects and longer production runs.
Bold export	 targets were set,	 as the	 company
optimistically planned to take advantage of Britain's entry
into the EEC and a more international pattern of business.
RHP's subsequent performance is analysed in Table 27.
Table 27 RHP's performance 1970-811.
Sales. Profit Marzin ROCE Sales/ Exports Non-
3.Q. Sent £m'&O £m'80	 em1ovee £m'B p	bearinz
____	
activities
L sales
1970	 148	 7.0	 4.7	 3.i. 10,000	 24.7	 -
1971	 150	 8.5	 5.7	 4.7 10,800	 32.0	 -
1972	 135	 3.5	 2.6	 2.6 10,900	 24.3	 -1 973	 111.1	 2.4	 1.7	 2.3 12,700	 26.6	 -1974	 126	 6.8	 5.11	 4.6 11,800
	 29.].	 -1975
	 125	 11.5	 9.2	 8.11. 11,900
	 24.9	 111976	 132	 8.6	 6.5	 5.9 12.500
	 238	 121977
	 12.9	 7.2	 6.0	 4.8 11,300
	 23.8	 111.1978	 114	 11.9	 11.3	 3.2 11,600
	 211.2
	
111.1979
	 114	 6.1	 5.11	 6.3 11,700
	 28.4	 181980	 120	 11.0	 9.2	 17.5 12,400
	 31.1.	 21198].	 105
	
0.7	 0.6	 1.2 12,300	 25.2	 241982	 91	 3.3	 3.6	 6.5 12,900
	 20.1.	 271983
	 81	 0.5
	
0.7	 1.2. 12,900
	 17.6	 2919811.	 79	 4.6	 5.9	 9.8 13,BOo
	 18.6	 27
Source: company accounts
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Allowing for initial disru ption, results in the first
few years looked promising. Under favourable market
conditions sales volume fell only slightly as product lines
were rationalised, and by 1973 productivity had been pushed
up about 27% above 1970 levels. ROCE recovered, after being
depressed in 1972 and 1973. peaking at just over 8% in 1975.
By	 1974 a fundamental weakness in	 this	 volume
orientated strategy was becomin g evident.	 The benefits
associated with volume seem greater in this sector than for
many other components.	 Had	 competition	 remained
predominantly UK,	 this strategy would probably have
continued to serve RHP (as the UK market leader) extremely
well.	 Yet in the volume market segments particularly, RHP
faced increasing competition from more powerful
international competitors, better supported internationally
to pursue precisely the same benefits associated with
volume. The prospect of cost reduction had seduced RHP into
head-on confrontation with international competitors that it
was unlikely to be able to match.
RHP's competitive problem was by 1974 already apparent
in popular metric segments of the market, where production
runs were the longest. Fierce Japanese competition,
particularly from NSK which had specialised in these market
segments, hastened moves by other competitors. By 1974,
SKF's "GFSS" programme, integrating manufacturing operations
throughout Europe, had im proved its competitiveness In
volume market segments. In the ensuing price war as SKF
retaliated against low priced Japanese competition, RHP was
gradually squeezed out. The same theme was to repeat itself
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in the major automotive market segments,
	 as will be
discussed in section 5.162 below.
Such problems called for some decisive read j ustment to
this strategy.
	
To have succeeded, such a volume orientated
strategy would have called for a much stronger international
position, but some options had been ruled out by the UK
government's ori ginal decision (perhaps also influenced by
defense considerations) to opt for a UK-onl y solution. Many
international options risked compromising the company's
future independence and sovereignty, something not likely to
have been attractive to senior executives. 	 A major
international move similar to BL's linka ge with Honda might
well have been another possibility.
Having decided against major international moves, RH?
was nevertheless reluctant to reverse its volume orientated
stance.	 RHP was already deeply committed, and any trimming
back in volume market segments would have meant painful
surgery, cutting out substantial capacity .	 This was later
forced on REP but at this time rather than grapple with
critical competitive problems, REP was distracted by a third
alternative.
Whilst maintaining its original strategy in bearings,
it simply diversified through a rapid acquisition programme
into the unrelated but attractive area of electronics. This
can be seen in Table 27 above. Presumably REP hoped by this
means to bolster a weakenin g position in bearings, and
ultimately reduce its dependence.	 It is too early to
evaluate the success of these new electronics activities,
though competition is likely to intensify here also; but by
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diverting scarce investment funds and senior executives'
attention (particularl y after the retirement of	 their
original chairman in 1976) this further weakened RHP's
competitive position in bearings.
Whilst imports were continuing to penetrate RHP's home
market, its export strategy lay in ruins:
	 by 1980 export
volume was no higher than in 1971, and between 1980 and 1983
it fell by 1&3%.	 Sales volume fell from £150m in 1970 (at
1980 prices) to 120m in 1980 and then £80m in 1983.
	
This
was despite other new activities, which rose from % of
total sales in 1975 to 23% in 1980 and 29% in 1983.
5.162 Strategies in automotive bearings
5.1621 Overview
Table 28 gives some introduction to the main automotive
market segments now to be discussed.	 Appendix 6.2 shows
bearing locations on a conventional rear wheel drive car.
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Table_28 Main market segments taking the example of a
British conventional rear wheel drive car
32	 •	 I	 I	 I-	 -	
_J_
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Rear	 :wheel	 :Gearbox Clutch	 Water pump Electric
wheel,	 :bearings :bearings release
	 :spindle	 :motor
differen-	 bearings	 bearings	 bearings,
tial and :
	 :	 steering
prop'	 :related
shaft	 :	 I	 and
bearings 1	 1 others
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Mostly
	
May be	 IMainly	 Specialist:Double row Istarter
tapered	 tapered :cylind-	 fabric-	 deep	 Imotors and
roller	 roller orrical or ations	 grooved	 lalter-
bearings ball
	 needle	 lincorpor- Iball
	 Inators
but otherbearings bearings atin g balllbearings,	 require
options :or integ-	 bearings. leither
	 Istandard-
possible rated hub
	 Higher	 Isupplied	 heed small
units	 I	 I"value	 Iseparately Idiameter
added" butlor as part radial ball
Ineeding	 Iof a	 :bearings
hinnovativelcomplete
applied	 Ifabrication
lengineer-
hing
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Timken,	 IRHP, SKF, :RHP, SKF, IINA, RH?, IRHP, SKF,	 NSK;SKF in
SKF, RHP ITimken, IINA,Torr-SKF
	 FAG	 electrical,
and	 hKoyo, SNRlington	 Torrington
others	 :in steering
applications
The market for popular metric sizes of bearings, from
which RH? had been forced to retreat, had involved order
runs up to as much as 10,000,000 units p.a..	 The only
automotive applications in this class are for starter motors
and alternators.	 Most automotive bearin g orders are
smaller. <>
Yet the fierce competitive battles in the popular
metric segment heralded a similar increase in competition in
other volume segments. Current manufacturing developments
are also likely to raise competitive stakes still further.
RH? has been better protected against this competition on
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imperial size ranges since international competitors, with
the exception of US rivals, are orientated to metric ranges;
but even BL, with whom RHP fortunately enjoys a close
relationship, must be under some pressure to move to
metrification, especially in view of its Honda link. On
Ford's volume business 1
 which is metric, RHP no longer seems
cost competitive against SKF.
5.1622 Wheel bearings
The more international pattern of com petition has
"raised the stakes" in wheel bearings, one of the largest
automotive markets. SKF have developed an "integrated wheel
hub bearing", a logical move from a component company's
viewpoint, since the new product provides increased added
value, uti].ises engineering expertise and so provides one
direction for growth in an otherwise static market.
	 This
corresponds well with vehicle company needs for more
engineering support and simplifies their own assembly
operation.	 However even for the world leader SKF this
represents a very bold investment, ($25m), recoverable only
through exploiting the larger international market.
General Motors-owned US subsidiary New Departure Hyatt
has followed suit. Timken have been developing their own
variant on the integrated wheel hub bearing for 12 years now
(illustrating the time scales involved in such major product
developments)
RHP has not been able to keep up with such moves.
	 It
appears to have neither the financial resources nor the
worldwide marketing capability to respond to such technical
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developments, even in this core area of the automotive
bearings business. In the future its competitive position
ma' become even more vulnerable if, as some predict, further
product integration takes place with component suppliers
perhaps collaborating and producing an integrated unit
incorporating constant velocity joints.
.1623 Water pump apindle bearings
One strategy open to RHP was to concentrate on a
particular segment of the automotive market, in the hope of
becoming the maj or European specialist. Accordingly, RHP
focused onto the water pump bearin gs segment and dedicated
one of its factories onto this product. New markets were
captured through aggressive pricing; but powerful German and
Japanese competition forced punishingly low prices. RHP did
not seem able to exploit potential volume advantages (such
as "experience" effects) sufficiently.
	
Accumulating losses
and cash flow difficulties, exacerbated by more difficult
business conditions in the UK, ultimately forced RHP to
close its Northampton plant s pecialising in this product.
Much of this business has been transferred elsewhere in the
group, but any momentum has been lost and RHP are no longer
rated as one of the key com petitors in this product area.
With hindsight, this failure seems unsurprising: even
Koyo Seiko, who were active in water pump bearin gs, have
been forced by the strength of German competition to
retrench dramaticall y in the German market. 	 The high price
of failure though is recorded in the hi gh level of RHP's
recent extraordjflaryt costs.
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C'utch r.2ui.. b.iz'Lng.
If RHP has found itself increasingly Bqueezed in the
volume segments, another alternative mi ght have been to
develop a role in terms of customer applications. This
strategy has been successfully pursued by INA as a way of
extending its base beyond needle bearings.
An important example is clutch release bearings. Like
integrated wheel hub bearings, clutch release bearings
represent higher value added as the product encompasses
bearin gs as part of a complete assembley. This business
segment is more closely customer orientated and profits are
earned through engineering innovation, aimed at solving
particular customer design problems. For a good problem
solving design, the price can reflect not so much
manufacturing cost, but how much it is worth to the customer
to have his problem solved (eg in avoiding warranty costs).
Profit mark-ups can for a time at least be considerably
higher than on established bearings products, and the key to
competiveness is technical innovation and good applications
engineers workin g closely with customer design	 teams.
Patenting can also be important.
This area is perhaps better suited to RHP's technical
strengths, given its relative weakness on the manufacturing
side. In the event, however, it was INA that "stole a march"
on both RHP and SKF, with the development and introduction
of the self ali gning clutch release bearin g , one of the few
major recent developments in this market.
Although RHP later responded with its own self-aligning
clutch release bearin g , the product's technical reputation
does not appear to be as high.	 SKF has responded with new
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product progrannies and is reported to have a "string of
patents" coming out. The battle between SKF and INA is
expected to intensify.
In this type of application, RHP's competitiveness
seems also to have sli pped back in the face of international
competitors t
 more substantial engineering resources. Also
although RHP's technical reputation seems high in some
respects (eg aero), Germany appears particularly strong on
basic applications en gineering .	 One reason cited for
Japanese retrenchment in the German market was 	 their
inability to match German application engineers. The
emphasis on, and pace of basic technical innovation (e g on
CAD/CAM developments) seems higher in Germany than in either
Britain, America, or Japan.
5.163 Appraisal
In addition to difficulties arisin g from a broadly
volume-orientated approach, RHP seems to have extended
itself over too many fronts, particularly given its weak
base. One by one its strategic thrusts have petered out,
forcing it finally to retrench onto what is now a coherent
(if much smaller) role as a supplier of "specials".
Yet the wastage resultin g from not having attained a
more cogent strategy at an earlier stage, and the price
ultimately paid due to competitive decline have been
considerable both in human terms and financially.
In spite of its weak market perfomance, RHP's cautious
financial policies mi ght seem on first inspection to have
paid off in terms of profitability. Table 25 indicated that
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RHP'a profitability, thou gh lower than US competitors, has
been better in relation to other international competitors
such as Japanese companies. Its pre-tax return on capital
employed averaged 8.2% durin g 1970-80 and 5.1% durin g 1980-
83. Yet this performance is less satisfactory if Britain's
rate of inflation and hi gh cost of finance is taken into
account.
Table 29 shows RHP's recent profit performance, both on
a historical and on a current cost basis, and also
highlights "extraordinary items" not included in profit
figures.
Table 29 RHP's recent profit performance (n1)
Year to 0 Sevt	 1980	 1981	 1982	 j9...83	 1984
Pre-tax profit on
historical cost basis 11.02	 0.75	 3.93	 0.66	 6.23
Pre-tax profit on
current cost basis	 2.1	 (4.1) (2.8)	 na	 na
Extraord. items (pre-tax)
associated with closure/
redundancy	 (8.17) (4.05) (1.24) (2.32) -
Exceptional costs
associated with
retrenchment on
continuing operations 0.0
	
2.21	 0.61	 0.34
	 0.61
Total costs associated
with retrenchment	 (8.17) (6.26) (1.85) (2.66) (0.61)
Source: company accounts
RHP's performance on a current cost accounting basis
(arguably more relevant when assessin g a company's overall
strategic situation) reveals a much worse position. Even on
a historical cost basis virtually all £16m of profits
accumulated between 1980 and 1983 were eaten up by
"extraordinary items" associated with plant closures and
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redundancies.
Total costs associated with such cutbacks were in fact
£19m over the same period, with only about £3m havin g been
included as "exce ptional items" in the calculation of profit
figures. Most of these costs were attributable to the
closure of RH? Automotive Division's Annfield Plain factory
(involving	 about	 1,250 redundancies) and 	 its	 other
automotive plant at Northampton, makin g water pumps and
associated spindle bearings. These largely reflect the
price paid for allowing competitive decline, and must be
borne in mind in assessing the company's strate gic situation
in automotive bearings.
Table 30 shows the proportion of RHP's overall sales
and profits (unadjusted) represented by bearings.
Table 30 RH? bearings' activities as a % of total sales and
profits
Average for years:	 1975-79
% of total sales	 88
% of total profits
(pre-interest)	 64
Source: company accounts
1980-83	 1984
75	 73
36	 53
Profitability in bearings has been lower than for RHP
as a whole.	 Sales volume in bearin gs has also fallen more
sharply than for the company as a whole:	 in 1980 prices,
bearing sales fell from £120m in 1975 to £95m in 1980 and
£58m in 1983.
Employment has also suffered. For RHP as a whole this
fell from 14,800 in 1970 to 9,600 in 1980 and 6,300 in 1983.
Employment in bearings activities only fell even more
jiLl
sharply from 11,80o in 1970 to 11,700 in 1983.
To summarise RHP's performance has been poor in terms
of both market and financial performance, and the situation
has deteriorated markedly in more recent years. 	 The level
of productivity remains well below that of key competitors
and competitive decline has extracted a hi gh price both
financially and in terms of employment.
RHP's problem in dealing with a more European pattern
of competition was daunting. Despite a hi gh export ratio its
share was little more than about 1% even in its strongest
markets in continental Europe. 	 Table 22 showed this was
marginal in comparison with key competitors. These markets
were already highly integrated by the time Britain entered
the EEC so that the competitive situation was asymmetrical.
It was difficult for UK companies to break into continental
markets where the pattern of com petition was already
consolidated	 and	 highly	 oligopolistic;	 continental
companies, on the other hand, perceived the UK as the one
remaining market "up for grabs".	 One UK marketing
subsidiary explained how this factor had increased their
parent company 's support:	 "Just tell us what you need and
you can have it!". 	 RHP's difficulty has been compounded by
having to operate from a UK base that other com panies too
have found uncompetitive.
Nevertheless, I believe RHP would have fared better had
it been more sensitive to strate gic context.	 Its sequence
of strategies can be expressed in fairly general terms:
merging to achieve consolidation of domestically owned
industry,
	
rationalisation aimed at improving financial
1112
performance, increased volume orientation, market retreat,
retrenchment and further rationalisation as the company
closed its two automotive orientated factories and finally
found a new if much smaller role as a s pecials manufacturer.
In contrast more successful strate gies in this sector
appear coherent end sensitive to contextual issues. 	 Some
companies (particularly the most powerful, eg SKF, Timken
and NSK) do seem to have benefitted from bold fairly simple
strategic designs;	 but others such as INA seem to have
succeeded through responsiveness to subtler opportunities.
RH? too would have probably fared better had it opted for a
more flexible customer orientated approach, 	 aimed at
strengthening its relationships with vehicle companies.
There have been important opportunities arisin g out of
customers' needs for a new type of service. 	 Rubery Owen's
collapse in wheels, after BL changed its sourcing policy,
demonstrates that even long established suppliers cannot
afford to take their position for granted.
Further no company seems to be able to afford to ignore
sometimes quite basic issues, 	 which are
	
nevertheless
critical to success in the context of its particular
industry and circumstances.	 In this case, issues in the
production area seem particularly important. RH? and indeed
other UK manufacturers simply could not afford to get behind
on issues such as manning levels.	 Senior executives needed
to recognise the strategic significance of this and other
specific iBsues in the production area, such as quality and
more recently flexible manufacturing methods.
Progress in such matters would also seem to depend on
policies desi gned to enhance the morale and commitment of
11L3
those in the production area, particularly lower level
production management; a lon ger term and more constructive
partnership with emp loyee representatives than has been
achieved by both sides in the past also seems necessary.
5.17 Conclusion
This sector has been directly affected by
internationalisation more rapidly than other automotive
component sectors. This is only partly due to the product's
price sensitivity and low transport costs. The more
critical factor has been market opportunities opened up by
technological change, reinforced by benefits arising from
volume production, which are probably higher than in many
component sectors.
	 Customer requirements have also been an
important factor. In consequence the radius of competition
between companies has already become Europe, and further
rationalisation looks set to occur on a yet more global
scale over the next ten years.
The performances of UK manufacturers in this sector
have declined alarmingly and fairl y comprehensively. An
underlying problem has been the erosion in the UK'S
international competitiveness. This affects manufacturers
directly and also indirectly since customers, also under
international pressure, have had to insist on a more
internationally com petitive service.
All manufacturers have been damaged by an exceptionally
unfavourable business environment in the UK, but management
have also been responsible.
The only UK-owned manufacturer,
	 RHP,	 exacerbated
problems through insensitivity to changing - competitive
circumstances. ItB original volume orientated strategy,
coupled with the demands from com peting on too many fronts.
proved	 unsustainable	 in	 the face of	 international
competitors	 better supported to pursue similar aims.
Initial financial benefits were subsequently eroded as the
company was forced into costly retrenchment, and its present
position appears weak in most automotive bearing markets. A
more flexible customerised stance, aimed at strengthening
its relationship with UK vehicle assemblers would have been
preferential.	 The scope for offsetting a declining UK
market through exports proved limited because of	 the
company 's limited international strength, close often
nationalistic supplier/assembler ties on the continent, and
erosion in the UK's cost position.
For most manufacturers including RHP however, the main
problem was a failure to recognise and deal with the
strategic implications of fairly basic issues in production
areas particularly productivity, quality and more recently
approaches to improve flexibilit y . The effects became acute
as competition intensified after about 1979.
Armed with more cogent and positive strategies, UK
management needs to seek a much stronger partnership with
employees, such as that so actively fostered by Japanese and
German managers. Some shift in organisational em phasis will
also be required to reinforce the efforts and morale of
produation personnel.
The UK manufacturing operations of most multinational
companies are now virtually peripheral, and the market
position of RHP, the only UK-owned manufacturer appears
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extremely weak in most automotive segments. Thus the threat
to this sector's future is urgent.	 The costs of allowing
decline make it in everyone's interests to cooperate and
coordinate their efforts to restore competitiveness in this
sector.
1LI6
,2 Automotive Foziini.
5.21 The UK market
As will be discussed in 5.22 international trade in
forgings is low e so that UK manufacturers' sales figures
also provide a fairly accurate indication of market trends.
Table 31 Sales of forgers by value
9-7-9-	 1981	 1983
344	 273	 230
85.96
	 110. 6	 128.0
400	 250	 180
1973	 1975	 1977
Sales Liii	 144	 243
	
320
WPI, 1980=100	 33.32	 50.69	 71.22
Sales Lm'80	 430	 480	 450
Source: Business Monitor MLH 399.5
Sales fell 58% between 1973 and 1983 after inflation,
but tonnage output figures are analysed directly in Table
32.
Table 32 UK production of forgings (all types), '000 tons
	
1965	 196	 1973	 197	 1977	 1979	 1981	 198
	
662	 547	 538	 501	 477	 451	 282	 222
Source: National Association of Drop Forgers and Stampers,
Economic and Statistical Review, various issues.
Over the same period 1973-1983 the tonnage reduction
was 61%, suggesting that price/ton has risen marginally
faster than the general wholesale price index. Total
forgings production in the UK in 1973 was O.54m tons,
similar to the figure in 1969. Production gradually declined
to O.45m tonB in 1979 before tumbling dramatically to O.28m
tons in 1981, and continuing down to 0.22m tons in 1983.
Whilst the industry has displayed considerable decline over
the longer term, the reduction in output since 1979 to only
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Total forgings
Cars, vans
Corn' vehicles
Tractors
Other mobile
Other
1982
252
59
74
34
19
66
1981
282
71
78
27
61
Ic-za
5110
201
123
117
9
90
1977
477
122
140
8o
36
100
1979
451
106
149
65
35
97
half the previous level by 1983 is thus unprecedented on
past trends.
Table 33 Forgings sales by customer sector, '000 tons
% Cars, vans * 37.2
X Corn' vehicles 22.8
% Tractors	 21.7
% Other mobile	 1.7
% Other	 16.6
25.5
29.4
16.7
7.5
20.9
23.11
33.0
14.4
7.8
21.4
25.1
27.7
15.7
9.7
21. 8
23.3
29.11
13.5
7.5
26.3
* Exports have been apportioned on basis of home production.
Source: National Association of Drop Forgers and Stampers.
"Ecoriomjc and Statistical Review", various issues.
In 1982 cars and commercial vehicles represented 53% of
sales, with other mobile equipment (tractors and earthmoving
equipment) representing a further 21%.	 Forgings for cars
and vans declined particularly by 1982, to only 29% of the
level in 1972.
Other major markets in 1982 were minin g (5.0% by
weight), pipeline equipment (4.9%), mechanical engineering
(4.4%), industrial engines (1.1%), aircraft (1.0% by weight,
but more important on the basis of value), agricultural
machinery (0.9%), railways (0.7%) and the government (0.7%).
This can be compared with 1965: motor cars, commercial
vehicles, and tractors together accounted for 80%,
mechanical engineering 8%, mining 2.4%, aircraft 1.7%,
railways 1.3%, shipbuilding 0.9%, otherB 6.4%. The fastest
growing segments have been pi peline equipment, an almost
negligible market 10 years ago, and mining equipment.
Sectors particularly hard hit by decline have been
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mechanical engineering, shipbuilding and railwa's.
In the main, however, severe market decline between
1979 and 1981 was comprehensive, allowing little potential
for offset. Despite the wide range of customers served,
virtually every market segment declined over 30% in the
course of one year, 1980. The best performance in this year
was in the aero segment with a decline of "only" 19%: and
this segment declined further a year later.
Thus if output growth is taken as an indicator of
"competitiveness", competitive decline in this sector is
very much part and parcel of competitive decline of British
industry generally.
This raises further questions that must be answered.
Are we dealing merely with a knock-on effect of decline
elsewhere? Or has the international com petitiveness of this
sector too been allowed to decline,
	 contributing to
problems?	 If so what are the key issues that must be dealt
with?
5.22 International trade In forgings
Classification problems render trade fi gures unreliable
and official fi gures tally poorly with responses received by
NADFS from its members. Official Business Monitor figures
shown in Table 3L were available only up to 1976 but give
some indication of trends.
j.L&9
able3jj International trade in forgings 1972 - 1976
1072	 107	 ____	 107
Exports FOB £m
	 3.8	 6.2	 12.1	 17.3
Imports CIF £m
	
0.45
	
1.1	 2.6	 5,3
Trade surplus £m
	
3.4	 5.1	 9.5	 12.0
Exports/imports (value) 8.4	 5.6	 4.7	 3.3
Home market £m
	
138	 180	 231
Imports home market %
	
0.8	 1.4	 2.3
Exports FOB. '000 tons 14.4	 25.9	 36.1	 38.1
Imports CIF, '000 tons	 1.2	 2.8	 6.5	 na
Exports/imports (wt)
	 12.0	 9.2	 5.6	 na
Exports value £/tori
	
264	 239	 335	 454
Imports value £/ton
	 375	 393	 400	 na
Source: Business Monitor MLH 399.5
1Q 7 6
17.4
6.6
10.8
2.7
262
2.5
32.4
na
na
537
na
Import penetration is not hi gh but has been rising,
from 0.8% in 1973 to 2.5% in 1976. This was faster than the
growth in exports 1
 and the ratio of exports/imports (by
value) fell steadily from 8.4 in 1972 to 2.7 in 1976. By
1976 the trade surplus had fallen to only 4% of the value of
the home market.
In terms of international trade, the sector has been
competitive in the past, but there are clear si gns that this
competitive position has been declining with im ports growing
much faster than exports. Export prices per ton appear to
have been lower than import prices, though there was some
closing of the gap in 1974, indicating a tendency of the UK
to buy in dear and sell cheap. This suggests UK
manufacturers are tending to concentrate on the lower value
added end of the business, at least as regards international
trade.
More recent international trade ratios, compiled by the
Department of Industry , are shown in Table 35.
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Table...35 International trade - recent trends
1978	 1979
Imports/home demand	 5.9%	 5.5%
Imports/ "	 " plus exports	 5.5	 5.0
Exports/manufacturers sales	 8.L	 9.6
Exports/ "	 " plus imports	 7.9	 9.1
1980	 1981
6.3%	 6.1%
5.7	 5.8
9.6	 Li. 9
9.1	 Li. 6
This suggests a generally more stable situation, with
the exception of a surprisingly sharp fall in export ratios
in 1981.
In fact, official figures seem to underestimate the
impact of trade. NADFS export figures, which seem much
closer to the mark, indicate exports have been gradually
rising - from 5% of total output in 1969, to 10% in 1973,
13% in 1979. 1Li% in 1981, though fallin g back a little to
12.8% in 1982 (NADFS. Economic and Statistical Reviews).
Industry sources suggest real figures for im ports would also
be much higher.
The direct impact of international trade is less
important than in automotive bearings, affording
manufacturers less scope to offset UK market decline through
exports; yet it has increased si gnificantly. There are
clear signs, moreover, that this sector has become less
internationally competitive than in the past.
5.23 The etructure of competition
5.231 Introduction
Competition in forgings is extremely fragmented with
over 100 companies involved. Probably over 60 of these
companies are actively involved in automotive forgings of
some type or another.	 The exact number at any one time is
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difficult to determine: althou gh there is some tendency for
smaller companies to specialise in particular business
segments, they tend to switch segments depending on business
conditions.	 If demand picks up in a particular market
segment there is a tendency for new entrants to be sucked
in.
Although there are many companies making forgings, the
largest manufacturer GKN For gings accounts for about L 5% of
all production and their factories number 5 of the top 8 in
the industry.
	
In 1965, their share of all forgings was
reported by the Monopolies Commission (1967)to be 11%, after
adding back the output of Ambrose Shardlow and Birfield
Extrusions which were subsequently taken over. 	 GKN's
general market position would thus appear to have been
fairly stable.
GKN's share of the automotive market at that time was.
however, considerably higher at 66%. This market was split
BL 59%, GM 17%, Ford 1L1% and Rootes (now part of Peugeot)
9%, GKN' respective shares being 68%, 1 &%, 79% and 75%
(Thid).
5.232 Entry and exit barriers
Entry barriers in terms of setting up new factories are
high and this has deterred new plants being set up either in
the UK or overseas, either by GKN or other advanced
countries.	 <>
Exit barriers are also high. 	 In closing	 plants
companies have found that the effective scrap values were
virtually zero. Numerous smaller companies are still family
controlled and less financiall y orientated. It is therefore
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extremely difficult for capacity in the industrY to adjust
downwards in the face of falling demand.
A subtle factor exacerbating this, is that forgings
capacity is highly "modular". If sales fall it is
relatively easy to isolate and mothball particular items of
plant (much of this equipment is anyway fully depreciated).
By
 contrast, in the competing process of castings the
process is technically hi ghly integrated and fixed costs are
higher. Falling demand here has led to many more plant
closures (there have been surprisingly few in forgings),
since the cost penalty entailed in running below full
capacity is more serious and there comes a point where you
either operate the whole plant or not.
Competition from substitute products such as castings
has thus also been particularly fierce.
	 Castings have
gained ground particularly in the car market.
	 One German
car manufacturer professed little further interest
	 in
bought-in forgings because of more attractive alternative
processes. Other alternatives such as fabrication or
machining have also gained ground, and alternative materials
such as plastics have dis played extremely rapid growth in
some automotive applications. Forgings appear to have been
cushioned against such competition only on highly stressed
parts, such as commercial vehicle crankshafts, and some
safety critical parts where their stress characteristics are
more at a premium.
Within the forgings sector low utilisatjon, the
presence of numerous fairly heterogeneous competitors, and
high exit barriers have led to fierce rivalry.
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5.233 Competition and competitor groupings
TDle 36 The maj or forging
 companies* ranked by employees
Employees
GKN Forgings (1)	 ill., 1I0i
Daniel Doncaster (2) 	 1, 500
Cameron Iron Works	 na
Firth Brown (3)	 1,550
Hi gh Duty Alloys	 1,800
Deritend (1&)	 830
Bloxwich Lock and Stamping Co 	 720
Burton Delingpole & Co	 na
George Turton Platts & Co	 530
Omes-Faulkners	 500
Head Wrightson Stampirigs	 00
Stainpings Alliance Ltd 	 350
The Hughes-Johnson Stampings Ltd 	 31&9
T.B. Wellings	 283
George Morgan	 275
Chemetron	 260
Perkson Forgings	 250
Brockhouse Forgings	 250
(1) Garringtons, Shardlow, Forgings and Presswork,
Kirkstall, Smethwick Drop, Smith Clayton, Scottish
Stampings, Birfield Extrusions
(2) Monk Bridge, Sheffield	 -
(3) Firth Derihon Stainpings, River Don Stampings
() South Wales Forgemasters, Bescot Drop Forgings
*In addition there are over 80 smaller forging manufacturers.
Companies can be categorised by customer industry to
some extent.	 This applies particularly to the aero sector,
which involves quite different quality assurance systems,
factory through times, price levels etc.	 High Duty Alloys
en j oys a distinctive aero niche, though other ma j or aero
suppliers such as Daniel Doncaster are also involved in the
automotive market. Cameron Iron Works is mainly involved in
pi pe line applications.	 Most companies however maintain a
broad customer spread and are prepared to change this mix
opportunistically.
Some categoi-jsation derives from equipment employed and
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often can be stated in terms of the range of forgings
weights that can be handled.	 For example, George Turton
Platts advertises its main range as 10-300kg compared with
Omes-Faulkners at 0.25 to 22.5kg. MoBt companies find their
ranges overlap to a considerable extent.
The maj or distinction with regard to equipment is
between those companies engaged on hamxnerwork, the more
traditional process involvin g forming by means of repeated
blows, and companies employing presses. The latter process
attains comparative advanta ge particularly where longer
production runs are involved.	 The larger companies such as
GKN were particularly quick to introduce such equipment in
the 1950'g. as part of an attack on volume segments,
particularly in the automotive market. 	 However, even GKN
would maintain a balance between presses and hammers and
often the two processes are in competition, so competitors
cannot be classified exclusively on this basis.
Forging applications on both cars and trucks are shown
in Appendix C.1,	 and there is some degree of clear
differentiation by product.	 However, firms generally also
provide a flexible jobbing service. 	 One recent trend
favourable to some larger companies such as GKN has been
vehicle companies wanting quotes on	 of forging
products, often linked to another recent trend, single
sourcing , which is similarly aimed at cost reduction.
A more important distinction here applies to safety
critical parts where quality control standards are higher
and subj ect to regulation, eg on steering applications. A
number of companies have pursued strategies based on
specialist niches afforded by some of these applications
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(see Appendix C.6).
5.23 L Other Bectoral characteristics affectin g
 competition
Trans port and handling costs reflect the low value of
rough forgings in relation to weight and bulk.
	 There used
to be some distinction between companies originally set up
mainly to serve Scotland, such as Cameron and GKN Scottish
Stampings, and others set up to serve the rest of the UK.
This has become less important and many Scottish companies
now "export" a high proportion of their forgings to English
markets.
Steel represents half the cost of forgings and so is
potentially an important feature of competition.	 Access to
steel on favourable terms is possible to a limited extent
for	 the	 largest	 companies,	 particularly	 GKN.
Originally, GKN's access to its own steel su pplies was as
much an advantage in respect to quality as cost. Today,
quality
 standards on steel are probably more homogeneous,
and steel prices are in theory regulated throughout the EEC.
In practice, even within the constraints of EEC bureaucracy,
companies such as GKN can still gain a sli ght cost advantage
on steel.
Britain is unique in the extent to which the forgings
sector has developed independently and only about 8% of
forgings are produced "in-house", b y either steel producers
on the one hand or forgings customers on the other.
	 In-
house production is relatively much more important in France
and Germany where it represents about 30% of the total, and
also in Japan.
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5.235	 Ov.x.sss aomp.tition
The main threat posed by overseas competition is
indirect through forgings coming into the UK as part of
vehicles, for example, manufactured overseas. Although
increasing, direct international trade has generally been
inhibited because of limited market and technological
opportunities, high transport costs, and the need for some
customer liaison.
Particular markets display much hi gher exposure. An
extreme example some years ago was the way in which forgings
for the heads of golf clubs were taken over by foreign
competitors.	 The pattern of competition in this small
segment is now highly "global" in nature, with most of these
forgings being su pplied from outside Europe even. Forgings
which can only be done on the largest presses, or on more
specialised equipment (as happened in cold extrusion), tend
to be traded internationally as manufacturers in one country
"steal a march" on those in others. Longer production runs
are more likely to be worthwhile sourcing overseas. Vehicle
assemblers, especially in the UK, have become much more
active in their international purchasing operations, so that
suppliers	 are	 increasingly exposed to
	 international
competition.
An increasing number of newly industrialised countries
are now developing competitive forgings industries (viz
Turkey, Mexico, the Far East and Eastern bloc countries),
and these pose some threat in the long term to the UK, in
view of the very low prices being offered. The main import
threat is however from Europe: from German manufacturers at
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the top end of the market,	 and Italian and Spanish
manufacturers at the cheaper end.
Larger companies, such as GKN Forgings, are much more
affected by
	
international competition because 	 their
comparative advantage vie a vie smaller manufacturers tends
to rest on precisely the characteristics that promote
international trade: an em phasis on volume, on new products
and new technology.
	
International competition, or at least
the threat of it, also appears to be undermining their
former advantage due to a stronger negotiating position with
UK customers. This Is particularly so In the automotive
market.
On the continent not only is there a much higher
proportion of in-house forgings production, but supplIer/
customer ties are also still much stronger, Fiat in Italy
being an extreme example. 	 UK manufacturers' relative
independence, which used to be advantageous in permitting
better production volume, is now proving a liability because
international competition is developing asymmetrically .	 UK
forgers are being frustrated from gaining a real foothold in
Continental markets because of close supplier/customer ties,
whilst they themselves are increasingly under attack.
5.24 Performance analysis of automotive forgers
A detailed analysis of sales and profit performances of
forging companies, over the last 7 years, is given in
Appendix C.2.
	 Supporting figures for individual companies
are given in Appendix C.3.
	
The few companies identified as
carrying out no automotive work have been se gregated.	 In
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order to gain an understanding of the competitive situation
among UK manufacturers in such a fragmented industry, 36
automotive forging manufacturers with continuous figures
have been analysed. The companies have also been ordered on
the basis of turnover in 1976/77 at the start of the period,
and then classified into 6 size groups in order to check for
any performance / scale relationships.
	 These will be
examined in the next section, after first using the analysis
to examine the collective performances of automotive
forgers.
5.241 Market performances
Growth rates have been calculated in Table 37 below by
first taking out inflation, based on the wholesale price
index, and then calculating % growth p.a. on a simple
arithmetic basis.
Table 7 Company sales growth performances by size groups
ComPany
 Groups	 Sales £rowth
1976-1980
% p.a.
Av. group I	
-4.9
Av. group II	
-4.5
Av. group III	
-1.0
Av. group IV	
-2.5
Av. group V	
-0.1
Av. group VI	
-1.8
Av. all groups	
-2.5
Note: wholesale price indicies for 1976,
59.45, 100 and 120.1
-12.0
-12.3
-15.1
-12.4
1.8
-8.2
_______ Sales zrowth
1976-1982
,' p.a.
-6.8
-6.3
-5.2
-5.5
-1.9
-2. 1
-9.7	 -4.6
1980 and 1982 were
Sales growth
1980-1982
% p.a.
For forging companies collectively, the decline in
sales volume which had been about 2.5% p.a. in 1976-80, had
sharply accelerated to just under 10% p .a. during the last
three years examined.
	 Decline has been comprehensive as in
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QCE
gn k
16.0
18.5
18.8
24.2
111.9
20.1
18.5
the case of automotive bearings manufacturers.
5.242 Financial performances - returns on capital employed
Overall performances by size groupings
I
II
1'I
IV
V
VI
All
80/83 80/83 76/79 76/83
ROCE	 ROCE	 ROCE	 ROCE
rank	 .3 wr	 yr
16.5	 0.5	 19.11.	 11.3
17.3	 3.8	 16.2	 10.9
19.7	 -3.5	 15.5	 7.4
25.0	 -20.1	 17.0	 1.1
14.0	 4.2	 22.9	 14.9
18.5	 -15.2	 17.4	 3.11.
18.5	 -5.0	 18.1	 8.2
76/83 76/83
ROCE 
.±. ver
growth rank
	
4.4	 .17.2
	
4.6	 19.7
	
2.2	 19.0
	
-11.4	 211.0
	
13.0	 11.3
	
0.9
	 19.7
	
3.4	 18.5
The collective performance of these companies has
undergone a dramatic and comprehensive decline in the last
three years, with average (unweighted) ROCE f or all 36
companies falling to -5.0% compared with Just over 18%
during the previous four years. Examination of companies
with longer runs of financial figures, suggests that results
during this earlier period are similar to results going back
to 1963. The picture, therefore, over the last three years
has been one of an unprecedented decline in financial
performance.	 Dramatically. 58% of all companies averaged
losses during the most recent 3 years, whereas only one of
these 36 companies averaged losses durin g the previous four
years.
The aero sector has generally been much more
profitable, which may partly explain Hughes-Johnson as the
best performer (see Appendix C.2) since it is also highly
involved in this sector. It also seems a factor in Firth
Derihon's good performance. 	 01]. industry applications have
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also proved profitable for some companies, notably Cameron
Iron. However, such sectors are clearly no panacea. Another
large company specialising in the aero sector, George Turton
Platts, has had one of the most disastrous performances,
with ROCE averaging losses of 1% durin g the three year
period 1980-83. (A ppendix C.3 also includes details for some
non-automotive forging companies. )
Thus the comprehensive and precipitous performance
decline since 1979 is borne out even more starkly than in
automotive bearings.
5.25 Relationship between scale and performance
5.251 Sales growth
Table 37 showed that over the longer period 1976-82,
Group V performed best in terms of sales growth, and there
has been a general tendency for smaller companies to perform
better In terms of market performance. 	 In the most recent
three years, whilst companies in the smallest two groups V
and VI have performed better (particularly Group V), there
has been little difference in sales performances In the top
four groups and Group III com panies who had been doin g well
have fallen back.
Smaller companies have perhaps more scope, through
improvements in market share, for weatherin g market decline,
and companies below sales of about £1.7m in 1976-77 have
indeed consistently outperformed larger companies. (This has
probably also improved their profitability).
161
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Fi gures on profitability shown in Table 38 are not
susceptible to over-sim plistic analysis.	 General notions,
such as the idea that size or market share is likel y to lead
to superior performance clearly need to be treated with
considerable caution in this particular context.
Group V. comprising the second smallest group of
companies, with sales between £0.9m and 1.7m in 1976-77,
again appears to have performed best over the full seven
year period.	 ROCE's for this group averaged 14.9% compared
with 8.2% for the 36 companies as a whole. 	 The final
performance indicator in the table is a composite formed by
adding average ROCE and average annual sales growth after
inflation.	 On the basis of this composite performance
indicator, Group V companies averaged 13.0% compared with
only 3.4% for all 36 companies.
For companies above this size range, there is some
evidence that relatively smaller companies are being
squeezed.	 The largest group, Group I, averages ROCE of
11.3% thus marginally outperforming the next largest group,
Group II.	 ROCE performance in the next groups falls off
substantially, however, with Group III averaging 7.4% and
Group IV coming down to 1.1%. A similar pattern emerges on
the basis of the composite performance indicator with Group
I averaging 4.4%, Group II 4.6%, Group III 2.2% and Group IV
-4. 4%.
Once companies get above a certain size, (sales of more
than about £1.7m in 1976-77), they appear to enter into much
more direct competition with the larger companies, leading
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to something of a "squeeze".
	 Companies in the next size
groups up then seem to fare better.
Yet the advantages of scale cannot be overriding and at
some point diseconomies, perhaps arising from organisational
problems, seem to take over. The sample of 36 companies
excludes the GKN group of companies, with the exception of
Birfield. If any group holds advantages of scale it is
certainly this group, and GKN Forgings have rationalised to
exploit such advantages, yet it has not performed well.
Although it has weathered recent conditions a little better
than average, with ROCE during 1980-83 at 2.6% compared with
an average of -5.0% for all 36 companies, its performance
over the full 7 year period is less good, at 0.3% compared
with the sample average of 8.2%. Similarly, although due to
amalgamation continuous figures were not available for Firth
Derihon's equally large sister company River Don Stampings,
the latter's financial performance up to that date was well
below average.
With these reservations (and the sample size is quite
small), the general tendency of middle sized companies to
find their performances squeezed would appear to raise
strategic questions for the companies involved. Many of
these companies appear to be neither large enough to extract
the advantages of scale on the one hand or small enough to
find alternative competitive niches. They should therefore
consider, perhaps quite bold, changes in direction if they
are to escape a situation of being "caught in the middle".
The larger ones here could consider for example amalgamation
and rationalisation with other companies, moving u p a rank;
others might consider focusing their activities to attain
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greater a pecialisation, even if it is necessary to slim down
operations. The degree of overcapacity, which must now be
expected to persist even in the longer term, suggests that
fairly radical changes in direction will be needed for this
group of companies, if they are to resume acceptable levels
of financial performance.
The issue of scale may therefore raise strategically
important questions for some companies, but such issues must
be analysed in the light of circumstances and contextual
evidence. The key to successful performance cannot be
related simplistically to size for automotive forgers. They
must be wary of relying on fairl y general notions such as
supposed advantages from market share, particularly if the
market is interpreted on a parochial UK only basis. On
average it is smaller companies who have performed best, and
even in size categories where conditions do appear more
difficult, some companies have still managed performances
well above average.
	 Volume-orientated strategies such as
GKN Forgings' based on acquisition, integration and
rationalisatlon to gain maximum advantage from possible
scale advantages do not appear to have been successful in
recent years, though they may have been more appropriate in
the growth conditions of the 1950's and 1960's.
5.26 General ieuea related to success
Appendix C.6 orders companies in terms of their longer
term performances and then provides s ynopses of the
principal strategies they have pursued.
A number of successful companies identified distinctive
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niches quite early on (eg on specialist safety critical
applications); but they also dis played considerable
commitment over many years in their investments and by
focusing resources accordingly.
Not all specialists, though, have been so successful.
Many companies, including some of the specialists, have
fallen into what appears to have been somethin g of a trap,
that of simply going for volume orientated equipment.
Declining business volume, and disruption in order patterns
resulting in a sharp reduction in production runs, have in
more recent years placed flexibilit y in manufacturing
methods at a premium. A common progression in the past was
for automotive forgers to move from traditional hammers onto
presses, but in economic terms these tend to be less
flexible. Ironically , recent market changes have rendered
many more modern presses,	 even entire press	 shops,
uneconomic. In the UK, though not in fact overseas where
business conditions have been less unfavourable, there has
been a drift back towards older technolo gy ,	 and in
particular back towards hammers.
In practice however, increased focus tends to involve
some sacrifice in flexibility in a more general sense and
also the use of more dedicated e quipment. To be successful
companies have to balance the advantages of specialisation
against the need to retain as much flexibility as possible
in their manufacturin g operations.	 It is possible to
improve flexibility through careful attention to engineering
and production matters. However the days of success Just
through investing in the latest t ype of production
equipment have passed by.
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It is surprising how many companies have opted for
broadly similar strategies, 	 and companies which	 have
specialised more have often gone for similar niches.	 This
has contributed to greater rivalry and even more intense
competition. There would seem to be scope for some companies
to further focus their operations, and to do so in more
distinctive ways, so as to avoid quite such head on
competition with other manufacturers.
It would, however, be wrong to place too much emphasis
on such broad strate gies being pursued by manufacturers.
Appendix C.6 points to considerable overlap, with companies
proving more or less successful in spite of quite different
broad strategies.
Managerial commitment and attention to basics still
seem to be more vital factors for success. For example, the
Hill and Smith Group's two forging companies, Criterion
Stampings and British and Midlands, ranked respectively 3
and 7 on performance out of 36 companies, yet their market
strategies have not been particularly distinctive.
International competition has made far less direct
impact on forgers than on automotive bearing manufacturers,
but the subtler indirect effect has been dramatic.
Profitability remained reasonable up until almost 1979 and
it seemed suppliers could almost afford to ignore the
problems of their UK automotive customers. At this point, as
discussed in section I. the vehicle manufacturers had to
insist on a more internationally competitive service, simply
to survive themBelves. Larger com panies, particularly those
operating in volume market segments, are perhaps most
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exposed to such demands, since the threat of international
sourcing is much more credible than for small Jobbing
orders. This partly explains the relatively poor
performance of such companies. Yet the change has crucially
increased the importance of matchin g international rivals on
key issues such as productivity, cost reduction, quality and
flexible manufacturin g systems. Manufacturers complacent in
such matters have since paid a high price.
5.27 The eroaion of forgers' international competitiveness
5.271 Productivity differentials
Table 39 shows productivity estimates, obtained from
visiting automotive forging plants, in which data seemed
more reliable.	 The best UK data was from <> TJKF1. This
plant was chosen as a particular focus for 	 overseas
comparisons, partly for this reason and partly because of
its similarity to the German plant.	 Figures for other UK
companies are segregated.
Table 39 Productivity estimates for automotive forgers
Country	Company	 Employees	 Tons p .a. Sales p.a.
fl1fl.	 £'OOO/mpn*
Japan	 <JF1>	 300	 129	 99
Japan	 <JF2>	 3U0	 78	 L8
USA	 <USF1>	 370	 86	 80
Germany <GF1>	 900	 28
Britain <UKF1>	 L1.60	 19	 23
Britain <UKF2>	 23
Britain <UKF3>	 3L
Britain <UKFU>	 3U	 28
Britain <UKF5>	 9
* currency conversions at followin g rates of sterling : $1.5,
11.DM, L0O yen.
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of work done in-house are discussed in Appendix C.5, but do
not explain such substantial productivity differentials
between Britain and the USA and Japan.
These	 situations are less comparable than
	
those
discussed in automotive bearings, relating to operations of
multinational companies, but they give some appreciation of
the productivity gap.
Table 39 suggests that larger plant size is not a
factor in the better performances of US and Japanese plants.
Only
 a few years ago <UKF1's> plant employed over 900 people
and <UKF2> plants typically employed about 1,000 people,
going up to about 2,000 <>.	 This confirms findings in 5.25
that large size does not contribute greatly to success in
this particular sector.	 Indeed, UK plants would often seem
to suffer from being above the o ptimal size, bearing in mind
organisationa]. disadvantages as size increases.
	 US and
Japanese	 plants gained through greater specialisation,
though even here some <UKF2> plants are also quite
specialised.
Both Japanese plants are much more modern than those in
other countries. Although the first company <JF1> was
established in 1916, an analysis of the age structure of
maj or items of equipment (weighted by tonnage capacity)
produced an average age of 13.5 years in their main press
shop and only 3.1 years for all their air drop hammers,
producing an overall age estimate of 12.2 years. The
commitment to modern technology is supported by high
Investment levels and also through in-house developments.
This affects manning levels:
	 eg as a result of introducing
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pedal controls all their modern air drop hammers are now
manned by single operators. The plant belon ging to the
second company <JF2> was completed in 1976.
In 1968. the first company 's plant was visited by the
us company 's present plant manager. He was immensely
impressed by the modern equipment, but found the Japanese
were considerably behind in terms of production experience.
Since then experience effects, supported by impressive
commitment in the area of production, have enabled the
Japanese to catch up and surpass Western standards. Such
investments are still continuing and the Japanese seem
likely to move even further ahead.
Japanese investment levels are assisted by a dynamic
and competitive customer industry base, allowing them to
modernise whilst increasing capacity to meet demand. Their
lower cost of capital enables them to consider pa.yback
periods as hi gh as 10 years, which is unacceptably high for
most British or American forgers, particularly given recent
interest rates.
British plant is generally considerably older, with
much equipment over 50 years old. Disturbingly UK
conditions have penalised companies investing in more
progressive processes.	 This is partly because modern
equipment Is more volume dependent.	 Yet Japanese engineers
and executives were astonished to hear of the general drift
back towards traditional hammers in the UK. This suggested
UK conditions encouraged technological regression: hammers,
apart from representing a step backwards, were considered to
hold very little scope for further technological
development. For example, robotic arms can now be used on
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presBes but not on hammers. E quipment such as presses did
present greater problems in respect to flexibility, but was
(the Japanese argued) the only way forward in the context of
technological developments takin g place. However, from the
viewpoint of UK manufacturers facing such conditions, the
fact that companies employing old fashioned equipment
frequently outperform companies such as GKN with much more
modern equipment, suggestB that it would be unwise to place
undue emphasis on differences in plant and equipment.
Even given good equipment, progress on manning levels
depends upon everyone being determined to develop and
maximlee its potential usefulness.	 I was impressed by the
Japanese emphasis on targets everywhere. For example the
target output for a 1600 ton press, manned by just a single
operator, was 30 pieces an hour, reflectin g a more general
target of 1,5 kg/hour/man.	 The chalked up average actual
performance for the day prior to my visit was L1L8 pieces an
hour.	 Similarly down time targets were also proving
effective.	 I found down time on one 3 ton hammer, for
example, had fallen from 8.5-9% in 1977 to 1..5-4.7% in 1982.
General business conditions do matter too. UK economic
conditions have reduced capacity utilisation to well under
50%, and are also discouraging people's efforts in this
direction. Labour productivity would also rise if capacity
utilisation improved, since staff numbers in some areas are
fairly invariant. The US company 's productivity has also
fallen, despite considerable efforts, because of falling
capacity utilisation.	 In 1978 output per man appeared to
have been almost 100 tons/man.
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It should, however, be noted that there was less
evidence (if any ) of any productivity gap against the German
manufacturer <GF1>, whose plant and equipment were also
fairly old.	 It should also be appreciated that the company
is reputed to be a less formidable competitor than other
German forgers, such as Gerlach, with more modern equipment.
In conclusion a very substantial productivity gap has
emerged between UK forgers and those in Japan and the USA.
The fact that at least one major UK forging company <UKF2>
once enjoyed a reputation for much better efficiency than
manufacturers such as the Japanese only adds weight to
concern.	 Part, though not all, of the problem is the UK's
exceptionally unfavourable business environment. 	 This has
discouraged investment and led to stagnation, whilst rivals
such as the Japanese are movin g swiftly ahead.
5.272 More flexible manufacturin g methods
US productivity appears to owe a great deal to longer
production runs, which are now typically between 5,000 and
15,000, with most about 8,000-10,000, and going up to about
30,000 on better selling lines. 	 As <USF1's> in-house
facility , the US plant is in a better position than most US
forgers.
Significantly, this US advantage has been sharply
eroded.	 Two years ago, this US plant could choose a good
dee]. of its business allowing production runs of about
30,000 or above. Orders have fallen, but production runs
have fallen considerably further, because vehicle customers
are now in a much stronger bargaining position and (like
others) they are insistin g on a much more flexible delivery
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service.	 Japanese production runs are lower, typically
about 4,000, though European figures are lower still, and
disruption affecting UK production runs has been quite
exceptional.
Japanese forgers, however, have had to learn how to
handle relatively low production runs in order to comply
with just-in-time programmes instigated by their vehicle
customers over 10 years ago. 	 As a result of numerous
incremental changes in production methods, 	 they
	
have
radically reduced both changeover times and overall factory
through times.
Table 40 Changeover times in Japanese forging plant
2,500 ton forging press
2,500 ton friction press
1,600 ton forging press
25 ton-M Counterbiow hammer
2,000 ton upsetter
3 ton hammer
Changeover
4 wears .g.Q
30-45 mine
60-90 mine
Up to 3 bre
50 mine
Changeover
times now
15-20 mine
15-20 mine
12 mins
30-40 mine
50-60 mine
15-20 mine
Crews involved on changeovers comprised 4 men on the
large 2,500 ton presses, 2 on the 1600 ton presses, and 7 on
the Counterbiow hammer. Many small teams, com prising people
temporarily drawn off the production line due to below
capacity working , were constantly involved in timed training
exercises to reduce times even further.
Output rates on lighter forgings such as conn rode were
running at 690 / hour (1.5 ton hammer, usin g 2 operators).
With production runs now below 4,000 on many items, Japanese
manufacturers understandably claim changeovers as frequent
as 4 or 5 times a day on many jobs. Output rates on heavier
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forgings such as front axle beams are much lower, but here
die life can fall as low as 700 - 800 pieces, so there iB
still a problem of fairly frequent changeover. Manufacturers
have thus been forced to radically improve changeover times
in order to avoid excessive down time.
Western manufacturers are well behind
	 in	 such
developments, particularly the Americans cushioned until
recently by good production runs.
Table 41 US changeover times on forging plant
4-5000 ton hammers	 2.1 hrs set up + 0.7 hrs out = 2.8 hrs
1.5 - 3,000 "	 "	 1.8 hrs set up + 0.7 hi's out = 2.11 hrs
General hammers	 1.9 hrs set up + 0.7 hrs out = 2.6 hrs
The Americans have now recognised that conditions, even
for them, have changed and have plans to cut times down to
1.25 hours, using a block die concept.
Despite particularly severe problems in this respect, I
found scarcely any evidence of UK forgers pursuing such
programmes on any systematic basis.
5.273 Other production issues
At the heart of such progress on numerous production
matters seems to be a recognition by senior Japanese
management of their strategic significance, and a commitment
where necessary to long term improvement programmes. 	 Their
strategic thinking places due wei ght on the highly specific,
often quite technical issues involved.
In	 contrast	 to	 sophisticated	 financial	 plans,
characteristic of some UK companies, one Japanese forging
company's "strategic plan" comprised a single technical
drawing.	 Beginning with small pie charts indicating market
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share targets, this plan rapidly moved into hi ghly specific
technical and production targets. Their control systems
reflected these targets, and relied on numerous simple
performance charts, which were hi ghly visible, readily
comprehensible and ubiquitous in all production areas.
Quite specific targets in the "strategic plan", such as
flash reduction, were actually implemented: from 5.25 kg to
1.87 kg in the case of one axle beam.
Implementation, in this example as in other production
matters including quality improvements, relied heavily on
numerous highly committed groups of production workers,
often referred to as quality circles. 	 These production
groups received close attention and support from 	 top
management.
In return for flexibilit y and commitment, production
personnel received from top management not only Job security
(lifetime employment surprisingly appeared to be the norm
even in quite small supplier plants), but also recognition
of the strategic importance of their contribution. In
comparison to UK competitors, they were treated as "king
pins" and their morale was correspondingly much higher.
More reliance was placed on those lower down the
organisation, as compared to staff functions, and the
approach was (necessarily) associated with 	 a better
industrial relations climate.
ThUB	 to be effective,	 strategies need	 to pay
commensurate attention to such production matters.
Commitment to longer term improvement programmes seems to be
eBsential, and may have to entail improvements in the
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industrial relations climate and moves to a more production-
centred organisational fOcUB.
5.274 Comparative cost levels
Steel costs within Europe are largely controlled by EEC
agreements.	 In 1981,	 British forging prices averaged
£968/ton and steel costs were estimated by one company at
almost	 exactly 50%.	 implying their steel price	 was
approximately £480/ton. In the same year, Tok yo Drop was
paying about y 0.l3ni or about £325/ton , converting at the
then rate of around £=400 yen.	 This comparison is clearly
sensitive to trends in the real exchange rate. UK and other
European forgers are clearly squeezed by powerful customers
on the one hand, and bureaucraticall y established steel
prices on the other.
Labour cost trends for forgers in the main competitor
countries are graphed in Appendix c.4, although they are
less up to date than those discussed in the case of
manufacturers generally in the next section (these also
being graphed in Appendix D.5). It is clear that UK labour
costs moved sharply against trend after 1979. This
seriously damaged the international cost position of UK
forgers, at precisely the moment when UK vehicle customers
had to insist on greater international competitiveness.
Average remuneration paid by UK forging companies was
allowed to rise from £3. 500 in 1977/8 to £5,000 in 1980/81
and £7,000 in 1982/83 (ICC Business Ratio Reports, 1984 and
1981). In the context of monetary restraint, this has
damaged the competitiveness of UK forgers.
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5.28 GKN's Btrategy in automotive forgings
5.281 GKN'a dominant hiatorioal position
About 25 years ago, GKN Forgings was highly competitive
internationally . The UK automotive forgings market was
still large and dynamic. The UK for gings sector also gained
greater volume through bein g relatively inde pendent of
vehicle customers.
GKN's forgings strategy had been built upon volume
orientation. Its acquisition strategy had culminated in a
greater market share than overseas competitors enjoyed.
Plant sizes were particularly large. Their largest forgings
plant Garringtons produced 128.000 tons or almost 20% of
total UK production and was larger than any in Europe.
Production methods were geared to volume runs, and involved
a high proportion of modern volume orientated e quipment. In
the j95Ø Garringtons' press shop was a world showpiece,
much visited and photographed by people from all over the
world (not least the Japanese).
As UK market leader, GKN For gings' product range was
also the most comprehensive nationally ,	 and probably
internationally too.
	
They maintained a strong technical
capability. Between 1960 and 1965 R & D averaged O.4% of
sales, which was above the industry average, and the company
played a leadin g role at technical conferences both
nationally and internationally.
The success of this strategy owed a great deal to the
entrepreneurial flair and competitive commitment of
executives such as Lord Brooks.	 In the context of growth
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the approach	 corresponded to UK vehicle customers'
requirements at that time.
Basic production matters were not neglected.
	 Senior
management were allowed considerable free rein, owing to the
parent company 's loose (though financially
	
supportive)
organisational	 structure.	 The	 philosophy	 of
decentralisation	 in respect to plants (these actually
competed against each other in some cases) extended to the
situation within plants.
	 Considerable authority was
delegated down to production management, though they
received substantial top level support, chief executives
such as Lord Brooks being exponents of "management by
walking about".
Industrial relations were handled through a combination
of paternalism (eg better treatment for those who had served
the company longer, with the idea that they in turn would
pass on the benefit of their experience to others) and
tough-minded attention to the importance of precedent. In a
move reminiscentof the breaking of the Nissan strike in the
late 1950's. Lord Brooks broke a major strike and only re-
recruited those he wanted back. This secured the principle
of fairly efficient manning levelB (supported by piece work
incentives), and in fact a more healthy industrial relations
record thereafter than was common in UK industries
generally.
At this time international trade. though increasing,
still made little impact. GKN Forginge' direct exports
accounted for 37% of sales in 1965, about double the
Proportion in 1960, having increased considerably in 196-65
particularly to EEC and EFTA countries. 	 The parent
1.77
company ' s average export ratio was higher at just over 8%,
but trade in forgings was inhibited by a combination of
tariff barriers, high transport costs and the close liaison
between forging companies and vehicle customers (especially
overseas).	 For automotive components in general the GKN
Group tended to see manufacturing overseas as the best way
to compete more internationally ;	 but	 in	 forgings
technological	 change had opened up	 fewer market
opportunities in com parison to constant velocity joints, in
which they held powerful patents.	 Volume advantages were
also less appreciable.	 GKN Forgings therefore limited its
international strategy to a policy of gradually- increasing
exports, but its international position was no weaker than
that of overseas rivals, none of whom adopted more ambitious
international policies.
5.282 Seeds of complacency
Yet already by the 1960's there were inci pient signs of
complacency, which were later to cost the company dear.
Gradually a more "scientific" approach to management was
introduced and some degree of entrepreneurial commitment
which had hitherto characterised the corporate culture may
perhaps have been lost.
Industrial relations was still a thorny problem. 	 The
company gradually shed paternalistic policies, which had
encouraged employee loyalty; yet it ducked the issue of how
to sustain employees' total commitment. 	 Management and
unions alike exploited negotiating opportunities created by
the business cycle, myopic to the need for a longer term
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partnership. The develo pment of the personnel function did
little to rectify this and may have reduced the authority of
production supervisers at the sharp end.
Both sides then found themselves pressured	 into
allowing Important production issues to become the
sacrificial lamb in this quiescent battle of attrition.
With order books reasonably full, and unions in a strong
negotiating position,	 management allowed an ultimately
disastrous set of precedents to take root.
Managerial pressure on productivity eased off, j ust as
new payment schemes, replacing piecework, reduced individual
incentives. Increasing attention to work study did little
to assist, since the problem was embroiled with industrial
relations issues.
As competition in general increased the parent group
tightened its structure, with Forgings becomin g a "Sub
Group". Staff functions such as finance increased in
importance, as bud geting systems enabled the parent group to
apply greater pressure for results. A new phrase, "the
bottom line", carried increased influence in strategic
decisions taken at hi gher level.
Inflation accounting increased awareness of the need to
restore profitability;
	
but attempts to raise	 prices
foundered. Competitors, many with less sophisticated
financial approaches and depreciated plant, benefitted from
some alleviation in competitive pressure but felt no
necessity to follow suit on prices. Having not first
addressed fundamental competitive issues, such attempts did
not succeed in raisin g profitability.
The extension of GKN's acquisition strategy, with the
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takeover of Ambrose Shardlow and Birfield Extrusions, had
increased market domination; but any gains in negotiating
power that mi ght have been hoped for (eg monopolistic
pricing) were eroded when vehicle companies' bargaining
positions later strengthened substantially. Indeed, the
strategy may have diverted attention and resources from the
production area.
Momentum was sustained in R&D, redesignated as "Process
and Product Development" to preserve the emphasis
	 on
"development". This produced a number of practical
technical innovations, many well ahead of Japanese rivals
even in 1983, but much of this effort was wasted. <> There
was a lack of commitment by senior management and unions to
getting new processes into production which was matched by
many in production management. <>
Efforts by such staff departments were almost bound to
be swamped without greater support in production areas. But
as staff functions had increased in scale and importance,
relationships between production staff, senior management
and other staff became less continuous; morale in
production management suffered as they felt by-passed, and
resentment led to a backlash.
	 <>
Over-manning was recognised. The relative ease with
which full production levels were sustained during the three
day week in 1971. was one demonstration of this. Yet fear of
expensive strikes on the one hand and pressure for rapid
improvements in annual operating results on the other, led
to management being unprepared to grasp the nettle until
competitive conditions got much worse.	 The same applied to
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wage awards.
5.283 Tha n..d for a ahanga in itratagy
Having inherited a competitive advantage, the company
had effectively allowed this to be squandered through
complacency on basic matters of critical importance. Yet
there was also another strate gic problem.
GKN Forgings' competitive advantage had lain in volume
orientation, but (as has been argued) such benefits were
relatively small in this components sector, and any margin
for complacency narrow. There was therefore always a danger
in trying to dominate such an inherently fragmented sector,
relying on volume benefits, technology and vertical
integration back into steel (see for example the demise of
Prelude described in Porter, 1980). Family firms operating
with depreciated equipment created exit barriers.
Competitors could also switch with ease from other forgings
segments back into automotive work the moment conditions
improved.	 As growth tailed of f and overcapacity grew <>,
volume orientation became a liability.
Second, GKN Forgings' volume automotive markets, with
better	 technological opportunities, 	 became subject to
increased European competition.
	 By 1981, its own export
ratio had increased to 17%, with 69% of exports going to
Europe.	 Direct competition is still restricted to imports
and any import threat is limited by the lack of attractive
technological or marketing opportunities. Even so it is
increasing , whilst GKN's attempts to penetrate Europe are
hampered by much closer ties between forgers and vehicle
customers there.
	 Its early advantage as a result of the UK
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sector's relative independence from vehicle customers seems
to have become a liability: as in automotive bearings
international competition is asymnietrica]., since UK vehicle
customers are more "open" to international su ppliers than
overseas customers.	 Virtually all GKN Forgings' "mobile
equipment" customers had by this time developed
international procurement o perations, and the impact on
profit margins was considerable.
Squeezed by international competition on the one hand
and Intensified domestic competition on the other, GKN
Forgings' negotiating position against vehicle customers was
undercut.	 Like the US plant, GKN also found it could no
longer rely on volume production runs.	 Destocking also
increased disruption in vehicle company order schedules.
Thus GKN's relatively poor performance in the sector
can be ascribed to insensitivity to its changing strategic
context: its over-reliance on volume orientation,
exacerbated by underestimating the effects of European
competition on this strategy;
	
a lack of sensitivity to the
Implications of changed customer needs and lower growth
conditions; and ( partly as a result) complacency it could
not afford on more basic issues such as productivity and
flexible manufacturing systems.
Its main adfustment strategy in recent years has been
retrenchment and cutting employment back into line with
output. Output almost exactly halved between 1973 and 1981.
Employment in 1979 was 10,000, only slightly lower than in
1973. but was sharply reduced to 6,000 by March 1982.	 The
company estimates It could meet an additional 50% rise In
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demand without the need for additional labour, so its main
hope is for some restoration in demand. The full benefits
of efficiency
 improvements will not show up until then, but
the company anticipates a return to moderate levels of
profitability (ROCE levels are hindered by the fact that
only half their "capital employed" is actually in use).
The cost of decline has been hi gh in financial as well
as in human terms. Apart from redundancy costs, asset
write-offs were considerable. <>
The same closure also demonstrates a reluctance, rooted
in a corporate culture more appropriate to past conditions,
to move away from an undue reliance on large scale plants.
<> Capacity had to be cut somewhere and F & P's work was
transferred to other larger plants, hungry for business; yet
this analysis suggests that, given continuing overcapacity,
it might have been better to transfer work away from large
volume orientated plants to smaller more flexible
operations.
To summarise, GKN's volume orientated strategy has been
undermined	 by	 changing competitive	 circumstances,
particularly the
	 increased	 impact of	 international
competition in its chosen market segments. It has also
Buffered through neglecting matters In production, an area
of strength in the past.
5.29 Conclusions
As in automotive bearings, UK manufacturers in this
sector have undergone a remakably severe and comprehensive
performance decline in terms of sales and profits. Again
this appears to reflect an underlying problem of UK
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competitiveness.
A problem affectin g UK forgers particularly has been
the comprehensive phenomenon of decline in so many customer
industries.	 This UK sector has been part of, but has also
contributed to, this phenomenon since its own international
competitiveness has been allowed to decline. 	 From a
position well ahead of rivals such as the Japanese 30 years
ago, it is now well behind on issues such as productivity.
Des pite some improvements, it is still fallin g back in
relative terms.	 Had this sector been able to provide the
more internationally competitive service which vehicle and
other customer industries (themselves under international
pressure) can now insist upon, performance decline would
have been less severe and prospects brighter.
The	 UK's	 exceptionally unfavourable	 business
environment has however been partly to blame.
	 Wage cost
pressures have damaged com petitiveness.	 Investment In more
progressive technology has been discouraged, and massive
underutilisation has led to stagnation.	 The direct Impact
of overseas competition has been less important than in
automotive bearings.	 Trade, though increasing, has been
inhibited by the product's higher transport costs and the
need for fairly close customer links. More importantly,
there has been less scope for technological and marketing
opportunities and benefits associated with volume production
are also much lower for thiB product. 	 Even so, the trade
position has declined and direct competition (particularly
from Europe) is now significant strategically in volume
market segments.
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UK manufacturers have exacerbated their difficulties
through not bein g sufficiently sensitive to their changing
strategic context. Many appear to have overestimated
benefits associated with volume-orientated production
methods, particularly given the customer needs and the
general business climate. Even in market segments where
volume benefits are more pronounced, these have been offset
by the increased impact of direct international competition.
UK manufacturers	 need	 to establish	 a closer
relationship with UK customers. 	 In the past the sector may
have benefitted from a relativel y independent position, but
surprisingly this is no longer true. There is a limit to
the reliance that can be placed on export customers,
especially If UK conditions do not become more favourable,
and there are many areas In which It is important that UK
suppliers	 and their UK customers support each other.
However,	 there is substantial scope for technological
transfer agreements especially with Japanese manufacturers.
UK manufacturers need to be more sensitive to the
strategic implications (in their particular situation) of
fairly basic production issues, such as manning levels and
flexible manufacturing systems. They also need to be
prepared to change organisatiorial and industrial relations
approaches to support efforts by production personnel.
Decline in this sector is likely to be less dramatic
since international trade is relatively low; but the high
price paid for decline in financial and human terms, make it
In everyone's interest to coordinate their efforts, in a
more committed manner, to prevent this situation recurring
In the future.
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.3 Automotiv. Zn.tr'um.ntation
5.31 The market for automotive electronics and instrumentation
In comparison to other component markets, Lucas 1983
review could justifiably claim, "Few other market sectors
offer such glittering prospects". The value of an average
European car's electronic content, only £1 in 1970, had
risen to £25 by 1982, and was independently forecast by the
Bureau d'Informatlon de Precisions Economigues to rise to
£150 - £175 by 1990 ( quoted in Lucas 1983 review).
Accordingly the West European market for such automotive
electronics was expected to grow 30% p.a. from an estimated
value of £250 million in 1982 to a projected value of £1.5
to £1.75bn by 1990. Similar arguments are expressed, from a
more independent viewpoint, in Electronics (26.1.811).
Also in contrast to other component sectors, UK
electronic component manufacturers generally have been
consistently profitable. ICC average sector figures for the
largest 60 companies for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 for
ROCE were 25%, 25% and 23%, and for profit margins 9.2%.
8.6% and 8.2%.
Other major world markets appear even more dynamic.
Table 112 US and Japanese automobile electronics markets
1982	 1983	 19811	 1987
Estimates	 Projections
USA (Sm. constant prices)
	 1693	 1932	 2086	 2588
Japan (Sm, converted at $=Y238)1122
	 1330	 1564	 -
Source: Electronics, 12.1.1984
Citing Ford, the same article noted, "Between 1970 and
1980	 the electronics content per average US vehicle
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increased from about $25 to $250 ... Within 10 to 15 years
it should approach $1,1&00", and predicted a world market
over $llLbn by 1990. This is reasonably in line with nW own
interview findings. <>
5.311 Market segments
Historically the involvement by vehicle manufacturers
in electronics (apart from radios) dates back to headlight
controls in the 1950's, followed by voltage regulators and
alternators in the 1960's. By the end of the 1970's about
thirty different electronic items were identifiable and the
major segments now recognised began to emerge. In the last
few years the number of new items has mushroomed so it is
important to appreciate the pace of change reshaping market
segments.
Table 4 Main automotive electronic market segments
<>
Underlying such opportunities has been the development
of integrated circuits in the late 1950's, followed by very
large scale integration (VLSI) and more recently by
microprocessors.	 The market for inte grated circuits and
transducers alone is sizeable <>. It is particularly
important in respect to automotive instrumentation, the area
that because of its potential will be the focus in this
study.
Bob Schultz, Chief Engineer, Buick Motor Division at
General Motors, has suggested (Electronics, 26.1.811) that a
future scenario in about 1990 would have to allow for whole
ranges of completely new electronic products: 	 keyless
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s ystems, automatic seat and mirror adjustment, navigation
and other information systems, trip reports, moisture
activated wipers, replacement of throttle cables, radar-
assisted brakin g systems, ride controls, energy management
systems, diagnostics. Vehicle manufacturers' motivation is
partly the opportunity for product differentiation presented
by such developments, though Ford is a little more sceptical
about "razzmatazz applications";	 but it is also founded on
solid grounds such as cost reduction and reliability,
particularly in the more basic areas.	 Quality is now so
hi gh in some areas as to eliminate the need for quality
checks. Unit costs of electronic parts have already
improved by a factor of about 100, accordin g to Schultz, and
their reliability by about 200.
The	 pace	 of technological progress	 and market
development in Western Europe,	 though impressive, has
however lagged behind America and Japan. 	 Within Europe,
moreover, the UK market has not escaped entirely the
dramatic	 downturn	 experienced	 by other	 component
manufacturers.
The UK original equipment market for instrumentation,
including transducers, was worth <>. In 1982 compared to
expectations <> this market had slumped back in real terms
<>, producing quite considerable overcapacity, prior to
rat ionalisat ion.
Whilst Lucas' optimistic projections for the West
European market seem not unreasonable, the scale of their
optimism ought to be tempered by the relativel y flat
performance of the domestic market to date at least. UK
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manufacturers' export ratios in automotive instrumentation
have fallen back <> reflectin g therefore only a small share
of markets in mainland Europe.
Thus even in such an exceptionally attractive sector,
there are incipient signs of UK decline.
5.32 Internationalication of the market and competition
Prior to entry into the EEC, tariff barriers encouraged
close links between suppliers and assemblers. There was
little Inter-European trade in instrumentation, and the
pattern of competition was primarily national and
monopolistic. In the UK, Lucas tacitl y agreed not to attack
Smiths' virtual monopoly, in return for Smiths holding back
in other markets, and a similar stalemate in Germany kept
Bosch from attacking VDO's virtual monopoly.
Ford and GM were content to use national independent
suppliers until the end of the 1960's. when they shook up
the pattern of competition by introducing their own in-house
suppliers. Only about 5% of Ford's business (essentially
transducers) is now open to independent UK suppliers, the
rest being supplied on a European basis by Autolight, "in-
house". GM business tended to be increasingly controlled
though Opel in Germany. with about half supplied by their
in-house supplier AC Delco in the UK, and about half "open"
and in fact supplied mainly by VDO In Germany. With the
decline of GM's UK business, AC Delco Is pressing for more
of VDO's business to fill its own capacity.
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Major European instrumentation manufacturers
ij ain Germany	 France	 Italy	 Ford	 GM
smiths	 VDO	 Jaeger	 Veglia	 Autolight Delco
As in other components,
	 Europeanisation has been
encouraged by trade liberalisation and customer
requirements, but here even more than in the case of
automotive bearings, the change in technology from electro-
mechanical	 to electronic processes of production	 has
transformed the pattern of competition.
This change has reduced entry barriers and attracted
powerful competitors with no substantial previous
instrumentation involvement. Lucas and Bosch (from Germany)
and other "systems" companies have entered, recognising the
future need for Integrated electronic packages involving
instrumentation, such as engine management systems. The
investment stakes are set to increase beyond what weaker
instrumention manufacturers can afford. Motorola (USA)'s
chief executive has remarked (Electronics, 26.1.8L) on the
"sky rocketing" costs on the integrated circuits side: £i1.Om
by 1981 would scarcely finance one processing bay, whereas
just a few years before "it would have put you in business".
This will lead to further industry consolidation and
rationalisation, and makes the UK market base with sales of
£20m p.a. look too weak to sustain manufacturers in the
longer term. Other new entrants are electronics companies
such as Motorola who have now established an automotive
division. The change in the pattern of competition is
similar, in some respects, to that takin g place in the watch
industry, with experience effects likel y to be Important.
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Automotive instruments, though, tend to be highly
customerised, if not almost fashion products because they
are used by vehicle manufacturers as a means of
differentiating their vehicles. More standard electrical
items such as alternators and starter motors have already
been savaged by Far Eastern competition, but other
customerised electrical products such as interior lighting
have been less affected. Similarly, automotive electronics
are differentiated from other consumer electronic markets
because of the need for close customer liaison. Systems
design involvement is considerable and component development
must be matched to customers' model development programmes.
Also, quality and delivery requirements dictate considerable
conservatism, so that the pace of change will be slower than
in other consumer electronic markets. The effect will be to
encourage closer supplier/assembler relationships and to
inhibit the pace of internationalisatjon.
Investment re quirements are,	 however,	 encouraging
vehicle manufacturers to rely more on independent suppliers
and this is weakening the position of UK in-house
manufacturers such as Autolight. Yet customer ties are still
important. Jaeger is owned equally by VDO and Plafinco,
which is controlled by Matra, and is closely linked into
Renault. In Italy, Veglia Is owned by Borleti, in turn owned
by Fiat. Fiat's unions oppose im ports of UK parts. Thus
although competition is becoming more international, it is
perhaps naive to think in terms of free market competition.
In-house production accounts for almost 100% of the US
market compared with 70% or so In Europe. GM is served by
AC Delco, Ford by Autolight, and Chrysler by Huntsville.
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The only sizeable US independent is Stuart Warner which
specialises exclusively on trucks. 	 This is a major factor
inhibiting European entry into the US market - only VDO has
a manufacturing presence there,	 having established an
operation in support of VW's US plant.
In	 Japan Toyota owns Nippon Denso,	 which	 also
manufactures other electrical parts,
	
and Nissan	 owns
Kantoi Seiki (instrumentation only).	 There are a number of
independents	 such as Hitachi,	 but	 supplier/assembler
relations are extremely close.
British exports are now predominantly to Europe <>
though there is also some involvement with India and Korea.
Thus initially , from a UK standpoint, Europe will be the
major battleground as international competition intensifies.
UK manufacturers accept that they now have to operate en a
European basis if they are to survive, but arguments
expressed by some, that multi-sourcin g should ensure UK
manufacturers a reasonable share of the European market, are
unconvincing. Even the No. 2 in the US electronic calculator
business,	 Bowmar,	 filed for bankruptcy after intense
competitive pressure from Texas Instruments in 1975 (Hedley,
1976a).	 Competition in instrumentation may be less extreme
for reasons already outlined, but there is little room for
complacency, particularly in view of UK manufacturers' weak
position in mainland Europe.
Opinions differ on the question of whether the pattern
of competition may even become "global" as has happened in
motor cycles, watches and consumer electronicB. Some claim
Ford, whilst insisting on competitive standards against
19.
alternative European sources of supply, does not re quire UK
manufacturers to compete with costs available from Japanese
suppliers. The argument continues that European governments
would protect such an important industry at some point.
Yet other factors are drawing world markets closer together.
Instrumentation is closely linked with vehicle engines,
which	 are supplied on a highly international 	 basis,
particularly now that en gine sizes are more similar.	 Model
types and vehicle technolo gies are also more similar
following the drive for fuel economy, resulting in parallel
pressures	 on	 component	 suppliers.	 Also	 although
customerisation is im portant, the basic systems requirements
for instrumentation are quite similar worldwide.
There are already important linkages taking place. 	 <>
More expensive instruments, incorporating a higher degree of
technology, are the first to be affected. 	 Electronic
display systems range enormously in cost from about £8 to
£125, making it worthwhile shopping around for the world's
best products for luxury cars such as Jaguar, Mercedes and
BMW. Much simple non-electronic instrumetation equipment
will though continue to be made on a more local basis for
some time to come for reasons of cost.
My interviews with Japanese companies suggest that
while the immediate competitive ball game is certainly
Europe, this is unlikely to be the case in the longer term.
So far, Japanese export ratios have been low because of
close customer links, only about 6-7% for one company
visited and fairly negligible for the other. However, one
company expected its export/sales ratio might rise to iO-5O%
in the next five years.	 Technical links are already
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established, for example Bosch and Lucas have Bent director
level delegations to Japanese com panies and have numerous
technical agxeementB. Japanese manufacturers already have
European sales bases (though they have met stiff resistance
in Germany). They also have overseas plants, but their major
first target is undoubtedly the USA, where Nippon Denso for
example already has a plant for vehicle conditioning
equipment.
The Japanese do appear set to gain considerable
"experience" advantages from volume. One manufacturer,
currently producing <> a new type of pressure sensor,
pro j ected perhaps a hundredfold increase within the next 5
years <>. Japanese companies did see a pattern of
competition developing along similar lines to calculators
and watches.
In respect to Britain the close BL/Honda link and
the Nissan company coming to Britain must present an added
attraction.	 BL does receive some emission control parts
from one Japanese company but the amount is small an	 they
have found BL difficult to penetrate, to date at least.
Both Japanese and US suppliers benefit from domestic
vehicle industries with reputations for being dynamic in
respect to electronics. (For example, European assemblers
were much Blower in introducing electronic clocks). Both
are also reputed as bein g more prepared to pay for
additional sophistication.
Interestingly, Ford UK who are reputed to favour
simplicity, have j ust re j ected a technically
 advanced
Japanese li quid crystal display, in favour of a cheaper
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European model about half the price. The Japanese are so
far producing only small numbers <>, but are very conscious
of the experience effect. As volume grew, they expected
costs to have halved within 3 years <>.
The example casts an interesting light on the claim
that US multinational vehicle assemblers do not require UK
manufacturers to compete on price with Japanese competition!
The case of bearings also casts doubts on the ability of
European governments to intervene in time to adequately
protect manufacturers from Japanese competition, and
Instrument manufacturers themselves appeared to have some
doubts in this respect.
To sununarise this section, the Immediate competitive
battleground has now become Europe with com panies such as
Bosch <> and VDO posing the major threat. In the longer
term however, although Japanese attention is Initially
targeted on the US and at the upper end of the market
technologically, it seems highly optimistic for any British
supplier to believe they will remain sheltered from a more
global struggle.
5.33 Performance of UK manufacturers
Smiths held over 90% of the free UK market for
instrumentation until it joined forces with Lucas in 1983.
The company's overall performance between 1970 and 1982 was
well above average for the sector at 18.6% ROCE. Sales grew
at 7% p.a., after Inflation, between 1975 and 1981, also
well above average. Yet its good performance is large due to
non-automotive activities such as aerospace. These represent
more attractive opportunities than automotive work, which
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has shrunk proportionately . Its automotive electronics
activities generally are very small in relation to Lucas and
international competitors.
In the context of factors discussed in the last
section, Smiths has been wary of investment levels needed to
maintain Its position, given the demands associated with
growth and the change in technology. From a strate gic point
of view something had to happen. Smiths (like Lucas)
recognised that competition was set to intensify on a
European, If not global, basis. <> Joint operations with
Lucas on instrumentation have emerged as a possible answer.
Sceptics might see this move by the two companies as
primarily defensive, and designed to stem an otherwise
inevitable outbreak of fierce domestic competition.
Instrumentation has proved more attractive than other
automotive compoient sectors. Smiths have been assisted by a
rise in content per vehicle <> since 1972 and by exports
then negligible and now 25%.
	
However sales of
instrumentation <> have declined in volume terms.
Disturbin gly , from the viewpoint of the UK'S competitive
position in this sector, Smiths' export ratio in automotive
Instrumentation, havin g climbed steadily up to 35% in 1979,
has slumped back to 25% following the rise in the real
exchange rate. Closures and ratlonalisatlon, following the
establishment of the joint operation with Lucas in 1983, do
not merely represent elimination of duplicated resources,
since in instrumentation there has been limited overlap.
They also reflect a recognition of over-capacity and
retrenchment brought about by the UK's weak international
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position.
Lucas, like Smiths, can call on substantial, relevant
technical expertise from other activities such as aerospace.
Like BOsCh though, its main strength lies in being able to
offer the wide range of automotive electronics, necessary on
systems such as those required for engine/transmission
management. For Lucas, instruments therefore became
attractive complementary products to their own. Also since
their scale of involvement in automotive electronics was
much larger than Smiths', they could feasibly contemplate
the level of investment and resources that would ultimately
be involved.
Yet although benefits associated with volume are
particularly high for this product, scale on its own is no
guarantee of competitive success in the fast moving world of
electronics. Lucas' general performance is not encouraging.
Following two years of expensive retrenchment, the company
has commendably turned around financial performance in 1984.
However over the longer period 1970 - 1982, ROCE averaged
5.7%, below average for the automotive components industry
and well behind Smiths. In the context of inflation and
interest rates prevailing, investors could have done far
better elsewhere. Sales growth between 1975 and 1982 was
also poor, both absolutely (after inflation) and relative to
other component firms. Indeed, as one of the five largest
component companies Lucas is a reminder that sheer size
correlates badly with performance in this sector.
The company is strong in some key technological areas,
such as brake systems, harnessing and fuel injection
systems. Its advanced microjector was sufficiently ahead to
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penetrate the US market, although even here unexpected set-
backs in the diesel engine market have forced Lucas to
retrench, closing down their Sunbury factory.
Lucas Electrical Division's performance has
	 been
particularly poor, squeezed between powerful European
competitors such as Bosch and low priced Far Eastern
competition. More standard "finished" electrical products,
such as alternator starter motors appear to have somewhat
buckled under the full wei ght of global competition, leading
to heavy retrenchment - a disturbing indication given
increasing internationalisation in automotive electronics.
Lucas utilised its financial weight in attempting to
establish the position of its electrical division	 in
mainland Europe by buying a 50% share of Ducellier in
France;	 yet <>, Lucas has finally had to pull out,
surrenderin g an important manufacturing base on the
mainland. Given the "ties" that still exist, this will prove
a very serious weakness in Lucas' attempt to establish a
competitive position in European automotive electronics.
One electronic product that has already become exposed
to more global competition, the car radio, suggests room for
concern over the UK'S competitiveness. As the exchange rate
soared in 1980, Smiths finally abandoned this price
sensitive market in the face of Japanese competition. Lucas
fared little better in this product. Ford switched to
Germany 's Blaupunkt, whose radios as Beynon (198I.) has
pointed out are substantially manufactured in Korea.
Thus whilst Smiths performance has been extremely good
as a whole, its position in automotive instrumentation was
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too weak to cope with such a fundamental change in the
pattern of competition. Lucas' overall performance has been
poor, but in automotive electronics It is extremely powerful
and has a great deal to contribute in any joint venture, in
the context of changes which have taken place.	 There are
signs of weakness in terms of International competitiveness
and a critical problem appears to be the lack of overseas
support.
5.3& The Luoaa/Smith g joint operation
The Lucas/Smiths j oint venture does offer real and
immediate opportunities for synergy, but will probably
create only a temporary respite unless accompanied by
substantial strategic moves in the f'utre. Cnical, The
main Immediate advantage for both companies is avoiding
otherwise inevitable head-on competition in the home market.
Yet as with tariff barriers, reducing domestic competition
can provide only temporary cushioning against the effects of
international competition.	 Britain's preoccupation with
domestic mergers in the face of strategic problems, has
generally not proven highly successful, as was Illustrated
in	 the	 case	 of	 automotive	 bearings,	 where
internationalisation occurred earlier.
In the past, Smiths avoided such precedent and resisted
linking up with Lucas. Instead, its links with Bosch and
other overseas companies offered an alternative route. Even
If future competition were to remain essentially Europe,
some would have argued that linking with Bosch, who had a
similar Interest in ac quiring instrumentation expertise,
would have offered the more important advantage of a strong
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manufacturing base in mainland Europe.
Others, taking a yet more global view, suspected that
Europe was now sufficiently integrated for an export-only
policy to be sufficient within Europe, but pointed to the
need for a competitive grouping strong enough to survive US
and Japanese competition. This scenario called for a
powerful European grouping, ultimately to be supported b y a
major foothold in at least one of the other two major
markets. As global com petition increased, other weaker
participants, <> would be more likely to be squeezed out.
Evidence, discussed in the last section, veers towards
the latter view, at least in the longer term. Yet, on
either scenario, a merely nationalistic and defensive merger
will not be enough to sustain a credible future competitive
position. The real potential for this particular venture may
however be realised if it is used as a springboard for
aggreBsive international moves in the future.
5.35 The UK business environment
On recognising the need for major structural change in
1980, both companies approached the government for
assistance to support a new strategy for the industry, but
felt they "came u p against a brick wall". At the same time,
the French government responded to the opportunity presented
by automotive electronics. Displaying understanding of the
problem's international dimension, they provided funding
support but on the basis of international inte gration, Matra
being encouraged to link up with Germany's VDO to form
Jaeger.	 Timeliness,	 in	 such a fast movin g business
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situation, is important and in Britain almost three valuable
years were lost before any strategic response was
forthcoming, and even this appears nationalistic and
defensive rather than any final long term answer. The
Ministry for International Trade and Industry in .lapan
appears to have close long established involvement with
component manufacturers and a good re putation with these
companies.
Subtle pressure applied by the French government, who
are not so naive as to imagine that international
competition is totally open and free in this business,
effectively neutralised Lucas' Ducellier foothold in France.
This move,	 drawing little British	 response,	 has
substantially weakened the competitive position of UK
manufacturers. In Germany, GKN was similarly frustrated by
the legal system from acquiring Sachs which would have given
it some foothold on clutches.
Both Lucas and Smiths found their competitive position
damaged by the rIse in the real exchange rate in 1980, and
as mentioned this has done permanent damage in the case of
more exposed products. Both though see their competitive
position as pert and parcel of a more general collapse of
manufacturing in Britain. A strong and steadily growing
domestic market base will be important if they are to keep
up with technolo gical change and experience effects enjoyed
by more dynamic competitors overseas. UK business conditions
have not been favourable either to themselves or domestic
customers, either in terms of the market or relative costs.
Finally, there is concern that the education s ystem is
not supplying enough electronics engineers. By contrast
203
Japanese automotive electronicB manufacturers enjoy strength
in depth in this area: 100 of 512 em ployees at one Japanese
plant visited were engineering graduates and of these 50 had
graduated in electronics.
The government is primarily responsible for action on
such matters, but the crucial issue of cost pressures
depends also on coo peration from employees and their
representatives.
536 Relatione with vehicle manufacturere
Manufacturers	 in this sector tend to feel
	 that
political factors will prevent any further disappearance of
major vehicle customers, just as some, perhaps over-
optimistically, put their faith in the view that European
governments will be forced to act at some point even in the
case of automotive electronics components. 	 They also
recognise that, in spite their own increasing exposure to
international	 competition,	 overseas customer/supplier
relationships are still highly "tied", and are
understandably concerned about the danger of the UK market
opening up more rapidly than overseas markets.
However, relationships between assemblers and suppliers
are changing. Given their own heavy funding demands, most
vehicle customers are reluctant to take on the heavy
investments required in the automotive electronics field.
On the other hand, electronic developments dictate even
closer design and systems coordination than was the case
with electro-mechanjcal s ystems, so that customers must
anyway
 retain a substantial expertise and involvement.
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Engineers at VW have suggested this might lead to a much
closer relationship between assemblers and	 electronic
companies directly, which could tend to squeeze out
"systems" companies such as Smiths and Lucas. In fact, the
task of systems companies lB getting more difficult as
vehicle systems are rapidly becoming more sophisticated and
complex. Opportunities for systems companies, in my view,
will therefore continue to develop, though the presence of
new entrants will further intensif y competition. On balance
these developments will probably loosen ties between systems
companies and assemblers.
To date Japanese su ppliers such as Nippon Denso and
Mitsubishi Electric benefitted considerably from extremely
close customer relationships.	 Their levels of R & D
expenditure	 are fairly high <>,	 but	 they receive
considerable support from assemblers.	 <> Similar support
also applies to investment in plant and the rate of
modernisatiori of Japanese plants is hi ghly Impressive. So
far this close relationship has inhibited their ability to
attack more global markets.
Suppliers now, however, reco gnise that to recover
substantial investment outlays looming, and to exploit
experience effects, there may be some advantage in slightly
loosening traditional customer ties. Suppliers such as
Nippon Deriso already display more independence than typical
Japanese automotive component suppliers. Shimokawa (1982b)
believes there will be some decoupling in JapaneBe
customer/supplier relationshi ps; though even in thiB sector
where the pressures for change are greater, he is probably
correct in indicating only a limited shift. Traditional
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business relationshi ps appear very strong in Japan.
To summarise. volume benefits are sufficientl y hi gh to
encourage slightly looser relationships between suppliers
and assemblers.	 One effect may be much sharper Japanese
competition in the future. 	 As mentioned, there are already
some signs of this.	 Nevertheless, close supplier/assembler
relationships will continue to be important.	 Therefore
given the importance of volume, any further tendency for UK
vehicle assemblers to "open up" to overseas procurement in
advance of reciprocal developments overseas would damage
this sector.
5.37 Technological and manufacturing developments
Manufacturing processes have undergone a total
transformation in the move from electro-mechanical to
electronic	 systems.	 Such	 a fluid situation makes
international productivity comparisons dangerous, yet the
commitment demonstrated by the Japanese in the manufacturing
area appears to reflect closely what is happening in other
automotive component cases discussed.
Sophisticated modern equipment is much more evident as
a competitive weapon in this component area than in the
others. The Japanese are making a major push here towards
high productivity, highly automated integrated manufacturing
systems.	 New manufacturing systems and equipment are being
"turned over" at an extremely rapid rate.
ven in a Bituatlon chapacterised by such rapid
strategic change, Japanese manufacturers tend not to see
grand stratagems such as jnternationalisation, moves towards
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industry	consolidation or diversification as the 	 key
strategic issues; again, they point instead towards progress
achieved on much more specific targets	 affecting
manufacturing areas - key priorities such as productivity,
"zero defects", value analysis, desi gn developments aimed at
materials savings, and "worker based" morale programmes.
Ni ppon Denso for example claims 20 to 30 suggestions per
employee per year from its quality circles.	 Production
areas still abound with the same hi ghly visible charts noted
in other component factories, 	 showing	 targets	 and
achievements on fairly basic issues.	 Their commitment to
detail is perhaps illustrated by the seriousness attached to
the many si gns exhorting all employees not to use the lifts
so that the company can save energy.
Japanese manufacturers in this sector have resisted
manufacturing approaches such as standardisation.	 Close
customer ties have dictated customer responsiveness even
given the difficult y of having to learn to handle large
numbers of product variations efficiently.
	
This has been
incorporated in key manufacturing targets.
This approach is particularly evident in the case of
Nippon Denso's more established electrical products such as
alternators. Pointing to Impressive achievements on
changeover times on one such line a Japanese engineer
grinned, "Our target production is one". Also product life
cycles have been shortened to allow a new and comprehensive
series of alternators every two years. through comprehensive
and well integrated future product development programmes,
as illustrated in Table L&5.
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Table_A5. New alternator product line programmes
Alternator series
J.	 z
Model ve/
outside diameter
142mm
135mm
128mm
124mm
114mm
107mm
90 amps 100 amps 120 amps
	
75 "	 90 "	 100
	
60 "
	 75 "	 90 "
	
50 "
	 60 "
	 75 "
	4  "
	 50 "	 60 "
40 amps 50 amps
Source: Japanese company
Such an integrated product development programme
enables individual product offerings to be continuously
updated, with each new series coming out every two years,
whilst making the maximum usage of investment. <> This
approach is continuously eliminating older lines <>.
Japanese manufacturers' approaches were thus not based
on crude standardisation programmes, such as elimination of
marginal customer accounts for example, but were subtle and
aimed at ensurin g considerable flexibility both in terms of
the number of products handled (this manufacturer was
handling 400 different t ypes of starter motor and 200 types
of alternator) and also in the extent of product innovation
that	 they	 could handle.
In general, through continuous and dedicated attention
to detail, Japanese manufacturers such as Nippon Denso
appear to have not only improved levels of efficiency but,
more importantly in their own e yes, they have managed to
enhance the overall effectiveness of their service. They
felt this enabled them to assist customers to optimise
performance over a wide range of models and en gine types.
The subtler issue of effectiveness, though, is of course
more difficult to quantify than that of efficiency , but it
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is nevertheless extremely important from the point of view
of competitiveness.
ThUS although issues arising from volume and
internationalisation will I believe be important in this
sector, management cannot afford to neglect these more
detailed and perhaps subtler matters.
5.38 Conclusion
There are already si gns of decline even in this sector,
where opportunities are exceptionally attractive; but the
real threat lies at a later stage in the life cycle of these
new electronic products when competition is likel y to
increase.
Tacit collusion under which major automotive electrical
companies held off serious attack on each other's
instrumentation markets, has broken down in the last five
years as a result of technolo gical and market opportunities
created by electronics. Such opportunities, together with
economies of scale and experience effects which are
particularly important in this sector, are attracting new
entrants	 and changing the	 essential	 structure	 of
competition.
However though transport costs are low, traditionally
close, often nationalistic customer relationships and the
need for close coordination and market sensitivit y may
inhibit this process. Yet the immediate competitive arena
has already moved to urope and Japanese (and possibly US)
manufacturers are expected to represent more serious
competition in about five years time. Pressure Is likel y to
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intensify for rationalisation within Europe, leadin g to the
elimination of some competitors within the next ten years.
By this time some rationalisation on a more global scale
(including the USA and Japan) will probably have begun.
Just as direct International competition is beginning
to increase, there are signs that the international
competitiveness of this sector has weakened. Changes in the
UK's relative international cost position appear to have
damaged the position.	 The sector is heavily dependent on
the UK's weak vehicle industry base, which is particularly
important because of volume benefits and the need to keep up
technologically. The UK'S lack of strength in depth in
electronics expertise (and in management In this area) - is
also a problem. Late government recognition (in comparison
with France and Japan) of the need for some strategic
initiative may also have already damaged competitive
prospects.	 -
Manufacturers need to be sensitive to changes noted in
the pattern of competition. Whilst the UK industry's recent
strategy of domestic consolidation, would certainly be
attractive were competition to remain predominantly UK only,
a similar danger to that already manifest in automotive
bearings is evident. Given rapid internationalisation, such
a strategy Is likely to encounter, 	 head-on, powerful
overseas competition. Unless this strategy is followed up
by maj or international linkages, the UK position would seem
to be weakly supported in Europe. Whilst a stronger baBe in
continental Euro pe represents the immediate priority, within
the next ten years there will be a need for linkages to
improve the industry 's position with at least one of the
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other ma j or world markets, Japan or the USA.
Despite internationa].isation, manufacturers must be
wary of any loosenin g in their relationship with UK vehicle
customers.	 Overseas vehicle companies are still closely
involved with, and supportive of, their local suppliers and
they are likely to "open up" more slowly than UK vehicle
companies.	 This means UK suppliers must remain highly
orientated to the needs of UK vehicle customers, and to do
so they must strive to remain as flexible as possible.
More basic issues cannot be ignored.	 The pace of
technological change in this sector will increase the
Importance of research and development.	 Although the UK
record here is relatively good, 	 the ability of	 UK
manufacturers to match levels of fundin g support evident in
competitor countries such as Japan is more in question,
particularly in terms of investment that will ultimatel y be
needed to translate developments .into new processes.	 The
ability to develop and market new product lines is also
likely to be Important. At this stage in the "product life
cycle" more incremental production improvements are less
significant for this sector than for other automotive
components discussed.
	 However they are Important for more
mature automotive electrical products and are likely to be
so for this sector in the future. 	 The need to keep up with
such a rapid pace of change will require manufacturers to
foster employees' wholehearted participation and commitment.
Decline in this attractive, "star" component sector has
so far been less severe than in others, but future threats
demand immediate attention.
	 High investment levels likely,
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the support received by overseas competitors and the need
for strategic initiatives suggests further coordination
between suppliers. UK vehicle customers and government is
necessary. Unless there is a more general recognition of
the need for more adequate profit levels their leeway for
action will - remain limited, and the UK will miss out on
investment opportunities important to this sector's future.
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5.4 Automotive sxh&uit iysteme
5.41 The UK market
Exhaust systems, comprising silencers and associated
piping, are frequently replaced, so that the aftermarket is
relatively much more important than for other products
discussed. The aftermarket (AM) has traditionally been
considered more profitable than the ori ginal equipment (OE)
market. Eurofinance (1980) cited Smiths' AM profit margins
as having averaged 11.3% between 1974 and 1978, compared
with only 6.1% for CE.	 Exhaust systems are regarded as a
particularly "lucrative market" (Saso, 1981).
AM sales depend on the size of the "car parc". 	 Whilst
foreign vehicles have penetrated UK markets quite rapidly
(depleting	 domestic	 CE	 component markets),
	
foreign
penetration of the domestic "car parc" has occurred more
slowly.
	
This has cushioned AM manufacturers	 against
declining UK vehicle production levels. There has also been
the opportunity to attack the AM for foreign-made vehicles,
especially after the government's legislation 	 against
franchising.
A survey by Marplan suggested that the DIY market has
been growing particularly rapidly. This comprises about 25-
30% of the UK market, and a slightly higher percentage on
the Continent.	 Some component manufacturers, such as GKN,
have also used the AM as a means of vertically integrating
operations into distribution, an attractive o pportunity for
growth in a declining market.
High transport costs in relation to value added, and
the relatively low level of technology involved have
214
insulated UK manufacturers from international trade. Direct
trade in exhaust systems is still low, partly because of
their bulk in relation to value and official trade figures
are not even produced. Official figures for UK
manufacturers' sales, shown in Table 46, ought therefore to
reflect UK market trends.
Table 46 Sales of exhaust systems and parts
1973	 1975	 1977	 1979	 1981 1983
Mfrs' sales, Cm
	 26.6	 39.1	 58.8	 74.5
	
38.1 42.2
Coverage, %
	 98	 98	 94	 94	 77	 77
Adjusted sales, Cm
	 27.2	 39.9	 62,6	 79.2	 49.5 54.8
WPI, 1980=100	 33.3	 50.7
	
71.2	 86.0 110.6 126.5
Sales, Cm 1980	 81.5	 78.7
	
87.9	 92.1	 44.7 43.3
Source: Business Monitors PQ 381.1 and PQ 3530
My interviews suggest, however, that these official
figures reflect AM trends rather poorly, and that the real
decline here may be only 20-25%, though OE sales may have
fallen further than this.
	 Yet even in this component
market,	 enhanced by the existence of an attractive
aftermarket, decline since 1979 has been very severe.
5.142 Company pax'formanaaB
To gain some indication of company performance levels
in this sector I analysed the performances of a sample of
five companies for which continuous figures were available:
together their sales in 1975 amounted to 42% of the market
suggested by official fi gures. Financial reports of other
maj or participants such as Armstrong, Automotive Products
and Quinton Hazell were not included since exhaust systems
manufacture represents a 1.0w proportion of their activities.
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Results are shown in Table 1 7, Tenneco Walker figures being
segregated because losses eQuivalent to -191% and -95% in
1975 and 1976 would otherwise be unduly distorting.
Table 47 Exhaust systems company ROCE and growth performances*
ROCE ROCE ROCE Growth Growth Growth
	
75-79 80-81 75-J.. 75-79
	 79-81	 75-81
%p.a.	 %p.a.	 %• p. a.
TI Cheswlck	 47.7	 8.1	 36.4	 11.4	 (22.1)	 (3.1)
TI Nicholson	 55.8	 29.0	 48.2	 4.3	 (2.3)	 2.0
Burgess	 16.2	 7.4	 13.7	 8.9	 (19.2)	 (2.7)
Chilcotts	 21.8	 15.0	 13.9
	
8.1	 (21.6)	 (4.1)
Average	 35.11	 14.9	 28.0	 8.2	 (16.3)	 (2.0)
Tenneco W.	 (42.1)	 2.3 (29.4) 111.8	 (6.5)	 6.4
* Growth is sales growth after inflation (WPI)
Source: ICC Automotive Component Business Ratio Report
Table 11.7 reinforces the Bales picture j ust discussed.
The sharp reversal of trends after 1979 suggests a fall in
volume of 29% (taking all five companies) over the two years
to 1981.
Average return on capital employed (taking the first
four companies), 35% between 1975 and 1979, fell back to 15%
between 1980 and 1981. After early losses, Tenneco Walker
had recovered to reasonable levels of profitability by 1978,
but then it too fell sharply. (AM orientated companies such
as TI Nicholson have Indeed done noticeably better than OE
orientated companies such as TI Cheswick and Tenneco
Walker).
Profit and sales performances have thus been better
than in other component sectors, yet here too there has been
a sharp reversal following 1979. Accounts of exhaust system
companies visited in Japan and the USA do not Indicate such
substantial	 decline In either sales or
	 financial
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performance.
5.43 The changing pattern of competition
5.431 The general cituation
Major companies felt competition in OE and AM markets
could not be differentiated. TI Silencers and Tenneco Walker
both appear to accept lower profitability
 on OE operations,
because in the long run a strong OE position is critical to
remainin g
 competitive in their more profitable AM
operations. The distinction is of more significance to
smaller manufacturers, but should generally be treated
cautiously.
In the OE market the main com petitors are TI
(particularly Bainbridge and Cheswick), Tenneco Walker and
Gillet. Armstrong previously quite heavily involved, has
more recently been largely squeezed out.
	 Other major
companies involved maintain more limited manufacturing
facilities, rely much more on factoring, and generally focus
more on AM and distribution operations. Chilcotts, a rather
smaller company focuses on OE commercial vehicle business.
Given such a variety of products still in use in the
AM, even the largest manufacturers are prepared to factor
marginal orders, and some smaller com panies find further
scope for their activities by concentrating on particularly
lucrative product types or on lower order runs. Grundy and
Eminox specia].ise on stainless steel applications and
opportunities are provided by the need for more custoinerised
products or services.	 Table 48 gives details of major AM
competitorB.
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Table 11.8 Shares In the aftermarket and comments
Tenneco	 (Harmo)	 <> German No 1, No 2 in French AM
TI (eg Nicholson)	 <> UK. Mfr ops in Holland and Spain
Burgess	 <> UK
Quinton Hazell	 <> UK. No 3 in French AM
Armstrong	 <> UK
SU-Butec	 <> BL Unipart's subsidiary
Automotive Products	 <> UK
Bosa].	 <> Belgium MNC. No 1 in French AM
Peco Silencers	 <> UK
Source: Company Interviews
Although international trade is small, the impact of
other European companies using local manufacturing
operations is considerable. The AM is a lucrative
opportunity and overseas manufacturers are involved in the
UK AM for vehicles imported from their own countries: the
relatively poor opportunities for scale benefits further
discourage exports but facilitate a network of local
manufacturing operations. The OE in Its own ri ght Is
probably a less• attractive market opportunity, but the
opportunities provided by technology and by scale advantages
are probably greater; though here the driving force for
change has been requests from multinational vehicle
companies such as Ford.
Germany's Tenneco is represented in the domestic O
market by its UK subsidiary company Tenneco Walker, and in
the AM by another subsidiar y Harmo. The group is probably
the most powerful in Europe, being further supported by
manufacturing o perations in Germany (Mannheiin for OE, Langoz'
and Ernst for the AM). in France (Ballinger), Denmark
(Stal].a), and an operation in Holland.	 With an aggressive
pricing reputation, their impact on the UK AM has been
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immense. In recent years, they have increased their share in
the AM at TI Silencers' expense <>.
Likewise a Belgium company Bosal, supported by a number
of European plants and now a manufacturing presence In the
UK, has entered the market. The market leader in the French
Arvi, they too have inte grated operations within Europe. They
even have their own shipping operation, which reduces the
cost of bringing exhaust systems into the UK. They have
taken only a few years to build up to.ari AM share of about
5%, and their target is reputed to be 10%.
Low price imports have been noted from Ansa in Italy,
and from Spanish manufacturers who enjoy a tariff advantage,
facing only a 4% tariff in the UK whereas UK manufacturers
face a tariff of about 37% in S pain. Volume has so far been
low, but the impact on margins has been more substantial.
Thus despite factors uncoriducive to trade,
opportunities presented by AM and OE markets have led to a
predominantly European radius of competition between
companies, though many compete on the basis of local plants.
The impact of this change has increased recently, as
overcapacity has contributed to pressures 	 for some
rationalisation within Europe. The strate gic implications
are already evident in the crucial OE market, as will now be
discussed in more detail.
5.432 The competitive aituation in the OK market
Transport costs have not in fact been a major problem
within Europe: they can be reduced by expeditious shipping
arrangements <>. In respect to their OE business, companies
such as SU-Butec, BL Unipart's subsidiary, have found
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considerable scope for raising the level of technology and
so justifying exports to the continent.
Costs to the UK or Japan would be higher, but these
markets have also been distin guished by different pollution
and noise controls.	 These factors may be changing and BL's
increasing Involvement with Honda might raise the question
of tooling economies through joint production arrangements
at some point. Japan, however, is committed to just-in-time
arrangements which involve local exhaust system production
and the USA is following suit, so there Is unlikely to be
significant trade with either of these markets in the
immediate future.
Within Europe increasing interest in just-in-time
operations has led Ford, GM and also VW to require local
manufacturing support from suppliers. Faced with increasing
international, competition, these vehicle companies have also
been under pressure to rationalise their European supplier
networks so as to reduce costs. 	 Ford's wish to reduce
tooling costs <> was suggested as one of the key reasons for
its decision to reduce the number of its European exhaust
systems suppliers.	 These start up toolin g costs are
increased by homologation in Europe (which will probably hit
smaller UK suppliers particularly hard). 	 The effect of
Ford's decision Is to squeeze out manufacturers only
marginally competitive in European terms.	 Significantly.
its three major surviving exhaust system suppliers are all
supported by international manufacturing operations, and can
support both Ford UK and Ford Germany.
Like Tenneco, the leading UK manufacturer TI Silencers
has	 established operations on the continent
	 - a
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manufacturing and warehousing operation in Holland close to
the German border, established in 1969, and a manufacturing
operation in Spain, established in 1981.
Even this may not prove enough.	 <>
To take full advantage of international operations,
companies such as TI Silencers are now havin g to review
organisational structures with a view to obtainin g greater
integration ( j ust as happened in bearin gs). Scale economies
are considered to be low and plants have to handle an
enormous variety of products. In the past industrial
relations (and security of supply) was also a key problem,
so the policy was to have a number of fairly small plants,
allowing management as much automomy as possible. 	 <> This
is changing and to compete the group is having to consider
tightening	 Its	 structure,	 not only
	
nationally	 but
internationally. <>
Gillet, a German company, has been in a strong
position, having responded earlier to Ford Europe's request
to establish a modern factory close to their engine plant at
Bridgend in Wales.	 Ironically Gillet received considerable
financial support for this from the British government. In
doing so they cemented their strong relationship with Ford.
It is feared that Gillet'B investment in the UK also
reflects longer term objectives in the AM. Gillet has also
extended its manufacturing operations, into France in 1975,
and into Spain in 1977 to support Ford's Fiesta.
Armstrong's problems in the OE market illustrate the
strategic 	 Implications	 for UK	 manufacturers	 of
rationalisation taking place within Europe.	 The weakest of
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participants, with full product ranges and full vehicle
customer support facilities such as test ri gs, Armstrong has
been largely squeezed out at very considerable cost.
Armstrong saw their main problem as costs rather than
non-price aspects such as quality , <>.	 Their position was
weakened by rising relative UK labour costs after 1980
(labour costs are roughly 25% of sales value, but the cost
of other major items such as steel is fairl y similar for
European competitors). Overseas com petitors benefitted from
less severe financial conditions elsewhere and from the
ability to spread fixed costs, R&D etc over a wider market
base. The Tenneco Group, for example, was financially strong
enough to sustain low UK prices over a long period, and so
was able to squeeze out weaker UK competitors.
However,	 because of changes in the pattern of
competition, Armstrong also suffered from a more strategic
problem. Although the parent company is one of the top
automotive component performers and financially relatively
strong, it has other more attractive and closely related
market opportunities. 	 Its Chead].e and Blackburn exhaust
systems plants had only been acquired in 1975 as part of
Huntsville and its commitment to this sector has not matched
that of competitors.	 The company was seduced by an
extremely attractive deal from GKN into surrendering the
core of a strong AM distribution network it had carefully
built up, and without this support its AM position in
exhaust systems must have been weakened.
Its major mistake was in committing major new
investments into volume orientated plant directed at the OE
market.	 As in the case of RHP, this led to a head-on
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competitive collision with more powerful internationally
based companies. Its demise was far more dramatic, since in
Armstrong's context the importance of preserving flexibility
was even greater. For exhaust systems volume benefits are
lower than for bearin gs, and customer order sizes have
fallen even more sharply.
In June 1978, <> was invested in a modern, volume
orientated new plant at Hull. Geared specifically to the OE
market, operations were integrated from the point where pipe
entered at one end to where completed exhaust systems
emerged from the other. This involved automated assembly
lines, automatic transfer equipment and key items of
equipment, which were also volume orientated.
With changeover times on such lines of the order of two
days, they became highly inefficient as order runs, with
only a few exceptions, fell below about 2.000. At a factory
level, fixed costs were anyway higher, so that falling
overall volumes rapidly fell below break-even. In January
1981 this modern plant was closed and work transferred to
Armstrong's original exhaust system base at York. Much
modern equipment was salvaged but remained volume
orientated. As business conditions continued to deteriorate
further competitive retreat was inevitable as the company
retrenched onto Cheadle and Blackburn.
Table 119 evidences a continuing reduction in batch
sizes, made even more difficult by an increased number of
product programmes.
223
rab1e_L9 Trends in production batch quantities
Year/Quarter	 Batch auantitv
(average figure)
Source: production records
During 1981 and 1982 batch quantities halved.	 Faced
with setting up times now almost equal to operating times on
some equipment, the company made desperate attempts to
improve flexibility.
	
Set up times on some machines were
improved. <> They have succeeded in reducing factory through
time <> to improve responsiveness to order variations and to
reduce investments in stocks and work-in-progress.
	 Such
efforts helped regain some of the flexibility of more
traditional, modular processes.
Despite such efforts and heavy investments, total
output halved between 1975 and 1981/82 <>.	 Employment has
halved <>.	 This implies productivity was unchanged between
1975 and 1979, but had improved by about 7.5% by 1981/82 as
the company strove vigorously to cut
	 costs.	 Staff
departments have been reduced particularly <>.
	 At the time
of visiting the two remaining plants were down to three and
four day operating weeks respectively, despite the transfer
of business from Hull and York.
	 Such low utilisation
frustrated further efficiency improvements.
Armstrong's	 position was further "wedged in"	 by
intensifying competition from medium sized companies also
desperate for business, particularly for anything resembling
volume. One such company, with a reputation for "maverick"
pricing policies, in fact declined to participate in this
study, as with Iobs at stake competitive issues had become
80 highly sensitive.	 Automotive Products and Quinton
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Hazell, though mainl y AM, were vulnerable also and were
having to compete fiercely. Smaller UK manufacturers, such
as Peco Silencers and Burgess, better adapted to poor order
sizes, were also fighting to survive. Burgess for example
was reputed to have called in consultants to help with Its
difficulties.
Like many manufacturers, Armstrong also found its
position damaged by BL's determination to get a better deal
from the UK components sector, In order to sustain its own
competitive position. Throu gh Unlpart, BL extended its
operations into areas such as exhaust systems, which were
seen as particularly lucrative 1 this bein g handled through
Its in-house manufacturer SU-Butec. <> In the OE market
SU-Butec could take advantage of BL's own "cream" volume
business, sufficient to justify modern integrated volume
line production methods.
BL used its copyright position on exhaust systems to
sue Armstrong successfull y for infringement, (Engineer, 8-15
April 1982, p11). Other exhaust manufacturers were reported
as having been forced to pay 7% royalties, a substantial
fi gure given the pressure already on margins.
Such moves by BL really reflect the change in the
bargaining position between vehicle manufacturers and UK
suppliers already discussed. BL has achieved similar gains
at the expense of suppliers by increasing international
procurement generally, and until UK suppliers can offer a
more Internationally competitive deal to their customers
this type of problem is bound to continue.
Yet, despite internationalisation, close OEM / supplier
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links are still an important feature distorting "free
competition". Exhaust system companies argue that much of
the continental market is "tied". GM produces most of its
own in-house and the German market is fairly nationalistic:
Ford Germany buys mostly from Tenneco and Gillet. 	 VW's
supply situation Is complex, but it appears to buy mainly
from Gillet.	 Even in the AM, UK suppliers felt that only
about 10 to 15% of this market was "up for grabs". 	 The
danger,	 If	 BL "opens up" ahead of overseas vehicle
manufacturers or applies other ne gotiating levers	 too
severely, Is that many UK suppliers, faced with an
asymmetrical competitive situation in Europe, will collapse.
The UK may be "divided and ruled" by overseas competition.
Some suppliers alert to the situation in factoring
point to the demise of UK manufacturin g operations in other
products - WIlmot Breeden for example has largely stopped
manufacturing locks and even their vehicle fittings business
is reputed to be "shaky" - Japanese suppliers comin g over in
the wake of Honda were rumoured to be offering British
component companies attractive margins based on manufacture
in Japan.	 Faced with such difficult UK conditions, some
suppliers might be tempted, even though recognising that
such expediency would signal the end of future
competitiveness. Any weakening in the UK supplier base will
ultimately rebound on UK vehicle customers.
Armstrong's	 demise highlights the need	 for UK
manufacturers to be sensitive to changing competitive
conditions, and the danger of ignoring the increasing impact
of European competitors particularly in volume markets.
Although Its good financial performance must be qualified by
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the fact that it appears to have surrendered market share,
especially in the AM, TI Silencers' performance has been
relatively good (see Table L18).	 It has a clear picture of
the competitive battle taking place in Europe.	 <>
Thus TI Silencers' better performance seems partly to
reflect its alertness to the need for a stronger base in
continental Europe, accompanied by some degree of
reorganisation so as to extract the maximum possible synergy
from its international operations.
5.t& flaBic manufacturing issueB
5.41 Productivity comparieona
British exhaust system manufacturers visited were
compared with two overseas plants: <JS1's> plant in Japan
employing L8o people and <USS1's> plant in the USA employing
375 people. Both were about 90% OE and so perhaps most
comparable with TI Cheswick whose plant sizes were similar.
The American plant in particular was able to benefit from
longer production runs.	 Some indication of UK productivity
is given in Table 50.
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Table 50 UK exhaust companies sales/employee £'OOO, '82
ComoanY	 OE/AM Recent estimate	 Past wr .at.
£'OOO	 Year	 £'OOO	 Year
TI Cheewick	 OE	 57	 1982	 30	 1979
Tenneco Walker	 OE	 19	 1979	 15	 1975
Chilcotts	 OE	 26	 1981	 36	 1973
SU-Butec	 OE/AM 31	 1980	 na
<UKS1>	 AM	 <36>	 1982	 <>	 1979
Harmo	 AM	 37	 1976'
Burgess	 AM	 21	 1975
Quinton Hazell	 AM	 23	 1976	 21	 1972
Source: company accounts.
	
Figures for <UKS1's> exhaust
systems activities supplied b y company. All figures
adJusted to 1982 prices.
Exhaust systems prices have recently fallen behind the
wholesale price index, so that UK progress on productivity
is probably understated.	 The 'actual number of units/man/
month produced at <UKS1> remained unchanged at about 67
between 1975 and 1979. and actually rose about 7.5% by 1982.
Productivity in other companies has been mixed but generally
fairly stagnant, partly as a result of low utilisation
levels;	 but TI Silencers' performance is relativel y good.
TI have trimmed indirect staff particularly, so that its
ratio of direct/ indirect staff has risen <>.
In comparIson, sales/employee at the Japanese plant
<JS1> was approximately £72,000 in 1982 based on that year's
exchange rate of435.2 yen/. By 1981k sterlin g had fallen
to 300 yen/i so this exchange rate is probably unfavourable
to the Japanese, whose domestic car prices in 1982 were well
below those prevailing in Britain. 	 This suggests an
appreciable gap between the UK and Japan.
Without a value based productivity estimate, the US
plant <USS1's> estimated figure of 18.7 silencer
boxes/man/day plus piping, at roughly twice the Japanese
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figure of 9.4 seems almost dubiously high. Differences in
products and mixes in respect to piping may be distorting.
Surprisingly, the US estimate of the proportion of sales
value going on bought-in goods and services was hi gher at 30
to 35% than the Japanese estimate of 18 to 20%. Both US and
Japanese plants received R&D assistance not included in
their figures.	 However US production runs were very much
higher than in both Britain and Japan.
Sales for the Japanese plant's parent company had grown
88% after inflation between 1971 and 1980, compared with a
rise in employment of 13%.	 Historical figures were not
available for the plant itself, but the productivity target
was claimed to be 20% p.a. expressed in exhaust system
units/man.	 This had fallen to about 16% p .a. between 1980
and 1982 partly because of the downturn, and this was said
to have led to management bein g "scolded"!	 Historical
figures were not available for the US plant itself, but
figures for the parent group (1,700 employees) perhaps give
some indication.	 Sales/employee after inflation in 1981
fell 5% below the 1980 figure, but had recovered to 9% above
by 1982, following a turnaround in their exhaust systems AM
in April 1982. Both Japanese and American plants benefitted
from more favourable market circumstances, but productivity
performances seem well ahead of the UK.
5.442 Production iaau.g
American and Japanese plants were respectively 22 and
13 years	 old,	 with considerable evidence of	 plant
Inodernisation. However not all plant was so different
Dodern British plants had recently installed the same Eaton
229
Leonard CNC pipe bending machines as US and Japanese plants.
The most strikin g difference lay in the flexibility of
the Japanese plant, this bein g the result of "just-in-time"
developments. The plant had been built at Toyota's request,
in close proximity. Since then they have gone from
deliveries only about once a day though only on one t ype of
exhaust system, to about eight deliveries a day involving
many types.
Under guidance from s pecialist engineers at Toyota,
they have systematically had to develop more flexible
manufacturing methods. One auto-arm press, for example, now
has to be changed over between 10 and 15 times a da y , so
they had to find ways to reduce changeover time to about 10
minutes. A machine tool company belonging to the same group
has assisted with better adapted machines: 20 recently
installed Aida auto-sheet feeders have quick tool change
characteristics. New more flexible technology has been
introduced, such as CNC multiform pipe benders which are
well adapted to the problem of intermittent order take-of fs
and CAD/CAM,	 so as to facilitate quicker design and
manufacture of new jigs and
	 fixtures;	 but	 these
developments are being pursued now in all three countries.
The sheer volume of incremental production changes is
however remarkable. A press bendin g machine, converted to
reduce changeover time (about 30 minutes seven years ago) to
about 10 minutes, is one example; but numerous machines
have had to be changed since the flexibility of the
production flow rate often depends on the least flexible
machine.
	 Inherently Inflexible machines have necessitated
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changes in factory layouts and flow routes.
	 Pre-set tool
packs are used. Though one or two "dedicated" volume
assembly lines have been segregated, most have been adapted
to handling as many as ten major t ypes of exhaust system.
Responsiveness	 to changing	 customer	 delivery
requirements involved reducing factory through times and
getting their own suppliers to respond in the same way.
Just as Toyota developed a card system to inform them the
moment more Items were re quired, so they developed a similar
system with their suppliers. Having reduced their own
factory through time to 15 days some time ago, further
progress was frustrated because material suppliers took a
month to respond to the new orders.
	 Both cooperated on the
problem and they now claim each can respond in 5 days,
making a total of 10.
UK and US manufacturers have had little experience of
just-in-time arrangements, but TI's Cheswick plant has been
substantially changed, reducing factory through time <>.
Savings, on items such as stocks and work-in-progress costs,
have also been substantial.
Japanese progress reflects sustained, patient attention
to detail by numerous quality
 circles. These originated
under the influence of Deming statistical quality control
techniques, whose simplicity enabled production work groups
to take responsibility for their own quality. Recognising
the wider implications of such active participation,
management focused attention and training resources onto
these work groups. The groups were so successful on quality
improvements that their role was extended to productivity
improvements and other production matters such as flexible
231
manufacturing methods.	 Morale and participation are high.
ThiB plant receives an average of 9.6 suggestions/employee/
year.
The plant's trump card is that with rapid growth they
have been able to sustain "lifetime employment". Employment
slightly increased between 1971 and 1981 but otherwise
remained extremely stable.	 Employees,	 confident that
improvements such as productivity would not merely lead to
themselves or their colleagues being laid off, were prepared
to give 100% commitment and total flexibility.
	
The company
in return redoubled efforts to maintain competitiveness in
the marketplace and was even prepared to brin g in subsidiary
business when necessary:
	
steering wheel manufacture
introduced to maintain stable employment represents roughly
7% of turnover.	 There seems to be a genuine, long term two
way partnership.
The Americans, protected by a less exposed home market
and better production runs, are nevertheless responding to
such	 developments with greater dynamism than UK
manufacturers.
Assisted by a six-fold revival in earnings in 1982 as
compared with 1980, <US1s'> parent company 's 1982 Business
Report announced the key points in a new strategy, backed by
a maj or investment programme, to rebuild their competitive
position as "the industry's lowest cost producer":
"Eight new computer programmed and controlled pipe-
bending machines,	 capable of producing a major
proportion of our total bent pipe needs.	 Advantages:
Rapid changeover to new part numbers;	 scheduling
flexibility for inventory balance;	 consistent high
quality.
A program to convert muffler lines to quick changeover
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capability,
	
to	 facilitate	 greater
	
scheduling
flexibility , improved inventories, ra pid turnover.
A new high-speed shear press with quick changeover die
inserts that blanks, notches, ribs and embosses muffler
shells and wrappers in one operation. Changeover time
has been cut by half."
Capital investment can only be a part of the answer to
increased flexibilit y .	 Changeover time in their press
shop's box making machine was still about 2 to 3 hours and
was similar on other machines.	 Despite the annual report's
natural optimism, the implementation of real flexibility
will present an enormous challenge.	 In production areas it
was admitted that set up times were still very lon g , and the
pervading corporate culture still seemed volume orientated.
To quote: "Our philosophy is volume" and "For us 15,000 runs
are great!". One of the key questions is whether such
American companies can really win over the total commitment
of an enthustiastic but insecure workforce.
Yet the report also emphasised other "Just in Time
Preparations" and reco gnises the amount of "fine tuning of
production processes" necessary in addition to capital
projects. It also em phasised how facilities were now being
"converted to the Demin g statistical quality
	
control
system".	 Their in-house magazine "Pipeline" (Winter 1982)
went on to remind employees that
"This system was developed by Dr W.E.Demin g of New York
University during the 1950's but generated only limited
interest in the United States. The Japanese, however,
seized on it, and It is now in almost universal use in
Japanese industry."
The report Indicated a coordinated initiative by US
vehicle customers along the same lines as happened in Japan
just over a decade ago.
"In addition, many of our manufacturin g engineering,
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OEM sales and production scheduling personnel,
including members of the labor union, have attended
"dust in time" seminars at Ford World Headquarters in
Dearborn for thorough backgrounding on the system."
The new strategy also points to:
"intensified product development and service activities
by OEM sales and engineering teams working in close
collaboration with automakers."
There is one final element in this American turnaround
strategy which UK manufacturers should also consider.
Recognising that resources necessary for investment and
other "plow-back" activities require some sacrifice in short
term living standards, this US company
"negotiated important changes in the labor contracts at
the organised facilities that helped the company meet
price competition in the OEM market."
Thus UK manufacturers must take more positive steps to
match Japanese and US rivals on such developments taking
place in production areas, and some change in organisational
focus may be called for.
	
TI Silencers' relatively good
profit performance Is, I believe, partly attributable to
recognition at Board level of the strategic Importance of
such matters.
5..IL Conclusion
High transport costs, relatively low opportunities for
scale advantages and a customer preference for local
manufacture (particularly given increased interest in Iust-
in-time systems) mean that most exhaust systems for UK
customers will continue to be made in Britain. Nevertheless
opportunities presented by AM and volume OE markets have led
increasingly to a European radius of direct competition from
the viewpoint of UK companies. Pressure for rationalisation
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in Europe increased markedly after 1979. The effect was
first felt in volume OE market segments, but the aftermarket
is also coming under increasin g pressure and smaller
companies will also be affected in the longer term. 	 Such
pressures will intensify further in Europe, but the effect
of competition from further afield will remain merely
indirect for many years.
The sharp performance decline, even in a sector made
more lucrative by the existence of an attractive AM,
reflects declining UK competitiveness.	 This has been
exacerbated by sharp decline in the UK cost position, and by
a business climate so discouraging that some of the most
modern assembly lines have had to be literally broken up.
It is also worrying to see government support for overseas
companies establishing UK plants, in situations where UK
manufacturers are likely to be sQueezed out.
Yet some UK manufacturers have worsened their problems
through being insensitive to the strate gic implications of
European competition, es pecially in the volume OE market.
Armstrong has suffered particularly in this respect.	 TI
Silencers' relativel y good performance reflects in part a
recognition of the need, in this situation, to harness the
advantages of a strong manufacturing base in continental
Europe.	 It also reflects Board level recognition of the
need to match international standards on key issues such as
productivity and flexible manufacturing methods.	 Had UK
manufacturers generally demonstrated the 	 commitment
displayed by 3apanese and US rivals to ensuring an
internationally
 competitive	 supplier service,	 their
performance decline and the threat hanging over them would
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both have been less severe.
Though there is some scope for new technology to
increase the flexibility of manufacturing operations, the
JapaneBe experience indicates that more incremental
improvements to production processes will play a critical
role, both in respect to FMS and other im portant issues such
as productivity and quality. Thus more positive
participation and involvement of those in the production
area will prove particularly important in this sector (as
also in automotive forgjngs). This may call for a fresh
approach to industrial relations and a more production-
centred organisational approach.
Restoring this potentially lucrative sector's future
would probably demand a coordinated approach: it requires
economic choices by Britain more favourable to business
development, the active involvement of UK vehicle companies
(particularly in respect to just-in-time developments),
greater managerial sensitivity to key issues and total
support from employees in securing a competitive industry.
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6 Automotive Comonent Sector Oenergllj
6.1 The impact of internationalisation and of the UK's
declining trade position
Table 51 shows total production and trade figures
(adjusted to 1980 prices) for motor vehicle parts and
accessories from 1938 to 1982.
	 Business Monitor production
fi gures have been adjusted to exclude tyres, inner tubes and
identifiable agricultural parts, to bring them more closely
into line with trade figures taken from SMMT.
Table 51 Production and trade performance of UK motor
vehicle parts manufacturers
S1A.
Exports Imports Trade	 IL	 ilK	 LEI
Sur1us Prodn
	 Market
£m'80(1) £m'80	 £m'80	 £m'80	 £m'80	 1980=100
1938	 50	 30	 20	 770	 750	 6.16(2)
19118
	 170	 15	 35	 1270	 1115	 12.32
1953	 330	 35	 295	 1840(3) 1545
	 17.39(3)
1958	 580	 45	 535	 2470	 1935
	 19.30
1963	 740	 60	 680	 3250	 2570	 20.81
1968	 980	 230	 750	 3620	 2870	 24.32
1973
	 1510	 470	 10110	 3980	 2940	 33.32
1974	 1530	 520	 1010	 3550	 2540	 41.47
1975	 1610	 530	 1080	 3380	 2300	 50.69
1976	 1780	 740	 1040	 3650	 2610	 59.45
1977	 1610	 7110
	 870	 3600	 2730	 71.22
1978	 1590	 790	 800	 3730	 2930	 77.66
1979	 1610	 950	 660	 3710	 3050	 85.96
1980	 111110	 690	 750	 3190	 2440	 100.00
1981(4) na
	 780	 na	 na	 na	 110.60
1982	 1160	 890	 270	 2530	 2260	 120.10
(1) converted to 1980 prices using WPi
(2) 1937
(3) 19511
(11) import fi gures not available due to Customs & Excise strike
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51B.
xorts/
production
1938	 6.519118	 131953	 18
1958	 24
1963	 231968	 271973	 38
19711	 43
1975	 118
1976	 49
1977	 115
1978	 43
1979	 43
1980	 45
1981
1982	 46
Imoorts/ Trade SurPlus/ Imports/
	
IlK Markej Mark	 ExDorts
	
11	 3	 58
	
1	 111	 9
	
2	 19	 10
	
2	 28	 8
	
2	 26	 8
	
8	 26	 211
	
16	 35	 32.
	
20	 40	 311.
	
23	 117	 33
	
28	 110	 42
	
28	 32	 46
	
27	 27	 50
	
39	 22	 59
	
28	 30	 48
39	 12	 77
Source: Production figures from BusineBs Monitor; trade
figureB from SMMT yearbooks
Excluding inflation, the volume of imports more than
trebled between 1970 and 1982, so that the impact of direct
international competition is now substantial; the volume of
exports, however, had by 1982 fallen back below the level in
1970.
Correspondingly, the strong surplus on overseas trade
during most of the period has been cut dramatically.
Although there has been a clear long term trend, with
imports steadily rithirig as a percentage of exports from 22%
in 1970 to 77% in 1982, the sharpest decline has been since
1980. Taking out inflation, the favourable balance of trade
fell by 60% between 1980 and 1982 as the ratio of imports to
exports rose from 48% to 77%.	 The most recent fi gures, for
the first quarter of 1983, suggest imports have now risen to
just over 90% of exports, depleting any remaining trade
surplus.
Thus UK parts manufacturers' sales have fallen partly
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because of a declinin g home market (due to the position of
UK assemblers) and partly because, in the context of
increasing international trade, their own international
position has declined.
Appendix D.1 demonstrates that decline has affected
component sectors comprehensively and Appendix D.2 indicates
the declining international trade position of component
sectors for which official fi gures are available. 	 Just as
in case studies discussed, it should however be noted that
aggregate trade figures often understate the seriousness of
competitive decline. As international competition in wheels
increased, for example, first Rubery Owen was squeezed out
as BL was forced to go for single sourcing to provide
Dunlop, its last maj or UK supplier, with adequate volume
since its European competitors, such as Lemmertz and Kron-
Pririz of Germany and Michelin in France and Spain, enjoy
much larger markets.	 The Financial Times (19.8.85. p1) has
now reported that Dunlop has applied for state aid on "a £5m
investment programme crucial to future competitiveness" on
the grounds that although hi gh risk, the investment is
"essential if the UK is to maintain the strategic ability to
manufacture car wheels".	 Ford, arguing it would require an
investment of £9.5m to meet its future demand for lighter
motor wheels, "has opened negotiations with the unions to
wind up wheel manufacture at its Dagenham factory by 1987".
Dunlop has been assured of Austin Rover, purchases for three
years, "conditional upon the necessary measures being taken
to make the product internationally competitive". 	 Such
critical international decline would not easily be deduced
2Z1
from international trade figures.
Table 52 examines changes in the direction of trade.
Table 52 Direction of UK trade in motor vehicle parts and
accessories
.52A Destination of UK exports: %
1938	 1954	 1963	 1972	 1980
Europe	 45	 36	 42	 53	 63
America	 6	 10	 16	 24	 14
Africa	 13	 15	 11	 8	 10
Asia	 14	 20	 17	 9	 9
Oceania	 22	 18	 11	 6	 5
W. Germany
	 3	 3.6	 4	 8	 14
Belgium	 2	 3	 3	 8	 11
Sweden	 5	 8	 9	 10	 8
France	 1	 3	 3	 4	 7
Italy
	
0.5
	
2	 6	 2	 6
Netherlands	 4	 3	 3	 4	 4
Eire	 14	 2	 2	 2	 4
USA	 1	 2	 7	 14	 9
S. Africa	 8	 4	 4	 3	 3
Australia	 11	 14	 8	 5	 3
India	 7	 5	 5	 1	 0.6
Former British
Empire	 61	 52	 34	 14	 8
5.ZB Source of UK imports: %
1938	 1954 1963	 1972	 1980
Europe	 31	 42	 63	 80	 85
America	 69	 53	 31	 16	 8
Rest of World
	 0.2	 5	 6	 4	 7
W. Germany
	
14	 9	 22	 33	 32
France	 6	 11	 12	 9	 18
Belgium	 1	 1	 2	 15	 11
Italy
	
0.6	 2	 4	 5	 6
Sweden	 5	 3	 8	 5	 IL
Spain	 0	 0	 4
Netherlands	 0.5	 6	 5	 2	 3
Switzerland	 2	 2	 2	 0.3
	
0.3
Austria	 0.3	 0.4	 3	 2	 0.4
Asia	 0.09	 2	 IL	 3	 6
Japan	 0.07	 0.03
	
1.6	 3	 4
Source: SMMT yearbooks, taken from official sources
242
Britain's traditional "Empire" markets represented 61%
of parts exports in 1938 but even by 1963 had fallen to only
34%.	 This has been due to demands for local content and
overseas competition, particularly from Japan. The European
market has steadily risen in importance from 36% of all
parts exports in 1954 to 53% in 1972 and 63% in 1980. Since
entry into the EEC even the American market has fallen back
in importance, from 24% in 1972 to 14% in 1980.
In 1938 69% of imports were American.	 Some were a
stop-gap prior to US multinational companies establishin g UK
manufacturing operations; some were parts in short supply in
Europe.	 By 1972 American imports represented only 16% and
by 1980 zlust 8%.	 By contrast European imports, which
compete "head on" with UK manufacturers, rose from 31% of
imports in 1938 to 80% in 1972 and 85% in 1980. Germany and
France alone accounted for 50% of all imports. Imports from
the rest of the world were only 7% in 1980, but Asian
competition has increased, particularly from Japan.
The radius of business competition is now Europe.
6.2 Company performances generally
Appendices D.3 and D.4 analyse the sales growth and
profitability (ROCE) of the largest 66 automotive component
companies for which Inter Company Comparison figures were
available continuously from 1975 to 1982.	 For about 24 of
these companies it was possible to extend figures back to
1970.
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Table_53 Averaged (unweighted) company performances
	
1970-75	 1975-79	 1980-82
Growth: % pa
	 0.8	 5.11	 (10.9)
ROCE: %
	 18.0	 19.14	 (2.3)
Growth and ROCE: %
	
18.8	 214.8	 (13.2)
Note: Growth figures derived from sales in 1970, 1975, 1979
and 1982, ad j usted for inflation using the wholesale
price index.	 Rates represent total % change over
period divided by number of years.
Source: ICC Business Ratio Reports / company accounts
Table	 53 (derived from Appendices D.3 and	 D.L1)
demonstrates more generally the dramatic decline In company
performances noted in the case studies.
	 On average sales
volumes declined by one third between 1979 and 1982,
reflecting market conditions discussed in 6.1 and the
inability of companies to offset decline through exports or
diversification into other activities.
The	 decline	 in	 profitability has
	 also been
unprecedented.	 Between 1970 and 1979 ROCE's (unweighted)
averaged about 18%, ranging from a nadir of 13% following
the first oil crisis in 1975 to a peak of 25% in 1977.
Profitability remained stable, despite UK vehicle production
halving between 1973 and 1979. Average (unweighted) ROCE
then fell precipitously to 0.6% in 1980, -3.2% in 1981, and
-14.4% in 1982.
Decline has been comprehensive. Companies (detailed in
Appendices	 D.3 and D.11) were ranked into 	 6	 size
classifications, each with 11 companies, on the basis of
turnover in 1975. Table 54 shows that in the three years
1980-82 every Bize category averaged both ne gative growth
and negative ROCE.
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Table 51J. Performances by size classification 1980-82
Size zxous	 Growth 1979-82 ROCE averaze Growth ±
descending
 order	 a	 1980-82	 ROCE X
	Companies 1-li.	 (9.1)	 (3.1)	 (12.2)
	
12-22	 (10.2)	 (4.6)	 (14.8)
	
23-33	 (11.6)	 (5.5)	 (17.1)
	
34-44	 (12.4)	 (1.1)	 (13.5)
	
45-55	 (12.3)	 (4.8)	 (17.1)
	
56-66	 (9.8)	 (6.6)	 (16.4)
	
1-66	 (10.9)	 (4.3)
	
(15.2)
Source: ICC Business Ratio Reports / company accounts
After inflation only two companies,
	 both in the
smallest size category, increased sales volume between 1979
and 1982. Just under one quarter (and In fact only 2 of the
largest 22 companies) managed a positive combined total of
sales growth plus ROCE.
Of 66 companies, 22 avoided losses in any of these 3
years, 19 made losses in one year only and 9 in two years
only .	 Of the remaining 16 com panies which made losses in
all three years, 3 had made losses in 11 consecutive years
and another 3 in 5 consecutive years. By comparison,
between 1970 and 1979 on average Just under 9% of these
companies were making losses in any given year, the worst
figure occurring at the onset of the recent downturn in 1979
when the fi gure rose to 19%.
The extent and severity of decline cannot be fully
explained either by the natural knock-on effect of declining
UK vehicle production, which was relatively stable in this
period, or by the normal business cycle, since paBt
downturns had only a slight impact on performance figures.
ICC's 1982 Business Ratio report examining the top 100
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automotive component companies was forced to conclude:
"To summarise, the companies in this Report have been
hit very badly by a whole list of factors beyond their
control. It is far too easy to say that a reduction in
capacity earlier or diversification into other markets
and products should have taken place sooner, but the
truth of the matter is many com panies did this and yet
still made losses...
"There is no doubt that the performance of the UK motor
components sector has been horrific and has mirrored.
if not led, the decline in industrial output in this
country."
This suggests that Britain, and the government to the
extent of its ability , must take more seriously the need to
avoid economic choices creating such adverse business
conditions,	 so unconducive even to com panies pursuing more
progressive strate gies.	 Nor can the failure to do BO be
excused by glib thinking , showing little understanding of
business	 conditions:	 one Chief Executive interviewed
complained that the Minister concerned, on hearing his
problems, had merely commented, "Couldn't you make something
else?".
The lesson from a company perspective again echoes case
findings, that sweeping panaceas are unlikel y to prove
effective strategies in such a context. Companies in this
industry could not, in fact, rely on diversification or on
gains in market share or exports. Those that did found
their attempts at protecting
 sales volume frustrated, and
many dangerously postponed volume adj ustments. Some popular
panaceas,	 such as market domination or industry
consolidation, presuppose scale advantages.
	 This issue
receives detailed discussion in 6.5, but in this industry
there is little general indication that large companies
perform better.	 Companies must therefore carefully examine
21&6
the issue of scale in the context of their particular
competitive circumstances. As em phasised in product case
studies sensitivity to context, responsiveness to change,
and commensurate attention to more basic issues seem the
most likely paths to success.
6.3 The UK buinaas environment
Prior to 1960,	 UK manufacturers remained
	 fairly
shielded from the full impact of international competition.
Until then, vehicle manufacturers and component com panies in
particular were protected by a 30% tariff.
Between 1960 and 1978, UK wage rates in manufacturing
relative to those of rival countries, had been gradually
falling, compensating for slower productivity growth. TheBe
trends are illustrated in Appendix D.5, which includes
supporting figures and an example of the method of
calculation. Britain's "real" (inflation-adjusted) exchange
rate had moved so as to broadly maintain UK manufacturers'
cost competitiveness, which would have otherwise resulted
from allowing complacency in respect to productivity. For
this reason the Select Committee Inquiry (1975) found no
evidence of UK parts being uncompetitive on price with other
European manufacturers.
It should be noted that UK relative labour costs are
influenced by inflation-adjusted, not nominal exchange rate
movements. From the viewpoint of competition. European
rather than US rates (where the situation has recently
improved) are particularly important.
Between 1978 and 1980, a gross diBcontinuity in such
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trends resulted in relative UK labour rates suddenly moving
much more closely into line with those of European and other
rival	 countries.	 Relative to UK earnings	 rates	 in
manufacturing, US rates by 1980 had fallen to 66% of their
level in 1978, comparable figures for other rival countries
being Japan 64%, Germany 75%, France 84%, Italy 85% and
Sweden 75%.
The situation by Autumn 1981 is given in more absolute
cost terms in Table 55.
Table 55 Labour costs and productivity in the manufacturing
industry of major countries, autumn 1981
Hourl' labour Hourlw labour
costs in M costs*
as index
Belgium	 25.50	 102
Sweden	 25.20	 101
W. Germany
	 25.00	 100
US	 24.50	 98
Netherlands	 24.10	 96
Italy
	 19.90	 80
France	 18.40	 74
Japan	 16.20	 65
UK	 14.20	 57
Spain	 12.60	 50
Hourli	 Unit	 labou
productivitw** costs***
as index	 as index
89	 115
87	 116
	
100	 100
	
102	 96
	
97	 99
	
68	 118
	
83	 89
	
78	 83
	
50	 114
	
47	 106
*	 Index of 100 based on Germany. Costs include social
charges and fringe benefits
** Output per man-hour worked in terms of same currency
*** Column two divided by column three
Source: Financial Times, 12.1.82, from Dresdner Bank
A contributory factor has been a rise over just a few
years in the contribution of North Sea Oil to almost
	 10bn
to the UK's international current account. Ti ghter monetary
policy resulted in higher real interest rates and further
attracted capital inflows. In the context of dampened demand
conditions, inevitably somethin g else had to give on the
UK's current account.
	 Real exchange movements noted were
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the mechanism by which international trade flows were
• brought back towards eQuilibrium. The manufacturing sector,
representing almost 70% of the UK's current account
transactions, inevitably bore the brunt of this change, so
that the manufacturing sector's trade balance did indeed
move	 by something approaching £iObn.
	 The	 more
internationally
	 exposed and weaker sectors within
manufacturing, such as the UK vehicle and vehicle components
sectors, were in turn affected disproportionately.
As real exchange rates moved, UK vehicle manufacturers
and their suppliers both found themselves fully exposed to
international competition j ust as it was intensifying due to
international recession; but they were no longer shielded by
such high differentials in relative labour rates.
	 UK
manufacturers then found themselves faced with the fruits of
past complacency.
Yet Britain's economic choices, in allowing such a
sudden and unprecedented change in the relative cost
position were also to blame.
	 No country, not even Japan
under dynamic conditions most conducive to sustainable
productivity growth, has ever achieved productivity growth
levels such as would have been necessary to offset such a
sudden change in relative costs. To put the issue in
perspective, few UK component manufacturers have achieved
productivity gains of much over 10% in the last decade.
Even allowing for "slack", it	 inconceivable for UK
manufacturers to achieve productivity gains, over a period
of less than two years, of over 30%, net of progress being
made in more dynamic competitor countries.
249
UK vehicle assemblers and com ponent manufacturers were
likewise affected. UK vehicle prices, reflecting the cost
position, j umped so far ahead even of continental Europe
that the EEC considered action to try and reduce
differentials to under 18%. Even by late 1981, by which time
the real exchange rate surge had subsided somewhat, car
prices in the UK market were still ahead. For example, the
average price of models reported by the Financial Times
(18.12.81&, p15), comprising Citroen's GSA Pallas, Fiat's
Panda 1t5, Ford's Escort XR31, Peugeot's 305 GT, the Renault
5 GTL and the Volkswagen Golf GTI. was £5909 in the Belgium
market, £61J88 in Germany, £6700 in France, £7165 in Italy
and £7706 in the UK. The competitive gap, even against
Europe, was therefore still substantial.
Internationally aware procurement departments 	 of
vehicle manufacturing companies, whilst traditionally
cautious about over-reacting to cost changes brought about
by exchange rates, recognised UK component manufacturers'
decline in cost competitiveness. 	 BL claimed it could
purchase 80% of its components at prices 20% cheaper by
going overseas,	 arid a similar picture emerged
	 from
interviews with German and Japanese vehicle companies.
Volume adjustments were cautious, but the bargaining
position had radically changed so that margins available to
UK suppliers were cut dramatically. Itself under pressure,
BL claimed it ha to pass on competitive pressure onto UK
suppliers. Des pite success in freezing most component prices
over the four year period since 1979, Austin Rover were
nevertheless able to claim that they had effectively
subsidised UK component prices to the extent of £2lm during
250
the same period (Bessant et al. 198, pp6l-62).
Many UK suppliers had been slow to respond to declining
customer orders and could take up some degree of "slack",
but this improvement merely restored. former productivity
levels.	 Some went further by j ust cutting out less
profitable activities, representing further market
retrenchment. Nevertheless, despite being dogged by poor
market conditions and underutilisation, some real progress
has also been made.
The problem is that this has made manufacturing in
Britain even lesB attractive than in the past. Exposed
multinationals noted that whilst the UK had been an
attractive location for manufacturing components in '1973,
the rise in relative labour rates had reversed the position,
leading to UK business being relocated. UK suppliers,
uncompetitive in costs, were driven back both in export
markets and by increased import penetration.
The main problem is that UK manufacturers have been
even further discouraged from pursuing strategies needed to
improve their longer term position. The decline in
financial performances noted in section 6.2 placed perhaps
even the majority of UK component com panies into virtually a
"turnaround" situation. This dictated an approach to
strategy similar to that necessarily employed by receivers
and precluded many progressive strategies which would not
have met the primary requirement of a sufficiently rapid
return to profitability.	 In consequence they have slipped
further behind international rivals.
There has been one major gain: a more overriding
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commitment to competitiveness bY UK manufacturers. If the
importance of such a commitment were to become widely
recognised, it could even represent a psychological turning
point. Even so, improvements needed will still probably take
a decade of patient progress (judging by the Japanese
experience).
Efforts are probably doomed to frustration, however,
unless a radically more conducive business environment is
re-established and sustained. Unfortunately although US and
Japanese rivals show clear recognition of the need for wage
pressures to abate when international
	
competition
intensifies, so as to improve their business situations,
there still appears little such reco gnition in Britain,
particularly in the trade union movement. 	 This could prove
critical.
A more dynaniic market is also needed, but this will
prove unsustainable unless both customers and suppliers are
allowed better levels of profit, so that they can attract
the resources to support growth;
	 if not inflation will
frustrate such policy measures.
6.	 Ralationahip with vehicle companies
The competitive strength of the Japanese components
sector originates from the recognition of its strategic
importance, by entrepreneurs such as Honda and Toyoda
(Toyota), and their determination to develo p actively a
supplier network to match their own needs. The close
fostering relationship engineered between the two sectors,
has been at the heart of the many initiatives that have
transformed the competitive position of both.
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Toyota's initiatives for example, detailed in Shingo
(1981), began well over a decade ago though drawing little
attention from UK manufacturers until recently. These
gradually brought about changes in productivity, quality.
delivery systems (just-in-time), and more flexible
approaches to manufacturing methods, affecting suppliers and
their suppliers too, comprehensively.
A Japanese executive explained that Japanese
relationships between suppliers and assemblers in Japan were
less contractual than in the West. Their agreements with
Toyota were brief, often just a single page, and flexible.
saving considerable time. Though frequently broken, this was
acceptable because the customer relationship was perceived
as essentially long term, both "sides" being highly
conscious of the fact that their futures depended on each
fostering the competitiveness of the other.
Superficially integration between the two sectors might
appear lower, since Japanese assemblers typically buy in an
even greater proportion of components (about 70% by value)
than do UK assemblers. In fact the two sectors are closely
Integrated on a number of counts:
* Cross shareholdings
* As part of the same business groupings, linked by common
banks
* Manufacturing and logistical links
* Financial support, eg on R&D
* Personal linkages as a result of senior executives
moving between the sectors, particular as OEM
executives retire
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Shimokawa, a leading expert on the Japanese components
industry,
	
cites	 the "business	 groupism"	 (Shimokawa,
1982a,b,c) between parts manufacturers and assemblers as one
of the major factors underlying Japan's international
competitiveness, since it permits "vertical integration
gains"	 whilst	 mitigating the conflict	 of	 interests
characteristic of Western relationships. He also emphasises
that this "business groupism" extends also to machine tool
companies and distribution outlets.
In the UK, both vehicle companies and su ppliers have
taken maximum advantage from opportunities presented by
changing business	 circumstances to raise	 their own
profitability at the expense of the other.
	
Component
manufacturers succeeded for a considerable time in achieving
a rate of return on capital employed of about 18%, over
twice the average for UK car assemblers. 	 It was inevitable
that as their customers' fortunes declined, the negotiating
positions would change.	 Manufacturers such as BL had of
course to restore reasonable levels of profit to meet their
own short term financial targets. They had little difficulty
in the context of depressed conditions after 1979 in totally
reversin g this situation. <> By 1982 average ROCE for the
top 100 automotive component companies was down to about 0%,
whilst vehicle companies were recoverin g .	 Such a see-saw
effect is extremely damaging to the competitive situation of
both sectors in the longer term, since reasonable levels of
profitability are crucial to the provision of sufficient
levels of ploughback.
Even Bk's partner Honda seemed extremely cautious about
BL'a rapid moves to international procurement. Surel y , they
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argued, BL should instead foster its own component base,
just	 as Honda has done as part of its longer term
competitive strategy.
	 By coming overseas to Japanese
component suppliers,	 BL risked becoming dependent	 on
suppliers whose bargaining power would increase later.
Internationalisation is though changing the situation.
As Shimokawa (1982b) also noted, it could mean that in the
future the close relationship which has proved such a
competitive strength to Japanese manufacturers to date could
become less so, perhaps affording an advantage to more
competitive British component manufacturers in sectors where
internationalisation	 is	 proceeding faster.	 Some	 UK
suppliers have already taken advantage of their relative
independence	 to pursue opportunities 	 afforded	 by
internationalisatjon:	 notably Pilkington's glass, GKN in
constant velocity joints, and AE not far behind in pistons.
Such global strategies have so far depended heavily on
exceptionally strong patent positions, as Japanese suppliers
point out. For most UK su ppliers the real fear Is that
internationalisatlon is progressing asymmetrically , with UK
customers opening their doors to overseas suppliers (partly
for reasons of expediency) more rapidly than other vehicle
companies, such as GM in Germany. and particularly Fiat
whose domestic supplier links are still extremely close.
This is a justifiable fear. Williams et al (1983) traced the
rapid decline of British shipbuilding, to a fairly sudden
"de-coupling" in their relationship with UK shipping line
customers some years earlier.
Timing is also important.
	 The	 international
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competitiveness of the Japanese components industry was made
possible, because it was protected until the moment the
industry was strong enough to survive free trade. Had the
Japanese agreed to free trade much earlier, both vehicle
manufacturers and their suppliers would probably have been
savaged by Western competition. Free trade has never been
fully reciprocal, and by now UK manufacturers would in
general be far too weak to take advantage of the Japanese
market even if it was now, belatedly, fully opened up.
Britain cannot i gnore internationalisation, but it might be
wise to use the EEC to ensure it proceeds on a fairer, more
even-handed basis.
The real danger, meanwhile, is that any further de-
coupling in the relationship between UK component suppliers
and vehicle manufacturers so far in advance of developments
elsewhere may result in a process of divide-and-rule
working to the disadvantage of both sectors.
This point may be contentious.	 There are disturbing
indications that BL feels it could go it alone through
increasing reliance on overseas parts;
	 but I would argue
that	 the	 competitive	 success of
	 Japanese vehicle
manufacturers has been crucially dependent on extremely
close domestic supplier links. Conversely BL's Uni part OE
operations depend on becoming independent of BL through an
export policy. However, particularly while the UK's
international cost position remains poor and while the
competitive situation internationally remains asymmetrical,
case studies discussed in section 5 and my analysis of more
successful companies discussed in section 6.6 suggest there
is a limit to the reliance that can be placed on exporting
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for the majority of companies.
6.5 Tha ralationahip batwaan aia&nd p.z'form&no.
Table 5	 Performances by aize classification 1970-82
Size oi	 j Growth ROCE Growth j Growth ROCE Growth
(descending j.. 1970-75 1970-74 .±. ROCE j.. 1975-82 1975-82 ±. ROCE
orderj.
	% pa	 % pa
1-11	 :	 .4	 12.7	 16.1	 : (2.9)	 8.3
	
5.4
12-22	 :	 0.1	 26.5	 26.6	 (2.9)	 11.7	 8.8
23-33	 2.6	 19.6	 22.2 :
	 19.8	 16.1
34-44	 : (0.7)	 21.4	 20.7
	
: (1.2)	 8.0	 6.8
	
(3.2)	 5.1	 1.9
	
(2.6)	 13.2	 10.6
56-66	 -	 -	
-	
(0.7)
	
10.2	 9.5
Source: figures derived from Appendices D.3 and D.4
Figures for 1970-75 are based on only 24 com panies but
suggest the largest class of companies (household names such
as Lucas, Dunlop etc), although displaying faster growth,
were substantially outperformed by companies in the next
three size classifications in respect to profitability.
This suggests that some of these larger company groupings,
formed from earlier consolidations, have already passed the
point of optimum size; certainly market leadership,
exercised by nact of these companies (in their particular
component sectors) merely in a UK context, has proved no
guarantee of competitive success.
Figures for the eight year period 1975-82 are based on
the full 66 companies. Growth rates are similar, so the
issue of "buying market 8hare" does not arise, but the
largest class of companies is outperformed by every other
size classification. Indeed Table 57 shows how consistently
this happened in every year between 1970 and 1978.
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.ab1e_57 Average ROCE by size classification 1970-82
i.zji.
	
.12-22	 Z3-	 14-4J
	
45-55	 56-66
	
1982	 (2.2)	 (6.6)	 (0.7)
	
3.0	 (12.2)	 (8.3)
	
1981	 (3.4)	 (5.5)	 11.1	 (1.9)	 (6.5)	 (6.7)
	
1.980	 (3.6)	 (14.7)	 93	 (14.3)	 14.5	 2.4
	
1979	 12.7
	
10.8	 24.2	 10.9
	
20.8	 21.9
	
1978	 15.1	 18.7
	
33.3	 15,2	 23.1	 27.0
	
1977	 161	 22.6	 36.1	 15.0	 30.0	 33.1
	
197 6	 14.5
	 29.0	 25.9	 15.5	 22.5	 13.3
	
1975	 10,2	 21.5
	
23.9	 10.14	 7.14	 5.8
	
- 19714
	 11.8	 21.3
	
29.3	 13.3	 5.14	 -
	
1973	 12.4	 25.1	 14.5	 22.2	 1.5	 -
	
1 97 2	 12,7
	
24.9
	
25.1	 24.1	 (5.5)	 -
	
1971	 12.8	 29.6	 19.5	 25.6	 13.4	 -
	
1 970	 13.5	 34.4	 11.3	 23.2	 10.9	 -
Source: figures derived from Appendices D.3 and D.4
1-66
(14.5)
(3.3)
0.6
16.9
22.1
25.5
20.1
13.2
15.14
14.7
16. 14
18.7
17.1
Yet in the last few years this situation has changed
and the second largest group has in fact been under more
pressure than other groups including the largest.
	 As noted
particularly in the cases of automotive forgings
	 and
automotive exhaust systems, second tier companies have been
squeezed between stronger larger companies as their vehicle
manufacturer customers moved to fewer sources of supply (eg
Rubery Owen
	 in wheels),	 and smaller more	 flexible
competitorB carrying very low overheads.
This	 highlights	 the	 need	 for	 sensitivity	 to
circumstances.	 Many larger component companies suffered In
the	 1970's through over-reliance on strategies
	 more
appropriate to the growth conditions of the 1960's and
through Insufficient recognition of the changing radius of
competition.	 In todai's turbulent competitive conditions
the issue of scale cannot be ignored, but it must be
analysed carefully in context.
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Table_58 Best performing companies 1975-82
Growth ROCE Activities
1. IHW (118)*	 (2.11)	 67.11 Door hin ges, CE
2. Motaproducts (66)	 1128.7	 28.11 Accessories, AM
3. TI Nicholson (53)	 0.1	 114.8 Exhaust systems, AM
4. Britax wingard (29)	 (2.0)	 411.9 Accessories, AM
5. Oldhaxn (27)	 1.5	 36.1 Batteries, AM
6. Flexible Lamps (62)	 5.0	 32.2 Lighting, AM
7. Champion (21)	 (3.0)	 37.4 Spark plugs, AM
8. TI Cheswick (31)
	
(3.1)	 34.0 Exhaust systems, OE
9. Airflow (38)	 12.8	 15.0 Body panels, OE
10.Concentric Pumps(33) 	 (1.0)	 23.7 Water pumps, OE
11.Intermotor (64)	 8.7	 17.9 Electrical, AM
12.Cain Gears (13)
	
(11.3)
	
30.2 Misc, CE
13.Armstrong (111)	 6.9	 13.4 Exhaust systems, OE/AM
11L.0 H Industrials (40)
	
10.7	 9.1 Exterior trim
15.BBA (7)	 (2.7)	 21.8 Brake linings, AM
16.BRD (17)
	
(2.8)	 21.9 Prop shafts, OE
* size ranks, given in brackets, average 35 for this group
Source: ICC
Table 58 gives details of best performing companies in
the period 1975-82 and again confirms that size is no
guarantee of competitive success. 	 There also appears to be
little correlation between growth and ROCE, implying that
increasing market share is no guarantee either.
The group includes a miscellany of products but
aftermarket products such as exhaust systems are better
represented,	 confirming case findings of a slightly
healthier situation here.
Surprisingly, many better performing companies are
involved in relativel y low technology activities, which does
not support the notion of low technology companies being
inevitably doomed. This may be because such activities have
so far been less exposed to the im pact of international
competition.	 From the viewpoint of UK competitiveness
though, it is disturbing that higher technology companies
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are not better represented.	 This again seems to indicate
the UK business environment is discouraging more
technologically progressive strategies.
Table 59 Best performing companies 1980-82
Growth ROCE Activities
1. IHW (48)*	 (9.4)
2. TI Nicholson (53)
	
(11.8)
3. Concentric Pumps (33)	 (6.2)
11. Flexible Lamps (62)
	
(6.0)
5. Smiths	 (Ii.)	 (1.0)
6. Rockwell Maudsley (24) (12.8)
7. TI Cox (111)	 (6.6)
8. Oldhani (27)	 (10.1)
9. TRW Clifford (30)	 (10.3)
10.Abbey Panels (45)	 (5.8)
11.Intermotor (611)	 (1.1)
12.Motaproducts (66)	 (8.0)
13.Chilcotts (55)
	
(12.11)
1l1.Supra (42)
	 (7.1)
15.Commercial I gnition (59)(9.6)
16.Turrier (19)
	 (3.1)
67.4 Door hinges, OE
411.8 Exhaust systems, AM
28.2 Water pumps, OE
22.5 Lighting, AM
17.1 Instruments and systems,
OE/AM
21.1 Axles, OE
10.3 Seating parts, OE
16.3 Batteries, AM
15.2 Misc, OE
10.3 Body panels, OE
5.5 Electrical, AM
5.5 Accessories, AM
16.2 Exhaust systems, AM
7.8 Materials, paints,
sealants
10.0 Electrical parts
3.2 Gearboxes, clutches, OE
* size ranks, given in brackets, average 42 for this group
Source: ICC
As noted, however, factors making for competitive
success may be changing.	 Only half of these companies
appear in Table 59, which focuses on best performing
companies in j ust the most recent three years 1980-82, and
an even greater variety of activities are represented.
6.6 Baaio iaauea faein& UK manufaoturez'B
6.61 Productivity
Quantitative estimates of productivity differentials
noted in product cases can be taken as a strong indication
of a lack of commitment by UK manufacturers in regard to
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this issue, but I would not expect such differentials to
reflect the situation in all product sectors. Where manning
levels	 are	 largely process	 determined,	 productivity
differentials are likely to be lower.	 Some multinationals,
particularly those operating smaller UK plants below about
250 people, have not experienced such large productivity
differentials.	 Also some UK plants perform a "cats and
dogs" role, where it is appropriate for productivity to be
quite low.	 (In fact, UK conditions have led to some such
plants being closed though in more normal circumstances they
have served a useful role. ) I would also expect many UK
manufacturers to have made further improvements since my
visits and would be surpriBed if much of the more obvious
slack has not gone.
From this point on,	 I suspect improvements 	 in
productivity to match overseas rivals will involve a long
haul, requiring
 rapid but sustained progress. Low levels of
utilisation and stagnation in the UK appear to seriously
inhibit further progress.
Britain cannot afford this situation in the context of
such rapid advances by com petitors.	 Evidence of this is
ubiquitous throughout the Japanese automotive components
sector. Japanese productivity in disc pad manufacture for
example had increased from 31 pieces/man/hour in 1978 to 67
in 1982, reflecting the situation in cases discussed.
	 In
stagnating, Britain is slipping further behind.
6.62 Quality
Quality was a key
 factor from the viewpoint of OEM
Purchasing	 departments,	 particularly	 when	 buying
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internationally.
	
Britain's	 reputation	 is	 better	 on
particular products (eg brakes) where it has been- better
placed historically.
	
In general however, whilst British
manufacturers enjoyed a good International reputation for
quality a decade ago, today their re putation is mediocre.
By contrast, Japanese component manufacturers had a shoddy
reputation 25 years ago, but must now rate as leaders.
Some Japanese companies interviewed volunteered
unsolicited comparisons between British and German component
suppliers.	 The German sector's quality standards were
considered hi gh and ahead of Britain both by Japanese
component companies which had visited and collaborated with
both countries, and also by Japanese vehicle assemblers. One
British supplier hadn't even troubled to put the right
number of parts in the box, a matter of some sensitivity In
the context of " j ust in time" delivery systems.
Multinational parts companies have undoubtedly done a
great deal to ti ghten up quality standards in their British
plants In recent years. Even so one quality control
manager, monitoring Identical parts from plants In Germany
and the UK, stated that whilst his average rejection rate In
the UK had averaged only 0.1% over the previous two or three
years, the figure from the German plant was only half that
figure. Tracing the causes, about half the UK rejections
were due to faults on items the UK plant had itself bought
in, pointing to the fact that British manufacturers were
less thorough about passing responsibility for quality to
outside suppliers.
Quality standards maintained In Germany and Japan are
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assisted by more modern plants, enabling more ordered work
flow routes and equipment. The clinical neatness of German
factories and of more modern Japanese plants (some even
boasting small palm trees along the length of the assembly
lines) is in contrast to most British component factories
and provides a more conducive atmosphere for quality and
other improvements. GKN's extremely modern constant
velocity plants in the US have recently won American quality
awards however.
German and Japanese manufacturers enjoyed closer
relationBhips with machine tool suppliers whose support is
evident in numerous minor technical improvements, tailored
to their individual needs. Similarly, quality initiatives
pursued by so many Japanese component manufacturers, could
be traced back the direct involvement of their vehicle
manufacturer customers. The dynamic development of all three
industry "tiers", based on close fostered relationships, has
been mutual and reinforcing.
German and Japanese approaches to quality, and Indeed
other manufacturing issues, 	 were distinguished by a
different control philosophy. Both UK and US manufacturers
relied heavily on externally imposed systems, desi gned to
stop production personnel getting too far out of line with
regard to quality standards. There was still a tendency to
believe in a quality / cost "trade-off", and "optimised"
standards tended to be enshrined in quality control manuals,
backed up by sophisticated control systems and higher levels
of quality control staff. This also appeared to apply to
production control systems.
German manufacturers were not averse to advanced
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quality control techniques. One company, for example, had
installed a computerised statistical sampling system, and
was pushing beyond go-no-go inspection principles common in
Britain,	 by utilising advanced statistical methods in
con j unction with specific error data, available from more
accurate equipment. Generally though, German and Japanese
companies objected to "optimisation" approaches in any area
of manufacturing policy , on the grounds that they reduced
commitment to a more dynamic learning experience in the
production area.
Responsibility was placed more firml y in the hands of
production personnel whose morale and involvement was
considered crucial.
	 Japan's unique culture may have helped
foster the commitment of working groups referred to as
"quality circles", but it should also be remembered that its
entire cultural tradition had been associated in the 1950's
with quality problems far worse than in Britain.
	 What
changed was not culture, but a willingness to adopt a new
production centred or ganisational approach together with
specific and coordinated manufacturing programmes. 	 As
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) 's Personnel Director, Peter
Wiakens (Wickens, 	 1985) reiterates,	 such changes are
appropriate to UK manufacturers.
The ideas on statistical quality control put forward by
Deming and Juran in the late 1950's and early 1960's found a
most receptive audience among Japanese manufacturers
initially because of their pressing quality problems. The
simplicity of their methods enabled modern techniques of
quality control to be placed directly into the hands of
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operators, rather than becoming merely a staff function.
This caught the imagination of very large numbers of
people involved in manufacturing o perations, and encouraged
the emergence of the "quality circles" which were ubiquitous
In the Japanese vehicle component manufacturers visited.
One example was a small brake linings plant employing
only about 30 people. The section leader, a man who had
left school at 15 and come up through operations, not only
knew about the work of Deming (a US academic!) but also
produced a small library of books on the subject, proudly
admitting that he had his own personal library on
statistical quality control methods at home. The area set
aside for his quality circle was almost a shrine, with
photographs and diagrams of all the im provements he arid his
men had produced over recent years: pride of place went to
a series of beautifully presented colour photograph albums
(one album for example showed eight of this group's major
ideas during the previous year). This section leader, like
many Other's in Japan, attended monthly lectures at quality
groups outside the factory and about three or four meetings
per month took place inside the company. Two "circles" were
in fact in operation, one a quality circle which also
covered safety improvements and the other a productivity
group concerned with other im provements to the manufacturing
process.	 This group's numerous suggestions had generally
been Implemented and had contributed to a steady Improvement
in quality standards. The company's records indicated that
re j ection rates on brake pads had gradually been brought
down from 0.68% five years earlier to 0.18%.
Toyota, which claimed to receive about 38 suggestions
265
per employee per year, is a leading ex ponent of such schemes
and has directly influenced its suppliers. 	 Similar figures
for suppliers were high but generally more modest. One
brake manufacturer, with about 120 quality circles in
operation, averaged j ust under 5 p.a. though the target was
to beat 10 p.a,. This had also reduced the number of
quality control staff to only 1.5% of the •workforce, which
is low for a safety critical product.
Given a favourable organisatlonal context, something
that began with guality in mind ultimately succeeded in
harnessing the enthusiasm and commitment of enormous numbers
of employees, and was extended to a range of other basic
production improvements such as productivity and flexible
manufacturing methods.	 Yet it was not the result of some
accident or fortuitous circumstance;
	
it was the result of
management recognising and supporting such 	 critical
developments.
6.63 Research and development
In many component areas, UK manufacturers inherited a
strong R&D capability. Often, they had in fact licensed out
such know-how to Japanese companies, eg in constant velocity
j oints, brake linin gs, brakes and glass. British pistons
and fuel injection systems are also technicall y advanced.
In other areas, technological dominance has been allowed to
wither away: eg Dunlop 's supremacy in tyre technology was
lost to competitors such as Michelin, particularly after
radial tyres were developed.
UK manufacturers have suffered from a relatively
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undynamic market base, and a weak funding position. Most can
only afford small R&D departments at best, and even large
companies have often been forced to close departments
completely during such difficult recent business conditions.
Despite limited organisational support, British R&D
staff seem to have maintained a surprisingly good creative
record.	 GKN Forgirigs' technical developments were still
ahead of Japanese manufacturers. Individually, British R&D
engineers are better trained and qualified than their
counterparts in Japan. Even electronic companies in Japan
place little emphasis on outside training or qualifications,
though they do gain from strength in depth in terms of
graduates with relevant degrees.
	 They are also prepared to
increase the number of their staff when necessary.
Mitsubishi Electronics spends <> of sales value on R&D in
automotive electronics and also receives substantial support
from its parent Mitsubishi Motors, <>.
Japanese culture and their managerial approaches tend
to be less supportive in this area. Honda's production
personnel, for example, were proud that R&D staff were often
"not allowed in" and saw their R&D department very much as a
service department to develop their ideas. Nevertheless the
morale and commitment of Japanese R&D engineers seemed high,
sometimes almost matching the enthusiasm of kamikaze pilots.
I asked one R&D engineer how they tested brake linings only
to be told they were on the car we were driving ! Those I
interviewed habitually worked a couple of extra hours before
going home.
Japanese executives still seemed to respect British
technology, but one referred to a UK components manufacturer
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he had visited thus: "A good product, but the business isn't
so good!".
The key problem facing British R&D engineers is that
they lack support in the production area, so that many good
developments never get Im plemented. The changes that have
80 transformed Japanese component manufacturing have not
been associated with glamorous technical breakthroughs (I
found little evidence of robotics for example), but have
involved widespread incremental production improvements. In
areas where R&D will be more important, such as automotive
electronics, the Japanese ensure funding and staffing that
UK companies will find difficult to match.
There is powerful European competition in R&D.
	 German
R&D engineers are even better trained . and educated thai-i in
Britain.	 They are supported by enormous strength in depth,
extending upwards to Board level and to managers and
production operatives. The pace-setters In technological
change in automotive bearings seemed to be Germany (process
developments and applications engineering) and Italy (eg
integrated wheel bearing developments).
	 There is a danger
that	 continental Europe is becoming the main hub of
technological development,
	 whilst Britain is
	 becoming
stagnant and geographically perIpheral. 	 Another example
cited recently by the Rt Hon Edward Heath was a new
automatic transmission. Its developers reportedly
complained that no UK company was in a position to
manufacture, partly because of weak funding support from
British banks.
	 It is now being manufactured in Italy. I
asked an R&D manager from one vehicle manufacturer about the
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technological position of UK suppliers.	 His main worry
seemed to be, not that they were technically poor, but that
they did not any longer have "developments already in the
pipeline" in the same way as German counterparts.
	 This
probably reflects a weak funding situation.
6.64 Flexible manufaoturin& methods
Japanese vehicle companies and their suppliers have
worked concertedly together over the last decade to create
an overall system, more flexible in handlin g variability in
order patterns, and in dealing with an increasing variety of
new products.	 Whilst Japanese vehicle companies have
achieved extremely high volumes on some models, their
emphasis surprisingly is on increasing (and upgrading) the
number of their models and accelerating the pace of model
changes, rather than standardisation. Suppliers have been
suject to the same pressure to improve flexibility . Honda's
wheel supplier, for example, having built up ex perience In
dealing with the astonishing pace of model changes in motor
cycles, was having to push through similar programmes to
meet similar Honda demands on the car side. They are
experiencing product changes about every six months.
A total "systems" view of the o peration is required.
Vehicle companies have even found it necessary to advise
suppliers of changes required in their distribution and
logistical arrangements to meet their needs efficiently.
Car seats for example must now be delivered to a particular
place next to the assembly line on an hourly basiB. They
have become involved in quite detailed matters such as
getting suppliers to switch to smaller trucks.
269
After 1979, more difficult business conditions placed a
premium on such flexibility. Order runs available to
suppliers have been sharply reduced and subject to more
frequent disruption everywhere. UK conditions have been
particularly bad in this respect, and manufacturers have
paid a high price for their failure to pay the same degree
of attention to the issue of flexibility.
From an engineering stance, FMS developments that have
transformed the Japanese automotive components sector,
cannot in general be equated to the more sophisticated
robotic systems which now capture the public's imagination.
To date, at least, robotics appear to have played a very
minor role.
Investment and R&D have played a limited role in these
developments. FMS improvements have required changes
throughout the entire process route and have been heavily
dependent on incremental developments pursued by work groups
in production areas. As in the case of quality and
productivity improvements such progress has in turn depended
on a better partnership with employees and production-
orientated organisational approaches, together with numerous
detailed engineering improvements. Specific changes
involved have been discussed in detail in the two product
cases in which they were particularly im portant: automotive
forgings and automotive exhaust systems (5.2 and 5.11).
Such progress appears to have been fairly comprehensive
across all components however, reflecting coordination by
their vehicle manufacturer customers. The importance of
such developmentB and progress made by Japanese component
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manufacturers does vary though. Production methods for
components such as volume automotive bearings and to some
extent spark plugs are inherently more process determined.
It is harder (and perhaps a little less worthwhile) to gain
flexibility without incurring too great a cost penalty.
Even here there is evidence of similar progress. An extreme
example is glass, a process inherently inflexible. Japanese
manufacturers had dealt with this problem by adopting a
different approach to planning and control.
	 This company
was considering selling such ex pertise to US glass
manufacturers who are now facing the problem of supplying
Japanese vehicle plants in the USA.
After over a decade of progress, almost i gnored in
Britain, Japanese commitment to such developments appears
unrelenting. As one manufacturer of electric motors put it
"Our target production run is one!". Their relevance to UK
suppliers was again highlighted by Dunlop's request for
state aid reported in the Financial Times (19.8.85, p1).
Investment was required because Dunlop saw
	 flexible
manufacturing systems as the way to deal with Britain's
small production runs.	 The new investment is intended to
give the flexibility to change from production of one type
of wheel to another within an hour:
	 The normal change-over
among volume manufacturers can be 10 to 20 hours."
6.7 Industrial Relations
Strikes are merely an extreme manifestation of poor
industrial, relations, a symptom of a more fundamental
degeneration	 (sometimes for understandable reasons) in
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employees' commitment to ensuring an organisation',s
continued competitiveness. The power of precedent is such
that 90% of the time changes can be disru pted merely through
the unspoken threat of such problems. More importantly,
though, faced with such dynamic international competitors,
an ambivalent or merely passive attitude to change is no
longer likely to be adequate to ensure business survival.
My interviews with German and Japanese manufacturers
confirmed more general research findings that their strike
problems were of a totally different order of magnitude.
Asked to remember back as far as possible (10 or 20 years if
they could) the ei ght German component plants visited were
unable to produce a total of hours involved in strikes much
above 10 hours, with some claiming no hours lost at all.
The absence of strikes in the Japanese vehicle industr y has
been noted by Shimokawa (1982b, p275) as a major factor in
the rise of its competitiveness and my interviews confirmed
a similar picture in the case of vehicle component
manufacturers.
With delivery reliability now more im portant the wider
industrial	 relations	 scene is	 also	 relevant.	 The
international purchasing department in one German vehicle
company pointed out that UK component suppliers were also
damaged by fears of disruption in UK ports and transport
communications.	 As a result they tended to either restrict
shares of business going to UK suppliers or insist on high
levels of stocks held locally, placing an additional
financial burden on UK suppliers.
By 1982, US component manufacturers appeared to be
experiencing more industrial disputes than UK manufacturers,
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whose situation had im proved.	 However, employee attitudes
seemed enthusiastic and dynamic in comparison with Britain
where morale sometimes seemed at a low ebb. Japanese
multinationals were able to negotiate US labour contracts as
long as three years, and apart from pressure at such times.
few problems arose and the industrial relations atmosphere
was considered quite positive. Their main problem was in
harnessing employees' longer term commitment and loyalty.
US labour turnover figures were high. Often employees,
repressed any feelin gs of discontent and would merely leave
the moment a better j ob opportunity arose.
NSK (as discussed in 5.1) had a high re gard for UK
employees and did not feel industrial relations was a
problem. Their UK plant had though been set up on a green
field site basis, top managers were Japanese, and they had
only employed people under the age of 28, whose attitudes
were felt to have had less opportunity to become encrusted
by past conflicts. Japanese ideas on employee participation
were generally transferable, though progress on quality
circles could only be gradual anywhere and UK employees
lacked experience.
German executives in one multinational had deliberately
trained some UK production workers in Germany. There was no
difficulty in achieving German performance standards, but
when these operators returned to the UK plant, their
performance (which was monitored) slumped back to UK norms.
NSK also stated UK production workers matched Japanese
standards on trainin g , but they did not experience this
problem.
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Prais (1981) has argued that British industrial
relations problems escalate mainly as plant size rises above
about 250 employees and NSK's UK plant was a little below
this size.	 One German executive made the same point.
Industrial relations were not a problem in his company's UK
plant, but they were conscious of the need to keep down
plant Bize in Britain below about 500 employees, after which
problems escalated.
Both German and Japanese executives who had dealt with
British companies were critical of British managerial
attitudes towards employees. These were felt to be divisive
and myop ically exploitational. Executives in both countries
emphasised their responsibility to safeguard the interests
of employees, particularly in terms of continued employment;
in the absence of such a commitment by management, they
believed it was impossible to secure consensus and employee
commitment on any long term basis.
In Germany, this commitment was in part formalised,
through works councils and worker representatives on higher
tier boards in larger companies, but the attitudes of German
managers seemed very different.
	 One German superintendent
was an active campaigner on behalf of employee interests and
also had formal duties in this capacity.
	 In terms of any
"them and US" it was clear that his identification appeared
to lie more with employees than the company. Neither he nor
senior management considered this in any sense unusual or
out of order. One chief executive reminded me that even
before the last war the attitude had been "we are all
workers, even if some of us work with our brains rather than
our hands". Any residual class differences he felt had been
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levelled in the common experience of reconstruction from
almost nothing after the War. 	 Another executive commented
on the rapid turnover of British executives he dealt with
compared to the situation in mainland Europe generally.
	
He
had the impression that British employees were j udged more
on whether "their faces fitted" than on their ability to do
a job.	 The perceived divisiveness of British boardrooms,
and in particular separate dinin g facilities, was criticised
by German and Japanese executives alike.
Japanese executives criticised the shorter term, more
contractual, relationships between companies and employees
in Britain and America, and the tendency for employees to be
laid off the moment it was convenient.
	 Aa with aBsembler/
supplier relationships, such an exploitational relationship
would inevitably cause employees to hit back and exploit the
situation when conditions improved.	 Such conflict damaged
consensus and undermined employees' 	 commitment,	 their
training and career development.
Though I visited only a few small Japanese plants and
their "tertiary supplier sector" was not fully represented,
virtually all suppliers visited appeared to operate lifetime
employment schemes. To safeguard employment companies were
prepared to brin g back work in-house or even, sometimes, to
take on work outside their normal ambit (as in the case of
exhaust systems manufacture discussed in 5.1).
	
Market
targets were fought for tenaciously.
	
When work was slack,
employees were taken off production lines and recruited into
improvement groups.	 One factory visited had almost 60
people in such groups.	 "We can use their brains not their
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hands for a time", they said, "but when demand rises they
will return to the lines."
Such policies were financially viable because the
partnership with emp loyees was two way. Wage bonuses, which
were high, could as In Germany be reduced in difficult
conditions.	 With such coimnitment the supply side of the
Japanese economy was clearly in shape to sustain hi gher non-
Inflationary growth rates, mitigating unemployment problems
more generally.
Greater commitment by UK management and employees to a
genuine two way partnership will be essential in restoring
competitiveness in the longer term. NSK's experience In the
UK and Nissan's agreement with the AUEW suggests that this
is feasible.
6.8 Organisationa]. Issues
Japanese executives also attributed their success to an
organisationa]. approach which contrasted with that of many
Western companies. 	 The president of one component company
appeared to confirm the popular view of decisions frequently
being "bottom up" rather than "top down". "Yes", he said,
"it makes my job very easy!". Other executives, however,
clarified that it was very much a two way process.	 Senior
management is anything but passive, as illustrated by the
entrepreneurial influence obvious at Toyota and Honda.
Surprisingly career appraisal systems were also two-
way. An accountant from a large Japanese component company,
seconded to the British operation, compared the situation in
Britain and Japan.	 Company policies were similar to those
of other large Japanese companies.	 In the context of
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lifetime emp loyment, career development was regarded as very
important and appraisals occurred twice a year. Though his
salary is little affected, assessments make the difference
later between advancement and being shifted Into a
backwater. Like most of his Japanese colleagues he works an
extra couple of hours most evenin gs.	 "No one wants to get
left behind."
Such appraisal systems are fairly common in larger UK
companies, but he was puzzled to find no equivalent of the
second part of his company's assessment system. For he, in
turn, is required to complete a standard form for his
personnel department 1
 the first questions after standard
entries being broadly:
* How good are communications between you and your
boss?
* How good are communications between you and other
colleagues?
* Do you have any problems with your present work?
He felt the British system was perhaps unfair, since without
this system there was no feedback coming from those lower
down the organisation. Any comments were bound to be a
little veiled, but his personnel department carried
considerable weight because they influenced his manager's
next career move.
The Chief Executive of Allied Steel and Wire, a UK
steel supplier which has worked closel y with the Japanese,
also emphasises the vast number of reports Japanese
personnel departments received on even low level managers,
from bosses, colleagues and subordinates.
	 He feels that
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British managers compare unfavourably with those in Japan,
but that critical managerial qualities can only be assessed
on the j ob.	 The Japanese system, he says, ensures poor
managerial ability gets spotted early on.	 Even large
companies really know their staff over years of career
development and can ensure that only those with the right
qualities rise to take responsibility for others.
Academics	 in Japan such as Shimokawa and Ballon
distinguish " groupism" rather than individualism as lying at
the heart of Japanese approaches to or ganisation, education
and training .	 Ballon acknowledged Japanese businesses
displayed little interest in the content of university
courses.	 Such courses were not even particularly intense,
since at this level they wanted to encourage group cohesion
rather than pushing individual com petitiveness too far.
Japanese companies took little interest in outside training
courses and re j ected the concept of professions such as
engineering and accountancy.
	
This was felt to encourage
identification with
	
individual	 goals,	 rather	 than
identification with the working group and with the goals of
the company.	 This was perceived as creating divisiveness
and damaging to consensus, a luxury companies felt they
could not afford.	 (This may explain why Japanese engineers
interviewed were generally less well educated and trained
than those in Britain).
The personnel manager of a ma j or Japanese supplier
illustrated the chan ge in orientation required. Some years
earlier they had identified a technological gap emerging
between themselves and another Ja panese competitor. Having
determined that their own technical staff differed very
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little In either back ground or ability from those of the
competitor, they traced their problem to a lack of support
from production personnel. They found their professional
staff were so "swamped" with resulting problems, that they
had little time to carry out the numerous minor changes
which were putting their com petitor ahead. The solution had
involved a radical reorientation, making production
operators themselves the focus of attention, and training
resources had been accordingly redirected.
Their changed orientation, in fact, closely mirrored
the fairly extreme production-centred organisational
approaches	 advocated by vehicle
	 companies	 visited,
particularly Honda,
	 Toyota and Mitsubishi.	 The same
approach had been adopted by su ppliers visited. It was
reflected In the status given to production workers and also
pay. Engineers working in production were paid on precisely
the same scales as accountants or salesmen. (Age and length
of service were the main determinants of pay and status,
with billboards outside factories proclaiming the names not
of directors but of long service workers).
The organisational contrast in both UK and US plants of
one multinational company <> was marked. It was more
advanced, particularly in the USA, than its key Japanese
competitor, which I also visited, on "systems" operated by
staff functIonB.	 Financial, production and quality control
systems were Bophisticated, highly detailed and utilised
advanced computerised information systems; by contrast
Japanese "systems" mainl y comprised extensive simple control
systems of the type discussed in section 5.
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This multinational's performance was in many respect
impressive. Financial performance was well above average1
itB international strategies had been aggressive and timely.
and it was technolo gically well advanced. Nevertheless they
were concerned with the strides their Japanese competitors
were making in the area of production.
Self confidence and morale in Japanese production areas
were high and there was indeed ubiquitous evidence of
progress (similar to that discussed in other cases in
section 5). By contrast morale in the UK plant's production
areas was poor and production management seemed swamped by
externally imposed systems. 	 I asked supervisory staff what
happened to voluminous computer printouts of quality records
after filing. "It's pretty rare that anyone comes down here
to use them," they explained, "so eventually they Just get
thrown out to make room for more recent printouts."
Authority for handling industrial relations had largely
been transferred to the personnel department. Supervisors
complained they could "never get an answer" from such
distant staff departments.
	 Left with resultant problems,
they themselves felt undermined.
Production management felt excluded from the chief
executive's full support. They could not help noticing they
said, that on his visits to the shop floor he would walk
strai ght past them without even greeting them; 	 Instead he
would regularly seek out the shop steward asking
solicitously after his health condition. Junior production
management felt hurt and excluded by the staff/hourly paid
class divide in their organisation, which left them despite
their considerable responsibilities on the wrong side of the
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fence. Whilst they were not Invited to the plush yearly
staff dinner dance, the seventeen year old girl student who
served their tea was. Such stories are not rare In British
factories, but here there were also si gns from the staff
side of the same divide.
<>Senior staff did not seem to recognise
	 that
production personnel needed greater support and authorit y so
that they could be rebuilt as a strong team. This
alternative approach appears to have assisted Japanese
manufacturers to transform their competitive position over
the last twenty years.
The point echoes fears that Western management
philosophies may have downgraded the contribution made by
production personnel (Garvin, 19811). One US car worker was
said to have understood that he had been laid off because
the Japanese had got ahead on quality, but was left
perplexed by the fact that in twenty years no one had sought
his opinion as to how it could be improved.
Organisational changes, similar to those implemented In
Japan, must be taken more seriously by UK component
manufacturers.
6.9 The Approach to Strategy
6.91. The UK planning environment
The UK business environment, discussed in 6.3, has been
so severe that planning horizons were necessarily shortened
to preserve financial control. It has also been subject to
more extreme fluctuations than Germany, Japan and America.
German executives with experience of Britain pointed out
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that,	 whilst production forecasts from German vehicle
companies provided an accurate basis for planning, such
information in the UK was unreliable even a few months
ahead.	 The German sales office in one company claimed to
have been within 1% of sales budget forecasts in each of the
previous five years.	 Close customer relationships in Japan
and to some extent Germany encourage an almost logistical
approach to business planning.
6 .92 The lack of analysia of etrataglo iasuee in the UK
Although remainin g competitive was a matter of survival
for many UK manufacturers, few outside the very largest
companies seemed to have much idea of who their main
competitors were (even in the UK). Fewer had the data which
might logically have highlighted key competitive issues. In
smaller companies, sales and financial records over five
years old were often not stored in any accessible manner.
Very few companies had had much time to draw conclusions
from any competitive data they did have. 	 Often the only
people with much knowledge of the competitive position were
marketing or sales staff, and many chief executives seemed
preoccupied with day-to-day operating matters.
Yet since it is largely competition which holds down
profit margins,	 unless such issues are analysed more
effectively, manufacturers seem destined to remain "fire
fighting" and at the mercy of competition which will
continue to intensify relentlessly.
	
UK manufacturers
generally need more knowledge of key UK competitors and
increasin gly ( particularly for larger manufacturers)	 a
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knowledge of key European com petitors.	 Information sources
available on continental Europe are a handicap: this most
critical area is much more poorly documented not only than
the UK. but also than other trade blocB such as the USA and
Japan.	 Manufacturers also need to know more about Japanese
manufacturing methods. Since competition with Japan is
mainly
 indirect, there would seem scope for technological
transfer agreements.
6.93 Generalist approaches to strategy In Britain
Mant (1979, pp95-100) has criticised what he regards as
the "generalist" prediliction characteristic of British
management. In comparison with the Continent, British
boardrooms are too dominated by those with accountancy
backgrounds, "as if the primary task of industry was
laundering money, with production as an irksome constraint
rather than vice versa". He argues that functions such as
accountancy, personnel, and those of other head office
specialists and even maretin are frequently peripheral to
the key problems of British industry. These are seen as
being in the production area, and in the tendency for
production to be treated as a "Cinderella" function.
In the context of the UK vehicle components industry,
section 6.8 found some evidence to support the
organisationa]. implication that there is a need for a more
production-centred approach. Mant's argument that "breadth
of vision" must be complemented by "a meticulous eye for
detail" is also applicable to effective strategy thinking.
It implies that UK managers need to achieve a better balance
between general concepts of analysis and more specific
283
issues of key contextual importance (particularly in respect
to basic issues such as production). To take an analogy,
there has been increasing recognition that for British
"Research and Development" to be more effective,
	 the
emphasis needs to be as much on the more "applied"
Development as on the purer Research.
	 The latter may be of
more general interest but is often of less contextual
significance.
Case studies discussed In section 5 indicate a similar
need for analysis of more general issues to be balanced
against more s pecific issues, often in the production area.
A characteristic of UK component manufacturers' strategies
appears to be their generality.
The most common strategic theme among UK component
manufacturers has been retrenchment and rationalisation.
Traditional accounting policies were cited for example by
Automotive Products' chief executive as havin g become the
top priority.	 Other manufacturers faced with such a severe
decline in profitability have shared similar priorities -
control of fixed and working capital, particularly cash flow
and a quick resumption of ROCE. if necessary by cutting out
marginal activities.	 This general emphasis on retrenchment
and rationalisation has been reflected in a widespread
tendency towards unprecedented charges on extraordinary and
exceptional items taken "below the line". eg RHP, GKN and
Lucas.
Such strategies may be necessary given the UK's
situation but they are essentially defensive and by no means
sufficient, if manufacturers are to regain competitiveness
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internationally. Such retrenchment is less characteristic of
better performing overseas rivals such as the Japanese,
though some US component companies have also suffered.
UK manufacturers have also displayed a greater
dependence on general strate gies such as diversification,
acquisition and mergers than their counterparts in Japan and
Germany. Frequently these strategies have been defensive.
They have perhaps helped manufacturers cope with competitive
decline; but so far they have not represented effective
countermoves against overseas competitors.
UK manufacturers often seem overstretched in
	 the
context	 of increasing international competition.
	 Yet
diversification, weakening core business areas further,
seems	 of	 greater interest to UK than	 to	 overseas
manufacturers.	 Such strategies often seem to have done
little to restore international competitiveness. For
Dunlop, once preeminent in vehicle tyres, diversification
may have produced some new activities, but at the inordinate
cost of surrendering its core business area of tyres.	 Its
wheel production (discussed in 6.1) also seems on the brink
of collapse unless government money is forthcoming . These
automotive activities took years to build up; the value of
its smaller new activities cannot be judged until they have
withstood the test of com petition. Such a loss of world
leadership in automotive component sectors cannot be rated
as an effective strategy approach.
This is not to suggest such general strategy issues are
never important, only that effective strategy thinking
involves their bein g interpreted sensitively in context,.
Scale for example raises important strategic Issues for
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UK component manufacturers,	 particularly as	 business
competition becomes more international; but those who have
relied unduly on volume orientated approaches without
adequately taking into account their competitive context and
circumstances appear to have suffered disproportionately.
What many UK manufacturers have failed to do, in
comparison to overseas competitiors, is to reco gnise the
strate gic significance (in their particular context) of many
basic issues, particularly in the production area (as indeed
suggested by Mant).
6.94 OverBeaB	 optjtorØ emphasis on more specific
matters
Despite the popularisation of their strategies in more
dramatic terms (such as "laser beam marketin g"), Japanese
competitors in this sector shared with German manufacturers
an aversion to general strategy concepts, such as portfolio
approaches.	 This was partly because their business
environment	 and	 the structure of Japanese business
discouraged major moves such as diversification and
acquisitions. They therefore seemed to find it more
profitable to focus instead on basic issues and on
creatively developing their "own patch of grass", with a
longer term orientation. Their close relationshi ps with
vehicle manufacturers encouraged this and also induced an
almost engineering approach to planning.
Whereas strategic planning in UK companies tended to be
heavily financially orientated, in Japan the emphaBis seemed
to be on key market targets, expressed in quite simple
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terms.	 Attention then focused on fairly numerous "physical
aimed at bringing about improvements necessary to
attain these market targets.
	 One Japanese manufacturer's
approach was discussed in section 5.1g.	 Financial targets
(such as ROCE) and budgets were not ignored, but cost
reduction and profit projections appeared mainly derivative
and could be summed up fairly simply.
The contrasting situation in one UK company seemed to
epitomise the danger of applying the general approach to
strategy suggested by Argenti (1980) superficially.
	
Here
the process worked the opposite way round.	 Financial
targets were set and translated into more detailed (though
still largely financial) targets.
	 Fairly minor amendments
were made to existing operatin g plans.	 For example, If the
general view at the top was that cost levels would have to
be lower (to meet targets), this was transLated into oe
optimistic productivity assumptions, with an accompanying
budget amendment for Increased capital investment to pay for
more equi pment, creating the impression at the end of the
planning cycle of a coherent overall plan. Production issues
Inevitably received superficial treatment, whilst detailed
financial proj ections produced an illusory sense of control;
real control requires that competitors are matched on key
developments.
Asked to comment on their strategies, German executives
emphasised s pecific developments but were reluctant to make
general assertions.	 Like the Japanese they tended to avoid
standardisatlon, preferring to maintain a customised service
even where this involved additional costs (such as for
applications engineers).
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German companies were distinguished by the importance
attributed to technological developments - process design
arid development,	 product developments and applications
engineering and also "know-how". Some com panies felt their
Bum top tier of executive officers (often only about three
people) produced better communications with engineering
staff in design, development and production. One chief
executive felt cosy British boardrooms tended to lose touch
with technical developments critical in his industry : "Your
Boards don't have any designers on them at all, do they?".
The managerial structure also helped German chief executives
maintain ti ght communications with others such as salesmen.
One German chief executive held strong views against
over-theoretical approaches to business strategy. These he
felt often Involved misleadin g notions of optimisation.
This was illustrated by his company 's rejection of
optimisation ideas based on supposed trade-offs such as
between cost minimisation and quality . His philosophy which
extended to business strategy was based on the "80% rule".
By focusing on specific practical proposals and pushing
ahead as fast as possible, even If he eventually proved not
to be quite on the ri ght lines, he maintained crucial
advantages in decisiveness, implementation and flexibility.
The attitude seemed to reflect Ackoff's view (Ackoff, 1981)
that companies should prepare for a future that is anyway
uncertain by maintaining a flexible stance strategically.
It also seemed to reflect some of the paradoxes noted in
successful	 strategies by Peters and Waterman 	 (1984).
Resources could possibly be wasted thou gh.	 German brake
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linings companies interviewed held varying and quite
contradictory views on how to organise international
operations in the face of recent developments.
US companies were distinguished by a more "scientific"
approach to planning , and by an emphasis on top down control
systems monitoring progress a gainst such plans. There was
much greater interest in broader strategic issues such as
how to play the more global competitive game.
Yet their style appeared dynamic, positive, highly
competitive and refreshingly open.	 Many executives had
noted advances made by Japanese manufacturers and
acknowledged they had perhaps neglected developments in the
production area, where traditionally they had been strong.
They recognised the importance of developing employees'
potential. Employees too were prepared to make sacrifices
and US manufacturers seemed determined to fight their way
back to the number one position in the world.
Any generaljsatjon is dangerous. Yet the approaches
taken to strategy by UK component manufacturers broadly seem
to reflect the weakest feature in US approaches - their
tendency (in comparison with German and Japanese
manufacturers) to neglect critical production developments.
This is paralleled by a tendency to down-value the strategic
contribution of production personnel. 	 UK manufacturers
would do better to Imitate the real strengths of US
companies, their positiveness, their openness, their
willingness to make sacrifices when necessary, and their
decisive commitment to fighting their way back to the number
one position In the world.
	 In the absence of such
competitive commitment, American management techniques such
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as financial analysis, seem to have merely taught UK
manufacturers how to cOnt]ol a steady process of decline,
the costs of which have begizn to be reaped.
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7. Conclusions
7.1 Unprecedented decline reflects a strategic problem
By	 1983,	 UK automotive component	 manufacturers'
performances in terms of sales, output and profitability had
declined to an unprecedented extent.
	 Decline has been
remarkably comprehensive, affecting even automotive
component sectors displaying more attractive opportunities.
It has been sustained but cannot merely be explained by the
downturn in the business cycle: any natural improvement in
the immediate upturn will provide little leeway for further
British complacency. The issue cannot be discarded as merely
an automatic knock-on effect from the decline of the UK
vehicle manufacturers, though the competitive prospects of
su ppliers and their UK customers are highly interdependent;
rather,	 it reflects more fundamental problems in the
competitive capability of UK industry.
7.2 Business competition has become more international
A critical problem facing Britain is that the impact of
more international patterns of business competition, having
increased steadily over many years, has recently
intensified.
7.21 All manufacturers have been indirectly affected
Even those UK component suppliers who were shielded
against competition through direct trade, were severely
affected because UK vehicle manufacturer's, themselves under
intense pressure from international competition, had to
insist on a radically more competitive supplier service.
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Their changed bargaining position placed suppliers under
enormous pressure to comply.
7.22 Tha inoz'.aied impact of diract international.
competition, though influenced by logistical factors,
has largely been related to market and technological
opportunities associated with particular components.
The more direct impact of competition from overseas
automotive component companies, though generally increasing,
has varied according to the characteristics of particular
components. For components suited to international trade
and competition, such as bearings, the critical arena has
moved from being predominantly UK only twenty years ago, to
one in which there has already been intense pressure for
rationalisation within Europe, propelled in turn by yet more
global competitive pressures from Japan and to some extent
the USA.
In other areas, such as automotive instrumentation,
technological and market opportunities are now rapidly
breaking down what has been until the last five years an
essentially UK pattern of competition. A rapid transition to
real and effective competition within Europe is already
happening, and within five years global competition
including Japan and the USA will be gin to make a substantial
impact.
Some components' logistical characteristics or their
requirements for close customer liaison provide greater
protection against competition through overseas trade. Even
here multinational vehicle assemblers have pressured ay
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component companies into providing local manufacturing
support overseas. Thus although the radius of competition
between plants is still predominantly UK, that between
component companies has become more international. This has
happened with exhaust systems, where transport costs are
relatively high in relation to value added, though here the
impact of direct competition from beyond Europe is unlikely
to	 be significant for many years.	 This case	 also
illustrates that so long as market opportunities are
reasonably attractive, the absence of exceptionally high
levels of technology or volume advantages does not preclude
internationalisation.
However some areas characterised by fairly limited
market or technological opportunities have been partially
sheltered from direct international competition. This is
particularly so for more customerised products and where
production runs are low, such as lower volume automotive
forgings. In automotive for gings limited opportunities do
not yet j ustify companies acquiring overseas manufacturing
operations and trade is also inhibited by unfavourable
transport costs and some need for liaison with vehicle
manufacturers.	 Even so UK manufacturers cannot afford to
ignore	 the strategic implications of direct	 European
competition in volume automotive forging markets.
Perhaps	 the	 major	 factor	 inhibiting
internationalisation is close, often nationalistic ties
between UK suppliers and customers. A critical problem
facing UK component suppliers is that UK vehicle
manufacturers appear to be "opening up" to overseas
suppliers more rapidly than is the case elsewhere.	 Both
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need to give greater recognition to the dangers inherent in
this situation, and to their long term interdependence.
7.3 An unfavourable business environment in the UK has
damaged this industry's international competitiveness
and so contributed to declining performance.
An important factor largely outside the direct control
of either UK vehicle manufacturers or their suppliers has
been the exceptionally unfavourable UK business environment,
brought about primarily by upward pressure on real wage
levels. In the context of monetary and fiscal restraint.
and North Sea Oil revenues, such continued pressure resulted
in	 an	 unprecedented	 decline	 in	 this	 industry's
international cost position. The same pressure appears to
have	 substantially reduced profitability of	 both	 UK
component suppliers, and vehicle manufacturers. I suspect
businesses in the economy more generally also responded to
similar pressures by cutting back and that this contributed
to market decline, making matters worse.
Such economic choices in the UK have directly rendered
many UK automotive component manufacturers internationally
uncompetitive, thus effectively " pricing them out". Such an
unfavourable business environment has also inhibited and
discouraged manufacturers from pursuing more positive
strategies orientated to long term competitiveness.
7.ál UK	 Insensitivity to key contextual
issues has also contributed to competitive decline.
Much of the res ponsibility for competitive decline must
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however rest with top management in UK companies. Decline
reflects a weakness in their capability to recognise and
conceptualise the competitive threat, so as to respond
proactively and effectively,
	
rather than merely under
pressure of events.
7.fll Given more international patterns of direct competition
many UK companies placed undue reliance on volume
orientated strategies, especially since they were
weakly supported overseas.
A number of important UK companies appear to have
placed undue emphasis on benefits anticipated from greater
production volumes or from increased market share. This has
generally
	
been associated with industry consolidation,
rationalistion	 programmes	 and	 volume	 orientated
manufacturing processes.
In the case of components where volume benefits were
more pronounced, initial benefits such as cost reduction and
increased market power were gained at the expense of
entering into more direct competition with powerful overseas
companies, better supported to pursue similar benefits in an
international rather than a merely domestic context. As a
result of the increased impact of International competition
(particularly in volume market segments) and the relatively
weak position of most UK manufacturers overseas
(particularly in Europe), such volume orientated strategies
have generally degenerated into an extremely expensive
process of market retreat and retrenchment. In such
situations, UK manufacturers wishin g to pursue benefits
deriving from volume will generally require much more
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substantial international support: in the majority of cases
this would have to involve major international linkages,
often even at the cost of some loss in independence.
In	 some	 areas,	 such	 as	 automotive	 forgings,
technological and market opportunities have been 	 very
limited, and manufacturers have not found it worthwhile to
introduce international operations. 	 Yet even for these
products, whose hi gh transport costs would not seem to
encourage international trade, the impact of overseas
competition cannot now be ignored in volume market segments.
Many UK manufacturers here had anyway placed undue reliance
on volume orientated strategies. Volume benefits are
relatively low for these products and vehicle manufacturers'
chang ing needs have recently placed a greater premium on
flexibility . Problems were seriousl y worsened by increased
overseas competition, and the performances of these UK
manufacturers have been particularly poor.
Finally in the context of more international patterns
of business competition, many UK component companies have
tended to become too stretched on too many fronts; as a
result inadequate commitment has exacerbated problems in
core business activities.
Such problems reflect poorly on the ability of senior
management in the UK to respond sensitivel y and effectively
to the strategic implications of the issues of volume and of
the changing radius of competition.
7.U2 Inadequate attention to key production issues
More successful manufacturers, particularly those in
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Japan, recognised the strategic significance (for this
industry)	 of	 a number of basic	 production	 issues.
Management then pursued such matters demonstrating
unparalleled levels of commitment, recognising progress
could not be treated as "Iust an o perational matter".
In contrast many UK manufacturers have, over many
years, allowed themselves to fall substantially behind (from
a position well ahead) on basic manufacturing issues such as
productivity, quality, and the abilit y to respond flexibly
and efficiently in the context of vehicle customers' sharply
fluctuating demands (particularly in relation to "just-in-
time" developments). The result has been a substantial and
widening performance gap against international competitors.
Having gradually allowed such a competitive gap to
emerge, UK companies were totally vulnerable as
international competition intensified. Having effectively
lost control of the underlying com petitive situation, many
companies have only sustained financial control over a
sharply deteriorating situation through unprecedented
recourse to retrenchment at very considerable cost. Many
companies have also taken recourse to fairly defensive and
sometimes rather simplistic strategies.
If more basic issues, so critical to competitive
success in this particular industry, are not addressed with
appropriate commitment, continued "competitive retreat" In
the market place is inevitable, and a high price will
continue to be paid by everyone concerned.
The fact that senior management have found themselves
In the position of having to "fire-fight" such problems in
an operational time perspective, is itself a reflection of a
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deficiency in their strategic management capability. Unless
this is improved, such a situation will become chronic and
self-perpetuating.
7.i3 People iasuea
Progress in such production matters depends 	 upon
harnessing the positive and total commitment of personnel in
production areas.	 Managerial approaches (and the stance of
many unions) in the UK often appear to be a serious
stumbling block. Attitudes to employees (as, in the past.
to UK vehicle manufacturers) frequently have not been
orientated to achievin g a genuine two way partnership, so
actively pursued and evident in Germany and Japan.
Industrial relations have been allowed to see-saw, with
managers and unions takin g advantage of each other, as
bargaining positions altered with the economic cycle.
The difficulty of the situation-in the UK may have
necessitated unpalatable decisions on redundancies, but
industrial relations too is not an issue senior managment
can afford to "fire-fight". Management, too weak to grapple
with its own deficiencies, can generally still restore
temporary financial stabilit y through sufficientl y ruthless
resort to redundancies. There is now a need to restore
employees' trust that such a recourse will remain the last
possible resort, not only in a short term operational
perspective, but also in the context of the longer term
strate gic direction, which it is the function of senior
management to provide. It iB a failure in this latter sense
that appears to have precluded that degree of union and
298
employee loyalty and commitment necessary to reestablish
competitiveness in the longer term.
In the absence of a more participative atmosphere1
problems have been further compounded by senior management's
reluctance to delegate commensurate power and authority to
those lower down the organisation in the production area.
Until this organisational issue is rectified, efforts b y UK
staff departments will continue to be "swamped" by the sheer
volume of incremental changes re quired to catch up with
competitors.
What is required is for management to identif y much
more cogent and positive strategies,	 designed to re-
establish long term competitiveness. These, in the context
of a willingness by management and employee representatives
to form a new partnershi p , could reasonably command that
degree of commitment at all levels which will be necessary.
7.L&4 Weak x'elationehip with UK vehicle aBsemblex's
UK vehicle manufacturers also have	 a positive
coordinating role to play in such production developments
( particularly in respect to just-in-time arrangements).
This might have to involve production engineers, linked to
the procurement departments, going into suppliers'
factories, rather in the manner of supplier visits by Marks
and Spencers quality inspectors.	 In the long run, it is in
the interests of component suppliers to "open their doors"
to vehicle manufacturers.
The relative independence of UK component manufacturers
may once have been an advantage.	 Even until recently they
could achieve profitability levels above those or ux vehil
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manufacturers.	 This unusual situation has inevitably and
irreversibly changed. Both UK vehicle manufacturers and
their UK suppliers can now be seen to have both been damaged
by the relatively weak and distant relationship that has
existed between them.
	 The move to longer term contracts is
only one step along the way to a better partnership.
7.5 The threat to this industry's future Is urgent, and
demands a coordinated response from those responsible
at a number of leve].B.
The	 competitive situation of the UK automotive
components industry has declined to the point where much of
the industry's long term future is in j eopardy . The
situation continues to decline in relative terms against
progress achieved by international competitors.
The precise nature of the threat which this poses
depends on product characteristics. For products
particularly conducive to international trade, the whole
future of any substantial UK manufacturing capability is
potentially under threat, as is the case in automotive
bearings. UK vehicle manufacturers' requirements for many
other products (such as automotive exhaust systems) will
continue to be manufactured in the UK, but the survival of
many UK companies is potentially threatened in the context
of European rationalisation. There are also products, such
as automotive forgings ( particularly on smaller order runs),
sheltered both by factors unconducive to trade and bp
limited technological and marketing opportunities. Here the
threat to UK companies is less a matter of survival;	 ht
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unless the threat is countered we can expect a repetition of
dismal profitability, retrenchment and unemployment.
Any final solution will have to entail a more united
and committed response by all parties responsible for past
decline.
Government has the primary responsibility for ensuring
a more conducive business environment. Yet its room for
manoeuvre has been very seriously curtailed by the pressure
on real wage levels, this being primarily the responsibility
of trade union representatives and employees themselves in
the economy generally.
The literature from classical economics indicated
competitiveness could be improved, if people were prepared
to forego some present consumption so as to make room for
increased investment. Yet in Britain, by contrast
particularly with Japan and the USA, pressure on real wage
levels (which still shows little sign of abatement) has
curtailed profitability and so reduced not only growth in
the visible capital stock but also less visible ploughback
into activities (such as engineering) crucial for modern
business development.
Without contradictin g classical economists on this
point, Keynes clarified that willingness by employees to
allow real wage levels to fall, though a necessary condition
for recovery in output (and thereby employment), may not be
a sufficient condition in the context of unstable elements
inherent in modern economies. Recession though merely leads
to some short term intensification of competition, providing
the opportunity as well as the necessit y for companies to
carry throu gh adjustments, sometimes overdue.	 So long as
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the upturn does not result in the illusion that fundamental
competitive problems have vanished, encouraging further
complacency, benefits may even outweigh the costs. Yet the
effects of such Instabilit y in the economic system
(worldwide as well as UK), su perimposed on longer term
trends reflecting the competitive situation, do appear to
have been particularly marked in 1980. UK manufacturers
noted simultaneous contraction in almost all component
markets (not only automotive), and many were able to
pinpoint March/April as the period when "the bottom fell out
of the market".	 This suggests a step-down process of
contraction as envisaged in Keynes' multiplier effect, the
position evidently having been worsened by destockin g . The
original cause appears to have been the 1979 oil price hike,
removing aggregate demand and reducing real wage levels
compatible with full employment; but such sharp contraction
was exacerbated by the government's tighter fiscal and
monetary stance, In the context of North Sea Oil revenues
and continuing wage increases. If pressure on real wage
levels were finally to abate, there would be some leeway for
government to assist the demand situation, without the
benefit merely being destroyed by accelerated inflation.
Yet even these changes, though necessary, will not be
sufficient unless UK manufacturers themselves can improve
their strategic management capability and so respond with
greater competitive commitment than has been displayed in
the past. Any increased willin gness to make necessary
sacrifices will be wasted if manufacturers merely take
advantage of more conducive business conditions to let up
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their own efforts or to postpone difficult decisions.
It is management's task to be sensitive to changing
circumstances, so as to ensure resources are not dissipated
through wasteful endeavours or through neglecting issues of
key importance. A further responsibility is direction and
leadership. Yet nothin g can be achieved in the face of such
powerful competition without the support and unqualified
commitment of employees and their representatives.
The interdependence of automotive component suppliers
and vehicle manufacturers makes it also important that both
achieve a closer relationshi p in the future.	 UK vehicle
manufacturers need to play a key coordinating role in any
strategy aimed at reviving the competitiveness of UK vehicle
component manufacturers.
Despite underlying problems, immediate market prospects
for the industry must a gain improve as the next cyclical
upturn in the world vehicle industry takes place. There
appears to be no case for complacently abandoning yet
another maj or business sector; but neither is there any
scope for complacency if this sector's future is to be
safeguarded. The question is whether all parties in Britain
will respond, by altering past choices that have inevitablY
led to present problems, in time to meet future
intensification in international competition, in future
cyclical downturns.
7.6 This calls for a wider and more balanced understandinZ
of the issue of UK competitiveness.
Though	 often discussed in	 unidimensional	 terms,
competitiveness is not merely a problem of economics or of
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any other sin gle discipline The danger is that either the
problem is seen as someone else's or that other people's
contributions become downplayed.
There is also a danger of discussin g Britain's
competitive problems at too hi gh a level of abstraction.
Many of the key issues highlighted in this study are highly
contextual.	 They would not be the same for all economies,
for all business sectors, or for all businesses. General
principles, either of economic management at a macro level
or of financial analysis at the company level, tend to be
more orientated towards restorin g stability or control. Yet
control over the situation, against a backdrop of continued
decline, is not enough. 	 Unless key contextual matters are
dealt with, any sense of control enables people to defer
more intransigent matters.	 In the long term such "control"
will anyway prove illusory once competition inevitably
intensifies. What is needed is a better balance in
strategic thinking between general principles and more
practical, more "applied" analysis. This would also entail
a greater sense of purpose and competitive commitment. 	 The
principle of competitiveness cannot be allowed to be
submerged in analysis that is either too theoretical or so
detailed that it is impossible for people to see the way
forward.
However, whilst this study suggests more general
conclusions, it remains but a study of a single industry.
Yet the methodology used in this study, whereby wider
conclusions are drawn from selected product case studies, is
extendable.	 In conjunction with similar studies of other
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selected business sectors it would be possible to achieve
both a deeper and a broader understanding of this critical
issue.
Confronted with realities, the financial and human
costs, Britain must surely seek to escape the myopia which
has contributed to competitive decline over the best part of
a century.
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APPENDICES
Asn.ndiA. i
Qu.itioni to Manufacturer's agazdin Developments in the
Exhaust Systems Susiness
This is part of a more general study of developments
taking place	 in the business of vehicle 	 component
manufacture. The main focus here is parts for cars;
however as the intention is to obtain a broad view the
sector so attention is also given to commercial vehicles and
the aftermarket.	 Other vehicle components being examined
are:	 automotive ball and roller bearings,	 forgings,
automotive electronics and brake linings and pads.
A. Defining the business and looue of competition"
1.i) Which markets during the next five to ten years will be
the key to continued U.K.productiori of vehicle
silencers, firstly with respect to original equipment
(OE)	 market	 and secondly with respect	 to	 the
aftermarket (AM):
a) the UK
b) the EEC
c) Western Europe outside the EEC
d) the USA
e) the rest of the world.
Please assign rough proportions as to the degree of
their importance and add any comments.
ji)Would this situation have looked different in 1970?
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2.a) Which companies do you regard as your key competitors,
firstly with respect to the OE market and secondly the
AM?
b) What differences would there have been ten years ago?
c) What differences do you think there might be if you
were reassessing the situation in 1990?
3. Would the answers to questions 1 and 2 be appreciably
different for different sections of the vehicle parts
business eg car versus commercial vehicle parts? If so
please indicate where this would significantl y affect
answers given in 1 and 2.
B. Th. level of eoonomia operatione
iLa) Which costs do you consider as fixed rather than
variable for vehicle silencers and is this
significantly affected if a longer term view is taken?
b) What roughly are the proportions of fixed / total
costs?
c) Which types of employees represent fixed costs in the
sense that the numbers needed vary little with the
volume of sales, and what rough proportion would they
represent of total numbers?
d) What break even levels are typical in the vehicle
exhaust systems business?
e) How integrated is production? ie If sales fall of f, how
far is it possible to close down Just part of your
capacity (as happens in "modular" industries such as
forgings where individual presses can be closed down
without detriment to the rest of the operation) as
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opposed to a sudden decision on whether to close down a
complete	 factory	 (as tends to happen	 in more
"integrated" industries such as castings)?
5.a) Do you consider there is a minimum level of operations
for firms if they are going to be able to remain
competitive in the longer term?
b) If so how far is this determined by there being a
minimum level of either physical assets such as plant
and equipment or of "hidden assets" in terms of
engineering support (to keep up with innovation by
competitors in products or procesBes), of sales support
in terms of technical back up, negotiating power,
distribution outlets, maintainin g a full product range,
or funds to support sales penetration into fiercely
competitive markets?
c) Please add any other factor you consider important.
d) What sort of price advantage would a foreign competitor
need to break into your market (other things being
equal)? What would be the effect of a change of say 10%
In the exchan ge rate on your ability to either export
more or to resist more effectively imports	 from
overseas?
e) How important are scale economies in your industry?
ie If you were able to operate at twice the volume by
what proportion would your unit costs fall? More subtly
how important are experience curves? ie How far does
accumulated experience gradually enable you to bring
down unit costs?
308
C. Implio*tion. of t.ohnioal deva1opm•nt
6.a) What rough proportion of first your OE and second your
AM sales come from products introduced or significantly
changed in the last five years? Is the rate of new
products being developed in the industry increasing? If
so how far would your answer change if the question
were asked in five years time?
b) What major changes have occurred in production
processes in the last ten years?
c) Can you give an example of the sort of investments
needed to put in modern equipment or processes, and the
sort of cost or productivity gains which result.
d) How extensively has it been possible to employ more
modern equipment or processes, and what are the main
constraints on doing this?
e) In particular, what sort of production runs are needed
to justify more modern processes (eg the installation
of dedicated assembly equipment)? Does this mean that
minimum economic production runs can be expected to
change in the future, and have they changed since 1970?
f) Has technical innovation forced you to increase the
numbers of related "overhead" staff such as R&D or
engineering support in order to kee p with the technical
race, and if so to what extent?
7.a) Do you see a reduction in the future of the number of
companies surviving in the vehicle silencer business
(eg as a result of customer sourcing policies or
because of the level of operations necessary to remain
competitive)?
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b) What competitive strengths do you feel will hold the
key to companies surviving in thiB business area?
c) Who do you consider your key competitors, both
nationally and if appropriate overseas? Is there a
shift taking place possibly with overseas competitors
becoming more important than in the past?
d) How do these key competitors compare with yourselves on
the key competitive strengths identified in b)?
e) Of key competitors including yourselves who do you see
as having been "moving up the pack" and who "moving
down the pack", perhaps becoming more vulnerable in the
future?
D. Past policisi for offsetting decline in domestic vehicle
markets
8. What roughly is the value of your vehicle exhaust
systems turnover, first as regards cars and second
commercial vehicles, and what is the rough split
between OE and AM? What, again rou ghly, would these
have been in 1979 and in 1972 or alternatively as far
back as possible?
9.a) Between 1972 and 1981 UK car production fell from about
1.9m units to j ust under 1111 units, with commercial
vehicle production having also fallen very
substantially . Roughly by what proportions have car and
commercial vehicle silencer markets fallen first on the
OE side and second on the AM side.
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b) What is the rough sellin g price of a typical exhaust
system (complete system) and in the car and vehicle
markets, first with respect to the CE side and second
the AM?
c) How have prices moved over the last ten years and since
1979? eg How far have they kept up with inflation or
have they been squeezed by intensifying competition? If
the latter do you see the situation as likely to
Improve, stabilise or further intensify in the future?
In particular how far is the situation affected by
overseas competitors, especially in view of reports
that	 vehicle	 assemblers expect	 to	 increase
substantially their proportion of overseas parts?
1O.a) What has been the effect of the UK decline on your
numbers employed in the manufacture of vehicle exhaust
systems? If possible please give rough figures of
numbers employed on this now, about 1979 and some time
further back, preferably about 1972.
b) Could you please give a similar indication of the
effect on your own volume of business.
c) Would this be a reasonably accurate reflection of what
has been happening to productivity? How far do you
expect your level of productivity to alter in the
future, firstly if markets improve, secondly if they
remain at the present level and thirdl y
 if there Is
further decline?
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d) What has been the effect on your cost levels? How for
example does the gain through increased productivity
and other efficiency improvements compare with the more
detrimental effect of a declining market base?
e) What has been the effect of the UK decline on
profitability since 1972/3, eg on margins or return on
capital employed?
f) What has been the effect on investment in plant and
equipment etc?
g) What has been the effect on intan gible investments such
as R&D, training, design, sales effort or other subtle
Ways whereby firms can improve their future
competitiveness, eg taking lower or even negative
profits in order to build share in more attractive
markets?
11.a) What was your com pany 's original strategy for dealing
with the decline in the UK market (eg expanding
overseas, diversification, contractin g into best profit
areas)?
b) How far have such strate gies been successful in
offsetting the UK decline?
c) What problems have you encountered in attempting to
implement these strategies?
d) In particular, what problems have you encountered in
attempting to increase the proportion of overseas
sales? Is international trade restricted to only
certain parts of the business in practice?
e) In Western Europe do you find a significant proportion
of the business is firml y in the hands of domestic
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producers, perhaps by virtue of their proximity or
through close ties with customers? Have you had
experience of this bein g the case with any particular
customer.?
!. Future developments affectin g automotive business
12.a)With automotive customers increasin gly set up on an
International basis, the advent of the world car and
possibly world truck and with an increasin g number of
international agreements on j oint operations, eg on the
sourcing of major upstream components such as engines,
the	 industry
	
appears to be becoming	 more
internationalised. What has been the effect on your own
business and what do you think will be the effect on
your future activities?
b) What roughly do you feel will be the effect on the
volume of the vehicle exhaust system AM of any trend
towards longer life exhaust systems in five years time?
P. The role of government
13. In the last ten years do you consider that UK exhaust
system manufacturers have received as effective support
from government as have their competitors in Germany,
France. Italy, Japan, Spain or the USA? In what ways
could the government have better supported the vehicle
exhaust system business with hindsight, particularly
with respect to the followin g areas?
a) supporting the UK vehicle industry (eg through funds to
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b) supporting component suppliers through "local content"
agreements;
c) supporting UK industries in the context of
international competition through action to bring about
a more competitive exchange rate or possibly even
limited import controls?
d) investment incentives to assist component companies in
becoming more competitive?
e) supporting component companies through schemes to help
coordinate their activities to deal with common
problems (eg as happened in the castings industry)
perhaps to reduce widespread overcapacity?
14. What are your views on the government's policies as
regards franchising arrangements and how much effect do
you think they will have in practice?
15. If vehicle assembler's patents are deemed to extend to
basic engineering parts, enabling them to request
royalty payments from com ponent companies where this is
the case, how much effect will this have on your
company 's activities?
16. Are there any other issues relating to government
policies which you would wish to raise, and which of
the issues diBcussed do you feel are most im portant to
the success of your own business?
17. Do you expect import penetration to rise appreciably in
the next five years and do you expect any government
action, either at the national or at the EEC level, to
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give any measure of protection, eg against imports from
low cost areas of the world (with respect to vehicle
exhaust systems)?
18. A number of factors affect the competitiveness of
companies operating in the UK and affect how attractive
the UK is in general (e g as compared with, say,
operating in Spain) but which of the following do you
feel are most critical to success in your own business
area:
a) industrial costs eg labour, purchases and services such
as energy, rates etc.;
b) markets,eg size, growth and stability;
c) finance, eg profitability, risk, cost and availability
of finance;
d) infrastructure and convenience with respect to wider
international markets;
e) the labour force, eg industrial relations, working
practices and attitudes with respect to innovation;
f) UK organisationa]. performance in general.
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AoendiicA. 2
Int.rvi.w. with Japanaae Automotive Parti Manufacturari
A. Qu..tioni r'.latin to the formulation of itrategy.
1. What do you regard as your key company objectives?
a) return on capital employed (in terms of profit)
b) growth of sales
c) growth of market share
d) technical leadership
e) reputation for product quality
f) good company name
g) stable dividend policy
h) other
2. What time horizon do you use when planning for capital
investments? eg What pay-back period or other criterion
do you employ?
3. How involved are financial institutions in funding your
operation with respect to your long range plans?
LL Do you have a formal system of planning ahead, eg a five
year planning schedule?
Do you use any formal planning techniques such as the
analysis of "product portfolios", as put forward by the
Boston Consulting Group, for example?
5. Who is involved and what t ype of meetings do you have?
6. What developments do your plans cover and what are the
main types of information involved?
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7. How does your planning relate to those involved with
implementing them?
8. How stable is the business planning environment in
Japan, eg with respect to customer orderin g schedules?
. Qusitioni on apanaae man&ez'i and .nine.z'i.
1. Could you briefly outline typical career paths for:-
a) a foreman (is there more than one route to this
position?)
b) a senior foreman or superintendent
c) a department production manager
d) Chief Executive Officer and other board members
e) an engineer working in design
f) an accountant
g) a graduate entering the company
2. In particular,	 what training / qualifications are
involved?
3. What are typical annual salaries of the followin g staff?
a) an unskilled operator on entering the company
b) an average' unskilled operator
c) a skilled man on entering the company
d) an average skilled man
e) a foreman
f) a departmental production manager
h) a graduate engineer on enterin g the company
i) a graduate engineer aged 30 engaged in desi gn work
a typical accountant aged 30
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C, Qu.ition. on pz'oduotivitp with z•apsot to th. manufactuz'.
of automotiva ball and zollar' b.aringi*
1. What were your total sales of bearings in 1982?
2. -What was the total number of bearings produced?
3. Approximately, what % of sales value was the cost of
materials and parts procured from outside your
factories?
L. How many employees did you have on bearin gs manufacture?
5. Approximately, what was the total remuneration of these
employees, including on-costs?
6. Could you give any analsis of appoximately how many of
these employees there were in the main categories, for
example: direct/indirect, quality control or inspection,
maintenance, full time supervisory production
management, sales or marketing, and engineers in design,
in research and development, and in production related
departments.
7. What number of different types of bearings do you supply
and what are your main lines?
8. What "lot sizes" (ie the number of bearings produced
before it is necessary to chan ge over tooling ) are
typical for your main product lines?
* subsequently referred to as "bearings"
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9. At what exact stage do your company ' B activities start,
ie which operations are effectivel y sub-contracted, eg
with respect to initial machining, tool manufacture, use
of sub-contract labour on your own premises etc?
10. At what stage do your company's activities finish, ie do
they include operations such as warehousing and
distribution?
D. Questions on causes of international productivity
differentials.
1. In achieving high productivity how Important have been
the advantages of volume production,
a) through enabling larger "lot sizes"?
b) through facilitating the introduction of technological
innovation?
2. Approximately, what is the value of total "capital
employed" in bearings activities (ie total assets less
current liabilities)?
3. Could you give any rough indication of typical figures
for yearly investment/sales or R&D expenditure/sales
ratios?
Li. Could you give any illustrations of the numbers of
direct operators per machine or per assembly line?
5. Could you give any exaiples how long It takes to change
over particular machines, or assembly lines, from one
j ob to another?
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6. Typically how often does this occur, and how far have
you been able to improve changeover times in recent
years?
7. Roughly how many days stocks do you hold with res pect to
raw materials, "work in progress", and finished stock?
How far have you been able to improve this situation in
recent years?
8. In real terms, how much have sales and also productivity
grown in recent years?
9. What aspects of manufacturing policy have been most
important in improving productivity, eg productivity
-roups, quality circles, engineering applied to existing
equipment, improved work layouts, new equipment or
processes etc?
10. Does not increasing productivity lead to unemployment of
at least some part of your labour force, particularly as
sales growth begins to fall? What has happened to the
productivity of indirect workers in recent years? If
this is not a problem, what is your solution?
E. Queetiona with reapeot to business developments
affecting manufacturers of automotive beax'ings.
1. During the next 5 to 10 yearB, do you expect to see an
increase in your export/sales ratio, in international
tie-ups or joint ventures or in overseas production?
2. Would you expect other bearin g manufacturers (eg Koyo
Seiko) to do so?
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3. The introduction of integrated assembl y lines in the
late 1960's and early
 1970 ' s considerably altered the
pattern of competition among bearing manufacturers,
forcing rationalisation. What further developments might
have a similar impact on the pattern of competition?
lj. What will be their effect on the future pattern of
competition, eg would you expect such changes to lead to
further concentration within the industry or further
rationalisation?
5. If so, which companies worldwide, apart from your own,
do you see as in a strong position in such a situation
and which do you see as weaker and perhaps more likely
to lose market share?
6. In particular, what is your view of UK manufacturers?
7. What changes now taking place in the automotive
industries do you see as having most impact on the
business of manufacturin g automotive bearings?
8. What do you see as the main possible effects, eg would
you expect changes in assembler/supplier relationships,
or suppliers to have to structure their operations
differently in order to service changing customer needs?
9. What impact do you expect more flexible manufacturing
systems to have on the manufacture of automotive
bearings in the next 10 years, eg with respect to
assembly methods?
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ADDandix n.j
ChaneB in SKF'a Orgnisationa1 Structure in Response to
Int.zn&tion&li.ation ir tha Vehicle Industry
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Anix
Main Bsazj Positiona in Caz'* and Trucks
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Uain bearing positions
Layout
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ntionaI cars
3	 • 4	 5
1 Frori
 wheel, inner
2 Fror wheel, ouler
3 Waler pump
4 Dynamo or Allernator, fronl
5 Dynamo or Alternatnr. rear
6 Steering column
7 Sleer i ng worm, upper
8 Steering worm, lower
9 Steering nut
10 Clutth spigot
11 ClUtth withdrawal
12 ConStant mesh pinion
13 Main shaft. front
14 Mainshaft.rear
15 Lay Shaft,front
16 LayShaft, rear
17 Reverse idler
18 Overdrive:
19 Free wheel
20 Output shalt
21 Propeller shaft, support
22 Universal joints
23 Bevelpinion,front
24 Bevel pinion, rear
25 Differential.right	 -
26 Differential, left
27 Rear wheel
19	 18	 16	 17
/
' I	 /	
,,•
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Front wheel drive cars with engine behind transmission
1 Front wheel. inner
2 Front wheel. outer
3 Half shall. right
4 Half shaft, left
S Differential, right
6 Differential, left
7 Fan and Water pump, front
8 Fan and Waler pump, rear
9 Dynamo orAlternalor. front
10 Dynamo orAlternator, rear
11 Steering column
12 Steering worm, upper
13 Steering worm, lower
14 Clutch spigot
15 Clutctwithdrawal
16 Driveshaft.front
17 Driveshatt.rear
18 MainshaftorPinionfront
19 MainshaftorPinion,rear
20 Rearwheel.irtner
21 Rearwheel,outer
Conventional trucks (6x2)
10	 12	 11	 8	 7	 4	 5	 6
1 Front wheel, inner
2 Front wheel. oiter
3 Swivel pin
4 Water pump
5 Dynamo or Alternator, front
6 Dynamo or Alternator rear
7 Injection pump drive
8 Injection pump
9 Steering cOlumn
10 Steering worm upper
11 Steering worm, tower
12 Sleering lever arm
13 Clutch spigot
14 ClutCh withdrawal
15 Constant mesh pinion
16 Main shaft, front
17 Main shaft, rear
18 Lay shaft, front
19 Lay shalt, rear
20 Reverse iCIer
21 AuxIlIary transmission:
22 Drive shaft, front -
23 Drive shalt, rear
24 Main shaft, front
25 Main shaft, rear
26 Lay shaft
27 Universal joints
28 Propeller shaft, support
29 Rear axle:
30 Bevel pinion, front
31 Bevel pinion, rear
32 Bevel pinion, pilot
33 Differential, right
34 Differential. elI
35 Rear wheel, inner
36 Rear wheel, outer
37 TrailIng axle:
38 Spring shackle
39 BalanCe arm
40 Wheel. inner
41 Wheel. outer
9
18
9
37-
33°
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Th. Competitive Situation of Other Multinational Companiac'
B•ai'ing. Manufacturing Oparations in the UK
L31 Torrington
.31i Reorganisation in the face of international competition
International reorganisation has been a ma j or strategic
theme at Torrington and has had profound effects on their UK
operation. This almost led to the complete closure of UK
manufacturing operations, and employment at their main
Coventry plant was reduced from 700-800 a few years ago to
only about 300 now.
Even so, Torrington feel they may have reacted too
slowly to what is now considered a hi ghly international
pattern of competition. During the 1950's and 1960's their
manufacturing operations in Britain, Germany and the USA
were organised on a regional basis. Markets were divided up
"to avoid people stepping on each other's toes": both the
UK and Germany operated as separate profit centres and with
separate chief executives. Apart from receiving financial
data and decisions on investment funding, the parent company
was little involved in the running of the UK operation.
There was little even in the way of equipment and tooling
exchanges.
However, in the automotive area things began to change
towards the end of the 1960's and strains were beginning to
be manifest in this organisationa]. approach. The parent
company was slow in responding to the need for metrificatiori
in the German market and lost valuable ground to European
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competitors before bein g forced to react.
By the mid-1960'a working contacts were taking place
between the operations in the UK. Germany and the USA, with
research reports comparing productivity on specific items of
equipment for example. The Torrington International Sales
and Production Office (TISPO) was set up to provide
coordination within Europe.
In the early 1970's Ford, General Motors and Chrysler
began extending their international operations and
Torrin gton found it necessary to follow in support, setting
up plants in Brazil and Australia. With Australia's high
local content requirement, their Australian plant not only
secured their Vauxhall business but gave them the lion's
share of the remaining market at the expense of INA, their
maj or competitor.
In the mld-1970's a US General Manager was sent to
Europe to bring European operations closer together. A
computerised information centre was set up in Dusseldorf to
provide coordination. (Such moves tended to mirror those by
automotive customers: Ford in 1969 sacked a number of UK
staff involved and brought in sophisticated US information
and control systems).	 The imposition of US systems proved
to have Its limitations but this concept survived until
1981.
In 1980, a major change took place in the attitude of
the parent company to the need to coordinate international
operations. This arose partly from top level changes
brought about by Ingersoll Rand which had taken over in
about 1973. Recession and Intensifying competition created
the pressure for international rationalisatlon and a new
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General Manager was sent to Europe to carry this out and to
cut European losses.
US and European product designs and tooling were
further standardised. <>
In the meantime, the Dusseldorf office was closed down
with some of the functions transferred to UK and German
plants and a major campaign was mounted to cut overheads in
Europe. European coordination was replaced by everything
becoming linked on an international basis extending to the
US, for example: computer systems, sales engines,
warehousing and distribution. Modern communications have
been introduced with telefax playing a key role. Just as
with SKF, English has been made the common language for
business communications throughout the group,
	 even in
Brazil.
Such integration of international operations has
improved their service to vehicle producers. For example,
they have recently carried out a quotation for a set of
transmission bearings for General Motors Philippines. Five
years ago, the part of Torrington receiving the enquiry
would pick of f the items they were interested in, tick them
off on a list which would then be passed around the group,
with other operations ticking off what interested them on an
individual basis. This tended to result in overlapping
quotations. Now, whichever part of the group is approached
they can pull all the operations together, making rational
decisions and taking
 into account where similar items are
being made in the group. A com prehensive quote is then
submitted to the customer. Response time from enquiry to
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quotation has also been improved.
Commonality of equipment, particularly tooling , is
critical to this approach. For example, with the hi gh dollar
in 1982 they found the US parent plant could not compete on
price in the German market, and consequently tooling has
been	 transferred to Europe.	 This is also useful in
supporting vehicle companies affected by sudden changes in
local content requirements (e g Brazil) since the necessary
tooling can be moved quickly to the required plant location.
Finally in March 1983 the announcement was made of even
more extensive reorganisation internationall y .	 One new
division, Torrington International, will deal with all
operations outside North America. It will handle sales and
production aspects as well as finance.
B.312 Effect	 of	 internationaliBation on	 management
philosophy at operations level
To match International standards of competitiveness,
the group has increased Its emphasis on manufacturing
policy .	 They had noticed how the production function had
become down-graded compared withother staff functions In
their UK operation, so much so that few production people
appeared to progress to senior positions by comparison with
the USA.
There were two priorities If the UK operation was to
survive. These involved both management and employees
displaying greater commitment to keeping u p with standards
achieved elsewhere in the world.
First,	 productivity had to be brou ght into line
internationally. The UK was particularly weak in terms of
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overhead personnel such as people following j obs round from
department to department, many in peripheral menial jobs
transporting work around on almost a "bucket by bucket"
basis, and by US standards low productivity on clerical
tasks. Internationalisation, by allowing longer production
runs, provided opportunities for Improvement. It allowed
the Coventry plant to justify their first belt furnace In
December	 1982,	 making a si gnificant contribution 	 to
productivity.
Second, they had to move to more flexible and
res ponsive manufacturing systems, as lead times were forced
down by competition. A maj or campaign has been necessary to
reduce factory through time (the target is "four (weeks) on
the floor" compared with a present figure of about 3 months)
and also changeover times. This requires redesigning and re-
engineering tooling systems, with attention to the problem
of attaining accurate ad j ustments rapidly. New "black box
systems" have been installed in the UK. Such developments
have allowed them to bring down unit costs of a 100,000 per
month order to those of a former 500,000 per month order. To
appreciate the commercial significance of such developments
requires some idea of scale economies. <>
It is clear that this increased flexibility is becoming
an important demand from vehicle companies, particularly
Ford. Ford is now fully aware of substantial developments
made in this direction by Japanese suppliers, and
internationa].isation means Western suppliers have got to
keep up with manufacturing developments which have been
going on in Japan.
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Effective implementation of such change has forced them
to deal with wider issues. It has not Just been a Question
of isolated technical changes: the extent of the changes
required has been such as to demand the active contribution
of large numbers of personnel in the production area. This
in turn has demanded two things: first a change in the
industrial relations atmosphere; and second they have had to
review their skills in production, particularly with respect
to su pervisory management.
B.32 INA
B.32i. INA'a UK operation
INA's UK manufacturing operation was Bet U to support
the parent company's business with Ford UK in about 1959.
It is very much a "cats and dogs" plant aimed at giving the
UK marketing
 operation some local support, and at doing
short production runs which would be a nuisance to INA's
main factories. The value of UK manufactured products
represents more than a third of nominal INA UK sales but the
marketing o peration is relatively very important. In the UK
it employs about 300 people.
The manufacturing side in the UK is said by INA to be
running at a loss but like SKF's operation there is some
cushioning through its position within the group. Thus as
the UK real exchange rate rose in 1980, undermining the
international cost position of UK manufacturing operations,
this nevertheless increased the profitability of their UK
marketing operations. 	 Although in theory manufacturing has
to "stand on its own feet", there seems to be some
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cushioning so long as the UK operation as a whole remains
profitable, which has been the case.
Unlike SKF UK, INA's UK plant has to finance its own
investment from profits. For example, in 1981 they went
ahead with a CNC machine costin g about £90,000. <>
The immediate problem underl ying manufacturin g losses
is the decline in business volume in the UK <>. In their
case, market decline has been even more severe in non-
automotive applications.	 The textile machinery industry,
which accounted for about 1% of their business in 1969 has
since	 moved	 to countries with lower	 labour	 costs.
Dependence on the automotive industry is high at over LJ.O%
Their profitability has been affected less by the rise
in the real exchange rate, than by market contraction,
partly influenced by demand policy. Fallin g markets sharply
increased domestic competition as suppliers "fought over the
size of the remaining bone". As the bargaining position of
remaining customers strengthened, suppliers' profits were
reduced substantially.
At the same time they have been forced to provide more
precisely the type of service which customers ideally
prefer, even at some considerable cost. Customers are for
example pushing back onto suppliers the cost of stock
holding , recognising the advantages that Japanese vehicle
companies have In relation to this cost area. They have also
had to build warehousin g facilities at Sutton Coldfield in
addition to the plant at Lianelli to Im prove their delivery
Bervice. They are having to provide a merchandisin g service,
rather In the same way that Sainsburys require such services
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from their suppliers. Customer order schedules are being
severely chopped about. AB a result they find themselves
caught out carrying the cost of hi gh stock levels 1 in the
context of high "real" interest rates brought about by tight
government credit policy.
The decline of the attractiveness of UK manufacturing
was demonstrated in Febuary 1982 with a further cut in UK
employment of about 110%.
B.322 Needle bearings
The company 's core product area was originally needle
bearings. Competition has intensified in this area on a
worldwide basis. On the one hand SKF is trying to move in,
having allowed INA to get their foot in during the last war;
on the other hand there is competition from lower cost parts
of the world <>. INA are now very much structured on a
worldwide basis, with manufacturing plants in the UK at
Lianelli, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Brazil as well
as license arrangements with NTN of Japan.
Apart from the maj or world bearing manufacturers such
as SKF, their nearest rival and perhaps their key competitor
in needle bearings is Torrington, which is similarly set up.
Keen competition between them has to some extent stalemated
with INA ahead in Europe on market share and Torrington
ahead in the USA. <> There is also some division beween the
two on standards, with INA heavily in metric bearings which
are used in mainland Europe and Torririgton with its US base
carrying more imperial sized lines.
There is also a smaller French company, Nadella,
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specialising in needle bearings; however, it does not appear
to be strong enough to deal with the challenge of
internationalisin g competition and its position is reported
to be declining if not indeed collapsing. In fact, Nadella
is now up for sale <>: an interestin g example of the shake-
out which appears to be happening on an International basis
in this industry.
As competition has intensified in conditions of
worldwide over-capacity, so both INA and Torrington have
established coordination groups over their worldwide
operations to deal with the international requirements of
automotive customers 1 making use of modern communications
technology and sophisticated control systems. Like SKF. INA
point to the fact that their major automotive customer likes
suppliers to be able to switch production Internationally to
suit location changes by themselves, and they see this as
giving multinational 	 company suppliers	 an	 important
competitive advantage.	 The other factor they see as
important	 in this respect is having the back up of
production capacity in order to meet larger order
requirements, something which is becomin g an increasing
strain on the facilities of smaller nationally based
companies.
INA UK's needle bearing operations are now peripheral
to those of the main company. <>
Another factor affecting the volume of needle bearings
business in the UK has been the move by vehicle customers to
j oint ventures. The UK market is affected particularly by BL
going overseas for gearboxes which is a major area using
needle bearin gs. The parent group is in a position to offset
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this local loss of business with some gains elsewhere in the
world by virtue of its International structure, but this
does affect INA's UK manufacturing plant.
B.323 Speciali2t applications
The parent company has however been consistentl y moving
over to more specialist en gineering applications, using
bearings merely as part of complete assemblies. 	 This
represents a positive and quite conscious strategy of moving
up value added,	 based on the company's strength in
technological applications involving bearin gs. This is in
recognition of the fact that the standard catalogue bearings
business is being squeezed by the large groups at the top
end of the business, and by lower cost countries such as
Poland (F.L.T.) and Singapore (where SKF have recently set
up) coming in on the more basic technology.
About 15 years ago they developed an en gine fan belt
tensioner bearin g assembly, followed five years later by
hydraulic tappets, another specialist product. About nine
years ago they were the first to produce a self-aligning
clutch release bearing assembly. Modern developments are
more confidential, though steerin g joint applications appear
one likely area.
B.324 Clutch release bearings
The UK plant manufactures clutch release bearings. The
company 5e115 four variants to the UK market, but only one
type Is presently made in the UK. Given the reasonable
business volume in this area, the company has be gun to
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rationalise manufacture on an international basis, so that
the variants produced in the UK are also sold to the German
market. Previously , exports were not significant for UK
manufacturing operations, but for this product exports now
represent about 60%.
Further rationalisation is likel y. The customer's
purchasing department for this particular product tends to
prefer local production, but there are signs that the
customer is relaxing such conditions in other areas. <>
As	 international	 competition	 intensifies,	 the
technological	 back-up available to large multinational
companies is becoming increasin gly important. SKF is
reported in the industry to be coming out with a "string of
patents" aimed at restorin g the lead which INA's development
of the self aligning clutch release bearing took away some
years ago. This battle between INA and SKF is likel y to
intensify competition, putting considerable pressure on RH?.
B.325 Tensioner bearing assemblies
Tensioner bearing assemblies are essentially pressings
incorporating double row ball bearin gs. <>
Technology is important in competition. INA's dominant
position resulted from introducing a new pressed product
which replaced a more expensive cast product. SKF and
Torrington are the other important competitors in this area.
RH? seems to lack the technological and international
support to kee p up.
The company is acutely aware of comparisons with its
German operations, <>. As a result, its productivity in the
UK plant is now about L10% hi gher than in 1972. though it is
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still well behind Germany.
B.33 NSK
B.33i. NSK's UK manufacturing operation
NSK's manufacturin g operations in the UK started up in
early 1976, based on five bearing lines focused onto the
most popular metric sized ranges in the electrical bearings
segment. By 1978 they had moved up from single shift working
to full three shift workin g and in spring 1981 they
introduced four further bearin g lines, takin g production
capacity up from 21m bearin gs p.a. to 211.m. Further new lines
are planned for operation in about mid-198 Lt. <> Thus UK
production is expanding and would seem set to continue to do
so.
Employment has also has increased from 133 in 1977 to
230 people in 1982, excludin g a further 11.5 at head office
mainly in marketing and administration. They are involved in
some further recruitment and trainin g at the present time.
It would however be dangerous to interpret this as at
last a bri ght spot indicating that at least one situation of
bearings manufacture in the UK is competitive. The work
being carried out in the UK represents a proportion of
business won by the parent company in Japan and so
represents a transfer of production. NSK felt it necessary
to set up production in Europe to counter political problems
threatening to undermine its international position: eg the
European Court of Justice's anti-dumping actions and Italy's
refusal to take Japanese bearings unless sourced within the
EEC. Approximately 80% of the UK plant's output is for
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export, mainly to mainland Europe (though such exports still
constitute only about 30% of NSK sales to Europe).
Up to 1979, UK accounts showed they were still making
losses, although this includes marketin g operations. Since
then it is likely that the financial position on UK
manufacturing has deteriorated and the company feels the UK
has become a harsh environment from which to do business.
They have been affected to some extent by the UK downturn
and output is down compared with a capacity <>. Modern
volume orientated plants, such as their own, are the ones
hardest hit by market contraction.	 Whilst partly sheltered
by their high export ratio, they have been particularly
vulnerable to the rise in the real sterlin g exchange rate.
They are perhaps cushioned by the parent group since the
sales subsidiary in mainland Europe has been Instructed to
accept price levels on a sterling basis.
The underlying financial situation of 	 the UK
manufacturing operation seems to have deteriorated further
since 1979. The view at NSK UK seems to be that support for
expansion in such circumstances reflects a difference in the
Japanese approach to business:	 it Is unlikely they would
have received such support on commercial criteria typical in
Europe or the USA.
The parent company is aided by fundin g support from its
link with the Fu j i Bank and considerable emphasis is placed
on the longer term market position.	 Each new investment is
judged in terms of the role it plays with respect to market
share targets, technical position etc. There are no simple
rules but if the "position is right" they are even prepared
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to consider projects with pay back periods occasionall y as
long as 20 years.
Japanese objectives place great store on increasing
output levels, which of course becomes more important in the
context	 of the parent company's
	
lifetime employment
policies.	 To	 have to reduce output levels would be
considered as a "slap in the face".	 Disruptions	 to
manufacturing operations are frowned on and they are
prepared to ride situations which would be considered non-
commercial by Western standards. The reason they can do this
is that this commitment to competitiveness, particularly
with respect to technology and manufacturing operations,
underlies their hi gh market share position which in turn
generates	 the necessary cash	 flow and	 ultimately
profitability.
Des pite difficult economic conditions, NSK's experience
of manufacturing in the UK seems to have gone quite well
from their viewpoint. They are particularly concerned about
labour relations and their experience here has been good.
The policy has been to recruit extremely young workers whose
attitudes are thought to have had less chance to harden.
Their management philosophy in dealin g with employees is
also radically different from Western approaches.
Productivity is said by their UK mana ging director to
be as good if not better than Japanese plants. The parent
company points out though that overseas plants are highly
focused onto mass production lines whereas Japanese plants
handle an enormous variety of bearings, and the UK plant is
extremely modern. However, the parent company do not appear
to feel they have any productivity problem operating from
3"
the UK.
B.332 The parent company 's strategy
NSK's emphasis in Europe has been on the electrical
bearin gs segment, so only a small proportion is automotive.
These applications are principally on alternators and
starter motors, and also on windscreen wiper motors. The
segment is interestin g as it exemplifies globalisation of
competition already takin g place in volume segments.
In a global perspective, NSK's strategy is coherent.
From a strong base as the market leader in Japan, NSK
launched its attack on world markets about 20 years ago,
(with a clear target <> stated in terms of world market
share). Its resources were focused onto just a few very
high volume metric sized radial ball bearings for electrical
markets.	 It had recognised that the change from batch to
continuous	 line production methods created a market
opportunity,
	
justifying a more global	 pattern	 of
competition. They were assisted by volume benefits,w hich
were particularly high in this sector. Transport costs were
low and this market was accessible through Europe's well
developed and "open" distribution network. 	 Having slightly
expanded their product line, they now dominate the European
electrical	 bearing market.	 Many European companies,
includin g REP, have been squeezed out altogether.
Its initialS approaches to UK customers were "laughed
off"	 by UK manufacturers, 	 in view of very evident
shortcomings on quality. 	 As UK manufacturers remained
complacent, NSK took recourse to expensive proceBses such as
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extensive honing operations to meet quality requirements,
whilst	 still	 (to	 Quote	 one	 European	 competitor)
"slaughtering the price". 	 Even so penetration took several
years, and some willingness to sustain initial losses. The
Japanese fundin g advantage was important at this stage. The
same rather envious competitor commented, "Our shareholders
could never afford the luxury of following that line". NSK,
however, aggressively exploited experience effects, forcing
costs down, and as was shown in Table 25 they have been
fairly profitable.
Trade restrictions have forced them to support their
market position with overseas manufacturin g operations. EEC
anti-dumping actions prompted their establishment of the UK
factory. They cite the 80% local content requirement in the
Australian market and they are particularly concerned by the
possibility of similar moves by US Congress. They have now
established a US manufacturing facilit y , in addition to
their Brazilian plant.
NSK expect to exploit new methods of production in the
future, both by further development of dedicated production
lines (aimed at volume segments) and through increasin g the
flexibility of manufacturin g systems, which would enable
them to attack lower volume business. Like other large
bearing companies, NSK see such developments as "raising the
stakes" for participants. Larger producers in this capital
intensive business are hungry for volume, and smaller or
weaker companies may be squeezed out as greater
international concentration takes place. <>
The question, from an automotive viewpoint, is whether
NSK, in expanding out of its present electrical segment,
3146
will be forced to turn its attention to major automotive
bearing markets, these representing the next most volume
orientated bearing markets.
The new production lines at their UK plant are not
however orientated to OE automotive markets. NSK's only
automotive impact in the short term will be in terms of
further involvement in the indirect market, bearings
supplied to other automotive components such as starter
motors.
B.3L Fafnir
The	 parent	 group	 has	 been	 affected	 by
internationalisation. Hit hard by more powerful
international competitors such as SKF and the Japanese, it
has been forced to retreat from the volume bearing markets,
particularly the electrical bearings segment,	 and	 to
retrench onto two specialist areas in which it still has a
tenable strategic position in world terms: aerospace
applications and specialist machine tool high precision
bearings.
The decline of its UK manufacturin g subsidiary reflects
this change. In 1979 the company was finall y forced to
acknowledge defeat in the standard bearin gs segment, with
the closure of its Wolverhampton plant which involved 650
redundancies. This leaves the company with only one UK plant
at Wednesford, mainly on the specialised bearings referred
to above.
This company is not considered in great detail since
347
electrical bearings are only a minor automotive application,
and Fafnir's other applications are even less automotive
related.	 It will be noted however that this somewhat
marginal case (from the viewpoint of automotive
applications) does bear out two major themes in this
section, illustrating the effect of the internationalisation
of competition and of the decline of the UK competitive
position in this context.
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Main Forging Positions in C4ø and Trucks
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NOMENCLATURE: TERMS USED
The two following diagrams show, for passenger cars and commercial
vehicles, the components mentioned in the report in their positions
in the vehicle. They are listed below according to the number on
the diagram.
PASSENGER CARS:
1. Stub AxLe
2. Suspension Arms
3. Wheel Hub
4. Gear Cluster
5. Gear
6. Constant Velocity Joint (see descriptions of joint types)
7. Crankshaft
8. Camshaft
9. Cam Followers
10. Camshaft Pinion
11. Axle Shaft
12. Connecting Rods (Conn-Rods)
COMMERCIAL VEHICLES
1. Chassis Brackets
2. Crown Wheel
3. Wheel Hub (Driving)
4. Differential Pinions
5. Universal Joints
6. Gear
7. Gear Cluster
8. Crankshaft
9. Connecting Rod
10. Front Hub
11. Valve Rockers
Axle Beam
Stub Axle 3 See Front Axle Diagram
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ADDandix C.2
Forging
	Parformana•
Detailed analysis of saleB and profit performances of
forging companies over the last seven years is given in
Tables C.2j. and C.22 below.
	 Companies are ordered by size,
in terms of turnover, at the start of the period.	 The few
companies identified as carrying out no automotive work are
segregated.	 In order to gain an understanding of the
competitive situation among UK manufacturers in such a
fragmented industry, 36 automotive for ging manufacturers
with continuous fi gures are analysed in thiB section.
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Tab1e_C	 Market Performances
Sales
76/77
£000
Price index	 59.45
Group I
Burton-Deling '	 11166
Fix'th Derihon	 10437
Bloxwlch Lock
	 7048
Birfield Extr'	 6705
S.Wales Forge'	 5629
Omes-Faulkners	 5308
Group II
John Stokes	 5230
Head Wrightson	 5065
Stampings All'
	
11-492
Anslow	 4475
Dudley Drop	 4071
Hughes-Johnson	 3157
Group III
George Morgan	 2983
Blackheath	 2917
Premier Stpgs	 2800
James Dickie	 2791
Bescot Drop 2773
Armstrong Stevens2753
Group IV
Brockhouse	 2741
Thos. Smith	 2267
T. Williams	 2158
Kimber Die	 1772
Ha11adajs	 1770
Clydesdale	 1647
Group V
Light Metal	 1618
Arthur Edge	 1496
Perksori	 1252
Brit' & Midland 1210
Holden & Hayes	 1175
J & S Eyres	 1074
Group VI
Criterion	 900
Abbey Drop	 798
T.G. Lilleyman	 730
Shaw-Dudley
	 539
Scaffolding & Sup*484
W.H. Tildesley	 11-53
Non automotive forgers:
Cameron Iron	 37956
George, Turton'	 5023
Sales Sales Growth Growth Growth
	
80/81	 82/8	 76/80	 80/82	 76/82
£000	 £000	 %p.a.	 %p. a.	 %p. a.
	
100.0	 120.1
	
12389
	
11873
	
-8.5	 -10.1	 -7.9
	
20661	 15054	 4.11-	 -19.7	 -4.8
	
11145
	
12699
	
-1.5	 -2.6	 -1.8
	
8853	 8969	 -5.11-	 -2. 2	 -5.6
	
4217
	
3517 -13.9	 -15. 3	 -11.5
	
7391	 11-934	 -4.3	 -22.2	 -9.0
	
5398
	 11-7011-	
-9.7	 -13.7	 -9.3
	
5072	 5212 -10.1	 -7.2	 -8.2
	
5396	 3769	 -7.1	 -20.9	 -9.7
	
6371	 6099	 -3.8	 -10. 1	 -5.4
	
7239	 6842	 1.4	 -10.7	 -2.8
	
5846	 511-08	 2.5	 -11. 5	 -2.5
	
4543	 311-36	 -2.11-	 -18.5	 -7.2
	
3241	 1851	 -8.5	 -26.2	 -11.4
	
6687	 6943	 10.5	 -6.8	 3.8
	
4886	 4056	 1.0	 -15. 11-	 -4.7
	
3071	 2936	 -8.5	 -10.2	 -7.9
	
4983	 *4376	 1.9	 *-13. 4
	
4715	 4438	 0.1	 -10.8	 -3.3
	
3618	 3186	 -1.3	 -13.3	 -5.1
	
2826	 2850	
-5.5	 -8.0	 -5.8
	
2496	 2295	 -4.1	 -11.7	 -6.0
	
2135	 2031	 -7.1	 -10.4	 -7.2
	
3116	 2226	 3.1	 -20.3	 -5.5
	
3553	 3315	 7.6	 -11. 2	 0.2
	
1030	 2805	 -111.8
	
63.4	 -1.2
	279 	 2925	 8.2	 -6.4	 2.6
	1861 -	 1953	 -2.1	 -6.4	
-3.4
	
2019	 1818	 0.1	 -12.5	
-3.9
	
1788	 1451	 0.3	 -16.2	
-5.5
	
1675
	
1280	 2.7
	
-18.2	 -4.9
	
850	 812	 -9.2	 -10.2	 -8.3
	
858	 1160	
-7.5	 -6.3	 -3.6
	
797	 891	 -3.0	 -3.5	 -3.0
	
1285
	
1338	 *14.5
	
-6.7
	
*6.1
	
899
	
988	 -8.6	 -4.2	 1.3
	
7311-13 113338	 3.7	 14.3	 8.0
7329	 73711-	 -3.3	 -8.1.	 -11.6
* This 76/77 sales figure has had to be based on that for 77/78.
- Note: Growth rates have been calculated by first taking out
inflation, based on the wholesale price Index, and
then calculating % growth p.a. on a simple arithmetic
basis.
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-9.6
32.6
8.0
9.2
-13.0
-24.3
-0.1
-2.5
-22.7
2.7
-10.0
55.7
-8.1
-13.5
21.7
3.5
-15.9
-8.6
-27.1
-10. 2
-62.8
-1.8
-30.8
12. 0
27.0
-12.7
3.8
8.5
1.1
-2. 7
25.3
-28.3
-1.4
-98. 6
5.4
6.3
5.9
22. 9
25.8
9.6
43.2
9.3
14.2
-11.7
6.5
36.0
16.7
35.3
13.7
1.6
27.5
19.6
0.7
30.0
15.6
8.8
23.0
22.3
8.8
23.8
17.1
28.4
9.4
29. 3
33.7
19.8
37.1
0.3
14.1
24.1
18.5
10.1
-0.8
27.1
18.2
9.4
19.1
-5.1
8.1
-7.8
-6.0
21.7
5.3
44.1
U . Li.
-4.8
25.0
12.7
-6.4
13.4
-2.7
0.7
-13.8
12. 0
-8.2
18.7
21.4
10.8
7.0
20.4
19.8
10.2
32.1
-12.0
7.4
-28.5
12.9
8.5
-8.8
22.3
16.4
3.8
7.6
-14.9
-1.2
-16.0
-15.7
16.3
2.5
41.6
-2.8
-16.2
28.8
8.0
-14.3
9.8
-6.0
-4. Ii.
-19.6
6.0
-15.4
13.2
21.2
9.6
9.6
17.0
15.9
11.7
27.2
-20.3
3.8
-31. 5
19.0
7.2
26
3
11
18
9
29
20
32
30
5
23
1
24
28
4
ill
31
12
27
25
35
15
33
10
6
16
22
7
8
17
2
34
21
36
13
19
27
11.
8
20
16
29
23
32
31
9
22
1
24
33
2
15
28
12
26
25
34
18
30
11
5
13
14
7
10
19
3
:35
21
36
6
17
Table_C. 22 Profitabilit y performances
80/83	 QJB3 76/7Q 76/83. 76/83 76/83 76/83
ROCE ROCE ROCE ROCE ROCE ROCE+ PERF
Rank	 y.r ii r	 y	 Rank Growth Rffi
Group I
Burton-Delin g ' 23
Firth Derihon	 2
Bloxwich Lock
	 9
Birfield Extr' 7
S.Wales Forge' 27
Omes Faulkner 31
Group II
John Stokes 16
Head Wrightson 19
Stanipings All' 30
Anslow	 14
Dudley Drop	 24
Hughes-Johnson	 1
Group III
George Morgan 21
Blackheath 28
Premier Stamp' 5
Janies Dickie
	 13
Bescot Drop 29
Armstrong Stev' 22
Group IV
Brockhouse	 32
Thos. Smith	 25
T. Williams	 35
Kimber Die	 18
Halladays	 34
Clydesdale	 6
Group V
Li ght Metal	 3
Arthur Edge	 26
Perkson 12
Brit' & Midland 8
Holden & Hayes 15
J&SEyres	 20
Group VI
Criterion	 4
Abbey Drop	 33
T.G. Lilleyman 17
Shaw-Dudley 36
Scaffolding .. 11
W.H. Tildesley 10
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ADDendix C.
Performances Achieved by Competing Companies
Companies below are in descending order of size, based
on sales turnover at the start of the seven year period in
1976/77. 1976/77 refers to figures submitted in the
accounting period ending between April 1976 and April 1977,
and data has been taken from ICC Business Ratio reports and
has therefore been ad j usted to achieve a greater degree of
comparability.
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Table C.31 Return on Capital Employed (Pre-tax)
Comoanv	 B2/8	 81/82
GKN Forgings	 4.3	
-0.2
Cameron Iron
	 33.5	 39.5
Dan' Doncaster'?-lO.l	 "9.1
Bur'ton-Deling' -20.2
	
-6.2
Firth Derihon	 10.3	 32.2
Bloxwich Lock
	
5.1	 9.0
Birfield Extr'
	
5.4	 14.2
S.Wales Forge' -30.0 	 154
Omes-Faulkners*-65. 8 	
-99
John Stokes	 *-312	 4.8
Head Wrightson -7.6	 2.3
George,Turton' -87.6
	 28.2
Stampings All' -34.7 -28.3
Anslow	 -2.1	 85
Dudley Drop	 *-4.2 -21.6
Hughes-Johnson *51.7
	 60.6
George Morgan	
-2.4 -20.0
Blackheath	 -11.0	 0.5
Premier Stamp' *23 .6
 17.2
James Dickie	 •9	 1.4
Bescot Drop	 *-21.1	 79
Armstrong...	 ?-8.6
Brockhouse	 -29.5
	 337
Thos. Smith	
-4.3 -23.8
T. Williams *-156.7 -27.0
Kimber Die	 8.2 -16.8
Halladays
	 -35.5 -23.9
Clydesdale	 4.9	 11.7
Light Metal	 13.0	 380
Arthur Edge	 14.4 -17.9
Perkeon	 0.0	
-5.0
Brit' & Midland 15.3
	
-7.1
Holden & Hayes 0.3 -0.5
3 & S Eyres	
-24.2	 5.3
Criterion	 28.0	 14,7
Abbey Drop	
-26.4 -27.4
T.G. Lilleyman	 2.0	 0.9
Shaw-Dudley ?-167. 0?-167.o
Scaffolding ... 
-0.3	 0.3
W.H. Tildesley	 3.4	 5,3
80/81 7Q/80
-12.3 *_37,O
	
32.1	 20.8
	
?16.6	 14.4
	
-2.5	
-0.6
	
55.3	 26.3
	
9.9	 19.3
	
8.0	
-3.8
	
-24.3	 45.2
	
2.9	 9.0
	
26.1	 *6.2
-2.1 -20.4
	
-15.7
	
-9.2
-5.1
	
1.6	 21.5
	
-4.1	 8.254.9
	
-1.9	 6.6
-29.9 *_2.4
24.3 *28.6
10.8
-34.6
	
-14.8	 23.8
	
-18.1	 5.1
	
-2.5	
-0.11.
-11.6 *19.6
	
3.2	 20.5
	
-33.0	 *9.4
	
19.3
	 25.7
	
30.0	 12.7
-34.6 *13.5
16.4 ?11.2
	
17.11.	 17.5
	
3.6	 26.3
	
10.9	 14.9
	
33.3	 43.1
-31.2 -17.8
	
-7.1	 15.11.
	
38.2	 51.9
	
16.2	 41.1
	
10.1	 111.3
78 /7q
*8.3
17.0
13.5
1.0
25 . 0
24. 2
21.4
26.9
6.2
7.11
-26.9
1.8
13.
23.4
19.6
29.9
17.8
-20.1
29.5
16.6
-11.0
55.4
23.
10.5
26.7
-0.6
7.7
28.9
11.5
211.3
5.9
32.11
36.3
15.6
50.1
5.5
20.2
27.8
36.9
4.0
77/78
*3,2
19.7
0.6
3.5
20.4
30.7
7.2
46.6
8.9
16.3
-4.7
10.3
10.4
26.6
20.9
33.5
17.1
8.7
29.8
22.2
2.5
17.2
19.4
12.8
22.7
30.1
8.1
20.9
20.3
36.2
2.5
38.7
11.5.6
13.9
43.0
8.6
2.3
14.2
-14.8
13.11
76/77
*19.8
*23.0
2.9
19.7
20.0
29.2
13.6
511.1
13.0
27.1
5.0
9.0
7.8
72.7
18.2
39.9
13.11
20.11
22. 1
28.7
8.8
23.6
14.5
12.3
23.0
39.3
10.1
19.6
24.1
39.6
17.9
28.8
26.8
34.9
12.3
5.0
18.4
*2,7
?11. 0
8.8
Note: As far as possible all figures have been taken
directly from ICC Business Ratio reports to ensure
consistency. Figures prefixed with * are gaps in ICC
figures, filled using data from Com panies House,
taking care as far as possible to keep in line with
ICC conventions. In a small number of cases, a
continuous run of figures was destroyed by zust one
figure missing and figures inserted ( prefixed with ?)
represent the average of results for the two nearest
years.	 Shaw-Dud].ey's capital employed went negative
in 81/82,	 o figures for both 81/82 and 82/83 are
given as averages over the two periods. Finally,
figures for the most recent three years for Daniel
Doncaster have been inserted using figures for the
holding company INCO.
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82-83
-10.1
-8.5
7.2
8.3
21.3
32.7
-13. 3
0.9
1.0
21.9
3.0
1.9
15.6
2.1
6.6
21.9
0.7
81-82
9.1
-22. 1
13.5
-3.7
19.5
211. 8
-6.5
20. 2
0.3
16.7
0.8
15.9
11.8
2.3
211.7
3.1
-18.3
43.8
5.2
80-81
15.6
-25.1
15. 4
9.9
29.0
36.0
-7.1
26.9
5.11.
-1.6
1.6
32.7
11.3
1.1
35.5
3.9
-111.7
96.9
-5.6
79-80	 8-79 77-78 76-77
6.1
8.7
6.5
10.3
-7.3
9.2
Taken over
14.3
11.6
-92.5
-37.6
-70.3 -1119.9
18.6
18.6
33.9
	
5.2	 7.8	 6.7
	
5.4	 21.1	 111..L1.
-0.1
15.1
7.0
15.2
-111.9
8.5
9.8
-9.0
23.6
10.8
-81.2
-80.8
-17.9
-17.7
1.6
20.4
-42.3
-56.1
26.6
23.0
27.1
11.7
12.5
19.8
16.0
-2.7
11.9
33.7
-4.3
22. 2
15.3
19.8
-22.9
111.6
23.8
3.1
23.0
9.5
-61.2
22.4
17.0
9.5
15.5
5.9
23.8
16.2
1.3
15.3
42.2
11.9
5.9
18.1
6.4
-9.0
17.1
28.8
35.2
3.0
-32.5
32.11
411.0
25.0
Table_C.32 ROCE fi gures for companies without continuous
fi gures for full 7 years
Inco
River Don
HDA
John Folkes
Woodhouse &..
Ontario Corp
Beigrave
Thornton
Bretta
Fred' Greenwood
Eva Bros
Mills Bros
Aerocoldform
Epag
Earisdon Comp'
Maurice Darby
J. Reeside
John Perks
GKN Axles
Garringtons
Kirkstall Forge
Smethwick Drop
GKN Shardlow
Scot' Stampings
Smith Clayton
J. Shakespeare
Norbrit-Pick'
A.J. Vaughan
Portway
Valor Partridge
Vaughan Bros
Platte
Smiths
George Dyke
Leslie & Co
Edmund-Vaughan
3. Stanley
S.A. Harris
Victoria Drop
Francis Bros
Dan' Doncaster
Scaffolding
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32.29
35.68
39.59
46.95
56.22
61.96
68.03
76.82
88.63
100.00
Andix C.1&
C.41 Forgings industry wage rate indices: (local currencies)
Table_C,43i. Average annual increases, %
1972
1973
19711
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Germanw
11. 00
9.50
15.93
13.80
8.50
6.20
6.00
4.30
10.00
France
10. 50
111.90
20.00
7.70
15.00
13.00
14.20
12.00
13.50
Sweden
11.60*
12.60
12.00
10. 00
9.90
4.90
7.00
8.00
9.00
ItalY
2.86*
22. 10*
39. 80*
15.00
9.00*
22. 00
15.00
19.00
18.10
UK
10.5
10.92
18.60
19.80
10.20
9.80
12.90
15.110
12.80
* estimates based on wholesale price index
Source: NADFS
Table C. 1112 Derived indices, 1980=100
Germany
 France	 Sweden	 Italy
1971	 1111.50	 32.29
	
47.46*
	 23.04*
1972	 49.40	 35.69	 49.64	 23.70*
1973	 54.07	 41.02	 55.91	 28.93*
19711	 62.71	 49.22	 62.60	 40.45*
1975	 71.38	 53.00	 68.87
	
46.52*
1976	 77.1111	 60.95
	 75.70
	
50.72
1977	 82.211	 68.86	 79.110	 61.87
1978	 87.18	 78.65
	
811.95	 71.16
1979	 90.92	 88.08	 91.74	 84.67
19 80	 100.00	 100.00	 100.00	 100.00
* estimates based on wholesale price index
ble C.413 Average sterling value
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
8.515
7.987
6.540
6.0119
5.111169
4.552
/1.05011
3.850
3. 8875
/1.2183
11
13.1166
12.635
10.899
11.246
9.5003
8.6081
8.5733
8.611116
9.0265
9.8217
Swe. J
12.1171
11.920
10.6711
10. 374
9.910
7.870
7.8332
8.663
9.0919
9. 8266
11 ra
1510.8
1461.7
11126.4
1521.9
1446.7
1497.2
1540.112
1627.79
1762./49
1992.36
Source: CSO Annual Abstract
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Fian ce
72.9
77.8
93.4
91.6
97.5
112. 2
116.0
116.3
108.1
100.0
Sweden
115.8
114.7
130.0
126.3
121.5
152.6
146.4
125.4
111.9
100. 0
Italw
94.1
90.5
102.1
112.8
1111.0
108.9
117.6
113.4
108.0
100. 0
C.2	 stioi of ovezusas foz' gini wsg. rst.i to UK foz'iing
ware at• oompar.d to 1980 ratios
anrnle of method:
197:1-	 1980
Wage rate indices for Germany
(local currency)	 44.50	 100
Wage rate indices for UK
(local currency )	 32.29	 100
Sterling value in DM	 8.515	 4.2183
Rate of German wages/UK wages
in 1971 as % of 1980 ratio	 = 4.2183 X 44.50 X 100
8.515	 32.29
68.2%
This implies that German wage rates were proportionately
less competitive against UK rates in 1971 compared with the
situation in 1980.
Table C.42
man
1971	 68.2
1972	 73.0
1973	 88.0
1974	 93.0
1975	 98.2
197 6	115.7
1977	 125•7
1978	 124.2
1979	 iil.2
1980	 100.0
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A.ndixC. 3
Further Details on Productivity Comparisons for Automotive
Forging Companies
C.51 Differences in output mix
71% of <UKF1's> forgjngs are supplied for heavier
applications such as commercial vehicles and tractors, with
forging weights typically In the range 18-90kg. Lighter
forgings for applications such as cars weigh from about 3-
5.5kg , up to perhaps 9kg .	 <GF1> supplies a range of
forgings both to car and commercial vehicle Industries,
focusing particularly on steering knuckles. These would
generally be rather li ghter than those produced by <UKF1>.
<USF1> produces forgings for yokes, Journal crosses, rings,
pinions, and steering arms for both cars and trucks, these
generally being rather lighter than forgings made by either
<UKF1> or <GF1>. <JF1> produces forgings generally in the
range 0.5 - 10kg, going up to 70kg, for applications such as
truck links, crank shafts, knuckles, con rods, cam shafts
etc.	 <3F2> produces generally In the range 2 -15kg, and up
to 120kg for knuckles and heavier items such as front axles.
C.2 Differences in work done in-house
A check through process routes and production layouts
suggested that all plants compared carried out similar
operations, from billet shearing, to forging, heat
treatment, inspection, die manufacture etc. However <JF1>
contracted out a good deal of heat treatment work (heat
treatment would typically represent about 5% of total
manning for most forges) and certain machining work.
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ADDendix C6
Strategies of Forging Manufacturers
This appendix examines the main strategies undertaken
by companies whose performances were analysed in section
5.25.
	
To assist the reader to gain an insight into those
policies which have proved more successful, companies are
discussed over seven years in order of performance. This is
based on average ROCE plus average real sales growth.
Sister companies,	 controlled by the same parent, are
discussed together.
C.61 More successful companies
Hughss-ohrison and Light Metal Forginga
Hughes-Johnson	 and Light Metal Forgings,
	 ranking
respectively 1st and 5th on the combined index of
performance, are both part of the 3 & H.B. Jackson group.
Continuous performance figures are not available for Bretts,
the other forging company in the group.
Success	 is mainly attributable	 to	 their aero
activities, which represented 71% of sales in 1980 compared
with only 10% for commercial vehicles and 3% for cars.
Management must be given credit for positively increasing
aero activities over some years.
	 In 197L aero represented
about 50% of sales, commercial vehicles 10% and cars 6%.
Size is not an important factor: Hughes-Johnson ranks 12th
out of the 36 companies and Light Metal 25th, the two plants
employing approximately 350 and 250 people respectively.
Pz'.mjsz Itampina
This fairly small company, employing about 130 people,
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has been able to maintain consistent sales growth.
	 Both
growth	 and profitability have outstripped most 	 other
companies. Though on a gradual downward trend,
profitability has been remarkably consistent over 10 years,
margins being maintained between 11% and 21% and ROCE
between 17% and 31%.
The strategy does not appear glamorous.
	
For example,
it does no exporting at all. Good performance seems to
derive from attention to "basics", good financial control,
and taking advantage of its small size to increase market
share so as to offset market decline.
Such competitiveness has benefitted employees.
Although employment has been slightly cut back in the last 2
years, employment over the last 10 years has Increased.
Average remuneration in 1982/83 was £9,300 - above the
industry average.
Criterion and British & Midlands
Criterion and British and Midlands, ranking 3rd and 7th
In performance, are both part of the Hill and Smith group,
suggesting good management as the common factor. They have
resisted any temptations offered by overseas markets
(Criterion, for example, undertook no exporting in 1976).
Despite unexceptional market performance, ROCE has been
consistently in the top rankings for both companies.
Firth Derihon and River Don Stampinza
?lx'th Derihon ranked second on ROCE performance in the
last three years and third over the seven year period as a
whole, but its sister company River Don Stam pings has made
366
consistent losses, averaging -19% ROCE, over the last three
years. The distinctive feature more recently has been the
amalgamation and rationalisation of the forging activities
of British Steel and Firth Brown.
Firth Derihon's good performance largely reflects their
aero involvement, with 50% of sales accounted for by Rolls
Royce.
Firth Derihon, entered the automotive forgings market
some years ago as a deliberate counter-cyclical move, since
the natural business cycle on the aero side is longer and
therefore	 generally out of phase with that for
	 the
automotive market. Like other companies, their automotive
side has been hit badly. Their main automotive strategy has
been based on better technology and equipment, and this has
resulted in greater volume orientation.
	 Volume segments,
however, have been hardest hit both by the domestic downturn
and by international competition.
	 The volume of business
makes	 international trade worthwhile and international
competitors are "scrambling" for any available volume
business.	 An example is Ford wheel flanges. Two thirds of
this business was for Germany, until Ford reduced its
supplier network.
	 Following a price increase this business
was lost to an Italian supplier.
	 Their volume-orientated
presses have been hardest hit.
	 From 20 presses originally
in operation they are now only using 8.
River Don StampingB, the sister company, has been more
heavily automotive orientated with about half of sales
either to car or commercial vehicle customers. Efforts to
reduce dependence on the car market have been frustrated by
a declining UK industrial base generally . <>
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The company has become more orientated to longer
production	 runs and has increased the proportion
	 of
commercial vehicle business. <> This was achieved, but since
1979 UK commercial vehicle production has also halved so
there has been little cushioning to decline on the car side.
Another maj or market, tractors, was hit j ust as hard.
Using the group's expertise, they also succeeded in
building up the aero side. <> As the aero market in turn
plummetted, aero sales fell back in 1982 <>. They have
achieved some offset through exports;
	 but although their
export ratio doubled <>, export volume did not rise at all,
having been hit by the rise in sterling.
	 Decline in
automotive business has also been cushioned b y the takeover
and subsequent closure of Hadfield's Forge Lane plant. <>
Otherwise losses would have been even higher.
<>
Light Metal: see Hughes-Johnson above.
Scaffolding & Supplies: insuffient information
British & Midlands: see Criterion above.
B].oxwioh Look & Stampings
Success owes little to forgings involvement. <> Their
policy in automotive forgings was virtually to pull out.
Prices were under increasing pressure from vehicle
manufacturer' more internationally orientated procurement
operations, whilst UK forgers suffered from ageing plant and
massive underutilisation. A typical forging
 shop would have
no more than a quarter of hammers still in operation,
intensifying rivalry.
	 UK profitability was far too low.
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They could not afford to pursue important technological
opportunities.	 <> Pressure has intensified from substitute
processes:	 eg car door hinges and lift gear on the BL1100
went over to fabrications. 	 The best strategy in forgings
was felt to be differentiation, through specialising on
particular items, or particular shapes and sizes.
Since	 1960	 when	 automotive business	 generally
represented 95% of sales, they have reduced this dependence
<> through determined diversification into container gear,
focusing on small items <>.	 The container business became
even more international than the automotive business. 	 No
other UK manufacturer has succeeded to the same extent in
this area; their success lay in recognising suppliers had to
be equally internationally orientated, and in a hi gh degree
of focus so as to achieve a coherent international niche.
Ans].ow
A subsidiary of Duport, Anslow is heavily involved in
automotive forgings, particularly steering arms, compressor
cranks, suspension parts and slidin g clutch gear parts.
Although ROCE has fallen to an average of j ust under 3% in
the last 3 years, performance is well above average. Their
distinctive strategy has been to focus on close tolerance,
highly stressed and safety critical forgings, and on small
and medium order quantities in particular.
Holden & Hayec
This company's strategy was to specialise on steering
parts and this made it difficult to reduce a heavy
automotive dependence of about 70% including indirect sales
to the automotive market.	 The focus on safety critical
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parts fulfilled another element in their Btrategy, which was
to increase value-added.
In some respects the company feels it may have been
complacent when order books were full; they had not felt any
need for exports to reduce dependence on a deteriorating UK
market.	 They have though translated their strategy into
real	 gains	 In	 terms	 of manufacturing efficiency:
productivity doubled from 1LL5 to 29 tons p.a./man between
1972 and 1979, rising a further 17% by 1981.
Despite a relatively good performance, their efforts
were undermined in March 1980 when "sales died overnight".
Average ROCE fell in the most recent 3 years to just over 1%
compared with j ust under 3L1% during the previous 1& years.
They have also slipped back relative to other companies,
ranking only 15th out of 36 on ROCE during the last 3 years,
compared with a ranking of 8th over the last 7 years as a
whole. I would attribute this to their heavy automotive
dependence, and to the volume orientation to some extent
implicit in their strategy of specialisation.
Clydesdale
This company's relatively good performance can also be
attributed to a focused competitive strategy.
	 In the
1960's, the company undertook a conscious and boldly
entrepreneurial plan, deliberately narrowing their customer
base to focus on high quality forgings for automotive
transmission parts, and in particular onto standard size
ranges offering large order quantities. This overall
strategy was followed through with considerable commitment.
This involved buying literally the best equipment in the
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world to suit the segment identified. Hammers for example
were replaced with presses. During the 1960's, £4.5m was
invested in basic plant and equipment, about £22,500 per
employee. To this should be added a considerable investment
in working capital, eg in a back up steel stock increased to
5,000 tons to enable faster delivery performance.
Most importantly,
	
perhaps,	 considerable attention
centred on translating the broader strategy in terms of
manufacturing policies.	 Particular emphasis was placed on
ideas comin g forward from the shop floor, on schemes
designed to foster employee loyalty - improving working
conditions and long service awards.
	 There has also been a
persistent emphasis on improving products and productivity.
Armstrong Stevens
This company produces forgings for axle shafts and
their facilities have been orientated to heavy starnpings.
They have pushed up exports from 1.6% of sales in 1973 to
9.2% in 1982. Growth performance has been quite good with
turnover in 1982 3.3 times that in 1973, well ahead of
inflation.	 Profitability
	
in terms of ROCE has been
reasonable over the last ten years in relative terms but
unexciting, and losses were made in all of the latest three
years for which fi gures were available.	 At the start of
1983 this company was taken over by the Benjamin Priest
group, whose other forging companies are T.B. Wellings who
make automotive for gings (eg for steering sockets) and A.J.
Vaughan (Mitre) who make tools.
Fairly aggressive market penetration has not really
paid off as well as it mi ght have done in the economic
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conditions prevailing: although the company ranked 12th on
ROCE performance over the 7 year period, its position
slumped to 22nd in the last 3 years.	 They have been hit
particularly by the recent sharp decline in the
	 UK
commercial vehicle industry.
C.62 Companies displaying average levels of performance
Arthur Edge
This is a small forging company whose automotive
involvement appears to be small. Its fairly good
performance derives from its strategy of focusing onto
scaffolding parts and therely achievin g some measure of
differentiation.
Perkson Forgings
The company supplies li ght forgings, up to about 3.5kg,
direct to major automotive customers <> and products
Include Items such as latches, handles, hin ges, locking
devices etc. The company has enjoyed a degree of cushioning
against the downturn in the automotive forgings market since
it uses forgings in its own products, eg in conveyors,
another maj or field of activity . Its purchase of Goicher In
April 1978, now its second site, was because it needed
additional forgings capacity.
Even so, the company has experienced a severe downturn
and both plants are now operating at half capacity. Like
other forgers, recent strategies have been dominated by
retrenchment and ratlonalisation. Employment since 1978 has
been reduced by !O%.
Automotive	 business	 is	 under pressure	 from
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international competition due to customers turnin g to
international sourcing. They have just fought a battle with
a Spanish supplier to retain one customer's <> steering
forging parts, previously dual sourced with GKN; although
they won prices were sliced back. For one customer <> on
another item, clutch hub for gings, half of the business has
been given to Spain. affectin g both volume and profit
margins.
The company do not feel there are any glamorous
strategy alternatives in such a situation. They point to a
number of areas outside their control which render Britain
an uncompetitive place from which to manufacture automotive
forgings.	 In this situation investment opportunities are
rarely very attractive. It must be appreciated that with
plants at half capacity, a reasonable ROCE of say 20%
actually implies a target twice that level being demanded of
the remaining plant actually in o peration, and in the
context of depressed mar gins. In consequence, the company's
main strategy has been one of retrenchment aimed at
restoring the balance between capacity and demand, together
with	 sharpened attention	 given	 to fairly mundane
manufacturing issues such as quality, productivity etc.
3ames Diakie
The sudden downturn in demand has created massive
overcapacity . <>
Again there is nothing particularly glamorous about
this company's strategy. They have deliberately steered
clear of volume segments of the business, avoidin g buying
more modern, volume-orientated, presses. They have gone
373
instead for being a supplier of general for gings, relying on
flexibility and low overheads to sustain their competitive
position. Many hammers date back to Victorian days but are
fully depreciated, and more flexible than modern equipment
in the face of reduced order runs. <>
The company has avoided heavy investment strategies,
has been prepared to surrender volume segments such as new
gearbox business and areas in which other companies have
specialised, such as aero. It has avoided exports
altogether.
Productivity levels are low by international standards
and have, des pite some recent improvement, actually declined
over the last decade because of increasing underutilisation.
<>
They are now makin g a small loss on their forgings
side, but are actually performing better than many forging
companies. Flexibility has paid off and UK conditions have
not been conducive to more progressive policies. One mistake
they did make for example was in investing in the more
modern spark erosion process in die manufacture. In the
conditions now prevailing it is not even worth operating
such volume orientated equipment, despite the fact that
investment costs now have to be regarded as "sunk".
The company now concentrates its
	 attention on
incremental changes, such as cheaper methods of heating
billets.	 They are critical of government support being
focused on glamorous but less relevant areas such as
robotics.	 Government support for the industry has been
inconsistent over the decade.
	 One moment they are given
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enormous incentives to invest in modern equipment, which
they do not really want, and the next moment the government
is almost encouraging them to cut capacity.
They do not believe that more sweeping strategies, such
as GKN Forgings' ac quisition strategies, pay off in this
type of industry, particularly in prevailing conditions.
Tildesley: insufficient information
Kimber Die: insufficient information
J & S Eyres: insufficient information
Birfield Extrusions: see GKN Forgings.
Daniel Doncaster (Now INCO Engineering Products Ltd)
One of Irico Engineering Products' plants still supplies
the automotive industry,
	 mainly on commercial vehicle
forgings. <> The company identified a niche some years ago
for the new (at the time) Lasco extrusion presses. They were
one of the first companies in on this newer process and they
have been able to sustain some competitive advantage,
because of higher entry barriers due first to their head
start and the experience effect, second to substantial
capital costs, and third to the size of the appropriate
market which limits the potential number of entrants.
The new technology was appropriate not only to
automotive segments, but provided the basis for increased
penetration into the other sectors.
	 It is also interesting
to note	 that	 they are now experiencing a highly
international pattern of competition, the reasons being:
first,	 greater capital requirements and
	 technological
opportunities	 have	 made it more worthwhile
	 trading
internationally and, secondly, all their customer industries
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are	 themselves now highly international 	 In	 their
orientation. <>
Multinational	 customers1	 such	 as	 transmission
manufacturers for example, have been increasingly prepared
to move business around the world. It is possible to win
further overseas business on the back of such customers, but
It also increases international exposure both directly and
indirectly. <>
The company has pursued more aggressive strategies than
many forging companies. However, technological
opportunities such as the Lasco extrusion press are volume
orientated. The company estimates for example that it is
not economical to switch from the traditional hammer process
to presses on automotive applications until order runs are
above about 2,000 units, and the same critical fi gure for
the Laskos would be higher <>. Market conditions in Britain
have	 slumped	 and	 order runs
	 have	 been	 tilt
disproportionately, rendering such modern technological
processes less economic. Even operating costs, such as die
costs, heating costs and downtime costs, are higher on more
modern processes when order runs are low;
	 overhead costs
including de preciation charges are anyway higher.
A volume production press department has had to be
closed down completely, whilst traditional hammer shops have
been maintained.
Consequently, like others, the company has had to take
recourse to retrenchment and rationalisatjon.
	 Employment
has been cut substantially.
	 Overheads have been cut
particularly. <>
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C.623 Worst performers
Thos. Smith
This company does only a small amount of work for
automotive customers (eg Land Rover), havin g focused on.
products such as wrenches, spanners and slack adjusters. It
employs 219 people, but its capacity of about 4,000 tons
p.a. would imply productivity of no more than about i
tons/man/year. Automotive forgers should assess alternative
markets cautiously: the grass iB not always greener.
Brockhouae
Described by their mana ging director as a "Jobbing'
forge (Modern Purchasin g , October 1978), the company is said
to aim at order runs of 250 to 2,500. This should have
placed them in a better position to handle the sharp
reduction in order runs.
However their other stated strategy of finding more
specialised niches is probably more volume orientated: eg
their 6" Lambert upsetter, installed in 1978. targeted on
half-shaft forgings. 	Also the managing director's further
comments suggested the company was not really committed to a
more flexible manufacturing service:	 "...if we hold the
dies and are asked for 100 forgings, we are duty bound to-
make them.	 But they have to pay through the nose for them.
they have got to pay the value of a shift's work." I
suspect that order runs in today's changed conditions have-
fallen to just such a level, and that the company is ayin
a price for not having pushed harder on	 lexitle-
manufacturing systems.
-
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auz'ton-D.linipoi..
Direct forgings for use in vehicles constitute too low
a proportion of this company 's Bales to be of great
si gnificance in the context of automotive forgings. Again
however the company's performance indicates that size is no
easy guarantee of good performance.
Beseot Drop: see discussion on South Wales Forgemasters
Omes-Faulkners
Heavily dependent on the automotive industry, it would
appear that the company has been caught in the competitive
squeeze (discussed in section 5.2) between the larger group
of companies able to utilise commercial muscle and greater
technical sophistication on the one hand, and smaller
companies characterised by lower overheads and greater
flexibility on the other. It has tried unsuccessfully to
move into the aero market, so as to increase value added.
This company seems to be "caught in the middle" and needs to
reposition itself decisively if It is to improve future
performance: ROCE averaged minus 15% in the period 1976-83.
Halladays
This company is a mainstream automotive forgings
company, supplying forgings such as crown wheels and gears
directly to vehicle companies.
Their performance over a long period of time
illustrates consistently falling performance even before the
recent downturn. ROCE averaged 111% during 1963-66 24%
during 1 9 67-71, 11% during 1972-76 and 7% during 1978-79.
It has made significant losses In each of the last three
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years.
One of the company 's problems has been that, as a
relatively small company, engaged in one of the hi gh volume
segments of the market,	 they have had difficulty in
competing with larger companies who had presses for
production of high volume components. <> Such problems could
become more acute as car customers rationalise onto fewer
sources of supply.
<>
The company has aggressively developed new markets,
<> including exporting , but in the context of such a severe
market downturn these policies do not appear to have paid
of f in terms of profitability or sustained growth. There
have been heavy cuts in employment <>.
Stanipings Alliance
Up	 to 1973,	 Stampings Alliance operated as	 an
independent company, displaying reasonable performance.
Margins averaged LL5% between 1968 and 1973. and sales grew
from £1.5m to £2.6m ahead of inflation, although 1973 was a
peak year.	 In 19714, it was purchased by GM's Vauxha.11 to
reduce supplier dependence and to ensure continuity of
supply. The company was well equipped with modern plant.
They had installed a modern 13m ton counterbiow hammer in
June 1972 and a fully automated Chambersburg Impact No 3
system in February 1973). On becoming Vauxhall's "in-house"
supplier they pursued a strategy based on volume orientated
production, installing modern CECO gravity drop hanimers,
from 2,000 to 6,000 lbs, and gearing up to volume production
runs of automotive forgings.
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Modernisation based on volume orientated equipment has
proved cri pp ling to this company.
	
They have made losses in
all of the last four years and may well be surviving only
through GM support.
Head Wrightson
Over the last seven years this company has ranked 22
out of 2L both in terms of sales growth and ROCE.
	 It has
made losses in 5 out of the 6 most recent years. There seems
to be little focus or synergy in the group.
	 Their
Hartlepool plant makes crown wheels and gears, whilst their
Stockton Precision plant produces forgings for a wide range
of products: pipe flanges, clutch hubs, camshaft gears, and
tail shaft flanges.	 The parent company Davy Corporation
does not seem to have had much success at improving this
subsidiary's performance.
Blaakheath Stampings
Blackheath is another example showing that being part
of a powerful and, in this case, successful holding group
(Armstrong Equipment) is no guarantee of performance in this
sector. Decline dates back a long way though: return on
net assets averaged 10.5% in 1963-66 and fell back into
losses averaging 7.7% in 1967-69.
Blackheath employed about 230 people in 1980.	 Its
strategy of specialising in forgings for safety critical
steering arms and swivel pins does not seem to have afforded
a protected niche.
	 Its main production equipment comprises
six hammers, which ought to be relatively flexible, but it
is heavily dependent on automotive work.
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T. Williams
This company, owned by the Eva group of industries,
employs only about 70 people. It uses drop hammers and is
focused on lighter forgings in the range 1 to 5 lbs,
particularly conn rods and general items such as nozzle body
holdings and hand tools such as spanners.
The company averaged 18% ROCE during 1963-70 which
emphasises the extent of the decline in financial
performance in more recent years.
It has been an aggressive exporter (the market for hand
tools is more conducive to international trade as these
forgings represent finished products and are lighter), with
exports rising to 11.0% by 1981/82. This has have proved
difficult to sustain. Exports fell back to 25% in 1982/83
and sales which had risen from £0.9m in 1972 to £3.lJm in
1979/80 fell back even in nominal terms to £2.8m in 1982/83.
Aggressive market policies have not paid of f. They have
made losses in all of the last three years, risin g to -153%
ROCE (11.0% of sales value) in the most recent year 1982/83.
Abbey Drop Forge: insufficient information
Shaw-Dudley: insufficient information
C.62L& Other automotive forging companies
Dudley Drop Forge
This medium sized company, employing about 350 people,
is heavily focused onto the automotive forgings segment and
it is an important competitor in this sector.
	 They are
focused onto items such as conn rods, stubb axle forgings,
engine parts and safety critical parts such as suspension
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and steering items.
They made profits in every year between 197L and 1979,
averaging 25% ROCE, but have gone into loss in each of the
three most recent years avera ging -11%.
Their expressed strategy in 1978 was one of installing
the most modern plant whilst "retaining versatilit y so
essential in this type of consumer led industr y". They have
not been deterred by their fairl y limited size, pointing out
that although GKN controlled about 70% of forgings capacity,
it was "questionable whether any great advantages accrue
from sheer size" in this activit y .	 Dudley Drop's exports
are fairly modest at just over 10%. Their emphasis has been
on material utilisation, productivity and quality control.
This has meant increasing capacity. Capacity at their main
plant increased from 5,450 to 8,200 tons p.a. between 1972
and 1978.	 In 1973, they had acquired and then totally
reequipped Cartwrl ght Bros (capacity about 1,500 tons p.a.).
They have been relatively successful, particularly in
the past. Based on these capacity estimates, productivity
would appear to be higher than in many other automotive
forging companies: about 28 tons/man/year. However, recent
conditions have not favoured capacity orientated strategies
although they tried to retain flexibilit y, and this has
depressed performance in the last three years.	 Like other
forgers,	 they have recently undergone substantial
retrenchment and cut-backs in employment (from 360 in
1979/80 to 251 in 1982/83).
TI Tubas
Most of this company's forgings are for commercial
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vehicles <>.
Earisdon Components
Employment at this small family
 owned company halved
between 1979 and 1982 from 106 to 57 people.	 Having
responded Quickly to the downturn,
	 profitability has,
however, improved.	 Up to 1977 the company made negligible
profits, but it has moved back to reasonable levels.
Their	 main	 focus is engine	 valves,	 a	 highly
international business, with for gings j ust part of the
process.	 It is interesting that such a small manufacturer
can	 be highly competitive against	 key multinational
competitors such as TRW. They are technologically
progressive: for example their small screw presses utilised
robotic feeders, seen in few other UK forging companies.
The company 's policies of a sharp focus, very low
overheads, tight control over the use of all financial
assets and good employee relations, have enabled costs to be
kept down, even in the face of sharp market decline.
Polkes Hefo
There are perhaps few conglomerates such as this
company, ranking in the Times Top 500, operating from such
modest head Quarters - an otherwise Quite unremarkable
semi in Stourbridge! Forgings is only one of their
activities, but the success of this company (ranked fourth
in a 1976 survey of West Midlands companies on ROCE) again
seems to point to the importance of tight managerial
control, low overheads, and close attention to basic, if
unglamorous areas of efficiency.
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C1623 Non-automotivi foriini companisi
Cameron Iron (successful)
This US owned company enjoys a unique position in the
fastest growing market segments:	 aero, power and petroleum
applications.	 The processes involved are distinctive from
other forging applications, and capital intensity is fairly
high (eg £19,000/man in 1977). Competition here is now
hi ghly international and the company has been assisted by
its US linkage and also by its Scottish location in respect
to North Sea Oil business.	 It is the second largest UK
forging manufacturer;	 but in its well chosen sector, it is
fairly large even by international standards.
George, Turton Platte (unsuccessful)
This company produces no for gings for cars, a small
amount for the larger commercial vehicles, and mainly
specialises in aero applications. 	 Given hi gher value to
weight ratios and the international nature of the customer
industry,
	
the locus of competition has become highly
international.	 George, Turton Platte is much smaller and
less internationally based compared with Cameron Iron and
Daniel Doncaster which is part of INCO, and it has been
gradually	 "squeezed out".
	
The aero sector had been
relatively extremely buoyant, but recently plunged sharply,
intensifying competition. The company averaged a very small
profit during the earlier four year period, but the last
four years has displayed continuous and mounting losses (up
to -88% ROCE in 1982/83). Faster growing market segments
are no panacea in the absence of a defensible competitive
3814
strateg'.
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ADDsndixD. 2.
Volume indices fox' automotive component sales, 1973-100
Note: based on Business Monitor fi gures,	 adjusted for
inflation using WPI fi gures in Table 49
Carbux'- 	 Coil	 Laminated Other	 Oil filters
ettors	 srins	 srins	 Parts
accessories
1963
1968
1973
197 IL
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981E
1982
1963
1968
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981E
1982
160.4
100.0
135.2
137.9
156.7
158.2
122.9
134.9
129.9
139.7
138.9
Brakes
42.2
56.5
100.0
95.1
93.0
102. 8
109.5
108.6
110.6
95.1
74.2
66.9
Clutches
156.7
313.7
100.0
85.2
77.6
83.2
95.2
100. 9
132.8
108.6
107.7
103.0
Other
enzine
parts
100.0
93.4
91.7
92.6
99.3
100.2
101.6
73.5
68.0
60.4
64.3
62.5
100.0
103.0
103.5
100.7
86.1
60.0
95.0
64.6
44.9
43.2
Mirrors
100.0
74.4
55.9
78.3
88.0
87.2
87.8
62.8
66.8
59.4
100.0
121.2
115.5
122.2
115.1
130.7
108.9
104.7
89.1
72.7
56. 1
72.8
100.0
100.5
125.8
101.5
83.8
90.7
98.0
78.3
65.5
60.1
Wheels
100.0
102.9
84.3
92.6
94.1
99.8
96.2
79.1
82.2
67.6
40.2
70.6
100. 0
87.11
80.3
85.1
81.5
88.5
911.3
76.1
611.7
66.8
LocksShock	 Steering
absorbers rear
Radiators Axles
1963
1968
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981E
1982
47.0
67.8
100.0
93.1
94.9
97.0
95.7
92.8
92.8
77.7
62.8
53.9
85.3
58.8
100.0
91.9
90.0
98.6
105.5
95.6
99.5
71.0
62.4
60.5
55.8
62.4
100.0
911.2
97.0
88.9
86.8
88.9
90.5
66.3
53.8
47.0
94.2
94.3
100 • 0
100. 0
77.6
83.1
105.1
100.7
92.1
65.6
53.7
50.3
77.6
100.0
70.5
57.3
68.8
56.1
63.2
83.7
55.8
52.7
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Gearboxes Chassis	 Exhaust	 Seats	 Bumpers
frames	 systems
1963
1968
1973
19711
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981E
1982
100.0
88.7
82.1
83.0
77.7
78.6
82.2
57.9
51.0
53.7
79.7
113. 5
100.0
93.2
91.8
92.8
92.0
93.3
83.11
63.1
1111.7
38.0
54. 8
100.0
101. 8
97. 5
97.7
89.0
108.3
108.3
59.3
113.7
39.11
232.11
260.7
100.0
83.7
62.9
66.1
58.2
113.1
511.2
29.3
18.2
19.0
94.3
78.3
100. 0
89.8
70.6
80.5
64.8
56.2
115.1
26.0
12.3
7.6
Measuring Other	 Spark	 Fuel tanks Body shells
instrum-	 electronic Plugs
ents	 parts
1963
1968
1973
19711
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981E
1982
100.0
95.5
112.6
115.6
1011.7
112.8
120.5
100.0
163.9
94,6
119.8
118.8
1116.1
169.7
100.0
83. IL
83. 6
95.2
93.8
96.3
73.9
811.3
123. 0
100.0
69.5
57.5
54.1
47.3
51.8
57.4
100. 0
65.6
72.9
86.2
72.7
67.11
80.5
Starters Headlanis Ignition Heaters Horns
	 Enzines
eauiment	 totaL
generators	 Lexc coils)
1963	 92.7
1968	 80.3
1973	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1974	 95.2	 89.7	 59.11	 95.6	 67.6	 68.8
1975	 85.1	 66.9	 57.6	 70.5
	
56.1	 62.5
1976	 91.0	 70.0	 72.1	 70.3
	
119.2	 81.2
1977	 79.6	 66.0	 66.11	 73.5	 37.6	 96.9
1978	 91.8	 73.6	 70.0	 71.2	 90.6
1979	 85.0	 73.11	 68.7	 50.6	 112.2	 106.3
1980	 90.6
1981E	 90.6
1982	 100.0
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7.6
21.7
21.7
11.9
10.0
".7
42.11
31.7
33.6
40.0
55.2
46.8
13.5
21.8
21. 2
20.4
20.0
19.8
3.7
5.8
6.1
6.8
5.3
8.3
13.9
23. 9
15.9
15.1
22.5
8.9
111.8
311.3
1111.4
111.0
7.0
10.6
8.1
17.1
14.6
15.6
13.3
17.7
23.0
22. 6
18.1
26. 2
28.6
27.5
0.3
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.3
25.0
AgD•ndix .2
International trade in selected components
Exports/sales:
Brakes Axles Shock Wheels Chassis S park Starters Mirrors
absor-	 frames	 lus and. ten-
bers	 erators
1973
	
2.5	 2.7 10.8 24.3
1974	 3.9	 5.5 11.4 31.9
1975	 6.4	 5.7 11.0 38.1
1976	 8.0	 4.8 10.8 34.2
1977
	
9.3	 5.11	 9.1 37.7
	
1978 13.4	 -	 -	 40.5
1 979	 8.3	 -	 -	 41.4
1980	 7.1	 -	 15.3 51.9
1981 Figures not available
1982	 4.5
	
5.9 12.6 40.9
1mort penetration: Imports/(Sales-Exports+Imports)
Brakes Axles Shock Wheels Chassis SPark Starters Mirrors
absor-	 frames Plugs 	 men-
bers	 erators
1973
	
1.6	 4.6	 3.3 11.3
1974	 1.7
	
11.9
	
4.0 13.9
1975	 2.11	 5.2	 5.3 17.2
1976	 3.8	 11.1	 5.0 15.7
1977	 3.7	 5.8	 6.7 15.8
1978	 5.8	 -	 -	 17.3
1979	 4.0	 -	 -	 26.3
1980	 3.11	 -	 -	 37.11
1981 Figures not available
1982	 3.5	 -	 -	 39.8
Source: SMNT Yearbooks
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Apoendix b.
Salee Performance of Motor Component Manufacturers
Size
Rank
Sales Growth
1975-79 1979-82	 1975-82
% p.a.	 % p.a.	 % p.a.
1
2
3
11.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
111.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
211.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
311.
35
36
37
38
39
11.0
41
42
11.3
44
11.5
11.6
47
118
119
50
Comanw
Lucas
Chloride
Assoc Eng
Smiths
GKN Sankey
AP
BBA
Borg Warner
Quinton Hazell
3 Woodhead
Eaton
Hardy Spicer
Cam Gears
Armstrong
Triplex
Leys Foundries
BRD
TI A&P
Turner
TRW Valves
Champion
Cainford
Burman
Rockwell Maudsley
Rockwell Thompson
Trico Folberth
01 dh am
Fram Europe
Britax Wingard
TRW Clifford
TI Cheswick
Hobourn Eaton
Concentric Pumps
Motor Panels
Kangol Magnet
Silent Channel
Intec
Airflow
Adwest
CH Industrials
TI Cox
Supra
Bluemel
Burgess
Abbey Panels
GKN Kent Alloys
Hallam Sleigh
IHW
Concentric Prod.
Wipac
i.970-75
p.a.
1.4
12. 5
0.8
3.0
(0.6)
5.9
0.9
(1.0)
0.7
(0.5)
1.1
(0.4)
(4.0)
8.9
2.8
2.6
0.0
(3.7)
1.5
(4.9)
(6.1)
2.7
1.5
1.0
1.6
(5.3)
3.9
0.7
8.0
6.7
6.2
(0.7)
3.0
2.6
19.1
2.4
3.1
(1.2)
(5.9)
(1.0)
(6.1)
7.3
11.2
1.3
(3.5)
(1.9)
(0.4)
14.7
(3.0)
15.8
(1.5)
11.11
5.5
1.6
111.8
1.2
(1.3)
4.0
38.9
0.2
34.8
3.4
12.11.
(1.4)
7.0
7.6
19.8
3.3
11.0
2.2
9.0
(6.2)
(9.9)
(8.6)
(1.0)
(19.3)
(8.7)
(7.1)
(12.1)
(8.8)
(111.2)
(3.8)
(8. o)*
(12.2)
(5.3)
(11.5)
(19.2)
(5.1)
(12.2)
(3. 1)*
(13.6)
(13.0)
(8.6)
(16.2)
(12.8)
(10.7)
(10.7)
(10.1)
(2.4)
(15.8)
(10. 3)*
(15. U,)
(17.3)
(6. 2)*
(15.3)
(8.11.)
(12.2)
(26.11)
(8.6)
(12.4)
(8.9)
(6.6)
(7.1)
(14.2)
(15.9)
(5.8)
(10.1)
(16.2)*
(9.4)
(17.3)
(7.7)
(1.11.)
(3.7)
(3.3)
0.5
(9.5)
(2.1)
(2.7)
(2.3)
(1.0)
(11.1)
(2.0)
(0. 9)*
(4.3)
6.9
(Lj. 0)
(8.2)
(2.8)
(7.11.)
(1. 7)*
(7.9)
(3.0)
1.1
(6.6)
(6.7)
(5.3)
(11.8)
1.5
(2.6)
(2.0)
(11.. 2)*
(3.1)
(5.9)
(1. 0)*
(2.0)
(3.7)
(5.7)
(10.8)
12.8
(5.2)
10.7
(1.3)
2.4
(6.5)
(4.2)
1.1
3. 6
(3. 9)*
(2.4)
(6.8)
0.7
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Sa1eB Performance of Motor Componant Manufacturara (contd)
Lize Coman	 Sales Growth
Rank	 1970-75 1975-79 1979-82
	 1975-82
% p.a.	 % p.a.	 X p.a.	 % p.a.
51
52
53
511.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
611
65
66
Britax Dynasafe
Brockhouse
TI Nicholson
CBS Auto & md
Chillcotts
Desmo
HK Porter
Tenneco Walker
Commercial Ignit.
Joseph Fray
R a,'d o t
Flexible Lamps
Hills (Patents)
Intermotor
Eversure
Motaproducts
(0.9)
(0.9)
(15.3)
8.3
11.3
12.0
8.i.
1.2
0.2
111.8
1.7
6.5
17.5
16.1
6.5
16.6
(3.2)
(691.1)
(21 • 2)
(21.7)
(11.8)
(8.7)
(12.11)
(18.6)
(7.8)
3.0
(9.6)
(17.8)
(10.9)
(6.0)
(9.2)
(1.1)
(33. 1)*
2.8
(12.3)
(7.6)
0.1
1.3
(2.11)
(7.7)
(3.3)
10.5
(3.11)
(5.9)
2.0
5.0
(1.3)
8.7
(11. 8)*
(11.28.7)
Note: Fi gures based on sales growth adjusted for inflation
using WPI. Annual rates shown on a simple rather
than compounded basis.
* period to 1981 only
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ADDendix D.4
ROCE Performance of Motor Component Manufacturere
Size Coman	 Averaze ROCE
Rank	 1970-74 1975-79 1980-82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
111
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
311
35
36
37
38
39
40
lii
112
43
44
45
46
117
118
119
50
Lucas
Chloride
Assoc Eng
Smiths
GKN Sankey
AP
BBA
Borg Warner
Quinton Hazell
3 Woodhead
Eaton
Hardy Spicer
Cam Gears
Armstrong
Triplex
Leys Foundries
BRD
TI A&P
Turner
TRW Valves
Champion
Camford
B u rman
Rockwell Maudsley
Rockwell Thompson
Trico Folberth
Old ham
Frain Europe
Britax Wingard
TRW Clifford
TI Cheswick
Hobourn Eaton
Concentric Pumps
Motor Panels
Kangol Magnet
Silent Channel
Intec
Airflow
Adwest
CH Industrials
TI Cox
Supra
Bluemel
Burgess
Abbey Panels
GKN Kent Alloys
Hallani Sleigh
I HW
Concentric Prod.
Wipac
10.1
21. 0
10.7
15.4
15.8
(1.5)
12.3
18.0
13.9
10.9
22.6
58. 8
111.0
22.9
18.5
31.1
18.7
12.6
12.1
31.6
21.6
20.11
19.11
17.2
15.1
15.1
17.2
17.1
15.1
13.7
15.9
2.2
15.9
18.1
5.5
12.0
117.2
19.5
5.11
9.3
113.0
0.5
21. 0
5.1
50.1
12.6
16.0
16.5
19.9
16.6
48.1
5.3
68.1
20.7
117.7
23.4
29.9
2.5
13.11
1.9
16.0
22.9
211.0
11.2
8.11
15.6
15. 2
16.2
14.9
12.4
6.5
86.6
12.7
11.7
2.1
(3.1)
1.11
17.1
(25.2)(11.9)
11.7
7.1(0.4)
(12. 8)
(19.7)
5.5
1.9
3.2(111.7)
(12.3)
(13.3)
(9.5)
3.2
(15.9)
5.8(4.3)
5.6
21.1
2.3
2.4
16.3
(15.7)
6.3
15.2
11.1
(28.2)
23.7(21.9)(0.3)
(25.6)
(3.7)
1.8
6.5
5.7
13. 11
7.8
7.8
11.8
10.3
6.1
(15.5)
35.11
(22.0)
(3.2)
1975-82
10.2
8.3
11.3
17.1
0.2
6.7
21.8
11.0
9.7
6.5
(11.0)
10.2
30.2
13. 11(2.1)
1.2
21.9
(3.3)
15.9
(2.8)
37.11
6.3
11. 6
18.2
13.3
11.3
36.1
(2.6)
114.9
19.1
311.0
11.1
28.2
(6.7)
8.3(8.4)
8.6
15.0
17.11
9.1
10.3
12.7
12.7
11.9
12.5
10.1
21.11
67.11
(0.3)
6.1
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ROCE Performance of Motor Component Manufacturers (contd)
Size ComPani	 Averae_ROCE
Rank	 1970-711. 1975-79 1980-82	 1975-82
51
52
53
511.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
Britax Dynasafe
Brockhouse
TI Nicholson
CBS Auto & md
Chillcotts
Desmo
HK Porter
Tenneco Walker
Commercial Ignit.
Joseph Fray
Rayd o t
Flexible Lamps
Hills (Patents)
Intermotor
Eversure
Motaproducts
(23.5)
7.11.
(32.3)
7.8
55.8
30.5
21.8
0.9
26.6
(50.2)
29.0
36.3
19.5
37.9
37.3
25.3
9.7
45.0
(27.2)
(50.6)
26.3
(28.6)
16.2
(6.0)
(2.3)
2.2
10.0
5.5(13.6)
22.5
(10.1)
5.5(86.5)
0.7
(30.4)
(14.1)
411.. 8
8.3
19.7(1.7)
15.8(311.. 9)
21.9
23.8
7.1
32.2
19.5
17.9(17.8)
28.4
3911.
32.0	 2.62	 22.6
311.0	 2.90	 24.8
35.11.	 3.23
	
27.3
37.0	 3.46	 30.2
39.8	 3.711.	 33.1
43.7	 11.12	 36.1
116.2
	 4.112	 110.5
48.3
	
11.60
	
45.6
51.6	 11.79	 52.7
	
2.26	 2.09	 232
	
2.32	 2.25	 2118
	
2.39	 2.411.	 286
	
2.116	 2.65	 3311.
	
2.53	 2.84	 371
	
2.61	 3.00	 386
	
2.72	 3.18	 11.01
	
2.83	 3.37	 1125
	
3.01	 3.79	 11.11.5
ADoandix D.
Txandi in sarnings/hour in manufacturing
Table D.51
Earnings trends in manufacturin g : national currencies
L1	 Germanw Jppp*	 Fra	 Italy Sweden
p/hr	 DM/hr 000Y/mth s/hr FF/hr lira/hr kr/hr
M	 MF	 MF	 MF	 MF	 MF	 MF
1960
1961
1962
1963
1963
19611.
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
19711
19711
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
55.9
64.11.
72.0
82.1
92.9
111.6
139.9
155.9
168. 7
1911.9
227.5
266.11.
293.11
319.7
5.28
5.96
6.66
7.24
8.03
8.911
9.69
10.35
11.111
11.73
12.36
13.18
13. 92
14.64
61.8
71.11
81.0
93.6
116.3
111.6.5
163. 7
183.6
200.8
2111.6
227.8
2411.6
259.7
269.3
3.19
3.36
3.56
3.81
11.07
4.42
11.83
5.22
5.68
6.69
6.69
7.27
7.99
8.50
11.21
11.66
5.18
5.82
7.05
8.39
9.82
11.11
12.58
14.20
16.011
18.11.6
20.72
23. 97
1189
606
708
788
966
1209
17911.
2133
2673
321111
3874
116811
5711.2
na
5.77
6.23
6.17
6. 69**
7.29
7.911.
8.78
9.60
9.30
9. 87**
11.17
12.15
13.52
111.91
16.76
16.05
17. 81**
20.30
23.79
211.09
25.70
27. 911.
30.11
32.67
36.211
39.08
M men
MF= men and women
* The purpose of these figures is to establish trends over
time. National differences in methods of recording
labour rates make absolute comparisons at any particular
point in time dangerous. However Japanese monthly rates
can approximately be converted to an hourly basis by
dividing by 167.8, the estimated number of hoursworked
per month for 1979. This has been done in D.54 below.
** Series breaks at this point and new series starts.
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics / ILO
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1'ab1e D.52
Zterling
 exchange rates:
ffermani 1apn 1LA	 France Itaiw Sweden
DM	 yen	 $	 FF	 lire	 kr
11.699 1004.6
11.222 1016.0
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
11.203
11. 116
11. 096
11. 165
11. 168
11. 122
9.555
9.3941
8.736
8.515
7.987
6.540
6.049
5.4469
4.552
4.0504
3.850
3.8875
Lj 2183
4.556
4.2113
1003.9
1013.0
999.7
1011.4
1011.11
871.1
852.9
858.9
857.84
8113.57
753.65
664.56
682.66
658.08
535.43
1167.65
402.73
465.55
526.39
444.63
435.20
2.8007
2.8023
2.8078
2.8003
2.7925
2.7962
2.7932
2.7901
2.3937
2.3903
2.3960
2.111156
2.5054
2.4526
2.3402
2.220
1.8049
1.71155
1.9197
2.1225
2.3211
2.0254
1. 7489
13. 753
13.758
13. 736
13. 710
13. 671
13.702
13.723
13. 730
11. 855
13.3445
13.244
13.1166
12. 635
10. 899
11.2116
9.5003
8.6081
8.5733
8.61146
9.0265
9. 8217
10. 9356
11.4846
1711.0.1
17112.2
1739.4
17110.6
1743.2
17116.7
1744.0
1741.0
1491.9
11199.1
1502.4
1510.8
111.61.7
11126.11.
1521.9
111116.7
1497.2
1540.112
1627.79
1762.119
1992.36
2287
23611.
14. 535
111.560
14. 535
111.535
14. 355
iLL. 11211
111.428
111.399
12. 363
12. 356
12.1123
12. 471
11.920
10. 674
10. 3711.
9.910
7.870
7.8332
8.663
9.0919
9.8266
10. 192
10. 963
Source: CSO Annual Abstract
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Table D.5
Earnings trends In manufacturint. Pence/hour unless specified:
Germany Japan	 LA	 France Italw Sweden
£/month*
1960
1961
1962
1963
19611
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
19711
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
22. Lj.
25.8
28.8
31.1
33.7
36.9
39.6
L&1. IL
50.1
56.2
68.2
78.2
90.6
122.8
1117.8
177.9
227.11
275.0
304. 7
317.9
312.11
305.5
3115.0
13.11
111.5
16.2
17.8
19.7
21.3
23.9
31.2
36.8
42.9
83.2
96.0
124. 2
175.0
2111.6
248.8
3112,9
429. 11
532.9
489.3
464.7
5811.1
618.8
80.5
82.8
85.1
87.8
90.6
93.3
97. 11
101.11
125.7
133. 5
140.2
145. 6
152.1
165.9
188.9
217.6
289.2
325.11
348. 5
315.2
312.8
3911.5
1186.0
15.2
16.11
17.8
19.3
20.8
21.9
23.2
211.5
32.0
31.5
35.2
38.5
11.6.1
37.3
611.6
103 . 4
129.1
146.7
164.3
177.7
188.0
189.5
208.7
13.3
14. 2
16.11.
19.2
21.3
22.1
23.0
211.11
29.8
36.6
40.3
116. 9
53.9
67.7
79.11.
1211.0
142.5
173.5
199. 3
219.8
235.1
251.1
na
39.7
11.2.8
42.11.
50.2
55.3
60. 9
66.5
611.6
90.3
98. 3
108.8
119. 6
111.0.6
150.11
195.7
258.8
306.1
328.1
322. 5
331.2
332.5
355.6
356.5
*See note to D.51 above
Table D.511.
Trends in overseas_jnanufacturin earnin gs er hour as % _p
K rates
Germany Japan USA	 France Italy Sweden.
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
19711.
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
70.0
75.9
81.3
811.1
84. 7
84.11.
85.7
85.7
97.1
100.5
105.9
108.6
110.4
132.2
132.11.
127. 2
145.9
163.0
156.3
139.7
117.3
104.1
107.9
11.1.9
11.2.6
11.5.8
11.8.1
49. 5
118.7
51.7
64.6
71. 3
76.7
77. 0
79.4
90.1
112.3
1111.6
105.9
131.2
151.7
162.8
128.2
103.9
118.6
115.3
251. 6
211.3.5
240.4
237.3
227.6
213.5
210.8
209.9
243.6
238. 8
217.7
202 • 2
185.2
178.6
169.3
155.5
185.5
192.9
178.8
138.5
117.11.
134.5
152.0
117.5
118.2
50.3
52.2
52. 3
50. 1
50. 2
50.7
62.0
56. 11
511.6
53.11.
56. 1
11.0.2
57.9
73. 9
82.8
87.0
84.3
78.1
70. 6
611.6
65.3
41.11.
11.1.8
11.6.3
51.9
53.5
50.6
11.9.8
50.5
57.8
65.5
62.6
65.1
65. 7
72.9
71.1
88.6
91.4
102.8
102.3
96.6
88. 3
85.6
na
124.0
125.9
119.8
135.7
138.9
139. 11.
1113. 9
133.7
175.0
175.8
168.9
166.1
171.3
161.9
175. 4
185.0
196.3
1911.5
165. 5
1115. 6
1211.8
121.2
111.5
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